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THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS

ISSUED IN COMMEMORATION OP THE COMPLETION OP THE FIRST TEN
YEARS OP THE UNIVERSITY'S EXISTENCE

AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD OP TRUSTEES ON THE RECOMMENDATION
OP THE PRESIDENT AND SENATE

EDITED BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SENATE

EDWAED CAPPS
STABB WIIiLABD CUTTINQ BOIjLIN D. 8ALISBUBY

JAMES EOWLANB ANGELIj WILIjIAM I. THOMAS SHAILEE MATHEWS

CABIi DABLINa BDCE FBEDEBIC IVE9 CABPENTEB OSEAB BOIiZA

JUIilDS STIEGLITZ JACQUES I.OEB

THESE VOLUMES ARE DEDICATED

TO THB MEN AND WOMEN

OF OUB TIME AND COUNTKY WHO BY WISE AND QENEEODB GIVING

HAVE ENCOUBAGED THB SEABCH APTEE TEUTH

m AUi DEPARTMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE

STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY

JOHN DEWEY

PBOFE8SOB OF PHILOSOPBrX

WITH THE CO-OPEEATION OF MEMBEES AND FELLOWS OF THE
DEPAETMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS
SECOND SERIES VOLUME XI

CHICAGO

THE UNIVERSITY OP CHICAGO PRESS

1903

BY THE UNIVEESITTT OP CHICAGO

PEEFACE

This volume presents some results of the work done in the
matter of logical theory in the Department of Philosophy of
the University of Chicago in the first decade of its existence.
The eleven Studies are the work of eight different hands,
all, with the exception of the editor, having at some period
held Fellowships in this University, Dr. Heidel' in Greek,
the others in Philosophy. Their names and present pur-
suits are indicated in the Table of Contents. (The editor
has occasionally, though rarely, added a footnote or phrase
which might serve to connect one Study more closely with
another.") The pages in the discussion of Hypothesis, on
Mill and Whewell, are by him. With these exceptions,
each writer is individually and completely responsible for
his own Study.

The various Studies present, the editor believes, about
the relative amount of agreement and disagreement that is
natural in view of the conditions of their origin. The
various writers have been in contact with one another in
Seminars and lecture courses in pursuit of the same topics,
and have had to do with shaping one another's views.
There are several others, not represented in this volume,
who have also participated in the evolution of the point of
view herein set forth, and to whom the writers acknowledge
their indebtedness. The disagreements, proceed from the
diversity of interests with which the different writers ap-
proach the logical topic; and from the fact that the point
of view in question is still (happily) developing and showing
no signs of becoming a closed system.

If the Studies themselves do not give a fair notion of the

Pkefaoe

nature and degree of the harmony in the different writers'
methods, a preface is not likely to succeed in so doing. A few
words may be in place, however, about a matter repeatedly
touched upon, but nowhere consecutively elaborated — the
more ultimate philosophical bearing of what is set forth. All
aglfig, the editor takes the liberty of saying, that judgment is
the central function of knowing, and hence affords the central
problem of logic; that since the act of knowing is intimately
and indissohibly connected with the like yet diverse functions
of affection, appreci§.tion, and practice, it only distorts results
reached to treat knowing as a self-inclosed and self-explana-
tory whole — hence the intimate connections of logical theory
with fimctignal psychqjogy; that since knowledge appears
as a function within experience, and yet passes judgment
upon both the processes and contents of other functions, its
work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or trans-
f ormatory ; that since Reality must be defined in terms of
experience, judgment appears accordingly as the medium
through which the consciously effected evolution of Reality
goes on ; that there is no reasonable standard of truth (or of
success of the knowing function) in general, except upon the
postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self -evolving, and,
in particular, except through reference to the specific offices
which knowing is called upon to perform in readjusting and
expanding the means and ends of life. And all agree that
this conception gives the only promising basis upon which
the working methods of science, and the proper demands of
the moral life, may co-operate. All this, doubtless, does not
take us very far on the road to detailed conclusions, but it
is better, perhaps, to -get started in the right direction than
to be so definite as to erect a dead- wall in the way of farther
movement of thought.

In general, the obligations in logical matters of the writers

Pbeface

are roughly commensurate with the direction of their criti-
cisms. Upon the whole, most is due to those whose views
are most sharply opposed. To Mill, Lotze, Bosanquet, and
Bradley the writers then owe special indebtedness. The
editor acknowledges personal indebtedness to his present
colleagues, particularly to Mr. George H. Mead, in the
Faculty of Philosophy, and to a former colleague, Dr. Alfred
H. Lloyd, of the University of Michigan. For both inspira-
tion and the forging of the tools with which the writers
have worked there is a pre-eminent obligation on the part
of all of us to William James, of Harvard University, who,
we hope, will accept this acknowledgment and this book as
unworthy tokens of a regard and an admiration that are
coequal.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Thought and its Subject-Matter - - 1

By John Dewey

II. Thought and its Subject-Matter : The Antecedents of

Thought 23

By John Dewey

III. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Datum of
Thinking - 49

By John Dewey

IV. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Cksntent and
Object of Thought - - 65

By John Dewey

V. Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment - - 86

By Helen Bradford Thompson, Ph.D., Director of the
Psychological Laboratory of Mount Holyoke College

VI. Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment 127

By Simon Fkaser McLennan, Ph.D., Professor of Phi-
losophy in Oberlin College

VII. The Nature of Hypothesis 142

By Myron Lucius Ashley, Ph.D., Instructor, American
Correspondence School

VIII. Image and Idea in Logic 183

By WiLLAKD Clark Gore, Ph.D., Assistant Professor
of Psychology in the University of Chicago

IX. The Logic of the Pre-Socratio Philosophy 203

By William Arthur Heidbl, Ph.D., Professor of
Latin in Iowa College

X. Valuation as a Logical Process - - 227

By Henry Waldgravb Stuart, Ph.D., Instructor in
Philosophy in the State University of Iowa

XI. Some Logical Aspects of Purpose ... 341

By Addison Webster Moore, Ph.D., Assistant Pro-
fessor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago

THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE GENERAL
PROBLEM OF LOGICAL THEORY

No ONE doubts that thought, at least reflective, as distipct
from what is sometimes called constitutive, thought, is deriva-
tive and secoiuiary. It comes after something and out of
something, and for the sake of something. No one doubts
that the thinking of everyday practical life and of science is
of this reflective type. We think about ; we reflect over. If
we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought;
if we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which
thought intervenes ; if we ask in what sen_se we are to under-
stand thought as a derivgd procedure, we are plunging our-
selves into the very heart of the logical problem : the relation
rfjthought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent,
truth, and the relation of truth to reality.

Yet from the naive point of view no difficulty attaches to
these questions. The antecedents of thought are our uni-
verse of life and love; of appreciation and struggle. We
think about anything and everythiag: snow on the ground;
the alternating clanks and thuds that rise from below; the
relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the embroglio in Vene-
zuela ; the relation of art to industry ; the poetic quality of
a painting by Botticelli ; the battle of Marathon ; the economic
interpretation of history ; the proper definition of cause ; the
best method of reducing expenses; whether and how to
renew the ties of a broken friendship; the interpretation of
an equation in hydrodynamics; etc.

Through the madness of this miscellaneous citation there
appears so much of method: anything — event, act, value,

Studies in Logical Theory

ideal, person, or place — may be an object of thought. Reflec-
tion busies itself alike with physical nature, the record of
social achievement, and the endeavors of social aspiration.
It is with reference to such affairs that thought is derivative ;
it is with reference to them that it intervenes or mediates.
Taking some part of the universe of action, of affection, of
social construction, under its special charge, and having
busied itself therewith sufficiently to meet the special diffi-
culty presented, thought releases that topic and enters upon
further more direct experience.

Sticking for a moment to this naive standpoint, we recog-
nize a certain rhythm of direct practice and derived theory ;
of primary construction and of secondary criticism ; of living
appreciation and of abstract description ; of active endeavor
and of pale reflection. We find that every more direct
primary attitude passes upon occasion into its secondary
deliberative and discursive counterpart. We find that when
the latter has done its work it passes away and passes on.
From the naive standpoint such rhythm is taken as a matter
of course. There is no attempt to state either the nature of
the occasion which demands the thinking attitude, nor to
formulate a theory of the standard by which is judged its
success. No general theory is propounded as to the exact
relationship between thinking and what antecedes and suc-
ceeds it. Much less do we ask how empirical circumstances
can generate rationality of thought; nor how it is possible
for reflection to lay claim to power of determining truth and
thereby of constructing further reality.

If we were to ask the thinking of naive life- to present,
with a minimum of theoretical elaboration, its conception of
its own practice, we should get an answer running not unlike
this : Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at
specific need, just as at other need we engage in other sorts of
activity : as converse with a friend; draw a plan for a house;

General Problem of Logical Theory 3

take a walk; eat a dinner; purchase a suit of clothes; etc.,
etc. In general, its material is anything in the wide universe
which seems to be relevant to this need — anything which
may serve as a resource in defining the difficulty or in sug-
gesting modes of dealing effectively with it. The measure
of its success, the standard of its validity, is precisely the
degree in which the thinkmg actually dispo ses of the diffi-
culty M id allows us to proc eed with more direct modes of
experiencing, that are forthwith possessed of more assured
and deepened value.

If we inquire why the naive attitude does not go on to
elaborate these implications of its own practice into a sys-
tematic theory, the answer, on its own basis, is obvious.
Thought arises in response to its own occasion. And this
occasion is so exacting that there is time, as there is need,
only to do the thinking which is needed in that occasion —
not to reflect upon the thinking itself. Reflection follows so
naturally upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so
practical, the entire relationship is so organic, that once
grant the position that thought arises in reaction to specific
demand, and there is not the particular type of thinking
called logical theory because there is not the practical demand
for reflection of that sort. Our attention is taken up with
particular questions and specific answers. What we have to
reckon with is not the problem of. How can I think iiber-
hauptf but. How shall I think right here and now? Not
what is the test of thought at large, but what validates and
confirms this thought?

In conformity with this view, it follows that j^^eneric
account of ou r thinking behavior, the gen eric account termed
l ogical the ory, arises at historic periods in which the situa-
tion has lost the organic character ' above described. The
general theory of reflection, as over against its concrete
exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so over-

Studies in Logical Theoky

whelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate
response in thought is blocked. Again, it shows itself when
practical affairs are so multifarious, complicated, and remote
from control that thinking is held off from successful pas-
sage into them.

Anyhow (sticking to the naive standpoint), it is true that
the stimulus to that particular form of reflective thinking
termed logical theory is found when circumstances require
the act of thinking and nevertheless impede clear and coher-
ent thinking in detail; or when they occasion thought and
then prevent the results of thinking from exercising directive
influence upon the immediate concerns of life. Under these
conditions we get such questions as the following: What is
the relation of rational thought to crude or unreflective experi-
ence ? What is the relation of thought to reality ? What
is the barrier which prevents reason from complete penetra-
tion into the world of truth ? What is it that makes us live
alternately in a concrete world of experience in which thought
as such finds not satisfaction, and in a world of ordered
thought which is yet only abstract and ideal?

It is not my intention here to pursue the line of historical
inquiry thus suggested. Indeed, the point would not be
mentioned did it not serve to fix attention upon the nature
of the logical problem.

It is in dealing with this latter type of questions that
logical theory has taken a turn which separates it widely
from the theoretical implications of practical deliberation
and of scientific research. The two latter, however much they
differ from each other in detail, agree in a fundamental
principle. They both assume that every reflective problem
and operation arises with reference to some specific situation,
and has to subserve a specific purpose dependent upon its
own occasion. They assume and observe distinct limits —
limits from which and to which. There is the limit of origin

Genebal Peoblem op Logical Theoey 5

in the needs of the particular situation which evokes reflec-
tion. There is the limit of terminus in successful dealing
with the particular problem presented — or in retiring, baffled,
to take up some other question. The query that at once faces
us regarding the nature of logical theory is whether reflection
upon reflection shall recognize these limits, endeavoring to
formulate them more exactly and to define their relationships
to each other more adequately; or shall it abolish limits, do
away with the matter of specific conditions and specific aims
of thought, and discuss thought and its relation to empirical
antecedents and rational consequents (truth) at large?

At first blush, it might seem as if the very nature of
logical theory^as generalization of the refleo-tive prpcess must
of necessity disregard the matter of particular conditions and
particular results as irrelevant. How, the implication runs,
could reflection become generalized save by elimination of
details as irrelevant ? Such a conception in fixing the central
problem of logic fixes once for all its future career and mate-
rial. The essential business of logic is henceforth to discuss
the relation of thought as such to reality as^guch. It may,
indeed, involve much psychological material, particularly in
the discussion of the processes which antecede thinking and
which call it out. It may involve much discussion of the
concrete methods of investigation and verification employed
in the various sciences. It may busily concern itself with
the differentiation of various types and forms of thought —
different modes of conceiving, various conformations of judg-
ment, various types of inferential reasoning. But it concerns
itself with any and all of these three fields, not on their own
account or as ultimate, but as subsidiary to the main prob-
lem : the relation of thought as such, or at large, to reality as
such, or at large. Some of the detailed considerations referred
to may throw light upon the terms under which thought
transacts its business with reality ; upon, say, certain peculiar

Studies in Logical Theoe?

limitations it has to submit to as best it may. Other con-
siderations throw light upon the ways in which thought gets
at reality. Still other considerations throw light upon the
forms which thought assumes in attacking and apprehending
reality. But in the end all this is incidental. In the end the
one problem holds: How do the specifications of thought as
such hold good of reality as such? In fine, logic is sup-
posed to grow out of the epistemological inquiry and to lead
up to its solution.

From this point of view various aspects of logical theory
are well stated by an author whom later on we shall con-
sider in some detail. Lotze' refers to "universal forms and
principles of thought which hold good everywhere both in
judging of reality and in weighing possibility, irrespective
of any difference in the objects." This defines the business
of pure logic. This is clearly the question of thought as
such — of thought at large or in general. Then we have the
question "of how far the most complete structure of thought
.... can claim to be an adequate account of that which we
seem compelled to assume as the object and occasion of our
ideas." This is clearly the question of the relation of thought
at large to reality at large. It is epistemology. Then
comes "applied logic," having to do with the actual employ-
ment of concrete forms of thought with reference to investi-
gation of specific topics and subjects. This " applied" logic
would, if the standpoint of practical deliberation and of scien-
tific research were adopted, be the sole genuine logic. But
the existence of thought in itself having been agreed upon,
we have in this "applied" logic only an incidental inquiry of
how the particular resistances and oppositions which "pure "
thought meets from particular matters may best be dis-
counted. It is concerned with methods of investigation
which obviate defects in the relationship of thought at

iLogic (teanslation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 10, 11. Italics mine.

GrENEEAL PeOBLEM OF LOGICAL ThEOEY 7

large to reality at large, as these present themselves under
the limitations of human experience. It deals merely with
hindrances, and with devices for overcoming them; it is
directed by considerations of utility. When we reflect that
this field includes the entire procedure of practical delibera-
tion and of concrete scientific research, we begin to realize
something of the significance of the theory of logic which
regards the limitations of specific origination and specific
outcome as irrelevant to its main problem, which assumes an
activity of thought "pure" or "in itself," that is, "irrespec-
tive of any difference in its objects."

This suggests, by contrast, the oppogite mode of stating
the problem of logical theory. Greneralization of the nature
of the reflective process certainly involves elimination of much
of the specific material and contents of the thought-situa-
tions of daily life and of critical science. Quite compatible
with -this, however, is the notion that it seizes uponcer/om
ff^ecific^conditions and factors, and aims to bring_^them to
clear consciousness — not to abolish them. While eliminat-
ing the particular material of particular practical and scien-
tific pursuits, (1) it may strive to hit upon the common
denominator in the various situations which are antecedent
or primary to thought and which evoke it ; (2) it may attempt
to show how typical features in the specific antecedents of
thought call out to diverse typical modes of thought-reaction ;
(3) it may attempt to state the nature of the specific con-
sequences in which thought fulfils its career.

(1) It does not eliminate dependence upon specific occa-
sions as provocative of thought; but endeavors to define
what in the various situations constitutes them thought-
provoking. The specific occasion is not eliminated, but in-
sisted upon and brought into the foreground. Consequently
psychological considerations are^ not subsidiary incidents,
but of essential importance so far as they enable us to trace

8 Studies in Logical Theoet

the generation of the thought-situation. (2) So from this
point of view the various types and modes of conceiving, judg-
ing, and inference are treated, not as qualifications of thought
per se or at large, but of thought engaged in its specific,
most economic, effective response to its own particular occa-
sion; they are adaptations for control of stimuli. The dis-
tinctions and classifications that have been accumulated in
"formal" logic, are relevant data; but they demand inter-
pretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjust-
ment to material antecedents and stimuli. (3) Finally the
question of validity, or ultimate objective of thought, is rele-
vant ; but is such as a matter of the specific issue of the specific
career of a thought-function. All the typical investigatory
and verificatory procedures of the various sciences are inher-
ently concerned as indicating the ways in which thought
actually brings itself to its own successful fulfilment in
dealing with various types of problems.

While the epistem^ogical type of logic may, as we have
seen, leave (under the name of applied logic), a subsidiary
place open for the instrumental type, the type which deals
with thinking as a specific procedure relative to a specific
antecedent occasion and to a subsequent specific fulfilment,
is not able to reciprocate the favor. From its point of view,
an attempt to discuss the antecedents, data, forms, and objec-
tive of thought, apart from reference to particular position
occupied, and particular part played in the growth of experi-
ence is to reach results which are not so much either true or
false as they are radically meaningless — because they are
considered apart from limits. Its results are not only
abstractions (for all theorizing ends in abstractions), but
abstractions without possible reference or bearing. From
this point of view, the taking of something, whether that
something be thinking activity, its empirical condition, or
its objective goal, apart from the limits of a historic or devel-

GrENEKAL Problem of Logical Theoet 9

oping situation, is the essence of metaphysical procedure —
in the sense of metaphysics which makes a gulf between it
and science.

As the reader has doubtless anticipated, it is the object
of this chapter to present the problem and industry of reflect-
ive thought from this latter point of view. I recur again
to the standpoint of naive experience, using the term in a
sense wide enough to cover both practical procedure and
concrete scientific research. I resume by saying that this
point of view knows no fixed distinction between the empiri-
cal values of unreflective life and the most abstract process
of rational thought. It knows no fixed golf between the
highest flight of theory and control of the details of practical
construction and behavior. It passes, according to the occa-
sion and opportunity of the moment, from the attitude of lov-
ing and struggling and doing to that of thinking and the
reverse. Its contents or material shift their values back
and forth from technological or utilitarian to aesthetic, ethic,
or affectional. It utilizes data of perception or of discursive
ideation as need calls, just as an inventor now utilizes heat,
now mechanical strain, now electricity, according to the
demands set by his aim. From this point of view, more
deflnite logical import is attached to our earlier statements
(p. 2) regarding the possibility of taking anything in the
universe of experience as subject-matter of thought. Any-
thing from past experience may be taken which appears to be
an element in either the statement or the solution of the
present problem. Thus we understand the coexistence
without contradiction of an indeterminate possible field and
a limited actual field. The tmdefined set of means becomes
specific through reference to an end.

In all this, there is no difference of kind between the
methods of science and those of the plain man. The difference
is the greater control in science of the statement of the prob-

10 Studies in Logical Theory

lem, and of the selection and use of relevant material, both
sensible or ideational. The two are related to each other
just as the hit-or-miss, trial-and-error inventions of uncivi-
lized man stand to the deliberate and consecutively per-
sistent efforts of a modern inventor to produce a certain
complicated device for doing a comprehensive piece of work.
Neither the plain man nor the scientific inquirer is aware, as
he engages in his reflective activity, of any transition from
one sphere of existence to another. He knows no two fixed
worlds — reality on one side and mere subjective ideas on
the other ; he is aware of no gulf to cross. He assumes un-
interrupted, free, and fiuid passage from ordinary experience
to abstract thinking, from thought to fact, from things to
theories and back again. Observation passes into develop-
ment of hypothesis ; deductive methods pass to use in de-
scription of the particular ; inference passes into action with
no sense of difficulty save those found in the particular task
/ in question. The fundamental assumption is continuity in
and of experience.

This does not mean that fact is confused with idea, or
observed datum with voluntary hypothesis, theory with doing,
any more than a traveler confuses land and water when he
journeys from one to the other. It simply means that each
is placed and used with reference to service rendered the
other, and with reference to future use of the other.

Only the epislemological spectator is aware of the fact
that the everyday man and the scientific man in this free and
easy intercourse are rashly assuming the right to glide over
a cleft in the very structure of reality. This fact raises a
.query not favorable to the epistemologist. Why is it that
the scientific man, who is constantly plying his venturous
traffic of exchange of facts for ideas, of theories for laws, of
real things for hypotheses, should be so wholly unaware of
the radical and generic (as distinct from specific) difficulty

GrENEKAL PROBLEM OP LoGIOAL ThEOEY 11

of the undertakings in which he is engaged? We thus
come afresh to our inquiry: Does not the epistemological
logician unwittingly transfer the specific difficulty which
always faces the scientific man — the difficulty in detail of
correct and adequate translation back and forth of this set
of facts and this group of ideas — into a totally different
problem of the wholesale relation of thought at large with
reality in general ? If such be the case, it is clear that the
very way in which the epistemological type of logic states
the problem of thinking, in relation both to empirical ante-
cedents and to objective truth, makes that problem insoluble.
Working terms, terms which as working are flexible and
historic, relative, are transformed into absolute, fixed, and
predetermined forms of being.

We come a little closer to the problem when we recognize
that every scientific inquiry passes historically through at
least four stages, (a) The first of these stages is, if I may
be allowed the bull, that in which scientific inquiry does not
take place at aHi because no problem or difficulty in the
quality of the experience has presented itself to provoke
reflection. We have only to cast our eye back from the
existing status of any science, or back from the status of any
particular topic in any science, to discover a time when no
reflective or critical thinking busied itself with the matter —
when the facts and relations were taken for granted and
thus were lost and absorbed in the value which accrued from
the experience.' (6) After the dawning of the problem,
there comes a period of occupation with relatively crude and
unorganized facts — the hxmting for, locating, and collecting
of raw material. This is the empiric stage, which no exist-_
ing science, however proud in its attained rationality, can
disavow as its own progenitor, (c) Then there is also a
speculative stage : a period of guessing; of making hypothe-
ses, of framing ideas which later on are labeled and con-

12 Studies ik Logical Theoet

demned as only ideas. There is a period of distinction and
classification-making which later on is regarded as only
mentally-gymnastic in character. And no science, however
proud in its present security of experimental assurance, can
"disavow a scholastic ancestor, (d) Finally, there comes a
period of fruitful interaction between the mere idea s and
the mere fects: a period when observation is determined by
experimental conditions depending upon the use of certain
guiding conceptions ; when reflection is directed and checked
at every point by the use of experimental data, and by the
necessity of finding such form for itself as will enable it to
serve as premise in a deduction leading to evolution of new
meanings, and ultimately to experimental inquiry, which
brings to light new facts. In the emerging of a more orderly
and significant region of fact, and of a more coherent and
self-luminous system of meaning, we have the natural limit
of evolution of the logic of a given science.

But consider what has happened in this historic record.
Unanalyzed experience has broken up into distinctions of
facts and ide§s; the factual side has been developed by
indefinite and almost miscellaneous descriptions and cumu-
lative listings; the conceptual side has been developed by
unchecked and speculative elaboration of definitions, classi-
'fications, etc' There has been a relegation of accepted
meanings to the limbo of mere ideas; there has been a pas-
sage of some of the accepted facts into the region of mere
hypothesis and opinion. Conversely, there has been a con-
tinued issuing of ideas from the region of hypotheses and
theories into that of facts, of accepted objective and mean-
ingful contents. Out of a world of only seeming facts, and
of only doubtful ideas, there emerges a universe continually
growing in definiteness, order, and luminosity.

This progress, verified in every record of science, is an
absolute monstrosity from the standpoint of the epistemol-

GrENEEAL Problem of Logical Theoey 13

ogy which assumes a thought in general, on one side, and a
reality in general, on the other. The reason that it does not
present itself as such a monster and miracle to those actually
concerned with it is because there is a certain homogeneity.
or continuity of reference and of use which controls all
diversities in both the modes of existence specified and the
grades of value assigned. The distinction of thought and
fact is treated in the growth of a science, or of any particu-
lar scientific problem, as an induced and intentional practi-
cal division of labor; as relative assignments of position
with reference to performance of a task; as deliberate distri-
bution of forces at command for their more economic use.
The interaction of bald fact and hypothetical idea into the
outcome of a single world of scientific apprehension and
comprehension is but the successful achieving of the aim on
account of which the distinctions in question were insti-
tuted.

Thus we come back to the problem of logical theory. To
take the distinctions of thought and fact, etc., as onto-
logical, as inherently fixed in the make-up of the structure
of being, is to treat the actual development of scientific
inquiry and scientific control as a mere subsidiary topic
ultimately of only utilitarian worth. It is also to state the
terms upon which thought and being transact business in a
way so totally alien to the use made of these distinctions in
concrete experience as to create a problem which can be dis-
cussed only in terms of itself — not in terms of the conduct
of life — metaphysics again in the bad sense of that term.
As against this, the problem of a logic which aligns itself
with the origin and employ of reflective thought in everyday
life and in critical science, is to follow the natural history of
thinki ng a s a life-process having its own generating antece-
dents and stimuli, its own states and career, and its own
specific objective or limit.

14 Studies in Logical Theoey

This point of view makes it possible for logical theory
to come to terms with psychology/ When logic is consid-
ered as having to do with the wholesale activity of thought
per se, the question -bf the historic process by which this
or that particular thought came to be, of how its object
happens to present itself as sensation, or perception, or con-
ception, is quite irrelevant. These things are mere tempo-
ral accidents. The psychologist (not lifting his gaze from
the , realm of the changeable) may find in them matters of
interest. His whole industry is just with natural history —
to trace series of psychical events as they mutually excite
and inhibit one another. But the logician, we are told, has
a deeper problem and an outlook of more unbounded horizon.
He deals with the question of the eternal nature of thought
and its eternal validity in relation to an eternal reality. He
is concerned, not with genesis, but with value, not with a
historic cycle, but with absolute distinctions and relations.

Still the query haunts us : Is this so in truth ? Or has
the logician of a certain type arbitrarily made it thus by tak-
ing his terms apart from reference to the specific occasions
in which they arise and situations in which they function?
If the latter, then the very denial of historic relationship
and of the significance of historic method, is indicative
only of the unreal character of his own abstraction. It
means in effect that the affairs under consideration have
been isolated from the conditions in which alone they have
determinable meaning and assignable worth. It is aston-
ishing that, in the face of the advance of the evolutionary
method in natural science, any logician can persist in the
assertion of a rigid difference between the problem of origin
and of nature ; between genesis and analysis ; between his-
tory and validity. Such assertion simply reiterates as final

I See Angell, " The Eelations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Phi-
losophy," TAe Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, Vol. Ill (1903),
Part II, pp. 61-6, 70-72.

General Problem of Logical Theory 15

a distinction which grew up and had meaning in pre-evolu-
tionary science. It asserts against the most marked advance
which scientific method has yet made a survival of a crude
period of logical scientific procedure. We have no choice
save either to conceive of Jhinking as a response to a specific
stim^uSj^ or else to regard it as something " in itself," hav-
ing just in and of itself certain traits, elements, and laws. If
we give up the last view, we must take the former.

The entire significance of the evolutionary method in,
biology and social history is that every distinct organ, strucf-
ture, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has
to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation
to a particular environing situation. Its meaning, its char-
acter, its value, is known when, and only when, it is consid.
ered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved
in some specific situation. This analysis of value is carried!
out in detail by tracing successive stages of development —
by endeavoring to locate the particular situation in which
each structure has its origin, and by tracing the successive
modifications through which, in response to changing media,
it has reached its present conformation.' To persist in con-
demning natural history from the standpoint of what natural
history meant before it identified itself with an evolutionary
process is not so much to exclude the n9.tural-history stand-
point from philosophic consideration as it is to evince igno-
rance of what it signifies.

Psychology as the natural history of the various atti-
tudes and structures through which experiencing passes, as
an account of the conditions under which this or that state
emerges, and of the way in which it influences, by stimula-
tion or inhibition, production of other states or conforma-
tions of consciousness, is indispensable to logical evaluation,
the moment we treat logical theory as an account of think-

iSee Philosophical Beoiew, Vol. XI, pp. 117-20.

16 Studies in Logical Theoet

ing as a mode of adaptation to its own generating condi-
tions, and judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in
meeting its problems. TEeTiistorical point of view describes
the sequence; the normative follows the sequence to its
conclusion, and then turns back and judges each historical
step by viewing it in reference to its own outcome.'

(In the course of changing experience we keep our balance
as we move from situations of an affectional quality to those
which are practical or appreciative or reflective, because we
bear constantly in mind the context in which any particular
distinction presents itself.^ As we submit each characteristic
function and situation of experience to our gaze, we find it
has a diml aspect. Wherever there is striving there are
obstacles ; wherever there is affection there are persons who
are attached; wherever there is doing there is accomplish-
ment ; wherever there is appreciation there is value ; wher-
ever there is thinking there is material-in-question. We
keep our footing as we move from one attitude to another,
from one characteristic quality to another, because we know
the position occupied in the whole growth by the particular
function in which we are engaged, and the position within
the function of the particular element that engages us.

The distinction between each attitude and function and
its predecessor and successor is serial, dynamic, operative.
The distinctions within any given operation or function are
structural, contemporaneous, and distributive. Thinking
follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows thinking.
Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out
its successor. But coincident, simultaneous, and correspond-
ent within doing, is the distinction of doer and of deed;
within the function of thought, of thinking and material
thought upon; within the function of striving, of obstacle

I See statements regarding the psychological and the logical in The Child and
the Curriculum^ pp. 28, 29.

General Pboblem op Logical Theory 17

of aim, of means and end. We keep our paths straight
because we do not confuse the sequential, efficient, and
functional relationship of types of experience with the con-
temporaneous, correlative, and structural distinctions of ele-
ments within a given function. In the seeming maze of
endless confusion and unlimited shiftings, we find our way
by the means of the stimulations and checks occurring within
the process we are actually engaged with. We do not con-
trast or confuse a condition or state which is an element in
the formation of one operation with the status or element
which is one of the distributive terms of another function.
If we do, we have at once an insoluble, because meaningless,
problem upon our hands.

Now the epistemplogical logician deliberately shuts him-
self off from those cues and checks upon which the plain
man instinctively relies, and which the scientific man
deliberately searches for and adopts as constituting his
technique. Consequently he is likely to set the sort of object .
or material which has place and significance only in one of
the serial functional situations of experience, over against
the active attitude which describes part of the structural
constitution of another situation; or with equal lack of
justification to assimilate terms characteristic of different
stages to one another. He sets the agent, as he is found
in the intimacy of love or appreciation, over against the
externality of the fact, as that is defined within the reflect-
ive process. He takes the material which thought selects
as its own basis for further procedure to be identical with
the significant content which it secures for itself in the
successful pursuit of its aim; and this in turn he regards
as the material which was presented at the outset, and whose
peculiarities were the express means of awakening thought.
He identifies the final deposit of the thought-function with
its own generating antecedent, and then disposes of the

18 Studies in Logical Theoet

resulting surd by reference to some metaphysical con-
sideration, which remains when logical inquiry, when science
(as interpreted by him), has done its work. He does this,
not because he prefers confusion to order, or error to truth,
but 'simply because, when the chain of historic sequence is
cut,, the vessel of thought is afloat to veer upon a sea without
soundings or moorings. There are but two alternatives:
either there is an object "in itself" of thought "in itself,"
or else there are a series of values which va^j with the vary-
ing functions to which they belong. If the latter, the only
way these values can be defined is by discriminating the
functions to which they belong. It is only conditions
relative to a specific period or epoch of development in a
cycle of experience which enables one to tell what to do
next, or to estimate the value and meaning of what is already
done. And the epistemological logician, in choosing to take
his question as one of thought which has its own form just
as " thought," apart from the limits of the special work it has
to do, has deprived himself of these supports and stays.

The problem of logic has a more general and a more
specific phase. In its generic form, it deals with this ques-
tion: How does one type of functional situation and attitude
in experience pass out of and into another; for example, the
technological or utilitarian into the sesthetic, the aesthetic
into the religious, the religious into the scientific, and this
into the socio-ethical and so on ? The more specific question
is: How does the particular functional situation termed the
refiective behave? How shall we describe it? What in
detail are its diverse contemporaneous distinctions, or divi-
sions of labor, its correspondent statuses; in what specific
ways do these operate with reference to each other so as
to effect the specific aim which is proposed by the needs of
the affair?

This chapter may be brought to conclusion by reference

Genekal Pboblem of Logical Theory 19

to the more alternate value of the logic of experience, of
logic taken in its wider sense ; that is, as an account of the
sequence of the various typical functions or situations of
experience in their determining relations to one another.
Philosophy, defined as such a logic, makes no pretense to
be an account of a closed and finished universe. Its business
is not to secure or guarantee any particular reality or value.
Per contra, it gets the significance of a method. The right
relationship and adjustment of the various typical phases of
experience to one another is a problem felt in every depart-
ment of life. Intellectual rectification and control of these
adjustments cannot fail to reflect itself in an added clearness
and security on the practical side. It may be that general
logic can not become an instrument in the immediate direc-
tion of the activities of science or art or industry ; but it is
of value in critic ising and in organizing the toolg. of
immediate research_m_ these^ines. It also has direct sig-
nificance in the valuation for social or life-purposes of results
achieved in particular branches. Much of the immediate
business of life is badly done because we do not know in
relation to its congeners the organic genesis and outcome
of the work that occupies us. The manner and degree of
appropriation of the values achieved in various departments
of social interest and vocation are partial and faulty because
we are not clear as to the due rights and responsibilities of
one function of experience in reference to others.

The value of research for social progress; the bearing of
psychology upon educational procedure ; the mutual relations
of fine and industrial art; the question of the extent and
nature of specialization in science in comparison with the
claims of applied science ; the adjustment of religious aspira-
tions to scientific statements ; the justification of a refined
culture for a few in face of economic insufficiency for the
mass — such are a few of the many social questions whose

20 Studies in Logical Theory

final answer depends upon the possession and use of a general
logic of experience as a method of inquiry and interpreta-
tion. I do not say that headway cannot be made in such
questions apart from the method indicated: a logic of
genetic experience. But unless we have a critical and
assured view of the juncture in which and with reference to
which a given attitude or interest arises, unless we know the
service it is thereby called upon to perform and hence the
organs or methods by which it best functions in that service,
our progress is impeded and irregular. We take a part for a
whole, a means for an end, or attack wholesale some other
interest because it interferes with the deified sway of the
one we have selected as ultimate. A clear and comprehen-
sive consensus of social conviction, and a consequent con-
centrated and economical direction of effort, are assured only
as there is some way of locating the position and rSle of each
typical interest and occupation in experience. The domain
of opinion is one of conflict ; its rule is arbitrary and costly.
Only intellectual method affords a substitute for opinion.
The general logic of experience can alone do for the region
of social values and aims what the natural sciences after cen-
turies of struggle are doing for activity in the physical
realm.

This does not mean that systems of philosophy which
have attempted to state the nature either of thought and of
reality at large, apart from limits of particular crises in the
growth of experience, have been worthless — though it does
mean that their industry has been somewhat misapplied.
The unfolding of metaphysical theory has made large
contributions to positive evaluations of the typical situations
and relationships of experience — even when its conscious
intention has been quite otherwise. Every system of phi-
losophy is itself a mode of reflection; consequently (if our
main contention be true), it too has been evoked out of

General Peoblem op Logical Theory 21

specific social antecedents, and has had its use as a response
to them. It has effected something in modifying the
situation within which it found its origin. It may not
have solved the problem which it consciously put itself;
in many cases we may freely admit that the question put
has afterward been foimd to be so wrongly put as to be
insoluble. Yet exactly the same thing is true, in precisely
the same sense, in the history of science. For this reason,
if for no other, it is impossible for the scientific man to
cast the first stone at the philosopher.

The progress of science in any branch continually brings
with it a realization that problems in their previous form of
statement are insoluble because put in terms of unreal con-
ditions; because the real conditions have been mixed up
with mental artifacts or misconstructions. Every science is
continually learning that its supposed solutions are only
apparent, because the "solution" solves, not the actual prob-
lem, but one which has been made up. But the very putting
of the question, the very giving of the wrong answer, in-
duces modification of existing intellectual habits, stand-
poiats, and aims. "Wrestling with the problem, there is
evolution of new forms of technique to control its treatment,
there is search for new facts, institution of new types of
experimentation; there is gain in the methodic control of
experience. And all this is progress. It is only the worn-
out cynic, the devitalized sensualist, and the fanatical dog-
matist who interpret the continuous change of science as
proving that, since each successive statement is wrong, the
whole record is error and folly ; and that the present truth
is only the error not yet found out. Such draw the moral
of caring naught for all these things, or of flying to some
external authority which will deliver once for all the fixed
and unchangeable truth. But historic philosophy even in
its aberrant forms has proved a factor in the valuation of

22 Studies in Logical Theoet

experience ; it has brought problems to light, it has provoked
intellectual conflicts without which values are only nominal ;
even through its would-be absolutistic isolations, it has se-
cured recognition of mutual dependencies and reciprocal
reinforcements. Yet if it can define its work more clearly, it
can concentrate its energy upon its own characteristic prob-
lem: the genesis and functioning in experience of various
typical interests and occupations with reference to one
another.

THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER : THE ANTECEDENT
CONDITIONS AND CUES OF THE THOUGHT-FUNCTION

We have discriminated logic in its wider sense, concerned
with the sequence of characteristic functions and attitudes
in experience, from logic in its stricter meaning, concerned
in particular with description and interpretation of the func-
tion of reflective thought. We must avoid yielding to the
temptation of identifying logic with either of these to the
exclusion of the other ; or of supposing that it is possible to
isolate one finally from the other. The more detailed treat-
ment of the organs and methods of reflection cannot be
earned on with security save as we have a correct idea of
the historic position of reflection in the evolving of expe-
rience. Yet it is impossible to determine this larger placing,
save as we have a defined and analytic, as distinct from
a merely vague and gross, view of what we mean by reflec-
tion — what is its actual constitution. It is necessary to
work back and forth between the larger and the narrower
fields, transforming every increment upon one side into a
method of work upon the other, and thereby testing it.
The apparent confusion of existing logical theory, its uncer-
tainty as to its own bounds and limits, its tendency to oscillate
from larger questions of the inherent worth of judgment and
validity of inference over to details of scientific technique,
and to translation of distinctions of formal logic into terms
of an investigatory or verificatory process, are indications of
the need of this double movement.

In the next three chapters it is proposed to take up some
of the considerations that lie on the borderland between the

24 Studies in Logical Theoey

larger and the narrower conceptions of logical theory. I
shall discuss the locus of the function of thought, so far as
such locus enables us to select and characterize some of the
most fundamental distinctions, or divisions of labor, within
the reflective process. In taking up the problem of the
subject-matter of tho^ight, I shall try to make clear that it
assumes three q uite, distinct forms, according to the epochal
moment reached in transformation of experience ; and that
continual confusion and inconsistency are introduced when
these respective meanings are not identified and described
according to their respective geneses and places. I shall
attempt to show that we must consider subject-matter from
the standpoint, first, of the antecedents or conditions that
evoke thought ; second, of the datum or immediate material
presented to thought; and, third, of the proper content of
thought. Of these three distinctions the first, that of ante-
cedent and stimulus, clearly refers to the situation that is
immediately prior to the thought-function as such. The
second, that of datum or immediately given matter, refers to
a distinction which is made within the thought-process as a
part of and for the sake of its own modus operandi. It is a
status in the scheme of thinking. The third, that of content
or object, refers to the progress actually made in any thought-
function; the material which is organized into the thought-
situation, so far as this has fulfilled its purpose. It goes
without saying that these are to be discriminated' as stages of
a life-process in the natural history of experience, not as
ready-made or ontological ; it is contended that, save as they
are differentiated in connection with well-defined historical
stages, they are either lumped off as equivalents, or else
treated as absolute divisions — or as each by turns, accord-
ing to the exigencies of the particular argument. In fact,
this chapter will get at the matter of preliminary conditions
of thought indirectly rather than directly, by indicating the

Conditions and Cues of Thought-Funotion 25

contradictory positions into which one of the most vigorous
and acute of modern logicians, Lotze, has been forced through
failing to define logical distinctions in terms of the history
of readjustment of experience, and therefore endeavoring to
interpret certain notions as absolute instead of as periodic
and methodological.

Before passing directly to the exposition and criticism of
Lotze, it will be well, however, to take the matter in a some-
what freer way. We cannot approach logical inquiry in a
wholly direct and uncompromised manner. Of necessity we
bring to it certain distinctions — distinctions partly the out-
come of concrete experience; partly due to the logical
theory which has got embodied in ordinary language and in
current intellectual habits; partly results of deliberate scien-
tific and philosophic inquiry. These more or less ready-
made results are resources ; they are the only weapons with
which we can attack the new problem. Yet they are full
of unexamined assumptions; they commit us to all sorts
of logically predetermined conclusions. Intone senseour
study of the new subject-matter, let us say logical theory, is
in truth only a review, a re-testing and criticising of the
intellectualstandpoints and methods. which_ we bring with
us to the^tudy.

Everyone comes with certain distinctions already ms^e
between the subjective and the objective, between the ph^i-
cal and the psychical, between the intellectual and the factual.
(1) We have learned to regard the region of emotional dis-
turbance, of uncertainty and aspiration, as belonging some-
how peculiarly to ourselves; we have learned to set over
against this a world of observation and of valid thought as
something unaffected by our moods, hopes, fears, and opin-
ions. (2) We have also come to distinguish between what is
immediately present in our experience and the past and the
future; we contrast the realms of memory and anticipation

26 Studies in Logical Theory

of sense-perception; the given with the ideal. (3) We are
confirmed in a habit of distinguishing between what we
call actual fact and our mental attitude toward that fact —
the attitude of surmise or wonder or reflective investigation.
While one^of the aims of logical theoryJs^£reciselj_to make
us critically conscious of the significance and bearing^ of
these various distinctions, to change them from ready-made
assumptions into controlled constructs, our mental habits are
so set that they tend to have their own way with us; and
we read into logical theory conceptions that were formed
before we had even dreamed of the logical undertaking
which after all has for its business to assign to the terms in
question their proper meaning.

We find in Lotze an unusually explicit inventory of these
various preliminary distinctions; and an unusually serious
effort to deal with the problems which arise from introducing
them into the structure of logical theory. (1) He expressly
separates the matter of logical worth from that of psycholo-
gical gen^is. He consequently abstracts the subject-matter
of logic as such wholly from the question of historic locus
and situs. (2) He agrees with common-sense in holding that
logical thought is reflective and thus presupposes a given
material. He occupies himself with the nature of the ante-
cedent conditions. (3) He wrestles with the problem of
how a material formed prior to thought and irrespective of
it can yet afford it stuff upon which to exercise itself. (4)
He expressly raises the question of how thought working
independently and from without upon a foreign material can
shape the latter into results which are valid — that is,
objective.

If his discussion is successful ; if Lotze can provide the
intermediaries which span the gulf between an independent
thought-material and an independent thought-activity; if
he can show that the question of the origin of thought-

Conditions and Cues of Thought-Function 27

material and of thought-activity is irrelevant to the question
of its worth, we shall have to surrender the position already
taken. But if we find that Lotze's elaborations only elaborate
the same fundamental difficulty, presenting it now in this
light and now in that, but never effecting more than pre-
senting the problem as if it were its own solution, we shall
be confirmed in our idea of the need of considering logical
questions from a different point of view. If we find that,
whatever his formal treatment, he always, as matter of
fact, falls back upon some organized situation or function as
the source of both the specific thought-material and the
specific thought-activity in correspondence with each other,
we shall have in so far an elucidation and even a corrobora-
tion of our theory.

1. We begin with the question of the material antecedents
of thought — antecedents which condition reflection, and
which call it out as reaction or response, by giving it its cue.
Lotze differs from many logicians of the same type in
affording us an explicit account of these antecedents. The
ultimate material antecedents of thought are found in impres-
sions, which are due to external objects as stimuli. Taken
in themselves, these impressions are mere psychical states or
events. They exist in us side by side, or one after the other,
according as the objects which excite them operate simul-
taneously or successively. The occurrence of these various
psychical states is not, however, entirely dependent upon the
presence of the exciting thing. After a state has once been
excited, it gets the power of reawakening other states which
have accompanied it or followed it. The associative mechan-
ism of revival plays a part. If we had a complete knowl-
edge of both the stimulating object and its effects, and of
the details of the associative mechanism, we should be able
from given data to predict the whole course of .any given
train or current of ideas (for the impressions as conjoined

28 Studies in Logical Theoey

simultaneously or successively become ideas and a current of
ideas).

Taken in itself, a sensation or impression is nothing but
a " state of our consciousness, a mood of ourselves." Any
given current of ideas is a necessary sequence of existences
(just as necessary as any succession of material events),
happening in some particular sensitive soul or organism.
"Just because, under their respective conditions, every
such series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity
and law as every other, there would be no ground for mak-
ing any such distinction of value as that between truth
and untruth, thus placing one group in opposition to all the
others." ' '■

2. Thus far, as the last quotation clearly indicates, there
is no question of reflective thought, and hence no question
of logical theory. But further examination reveals a peculiar
property of the current of ideas. Some ideas are merely
coincident, while others may be termed coherent. That is
to say, the exciting causes of some of our simultaneous and
successive ideas really belong together; while in other cases
they simply happen to act at the same time, without there
being a real connection between them. By the associative
mechanism, however, both the coherent and the merely coin-
cident combinations recur. The first type of recurrence
supplies positive material for knowledge ; the second gives
occasion for error.

3. It is a peculiar mixture of the coincident and the
coherent which sets the peculiar problem of reflective
thought. The business of thought is to recover and con-
firm the coherent, the really connected, adding to its
reinstatement an accessory justifying notion of the real
ground of coherence, while it eliminates the coincident as

1 LOTZD, Logic (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 2. For the preceding exposi-
tion see Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 13, 11, ST, 38 ; also Microkosmus, Book V, chap. 4.

Conditions and Cues of Thought-Function 29

such. While the mere current of ideas is something which
just happens within us, the process of elimination and of
confirmation by means of statement of real ground and
basis of connection is an activity which mind as such exer-
cises. It is this distinction which marks off thought as
activity from any psychical event and from the associative
mechanism as receptive happenings. One is concerned
with mere de facto coexistences and sequences ; the other
with the worth of these combinations.'

Consideration of the peculiar work of thought in going
over, sorting out, and determining various ideas according
to a standard of value will occupy us in our next chapter.
Here we are concerned with the material antecedents of
thought as they are described by Lotze. At first glance, he
se§ms to propound a satisfactory theory. He avoids the
extravagancies of transcendental logic, which assumes that
all the matter of experience is determined from the very
start by rational thought; and he also avoids the pitfall
of purely empirical logic, which makes no distinction
between the mere occurrence and association of ideas and
the real worth and validity of the various conjunctions thus
produced. He allows unreflective experience, defined in
terms of sensations and their combinations, to provide ma-
terial conditions for thinking, while he reserves for thought
a distinctive work and dignity of its own. Sense-experience
furnishes the antecedents; thought has to introduce and
develop systematic connection — rationality.

A further analysis of Lotze's treatment may, however,
lead us to believe that his statement is riddled through and
through with inconsistencies and self-contradictions; that,
indeed, any one part of it can be maintained only by the
denial of some other portion.

1. The impression is the ultimate antecedent in its purest

I Lotze, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 6, 7.

30 Studies in Logical Theory

or crudest form (according to the angle from which one
' views it). It is that which has never felt, for good or for bad,
the influence of thought. Combined into ideas, these impres-
sions stimulate or arouse the activities of thought, which
are forthwith directed upon them. As the recipient of the
activity which they have excited and brought to bear upon
themselves, they furnish also the material content of thought
— its actual stuff. As Lotze says over and over again: "It
is the relations themselves already, subsisting between
impres^ons, when we become conscious of them, by which
the action of thought which is never anything but reaction,
is attracted; and this action consists merely in interpreting
relations which we find existing between our passive impress
sions into aspects of the matter of impressions." ' And
again :^ "Thought can make no difference where it finds
none already in the matter of the impressions." And
again:' "The possibility and the success of thought's pro-
cedure depends upon this original constitution and organi-
zation of the whole world of ideas, a constitution which,
though not necessary in thought, is all the more necessary
to make thinking possible."

The impressions and ideas play a versatile r5le ; they now
assume the part of ultimate antecedents and provocative
conditions ; of crude material ; and somehow, when arranged,
of content for thought. This very versatility awakens
suspicion.

(While the impression is merely subjective and a bare state
of our own consciousness, yet it is determined, both as to its
existence and as to its relation to other similar existences,
by external objects as stimuli, if not as causes. It is also
determined by a psychical mechanism so thoroughly objec-
tive or regular in its workings as to give the same necessary

1 Lotze, Logic (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 25.

2 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 36. 3 Ibid.

Conditions and Cues op Thought-Function 31

character to the ctirrent of ideas that is possessed by any phys-
ical sequence. ) Thus that which is " nothing but a state of
our consciousness " turns out straightway to be a specifically
determined objective fact in a system of facts.

That this absolute transformation is a contradiction is no
clearer than that just such a contradiction is iadispensable
to Lotze. (If the impressions were nothing but states of
consciousness, moods of ourselves, bare psychical existences,
it is sure enough that we should never even know them to be
such, to say nothing of conserving them as adequate condi-
tions and material for thought. ) It is only by ir eating them
as real facts in a real world, and only by carrying over into
them, in some assumed and unexplained way, the capacity
of representing the cosmic facts which arouse them, that
impressions or ideas come in any sense within the scope of
thought. But if the antecedents are really impressions-in-
their-objective-setting, then Lotze's whole way of distin-
guishing thought- worth from mere existence or event without
objective significance must be radically modified.

The implication that impressions have actually a matter
or quality or meaning of their own becomes explicit when
we refer to Lotze's theory that the immediate antecedent of
thought is found in the matter of ideas. When thought is
said to " take cognizance of relations which its own activity
does not originate, but which have been prepared for it by
the unconscious mechanism of the psychic states," ' the attri-
bution of objective content, of reference and meaning to
ideas, is unambiguous. The idea forms a most convenient
half-way house for Lotze. On one hand, as absolutely prior
to thought, as material antecedent condition, it is merely
psychical, a bald subjective event. But as subject-matter for
thought, as antecedent which affords stuff for thought's exer-
cise, it is meamng, characteristic quality of content.

1 Microkosmws, Book V, chap. 4.

32 Studies in Logical Theoet

Although we have been told that the impression, is a mere
receptive irritation without participation of mental activity,
we are not surprised, in view of this capacity of ideas, to learn
that the mind actually has a determining share in both the re-
ception of stimuli and in their further" associative combina-
tions. The subject always enters into the presentation of any
mental object, even the sensational, to say nothing of the per-
ceptional and the imaged. The perception of a given state of
things is possible only on the assumption that "the perceiv-
ing subject is at once enabled and compelled by its own
nature to combine the excitations which reach it from
objects into those forms which it is to perceive in the objects,
and which it supposes itself simply to receive from them." '

It is only by continual transition from impression and
ideas as mental states and events to ideas as cognitive (or
logical) objects or contents, that Lotze bridges the gulf from
bare exciting antecedent to concrete material conditions of
thought. This contradiction, again, is necessary to Lotze's
standpoint. To set out frankly with " meanings " as ante-
cedents would demand reconsideration of the whole view-
point, which supposes that the difference between the logical
and its antecedent is a matter of the difference between worth
and mere existence or occurrence. It would indicate that
since meaning or value is already there, the task of thought
must be that of the transformation or reconstruction of worth
through an intermediary process of valuation. On the other
hand, to stick by the standpoint of mere existence is not to
get anything which can be called even antecedent of thought.

2. Why is there a task of transformation? Considera-
tion of the material in its function of evoking thought, giv-
ing it its cue, will serve to complete the picture of the con-
tradiction and of the real facts. It is the conflict between
ideas as merely coincident and ideas as coherent that con-

1 Logic, Vol. II, p. 235 i see the whole discussion, §§ 325 through 327.

Conditions and Cues op Thought-Function 33

stitutes the need which provokes the response of thought. !
Here Lotze vibrates (a) between considering coincidence and
coherence as both affairs of existence of psychical events;
(6) considering coincidence as purely psychical and coher-
ence as at least quasi-logical, and (c) the inherent logic which
makes them both determinations within the sphere of reflect-
ive thought. In strict accordance with his own premises,
coincidence and coherence both ought to be mere peculiarities
of the current of ideas as events within ourselves. ) But so
taken the distinction becomes absolutely meaningless.
Events do not cohere ; at the most certain sets of them happen
, more or less frequently than other sets ; the only intelligible
difference is one of repetition of coincidence.) And even this
attributes to an event the supernatural trait of reappearing
after it has disappeared. Even coincidence has to be
defined in terms of relation of the objects which are sup-
posed to excite the psychical events that happen together.

As recent psychological discussion has made clear enough,
it is the matter, meaning, or content, of ideas that is asso-
ciated, not the ideas as states or existences. Take such an
idea as sun-revolving-about-earth. We may say it means
the conjunction of various sense-impressions, but it is conjunc-
tion, or mutual reference, of attributes that we have in mind
in the assertion. It is absolutely certain that our psychical
image of the sun is not psychically engaged in revolving
about our psychical image of the earth. It would be
amusing if such were the case; theaters and all dramatic
representations would be at a discount. In truth, sun-
revolving-about-earth is a single meaning or idea; it is a
unified subject-matter within which certain distinctions of
reference appear. It is concerned with what we intend when
we think earth and sun, and think them in their relation to
each other. It is really a specification or direction of how
to think when we have occasion to think a certain subject-

34 Studies in Logical Theoky

matter. To treat the origin of this mutual reference as if it
were simply a case of conjunction of ideas produced by con-
ditions of original psycho-physical irritation and association
is a profound case of the psychological fallacy. We may,
indeed, analyze an experience and find that it had its origin
in certain conditions of the sensitive organism, in certain
peculiarities of perception and of association, and hence con-
clude that the belief involved in it was not justified by' the
facts themselves. But the significance of the belief in gun-
■ revolving-about-earth as an item of the experience of those
who meant it, consisted precisely in the fact that it was taken
not as a mere association of feelings, but as a definite portion
of the whole structure of objective experience, guaranteed
by other parts of the fabric, and lending its support and
giving its tone to them. It was to them part of the experi-
ence-frame of things — of the real universe.

Put the other way, if such an instance meant a mere con-
junction of psychical states, there would be in it absolutely
nothing to evoke thought. Each idea as event, as Lotze
himself points out (Vol. I, p. 2), may be regarded as ade-
quately and necessarily determined to the place it occupies.
There is absolutely no question on the side of events of mere
coincidence versus genuine connection. As event, it is there
and it belongs there. We pannot treat something as at once
bare fact of existence and as problematic subject-matter of
logical inquiry. To take the reflective point of view is to
consider the matter in a totally new light ; as Lotze says, it is
to raise the question of rightful claims to a position or relation.

The point becomes clearer when we contrast coincidence
with connection. To consider coincidence as simply psy-
chical, and coherence as at least quasi-logical, is to put the
two on such different bases that no question of contrasting
them can arise. The coincidence which precedes a valid or
grounded coherence (the conjunction which as coexistence

Conditions and Cues op Thought-Function 35

of objects and sequence of acts is perfectly adequate) never
is, as antecedent, the coincidence whicli is set over against
coherence. The side-by-sideness of books on my book-
shelf, the succession of noises that rise through my window,
do not as such trouble me logically. They do not appear as
errors or even as problems. One coexistence is just as good
as any other until spme new point of view, or new end, pre-
sents itself. If it is a question of the convenience of arrange-
ment of books, then the value of their present collocation
becomes a problem. Then I may contrast their present bare
conjunction with a scheme of possible coherence. If I regard
the sequence of noises as a case of articulate speech, their
order becomes important — it is a problem to be determined.
The inquiry whether a given combination means only appar-
ent or real connection, shows that reflective inquiry is already
going on. Does this phase of the moon really mean rain,
or does it just happen , that the rain-storm comes when the
moon has reached this phase? To ask such questions shows
that a certain portion of the universe of experience is sub-
jected to critical analysis for purposes of definitive restate-
ment. The tendency to regard one combination as bare
conjunction or mere coincidence is absolutely a part of the
movement of mind in its search for the real connection.

If coexistence as such is to be setover against coherence
as such, as the non-logical against the logical, then, since our
whole spatial universe is one of collocation, and since thought
in this universe can never get farther than substituting one
collocation for another, the whole realm of space-experience
is condemned off-hand and in perpetuity to anti-rationality.
But, in truth, coincidence as over against coherence, conjunc-
tion as over against connection, is just suspected coherence,
one which is under the fire of active inquiry. The distinc-
tion is one which arises only within the grasp of the logical
or reflective function.

36 Studies in Logical Thbokt

3. This brings us explicitly to the fact that there is no
such thing as either coincidence or coherence in terms of the
elements or meanings contained in any couple or pair of
ideas taken by itself. It is only when they are co-factors
in a situation or function which includes more than either
the "coincident" or the "coherent" and more than the arith-
metical sum of the two, that thought's activity can be
evoked. (Lotze is continually in this dilemma: Thought
either shapes its own material or else just accepts it. In
the first case (since Lotze cannot rid himself of the pre-
sumption that thought must have a fixed ready-made ante-
cedent) its activity can only alter this stuff and thus lead the
mind farther away from reality.) But if thought just accepts
its material, how can there be any distinctive aim or activity
of thought at all? As we have seen, Lotze endeavors to
escape this dilemma by supposing that, while thought receives
its material, it yet checks it up: it eliminates certain portions
of it and reinstates others, plus the stamp and seal of its own
validity.

Lotze objects most strenuously to the notion that thought
awaits its subject-matter with certain ready-made modes of
apprehension. This notion would raise the insoluble ques-
tion of how thought contrives to bring the matter of each
impression under that particular form which is appropriate
to it (Vol. I, p. 24). But he has not really avoided the diffi-
culty. How does thought know which of the combinations
are merely coincident and which are merely coherent ? How
does it know which to eliminate as irrelevant and which to
confirm as grounded? Either this evaluation is an impo-
sition of its own, or else gets its cue and clue from the
subject-matter. Now, if the coincident and the coherent
taken in and of themselves are competent to give this direc-
tion, they are already practically labeled. The further work
of thought is one of supererogation. It has at most barely

Conditions and Cues op Thought-Function 37

to note and seal the material combinations that are already
there. Such a view clearly renders thought's work as
xmnecessary in form as it is futile in force.

But there is no alternative in this dilemma except to
recognize that an entire situation of experience, within which
are both that afterward found to be mere coincidence and
that found to be real connection, actually provokes thought.
It is only as an experience previously accepted comes up in
its wholeness against another one equally integral; and only
as some larger experience dawns which requires each as a
part of itself and yet within which the required factors show
themselves mutually incompatible, that thought arises. It
is not bare coincidence, or bare connection, or bare addition
of one to the other, that excites thought. It is a situation
which is organized or constituted as a whole, and which yet
is falling to pieces in its parts — a situation which is.in,conr
, flict within jtself — that arouses the search to find what really
goes together and a correspondent effort to shut out what
only seemingly belongs together. And real coherence means }
precisely capacity to exist within the comprehending whole.
It is a case of the psychologist's fallacy to read back into the
preliminary situation those distinctions of mere conjunction
of material and of valid relationship which get existence, to
say nothing of fixation, only within the thought-process.

We must not leave this phase of the discussion, however,
until it is quite clear that our objection is not to Lotze's
position that reflective thought arises from an antecedent
which is not reflectional in character; nor yet to his idea that
this antecedent has a certain structure and content of its own
setting the peculiar problem which evokes thought and gives
the cue to its specific activities. On the contrary, it is this
latter point upon which we would insist; and, by insisting,
point out, negatively, that this view is absolutely inconsist-
ent with Lotze's theory that psychical impressions and ideas

38 Studies in Logical Theoey

are the true antecedents of thought ; and, positively, that it is
the situation as a whole, and not any one isolated part of it,
or distinction within it, that calls forth and directs thinking.
We must beware the fallacy of assuming that some one ele-
ment in the prior situation in isolation or detachment induces
the thought which in reality comes forth only from the
whole disturbed situation. On the negative side, character-
izations of impression and idea (whether as mental contents
or as psychical existences) are distinctions which arise only
within reflection upon the situation which is the genuine
antecedent of thought; while the distinction of psychical
existences from external existences arises only within a
highly elaborate technical reflection — that of the psycholo-
gist as such.' Positively, it is the whole dynamic experience
with its qualitative and pervasive identity of value, and its
inner distraction, its elements at odds with each other, in
tension against each other, contending each for its proper
placing and relationship, that generates the thought-
situation.

From this point of view, at this period of development,
the distinctions of objecijve and subjective have a charac-
terigtic meaning. The antecedent, to repeat, is a situation
in which the various factors are actively incompatible with
each other, and which yet in and through the striving tend to
a re-formation of the whole and to a restatement of the parts.
This situation as such is clearly objective. It is there ; it is
there as a whole; the various parts are there; and their

iThe emphasis here is upon the term "existences," and in its plural form.
Doubtless the distinction of some experiences as belonging to me, as mine in a
peculiarly intimate way, from others as chiefly concerning other persons, or as hav-
ing to do with things, is an early one. But this is a distinction of coTwern^ of value.
The distinction referred to above is that of making an object, or presentation, out of
this felt type of value, and thereby breaking it up into distinct " events," etc., with
their own laws of inner connection. This is the work of psychological analysis.
Upon the whole matter of the psychical I am glad to refer to Professor George H.
Mead's article entitled "The Definition of the Psychical," Vol. Ill, Part II, of The
Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.

Conditions and Cues of Thought-Function 39

active incompatibility with one another is there. Nothing
is conveyed at this point by asserting that any particular part
of the situation is illusory or subjective, or mere appearance ;
or that any other is truly real. It is the further work of
thought to exclude some of the contending factors from mem-
bership in experience, and thus to relegate them to the
sphere of the merely subjective. But just at this epoch
the experience exists as one of vital and active confusion
and conflict. The conflict is not only objective in a de facto
sense (that is, really existent), but is objective in a logical
sense as well ; it is just this conflict which effects the transi-
tion into the thought-situation — this, in turn, being only a
constant movement toward a defined equilibrium. The con-
flict has objective logical value because it is the antecedent
condition and cue of thought.

Every reflective attitude and function, whether of naive
life, deliberate invention, or controlled scientiflc research,
has risen through the medium of some such total objective
situation. The abstract logician may tell us that sensa-
tions or impressions, or associated ideas, or bare physical
things, or conventional symbols, are antecedent conditions.
But such statements cannot be verified by reference to a
single instance of thought in connection with actual practice
or actual scientific research. Of course, by extreme media-
tiop symbols may become conditions of evoking thought.
They get to be objects in an active experience. But they are
stimuli onlv in case their manipulation to form a new whole
occasions resistance, and thus reciprocal tension. Symbols
and their definitions develop to a point where dealing with
them becomes itself an experience, having its own identity ;
just as the handling of commercial commodities, or arrange-
ment of parts of an invention, is an individual experience.
There is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some i
subject-matter of the physical or social world, or organized i

40 Studies in Logical Thboet

intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each
other — so much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire
experience, which accordingly for its own maintenance
requires deliberate re-definition and re-relation of its ten-
sional parts. This is the reconstructive process termed
thinking: the reconstructive situation, with its parts in ten-
sion and in such movement toward each other as tends to a
unified experience, is the thought-situation.

This at once suggests the subjective phase. The situa-
tion, the experience as such, is objective. There is an
experience of the confused and confl;icting tendencies. But
just what in particular is objective, just what form the situa-
tion shall take as an organized harmonious whole, is
unknown; that is the problem. It is the uncertainty as
to the what of the experience together with the certainty
that there is such an experience, that evokes the thought-
function. (Viewed from this standpoint of uncertainty, the
situation as a whole is subjective.) No particular content or
reference can be asserted off-hand. Definite assertion is
expressly reserved — it is to be the outcome of the proce-
dure of reflective inquiry now undertaken. This holding
off of contents from definitely asserted position, this viewing
them as candidates for reform, is what we mean at this stage
of the natural history of thought by the subjective.

We have followed Lotze through his tortuous course of
inconsistencies. It is better, perhaps, to run the risk of
vain repetition, than that of leaving the impression that these
are mere self-contradictions. It is an idle task to expose
contradictions save we realize them in relation to the
fundamental assumption which breeds them. Lotze is
bound to differentiate thought from its antecedents. He is
intent to do this, however, through a preconception that
marks off the thought-situation radically from its predecessor,
through a difference that is complete, fixed, and absolute,

Conditions and Cues op Thought-Function 41

or at large. It is a total contrast of thought as such to
something else as such that he requires, not a contrast within
experience of one phase of a process, one period of a rhythm,
from others.

This complete and rigid difference Lotze finds in the
difference between an experience which is mere existence or
occurrence, and one which has to do with worth, truth, rigjjt
relationship. Now things, objects, have already, implicitly
at least, determinations of worth, of truth, reality, etc. The
same is true of deeds, affections, etc., etc. Only states of
feelings, bare impressions, etc., seem to fulfil the prerequi-
site of being given as existence, and yet without qualifica-
tion as to worth, etc. Then the current of ideas offers itself,
a ready-made stream of events, of existences, which can be
characterized as wholly innocent of reflective determination,
and as the natural predecessor of thought.

But this stream of existences is no sooner there than its
total incapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of
thought appears. It is about as relevant as are changes that
may be happening on the other side of the moon. So, one
by one, the whole series of determinations of value or
worth already traced are introduced into the very make-
up, the inner structure, of what was to be mere existence:
viz., (1) value as determined by things of whose spatial and
temporal relations the things are somehow representative;
(2) hence, value in the shape of meaning — the idea as signifi-
cant, possessed of quality, and not a mere event ; (3) distin-
guished values of coincidence and coherence within the
stream. All these kinds of value are explicitly asserted,' as
we have seen ; underlying and running through them all is
the recognition of the supreme value of a situation which is
organized as a whole, yet conflicting in its inner constitution.

These contradictions all arise in the attempt to put
thought's work, as concerned with value or validity over

42 Studies in Logical Thboey

against experience as a mere antecedent happening, or occur-
rence. Since this contrast arises because of the deeper
attempt to consider thought as an independent somewhat in
general which yet, in our experience, is specifically dependent,
the sole radical avoiding of the contradictions can be found
in the endeavor to characterize thought as a specific mode of
valuation in the evolution of significant experience, having its
own specific occasion or demand, and its own specific place.
The nature of the organization and value that the antece-
dent conditions of the thought-function possess is too large
a question here to enter upon in detail. Lotze himself
suggests the answer. He speaks of the current of ideas, just
as a current, supplying us with the "mass of well-grounded
information which regulates daily life" (Vol. I, p. 4). It
gives rise to " useful combinations,^'' ^^ correct expectations,^''
^'' seasonable ^reactions'''' (Vol. I, p. 7). He speaks of it,
indeed, as if it were just the ordinary world of naive experi-
ence, the so-called empirical world, as distinct from the
world as critically revised and rationalized in scientific and
philosophic inquiry. The contradiction between this inter-
pretation and that of a mere stream of psychical impressions
is only another instance of the diflBculty already discussed.
But the phraseology suggests the type of value possessed by
it. The unreflective world is a world of practical values ; of
ends and means, of their effective adaptations; of control
and regulation of conduct in view of results. Even the most
purely utilitarian of values are nevertheless values ; not mere
existences. But the world of uncritical experience is saved
from reduction to just material uses and worths ; for it is a
world of social aims and means, involving at every turn the
values of affection and attachment, of competition and
co-operation. It has incorporate also in its own being the
surprise of aesthetic values — the sudden joy of light, the
gracious wonder of tone and form. S

Conditions and Cues of Thought-Function 43

I do not mean that this holds in gross of the unreflect-
ive world of experience over against the critical thought-
situation — such a contrast implies the very wholesale, at
large, consideration of thought which I am striving to avoid.
Doubtless many and many an act of thought has intervened
in effecting the organization of our commonest practical-
affectional-sesthetic region of values. I only mean to
indicate that thought does take place in such a world; not
ajier a world of bare existences lacking value-specifica-
tions; and that the more systematic reflection we call
organized science, may, in some fair sense, be said to come
after, but to come after affectional, artistic, and technological
interests which have found realization and expression in
building up a world of values.

Having entered so far upon a suggestion which cannot be
followed out, I venture one other digression. The notion
that value or significance as distinct from mere existentiality
is the product of thought or reason, and that the source of
Lotze's contradictions lies in the effort to find any situa-
tion prior or antecedent to thought, is a familiar one — it is
even possible that my criticisms of Lotze have been inter-
preted by some readers in this sense.' This is the posi-
tion frequently called neo-Hegelian (though, I think, with
questionable accuracy), and has been developed by many
writers in criticising Kant. This position and that taken
in this chapter do indeed agree in certain general regards.
They are at one in denial of the factuality and the possi-

1 We have a most acute and valuable criticism of Lotze from this point of
view in Peofb8SOE Henev Jones, Philosophy of Lotze, 1895. My specific criti-
cisms agree in the main with his, and I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness.
But I cannot agree in the belief that the business of thought is to qualify reality as
such ; its occupation appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some
aspect or portion of reality, and to fall within the course of reality itself j being,
indeed, the characteristic medium of its activity. And I cannot agree that reality as
such, with increasing fulness of knowledge, presents itself as a thought-system,
though, as just indicated, I have no doubt that reality appears as thought-specifica-
tions or values, just as it does as aflectional and sesthetic and the rest of them.

44 Studies in Logical Theoey

bility of developing fruitful reflection out of antecedent
bare existence or mere events. They unite in denying that
there is or can be any such thing as mere existence — phe-
nomenon unqualified as respects meaning, whether such
phenomenon be psychic or cosmic. They agree that reflective
thought grows organically out of an experience which is
already organized, and that it functions withiii such an organ-
ism. But they part company when a fundamental question
is raised: Is all organized meaning the work of ikought?
Does it therefore follow that the organization out of which
reflective thought grows is the work of thought of some
other type — of Pure Thought, Creative or Constitutive
Thought, Intuitive Reason, etc.? I shall indicate briefly
the reasons for divergence at this point.

To cover all the practical-social-aesthetic values involved,
the term " thought " has to be so stretched that the situation
might as well be called by any other name that describes
a typical value of experience. More specifically, when the
difference is minimized between the organized and arranged
scheme of values out of which reflective inquiry proceeds,
and reflective inquiry itself (and there can be no other rea-
son for insisting that the antecedent of reflective thought
is itself somehow thought), exactly the same type of prob-
lem recurs that presents itself when the distinction is
exaggerated into one between bare unvalued existences and
rational coherent meanings.

For the more one insists that the antecedent situation is
constituted by thought, the more one has to wonder why
another type of thought is required; what need arouses it,
and how it is possible for it to improve upon the work of
previous constitutive thought. This difficulty at once forces
us^from a logic of experience as it is concretely experienced
into a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical experience. Con-
stitutive thought precedes our conscious thought-operations ;

Conditions and Cues of Thought-Function 45

hence it must be the working of some absolute universal
thought which, unconsciously to our reflection, builds up an
organized world. But this recourse only deepens the difliculty.
How does it happen that the absolute constitutive and intui-
tive Thought does such a poor and bungling job that it
requires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products ?
Here more metaphysic is called for: The Absolute Reason
is now supposed to work xmder limiting conditions of finitude,
of a sensitive and temporal organism. The antecedents of
reflective thought are not, therefore, determinations of
thought pure and undefiled, but of what thought can do
when it stoops to assume the yoke of change and of feeling.
I pass by the metaphysical problem left imsolved by this flight
into metaphysic: Why and how should a perfect, absolute,
complete, finished thought find it necessary to submit to
alien, disturbing, and corrupting conditions in order, in the
end, to recover through reflective thought in a partial, piece-
meal, wholly inadequate way what it possessed at the outset
in a much more satisfactory way?

I confine myself to the .logical difficulty. How can
thought relate itself to the fragmentary sensations, impres-
sions, feelings, which, in their contrast with and disparity
from the workings of constitutive thought, mark it off from
the latter; and which in their connection with its products
give the cue to reflective thinking? Here we have again
exactly the problem with which Lotze has been wrestling:
we have the same insoluble question of the reference of
thought-activity to a wholly indeterminate unrationalized,
independent, prior existence. The absolute rationalist who
takes up the problem at this point will find himself forced
into the same continuous seesaw, the same scheme of alter-
nate rude robbery and gratuitous gift, that Lotze engaged
in. The simple fact is that here is just where Lotze himself
began; he saw that previous transcendental logicians had

46 Studies in Logical Theoky

left untouched the specific question of relation of our sup-
posedly finite, reflective thought to its own'antecedents, and
he set out to make good the defect. If reflective thought is
required because constitutive thought works under exter-
nally limiting conditions of sense, then we have some 'ele-
ments which are, after all, mere existences, events, etc. ) Or,
if they have organization from some other source, and induce
reflective thought not as bare impressions, etc., but through
their place in some whole, then we have admitted the possi-
bility of organic unity in experience, apart from Reason,
and the ground for assuming Pure Constitutive Thought is
abandoned.

The contradiction appears equally when viewed from the
side of thought-activity and its characteristic forms. All our
knowledge, after all, of thought as constitutive is gained by
consideration of the operations of reflective thought. The
perfect system of thought is so perfect that it is a luminous,
harmonious whole, without definite parts or distinctions —
or, if there are such, it is only reflection that brings them
out. The categories and methods of constitutive thought
itself must therefore be characterized in terms of the modus
operandi of reflective thought. Yet the latter takes place
just because of the peculiar problem of the peculiar conditions
under which it arises. Its work is progressive, reformatory,
reconstructive, synthetic, in the terminology made familiar
by Kant. We are not only not justifled, accordingly, in
transferring its determinations over to constitutive thought,
but we are absolutely prohibited from attempting any such
transfer. To identify logical processes, states, devices, results
that are conditioned upon the primary fact of resistance to
thought as constitutive with the structure of such thought is
as complete an instance of the fallacy of recourse from one
genus to another as could well be found. Constitutive and
reflective thought are, first, defined in terms of their dissimi-

Conditions and Cues of Thought-Function 47

larity and even opposition, and then without more ado the
forms of the description of the latter are carried over bodily
to the former!'

This is not meant for a merely controversial criticism. It
is meant to point positively toward the fundamental thesis of
these chapters: All the distinctions of the thought-function,
of conception as over against sense-perception, of judgment in
its various modes and forms, of inference in its vast diversity
of operation — all these distinctions come within the thought-
situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical
formation of experience ; and have for their purpose the solu-
tion of the peculiar problem with respect to which the
thought-function is generated or evolved: the restoration of
a deliberately integrated experience from the inherent con-
flict into which it has fallen.

The failure of transcendental logic has the same origin as
the failure of the empiristic (whether taken pure or in the
mixed form in which Lotze presents it). It makes absolute
and fixed certain distinctions of existence and meaning, and
of one kind of meaning and another kind, which are wholly
historic and relative in their origin and their significance.
It views thought as attempting to represent or state reality
once for all, instead of trying to determine some phases or
contents of it with reference to their more effective and
significant reciprocal employ — instead of as reconstructive.
The rock against which every such logic splits is that either
reality already has the statement which thought is endeavor-
ing to give it, or else it has not. In the former case, thought
is futilely reiterative; in the latter, it is falsificatory.

The significance of Lotze for critical purposes is that his
peculiar effort to combine a transcendental view of thought
(t. e., of Thought as active in forms of its own, pure in and

I Bradley's criticisms of rationalistic idealism shonld have made the force of
this point reasonably familiar.

48 Studies in Logical Theory

of themselves) with certain obvious facts of the dependence
of our thought upon specific empirical antecedents, brings
to light fundamental defects in both the empiristic and the
transcendental logics. We discover a common failure in
both : the failure to view logical terms and distinctions with
respect to their necessary function in the redintegration of
experience.

Ill

THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE DATUM OP

THINKING

We have now reached a second epochal stage in the evo-
lution of the thought-situation, a crisis which forces upon
us the problem of the distinction and mutual reference
of the datum or presentation, and the ideas or " thoughts."
It will economize and perhaps clarify discussion if we start from
the relatively positive and constructive result just reached,
and review Lotze's treatment from that point of regard.

We have reached the point of confljct in the matters or
contents of an experience. It is in this conflict and because
of it that the matters or contents, or significant quales, stand
out as such. As long as the sun revolves about earth without
tension or question, this "content," or fact, is not in any way
abstracted as content or object. Its very distinction as
content from the form or mode of experience as such is the
result of post-reflection. The same conflict makes other
experiences assume conscious objectification; they, too, cease
to be ways of living, and become distinct objects of observa-
tion and consideration. The movements of planets, eclipses,
etc., are cases in point.' The maintenance of a unified experi-
ence has become a problem, an end. It is no longer secure.
But this involves such restatement of the conflicting ele-
ments as will enable them to take a place somewhere in the
new experience ; they must be disposed of somehow, and they
can be disposed of finally only as they are provided for. That

1 The common statement that primitive man projects his own volitions,
emotions, etc., into objects is but a back-handed way of expressing the tmth that
" objects," etc., have only gradually emerged from their life-matrix. Looking back,
it is almost impossible to avoid the fallacy of supposing that somehow such
objects were there first and were afterward emotionally appreciated.

50 Studies in Logical Thboet

is, they cannot be simply denied or excluded or eliminated;
they must be taken into the fold of the new experience;
such introduction, on the other hand, clearly demands more
or less modification or transformation on their part. The
thought-situation is the conscious maintenance of the unity
of experience, with a critical consideration of the claims of
the various conflicting contents to a place within itself, and
a deliberate final assignment of position.

The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichoto-
mizes itself. There is somewhat which is untouched in the con-
tention of incompatibles. There is something which remains
secure, unquestioned. On the other hand, there are ele-
ments which are rendered doubtful and precarious. This
gives the framework of the general distribution of the field
into "facts," the given, the presented, the Datum ; and ideas,
the ideal, the conceived, the Thought. For there is always
something unquestioned in any pBoblematic situation at any
stage of its process,' even if it be only the fact of conflict or
tension. For this is never mere tension at large. It is
thoroughly qualified, or characteristically toned and colored,
by the particular elements which are in strife. Hence it is
this conflict, unique and irreplaceable. That it comes now
means precisely that it has never come before; that it is
now passed in review and some sort of a settlement reached,
means that just this conflict will never recur. In a word,
the conflict as such is immediately expressed, or felt, as of
just this and no other sort, and this immediately appre-
hended quality is an irreducible datum. It is fact, even if
all else be doubtful. As it is subjected to examination, it
loses vagueness and assumes more definite form.

1 Of course, this very element may be the precarious, the ideal, and possibly
fanciful of some other situation. But it is to change the historic into the absolute
to conclude that therefore everything is uncertain, all at once, or as such. This
gives metaphysical skepticism as distinct from the working skepticism which is an
inherent factor in all reflection and scientific inquiry.

The Datum of Thinking 51

Only in very extreme cases, however, does the assured,
unquestioned element reduce to as low terms as we have
here imagined. Certain things come to stand forth as facts,
no matter what else may be doubted. There are certain
apparent diurnal changes of the sun ; there is a certain
annual course or track. There are certain nocturnal changes
in the planets, and certain seasonal rhythmic paths. The
significance of these may be doubted: Do they mean real
change in the sun or in the earth ? But change, and change
of a certain definite and numerically determinate character
is there. It is clear that such out-standing facts (ex-istences)
constitute the data, the given or presented, of the thought-
function.

It is obvious that this is only one correspondent, or status,
in the total situation. With the consciousness of this as cer-
tain, as given to be reckoned with, goes the consciousness of
uncertainty as to what it means — of how it is to be under-
stood or interpreted. The facts qua presentation or exist-
ences are sure ; qua meaning (position and relationship in an
experience yet to be secured) they are doubtful. Yet doubt
does not preclude memory or anticipation. Indeed, it is
possible only through them. The memory of past experience
makes sun-revolving-about-earth an object of attentive
regard. The recollection of certain other experiences sug-
gests the idea of earth-rotating-daily-on-axis and revolviag-
annually-about-sun. These contents are as much present
as is the observation of change, but as respects worth,
they are only possibilities. Accordingly, they are catego-
rized or disposed of as just ideas, meanings, thoughts, ways
of conceiving, comprehending, interpreting facts.

Correspondence of reference here is as obvious as correla-
tion of existence. In the logical process, the datum is not
just real existence, and the idea mere psychical unreality.
Both are modes of existence — one of given existence, the

52 Studies in Logical Theory

I other of mental existence. And if the mental existence is in
I such cases regarded, from the standpoint of the unified
j experience aimed at, as having only possible value, the datum
also is regarded, from the value standpoint, as incomplete and
i unassured. (^The very existence of the idea or meaning as
separate is the partial, broken up, and hence objectively
unreal (from the validity standpoint) character of the datum. ~)
Or, as we commonly put it, while the ideas are impressions,
suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc., the facts are
crude, raw, unorganized, brute. They lack relationship, that
is, assured place in the universe ; they are deficient as to con-
j tinuity. Mere change of apparent position of sun, which is
absolutely unquestioned as datum, is a sheer abstraction
from the standpoint either of the organized experience left
behind, or of the reorganized experience which is the end —
: the objective. It is impossible as a persistent object in expe-
; rience or reality. In other words, datum and ideatum are
divisions of labor, co-operative instrumentalities, for eco-
nomical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the
, integrity of experience.

[ Once more, and briefly, both datum and ideatum may
(and positively, veritably, do) break up, each for itself, into
i physical and psychical. In so far as the conviction gains
ground that the earth revolves about the sun, the old fact is
broken up into a new cosmic existence, and a new psychologi-
cal condition — the recognition of a mental process in virtue of
which movements of smaller bodies in relation to very remote
larger bodies are interpreted in a reverse sense. We do
not just eliminate as false the source of error in the old con-
tent. We reinterpret it as valid in its own place, viz., a case
of the psychology of apperception, although invalid as a
matter of cosmic structure. In other words, with increasing
accuracy of determination of the given, there comes a dis-
tinction, for methodological purposes, between the quality

The Datum of Thinking 53

or matter of the sense-experience and its f(yrm — the sense-
perceiving, as itself a psychological fact, having its own place
and laws or relations. Moreover, the old experience, that
of sun-revolving, abides. But it is regarded as belonging to
"me" — to this experiencing individual, rather than to the
cosmic world. It is psychic.

Here, then, within the growth of the thought-situation
and as a part of the process of determining specific truth
under specific conditions, we get for the first time the clue
to that distinction with which, as ready-made and prior to all
thinking, Lotze started out, namely, the separation of the
matter of impression from impression as psychical evrait.
The separation which, taken at large, engenders an insolu-
ble problem, appears within a particular reflective inquiry,
as an inevitable differentiation of a scheme of values.

The same sort of thing occurs on the side of thought, or
meaning. The meaning or idea which is growing in accept-
ance, which is gaining ground as meaning-of -datum, gets
logical or intellectual or objective force ; that which is losing
standing, which is increasingly doubtful, gets qualified as
just a notion, a fancy, a pre-judice, mis-conception — or finally
just an error, a mental slip.

Evaluated as fanciful in validity it becomes mere image —
subjective;' and finally a psychical existence. It is not
eliminated, but receives a new reference or meaning. Thus
the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not
one between meaning as such and datum as such. It is a
specification that emerges, correspondently, in both datum
and ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement.
That which is left behind in the evolution of accepted mean-
ing is characterized as real, but only in a psychical sense;

1 But this is a slow progress within reflection. Plato, who was influential in
bringing this general distinction to consciousness, still thought and wrote as if
*' image " were itself a queer sort of objective existence ; it was only gradually that
it was disposed of as psychical, or a phase of immediate experience.

54 Studies in Logical Theoey

that which is moved toward is regarded as real in an objec-
tive, cosmic sense.'

The implication of the psychic and the logical within
both the given presentation and the thought about it, appears
in the continual shift to which logicians of Lotze's type are
put. When the psychical is regarded as existence over
against meaning as just ideal, reality seems to reside in the
psychical ; it is there anyhow, and meaning is just a curious
attachment — curious because as mere meaning it is non-exist-
ent as event or state — and there seems to be nothing by
which it can be even tied to the psychical state as its bearer
or representative. But when the emphasis falls on thought
as content, as significance, then the psychic event, the idea as
image ^ (as distinct from idea as meaning) appears as an
accidental but necessary evil, the unfortunate irrelevant
medium through which our thinking has to go on.'

1 Of course, this means that what is excluded and so left behind in the problem
of determination of this objective content is regarded as psychical. With reference
to other problems and aims this same psychic existence is initial, not survivali
Beleased from its prior absorption in some unanalyzed experience it gains standing
and momentum on its own account; e. ff., the "personal equation " represents what
is eliminated from a given astronomic time-determination as being purely subjec-
tive, or " source-of-error." But it is initiatory in reference to new modes of technique,
re-readings of previous data — new considerations in psychology, even new socio-
ethical judgments. Moreover, it remains a fact, and even a worthful fact, as a part
of one's own " inner " experience, as an immediate psychical reality. That is to say,
there is a region of personal experience (mainly emotive or aSectional) already recog-
nized as a sphere of value. The " source of error " is disposed of by making it a fact
of this region. The recognition of falsity does not originate the psychic (p. 38, note).

2 Of course, this is a further reflective distinction. The plain man and the stu-
dent do not determine the extraneous, irrelevant, and misleading matter as image
in a psychological sense, but only as fanciful or fantastic. Only to the psychologist
and for his purpose does it break up into image and meaning.

3 Bradley, more than any other writer, has seized upon this double antithesis,
and used it first to condemn the logical as such, and then turned it around as the
impartial condemnation of the psychical also. See Appearance and Reality. In
chap. 15 he metes out condemnation to "thought" because it can never take in
the psychical existence or reality which is present ; in chap. 19, he passes similar
judgmentupon the "psychical " because it is brutally fragmentary. Other epistemo-
logical logicians have wrestled— or writhed — with this problem, but I believe Brad-
ley's position is impregnable — from the standpoint of ready-made differences.
When the antithesis is treated as part and lot of the process of defining the truth of
a particular subject-matter, and thus as historic and relative, the case is quite
otherwise.

The Datum of Thinking 55

1. The data of thought. — When we turn to Lotze,
we find that he makes a clear distinction between the pre-
sented material of thought, its datum, and the typical charac-
teristic modes of thinking in virtue of which the datum gets
organization or system. (It is interesting to note also that
he states the datum in terms different from those in which
the antecedents of thought are defined.") From the point of
view of the material upon which ideas exercise themselves,
it is not coincidence, collocation, or succession that coxmts;
but gradation of degrees in a scale. It is not things in
spatial or temporal grouping that are emphasized, but qual-
ities as mutually distingushed, yet classed — as differences
of a common somewhat. There is no inherent inconceivabil-
ity in the idea that every impression should be as incom-
parably different from every other as sweet is from warm.
But by a remarkable circumstance such is not the case.
We have series, and networks of series. We have diversity
of a common — diverse colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. In
other words, the datum is sense-qualities which, fortunately
for thought, are given arranged, as shades, degrees, varia-
tions, or qualities of somewhat that is identical.'

AH this is given, presented, to our ideational activities.
Even the universal, the common-color which runs through
the various qualities of blue, green, white, etc., is not a
product of thought, but something which thought finds
already in existence. It conditions comparison and recipro-
cal distinction. Particularly all mathematical determina-
tions, whether of counting (number), degree (more or less),
and quantity (greatness and smallness), come back to this
peculiarity of the datum of thought. Here Lotze dwells at
considerable length upon the fact that the very possibility, as
well as the success, of thought is due to this peculiar uni-
versalization ot prima facie ordering with which its material

1 Vol. I, pp. 28-34.

56 Studies in Logical Theoey

is given to it. Such pre-established fitness in the meeting
of two things that have nothing to do with each other is
certainly cause enough for wonder and congratulation.

It should not be difficult to see why Lotze uses different
categories in describing the given material of thought from
those employed in describing its antecedent conditions,
even though, according to him, the two are absolutely the
same.' ( He has different functions in mind. In one case,
the material must be characterized as evoking, as incentive,
as stimulus — from this point of view the peculiar combina-
tion of coincidence and coherence is emphasized. But in
the other case the material must be characterized as afford-
ing stuff, actual subject-matter. ) Data are not only what is
given to thought, but they are also the food, the raw mate-
rial, of thought. They must be described as, on the one
hand, wholly outside of thought. This clearly puts them
into the region of sense-perception. They are matter of
sensation given free from all inferring, judging, relating
influence. Sensation is just what is not called up in mem-
ory or in anticipated projection — it is the immediate, the
irreducible. On the other hand, seasoTy -matter is quali-

1 It is interesting to see how explicitly Lotze is compelled finally to differentiate
two aspects in the antecedents of thoughts, one of which is necessary in order that
there may be anything to call out thought (a lack, or problem) ; the other in order
that when thought is evoked it may find data at hand — that is, material in shape to
receive and respond to its exercise. "The manifold matter of ideas is brought
before us, not only in the systematic order of its qualitative relationships, but in the
rich variety of local and temporal combinations The combinations of hetero-
geneous ideas .... forms the problems, in connection with which the efforts of
thought to reduce coexistence to coherence will subsequently be made. The homoge-
neous or similar ideas, on the other hand, give occasion to separate, to connect, and
to count their repetitions." (Vol.1, pp. 33, 34; italics mine.) Without the hetero-
geneous variety of the local and temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to
excite thought. Without the systematic arrangement of quality there would be
nothing to meet thought and reward it for its efforts. The homogeneity of qualita-
tive relationships, in the pre-thought material, gives the tools or instruments by
which thought is enabled successfully to tackle the heterogeneity of collocations
and conjunctions also found in the same material I One would suppose that when
Lotze reached this point he might have been led to suspect that in this remarkable
adjustment of thought-stimuli, thought-material, and thought-tools to one another,
he must after all be dealing, not with something prior to the thought-function, but
with the necessary elements in and of the thought-situation.

The Datum of Thinking 57

tative, and quales are made up on a common basis. They
are degrees or grades of a common quality. Thus they
have a certain ready-made setting of mutual distinction and
reference which is already almost, if not quite, the effect of
comparing, of relating, and these are the express traits of
thinking.

It is easy to interpret this miraculous gift of grace in
the light of what has been said. The data are in truth
precisely that which is selected and set aside as present, as
immediate. Thus they are given to further thought. But
the selection has occurred in view of the need for thought;
it is a listing of the capital in the way of the undisturbed,
the undiscussed, which thought can count upon in this
particular problem. Hence it is not strange that it has a
peculiar fitness of adaptation for thought's further work.
Having been selected with precisely that end in view, the
wonder would be if it were not so fitted. A man may coin
counterfeit money for use upon others, but hardly with the
intent of passing it off upon himself.

Our only difficulty here is that the mind flies away from
the logical interpretation of sense-datum to a ready-made
notion of it brought over from abstract psychological
inquiry. The belief in sensory quales as somehow forced
upon us, and forced upon us at large, and thus condition-
ing thought wholly ab extra, instead of determining it as
instrumentalities or elements in its own scheme, is too
fixed. Such qualities are forced upon us, but not at large.
The sensory data of experience, as distinct from the psychol-
ogists' constructs, always come in a context; they always
appear as variations in a continuum of values. Even the
thunder which breaks in upon me (to take the extreme of
apparent discontinuity and irrelevancy) disturbs me because
it is taken as a part of the same space-world as that in
which my chair and room and house are located; and it is

58 Studies in Logical Theory

taken as an influence which interrupts and disturbs, because
it is part of my common world of causes and effects.
The solution of continuity is itself practical or teleological,
and thus presupposes and affects continuity of purpose,
occupations, and means in a life-process. It is not meta-
physics, it is biology which enforces the idea that actual
sensation is not only determined as an event in a world of
events,' but is an occurrence occurring at a certain period in
the evolution of experience, marking a certain point in
its cycle, and, consequently — having always its own con-
scious context and bearings — is a characteristic function of
reconstruction in experience.^

2. Forms of thinking data. — As sensory datum is materia]
set for the work of thought, so the ideational forms with
which thought does its work are apt and prompt to meet
the needs of the material. (^The "accessory"' notion of
ground of coherence turns out, in truth, not to be a formal,
or external, addition to the data, but a requalification of
them. Thought is accessory as accomplice, not as adden-
dum.) "Thought" is to eliminate mere coincidence, and to
assert grounded coherence. Lotze makes it absolutely clear
that he does not at bottom conceive of "thought" as an
; activity "in itself" imposing a form of coherence; but that
the organizing work of "thought" is only the progressive
realization of an inherent unity, or system, in the material
experience. The specific modes in which thought brings
its "accessory" power to bear — names, conception, judg-
ment, and inference — are successive stages in the adequate
organization of the matter which comes to us first as
datum ; they are successive stages of the effort to overcome the

1 Supra^ p. 30.

2 For the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest strain and
stress in conflicting or tensional experience, see " The Keflex Arc Concept in Psy-

I chology," Psychological Beview, Vol. Ill, p. 57.

3 For the " accessory " character of thought, see Lotze, Vol. I, pp. 7, 25-7, 61, etc.

The Datum of Thinking 59

original defects of the datum. Conception starts from the
given universal (the common element) of sense. Yet (and
this is the significant point) it does not simply abstract this
common element, and consciously generalize it as over
against its own differences. Such a "universal" is not
coherence, just because it does not include and dominate the
temporal and local heterogeneity. The true concept (see
Vol. I, p. 38) is a system of attributes, held together on the
basis of some ground, or determining, dominating principle —
a ground which so controls all its own instances as to make
them into an inwardly connected whole, and so specifies its
own limits as to be exclusive of all else. If we abstract color
as the common element of various colors, the result is not a
scientific idea or concept. Discovery of a process of light-
waves whose various rates constitute the various colors of the
spectrum gives the concept. And when we get such a con-
cept, the former mere temporal abruptness of color experi-
ences gives way to organic parts of a color system. The
logical product — the concept, in other words — is not a formal
seal or stamp ; it is a thoroughgoing transformation of data
in a given sense.

The form or mode of thought which marks the continued
transformation of the data and the idea in reference to each
other is judgment. Judgment makes explicit the assump-
tion of a principle which determines connection within an
individualized whole. It definitely states red as this case or
instance of the law or process of color, and thus overcomes
further the defect in subject-matter or data still left by con-
ception.' Now judgment logically terminates in disjunction.

IBOSANQTJET, Logic {Vol. I, pp. 30-34), and J0NB3 (.Philosophy of Lotze, 1895, chap.
4) have called attention to a curious inconsistency in Lotze's treatment of judg-
ment. On one hand, the statement is as given above. Judgment grows out of con-
ception in making explicit the determining relation of universal to its own particu-
lar, implied in conception. But, on the other hand, judgment grows not out of con-
ception at all, but out of the question of determining connection in change. Lotze's
nominal reason for this latter view is that the conceptual world is purely static;

60 Studies in Logical Theory

It gives a universal which may determine any one of a num-
ber of alternative defined particulars, but which is arbitrary
i as to what one is selected. Systematic inference brings to
i light the material conditions under which the law, or domi-
I nating universal, applies to this, rather than that alternative
' particular, and so completes the ideal organization of the
! subject-matter. If this act were complete, we should finally
have present to us a whole on which we should know the
determining and effective or authorizing elements, and the
order of development or hierarchy of dependence, in which
others follow from them.'

In this account by Lotze of the operations of the forms
of thought, there is clearly put before us the picture of a

since the actual world is one of change, we need to pass upon what really goes
together (is causal) in the change as distinct from such as are merely coincident.
But, as Jones clearly shows, it is also connected with the fact that, while Lotze
nominally asserts that judgment grows out of conception, he treats conception as
the result of judgment since the first view makes judgment a mere explication of
the content of an idea, and hence merely expository or analytic (in the Kantian
sense) and so of more than doubtful applicability to reality. The affair is too
large to discuss here, and I will content myself with referring to the oscillation be-
tween conflicting contents, and gradation of sensory qualities already discussed (p.
56, note). It is judgment which grows out of the former, because judgment is the
whole situation as such; conception is referable to the latter because it is one
abstraction within the whole (the solution of possible meanings of the data) just
as the datum is another. In truth, since the sensory datum is not absolute, but
comes in a historical context, the qualities apprehended as constituting the datum
simply define the locus of conflict in the entire situation. They are attributives of
the contents-in-tension of the colliding things, not calm untroubled ultimates. On
pp. 33 and 34 of Vol. I, Lotze recognizes (as we have just seen) that, as matter of
fact, it is both sensory qualities in their systematic grading, or quantitative de-
terminations (see Vol. I, p. 43, for the recognition of the necessary place of the
quantitative in the true concept), amd the "rich variety of local and temporal
combinations," that provoke thought and supply it with material. But, as usual,
he. treats this simply as a historical accident, not as furnishing the key to the
whole matter. In fine, while the heterogeneous collocations and successions con-
stitute the problematic element that stimulates thought,quantitative determination
of the sensory quality furnishes one of the two chief means through which thought
deals with the problem. It is a reduction of the original colliding contents to a form
in which the effort at redintegration gets maximum efficiency. The concept, as ideal
meaning, is of course the other partner to the transaction. It is getting the various
possible meanings-of-the-data into such shape as to make them most usefxil in con-
struing the data. The bearing of this upon the subject and predicate of judgment
cannot be discussed here.

1 See Vol. I, pp. 38, 59, 61, 1<&, 129, 197, for Lotze's treatment of these distinctions.

The Datum of Thinking 61

continuous correlative determination of datum on one side
and of idea or meaning on the other, till experience is again
integral, data thoroughly defined and corrected, and ideas
completely incarnate as the relevant meaning of subject-mat-
ter. That we have here in outline a description of what
actually occurs there can be no doubt. But there is as little
doubt that it is thoroughly inconsistent with Lotze's supposi-
tion that the material or data of thought is precisely the same
as the antecedents of thought ; or that ideas, conceptions, are
purely mental somewhats brought to bear, as the sole essen-
tial characteristics of thought, extraneously upon a material
provided ready-made. It means but one thing: The main-
tenance of unity and wholeness in experience through con-
flicting contents occurs by means of a strictly correspondent
■ setting apart of fact to be accurately described and properly
related, and meaning to be adequately construed and prop-
erly referred. The datum is given in the thought-situation,
and to further qualification of ideas or meanings. But even
in this aspect it presents a problem. To find out what is
given is an inquiry which taxes reflection to the uttermost.
Every important advance in scientific method means better
agencies, more skilled technique for simply detaching and
describing what is barely there, or given. To be able to find
out what can safely be taken as there, as given in any par-
ticular inquiry, and hence be taken as material for orderly and
verifiable thinking, for fruitful hypothesis-making, for enter-
taining of explanatory and interpretative ideas, is one phase
of the effort of systematic scientific inquiry. It marks its
inductive phase. <^To take what is given in the thought-
situation, for the sake of accomplishing the aim of thought
(along with a correlative discrimination of ideas or meanings),
as if it were given absolutely, or apart from a particular his-
toric situs and context, is the fallacy of empiricism as a
logical theory.^ To regard the thought-forms of conception,

62 Studies in Logical Theoey

judgment, and inference as qualifications of " pure thought,
apart from any difference in objects," instead of as successive
dispositions in the progressive organization of the material
(or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism. Lotze attempts to
combine the two, thinking thereby to correct each by the
other.

Lotze recognizes the futility of thought if the sense-
data are final, if they alone are real, the truly existent,
self -justificatory and valid. ') He sees that, if the empiricist
were right in his assumption as to the real worth of the
given data, thinking would be a ridiculous pretender,
either toilfuUy and poorly doing over again what needs no
doing, or making a wilful departure from truth. He realizes
that thought really is evoked because it is needed, and that
it has a work to do which is not merely formal, but which
effects a modification of the subject-matter of experience.
Consequently he assumes a thought-in-itself, with certain
forms and modes of action of its own, a realm of mean-
ing possessed of a directive and normative worth of its
own — the root-fallacy of rationalism. His attempted com-
promise between the two turns out to be based on the
assumption of the indefensible ideas of both — the notion
of an independent matter of thought, on one side, and of
an independent worth or value of thought-forms, on the other.

This pointing out of inconsistencies becomes stale and
unprofitable save as we bring them back into connection
with their root-origin — the erection of distinctions that are
genetic and historic, and working or instrumental divisions of
labor, into rigid and ready-made differences of structural real-
ity. Lotze clearly recognizes that thought's nature is depend-
ent upon its aim, its aim upon its problem, and this upon the
situation in which it finds its incentive and excuse. Its
work is cut out for it. It does not what it would, but what
it must. As Lotze puts it, "Logic has to do with thought.

The Datum of Thinking 63

not as it would be under hypothetical conditions, but as it is "
(Vol. I, p. 33), and this statement is made in explicit combina-
tion with statements to the effect that the peculiarity of the
material of thought conditions its activity. Similarly he says,
in a passage already referred to : " The possibility and the
success of thought's production in general depends upon this
original constitution and organization of the whole world of
ideas, a constitution which, though not necessary in thought,
is all the more necessary to make thought possible."'

As we have seen, the essential nature of conception, judg-
ment, and inference is dependent upon peculiarities of the
propounded material, they being forms dependent for their
significance upon the stage of organization in which they
begin.

From this only one conclusion is suggested. If thought's
nature is dependent upon its actual conditions and circum-
stances, the primary logical problem is to study thought-in-
its-conditioning; it is to detect the crisis within which
thought and its subject-matter present themselves in their
mutual distinction and cross-reference. I But Lotze is so
thoroughly committed to a ready-made antecedent of some
s.Qlt, that this genetic consideration is of no account to him.
The historic method is a mere matter of psychology, and has
no logical worth (Vol. I, p. 2). We must presuppose a
psychological mechanism and psychological material, but
logic is concerned not with origin or history, but with
authority, worth, value (Vol. I, p. 10). Again : "Logic is
not concerned with the manner in which the elements util-
ized by thought come into existence, but their value
after they have somehow come into existence, for the carry-
ing out of iatellectual operations" (Vol. I, p. 34). And
finally : "I have maintained throughout my work that
logic cannot derive any serious advantage from a discussion

iVol. I, p. 36 ; see also Vol. II, pp. 290, 291.

64 Studies in Logical Thboby

of the conditions under which thought as a psychological
process comes about. The significance of logical forms. . . .
is to be found in the utterances of thought, the laws which
it imposes, after or during the act of thinking, not in the
conditions which lie back of and which produce thought.'"
Lojize, in truth, represents a halting-st^e in the evolu-
tiqji of logical thecgy. He is too far along to be contented
with the reiteration of the purely formal distinctions of
a merely formal thought-by-itself. He recognizes that
thought as formal is the form of some matter, and has its
worth only as organizing that matter to meet the ideal
demands of reason; and that "reason" is in truth only an
ideal systematization of the matter or content. Consequently
he has to open the door to admit "psychical processes"
which furnish this material. Having let in the material, he
is bound to shut the door again in the face of the processes
from which the material proceeded — to dismiss them as
impertinent intruders. If thought gets its data in such a
surreptitious manner, there is no occasion for wonder that
the legitimacy of its dealings with the material remains an
open question. Logical theory, like every branch of the
philosophic disciplines, waits upon a surrender of the obsti-
nate conviction that, while the work and aim of thought is
conditioned by the material supplied to it, yet the worth of
its performances is something to be passed upon in complete
abstraction from conditions of origin and development.

1 Vol. 11, p. 246 ; the same is reiterated in Vol. 11, p. 250, where the question of
origin is referred to as a corruption in logic. Certain psychical acts are necessary as
" conditions and occasions" of logical operations, but the "deep gulf between psy-
chical mechanism and thought remains unfilled. "

THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER : THE CONTENT AND
OBJECT OF THOUGHT

In the foregoing discussion, particularly in the last chap-
ter, we were led repeatedly to recognize that thought has its
own content. At times Lotze gives way to the tendency to
define thought entirely in terms of modes and forms of
activity which are exercised by it upon a strictly foreign
material. But two motives continually push him in the other
direction. (1) Thought has a distinctive work to do, one
which involves a qualitative transformation of (at least) the
relationships of the presented matter; as fast as it accom-
plishes this work, the subject-matter becomes somehow
thought's own. As we have just seen, the data are pro-
gressively organized to meet thought's ideal of a complete
whole, with its members interconnected according to a
determining principle. Such progressive organization
throws backward doubt upon the assumption of the origi-
nal total irrelevancy of the data and thought-form to each
other. (2) A like motive operates from the side of the
subject-matter. As merely foreign and external, it is too
heterogeneous to lend itself to thought's exercise and
influence. The idea, as we saw in the first chapter, is the
convenient medium through which Lotze passes from the
purely heterogeneous psychical impression or event, which
is totally irrelevant to thought's purpose and working, over
to a state of affairs which can reward thought. Idea as
meaning forms the bridge from the brute factuality of the
psychical impression over to the coherent value of thought's
own content.

66 Studies in Logical Theory

We have, in this chapter, to consider the question of the
idea or- content of thought from two points of view: first,
the possibility of such a content — its consistency with
Lotze's fundamental premises ; secondly, its objective charac-
ter — its validity and test.

I. The question of the possibility of a specific content
of thought is the question of the nature of the idea as
meaning. Meaning is the characteristic content of thought
as such. We have thus far left unquestioned Lotze's con-
tinual assumption of meaning as a sort of thought-unit; the
building-stone of thought's construction. In his treat-
ment of meaning, Lotze's contradictions regarding the
antecedents, data, and content of thought reach their full
conclusion. He expressly makes meaning to be the product
of thought's activity and also the unreflective material out
of which thought's operations grow.

This contradiction has been worked out in accurate and
complete detail by Professor Jones.' He summarizes it as
follows (p. 99): "No other way was left to him [Lotze]
excepting this of first attributing all to sense and afterwards
attributing all to thought, and, finally of attributing it to
• thought only because it was already in its material. This
seesaw is essential to his theory ; the elements of knowl-
edge as he describes them can subsist only by the alternate
robbery of each other." We have already seen how strenu-
•ouHy Lotze insists upon the fact that the given subject-matter
of thought is to be regarded wholly as the work of a physical
mechanism, "without any action of thought."^ But Lotze also
states that if the products of the psychical mechanism " are
to admit of combination in the definite form of a thought,
they each require some previous shaping to make them into

^Philosophy of Lotze, chap. 3, "Thought and the Freliminaiy Fiocess of Expe-
rience."

2Vol. I, p. 38.

The Content and Object op Thought 67

logical bmlding-stones and to convert them from impressions
into ideas. Nothing is really more familiar to us tljan this first
operation of thought; the only reason why we usually over-
look it is that in the language which we inherit, it is already
carried out, and it seems, therefore, to belong to the self-
evident presuppositions of thought, not to its own specific
work."^ And again (Vol. I, p. 23) judgments "can consist
of nothing but combinations of ideas which are no longer
mere impressions: every such idea must have undergone at
least the simple formation mentioned above." Such ideas
are, Lotze goes on to urge, already rudimentary concepts —
that is to say, logical determinations.

The obviousness of the logical contradiction of attribut-
ing to a preliminary specific work of thought exactly the
condition of affairs which is elsewhere explicitly attributed
to a psychical mechanism prior to any thought-activity,
should not blind us to its meaning and relative necessity.
The impression, it will be recalled, is a mere state of our
own consciousness — a mood of ourselves. As such it has
simply de facto relations as an event to other similar events.
But reflective thought is concerned with the relationship of
a content or matter to other contents. Hence the impres-
sion must have a matter before it can come at all within
the sphere of thought's exercise. How shall it secure
this ? Why, by a preliminary activity of thought which
objectifies the impression. Blue as a mere sensuous irrita-
tion or feeling is given a quality, the meaning "blue"
— blueness ; the sense-impression is objectified ; it is pre-
sented "no longer as a condition which we undergo, but
as a something which has its being and its meaning in itself,
and which continues to be what it is, and to mean what it
means whether we are conscious of it or not. It is easy to
see here the necessary beginning of that activity which we

1 Vol. I, p. 13; last italics mine.

68 Studies in Logical Theory

above appropriated to thought as such : it has not yet got
so far as converting coexistence into coherence. It has first
to perform the previous task of investing each single' impres-
sion with an independent validity, without which the later
opposition of their real coherence to mere coexistence could
not be made in any intelligible sense."'

This objectification, which converts a sensitive state into
a sensible matter to which the sensitive state is referred,
also gives this matter "position," a certain typical character.
It is not objectified in a merely general way, but is given a
specific sort of objectivity. Of these kinds of objectivity
there are three mentioned: that of a substantive content;
that of an attached dependent content; that of an active
relationship connecting the various contents with each other.
In short, we have the types of meaning embodied in language
1 in the form of nouns, adjectives, and verbs. It is through this
preliminary formative activity of thought that reflective or
logical thought has presented to it a world of meanings
ranged in an order of relative independence and dependence,
and ranged as elements in .a complex of meanings whose
various constituent parts mutually influence each other's
meanings.^

As usual, Lotze mediates the contradiction between
material constituted hy thought and the same material just
presented to thought, by a further position so disparate to
each that, taken in connection with each in a pair, and by
turns, it seems to bridge the gulf. After describing the
prior constitutive work of thought as above, he goes on to
discuss a second phase of thought which is intermediary
between this and the third phase, viz., reflective thought
proper. This second activity is that of arranging experi-

1 Vol. I, p. 14 : italics mine.

2Se6 Vol. I, pp. 16-20. On p. 22 this work is declared to be not only the first,
but the most indispensable of all thought's operations.

The Content and Object of Thought 69

enced quales in series and groups, thus ascribing a sort of
universal or common somewhat to various instances (as
already described ; see p. 55). On one hand, it is clearly
stated that this second phase of thought's activity is in real-
ity the same as the first phase : since all objectification
involves positing, since positing involves distinction of one
matter from others, and since this involves placing it in a
series or group in which each is measurably marked off, as to
the degree and nature of its diversity, from every other. We
are told that we are only considering " a really inseparable
operation " of thought from two different sides : first, as to
the effect which objectifying thought has upon the matter
as set over against the feeling subjectj secondly, the effect
which this objectification has upon the matter in relation
to other matters.^ Afterward, however, these two opera-
tions are declared to be radically different in type and nature.
The first is determinant and formative ; it gives ideas " the
shape without which the logical spirit could not accept them."
In a way it dictates "its own laws to its object-matter."^
The second activity of thought is rather passive and recep-
tive. It simply recognizes what is already there. "Thought
can make no difference where it finds none already in the
matter of impressions.'" " The first universal, as we saw,
can only be experienced in immediate sensation. It is
no product of thought, but something that thought finds
already in existence." *

1 Vol. I, p. 26. 2 Vol. I, p. 35.

3 Vol. I, p. 36 ; see the strong statements already quoted, p. 30. What if this
canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to above : the original
objectification which transforms the mere state into an abiding quality or meaning ?
Suppose, that is, it were said that the first objectifying act cannot make a substan-
tial (or attached) quale out of a mere state of feeling; it must^Twi the distinction it
makes there already I It is clear we should at once get a regressus ad infinitum. We
here find Lotze face to face with this fundamental dilemma : thought either arbi-
trarily forces in its own distinctions, or else just repeats what Is already there — is
either falsifying or futile. This same contradiction, so far as it affects the impres-
sion, has already been discussed. See p. 31.

4Vol.I,p. 31.

70 Studies in Logical Theory

The obviousness of this further contradiction is paralleled
only by its inevitableness. Thought is in the air, is arbi-
trary and wild in dealing with meanings, unless it gets its
start and cue from actual experience. Hence the necessity
of insisting upon thought's activity as just recognizing the
contents already given. But, on the other hand, prior to the
work of thought there is to Lotze no content or meaning. It
requires a work of thought to detach anything from the flux of
sense-irritations and invest it with a meaning of its own. This
dilemma is inevitable to any writer who declines to consider
as correlative the nature of thought-activl^ and thought-
content from the standpoint of their generating conditions in
the movement of experience. (Viewed from such a standpoint
the principle of solution is clear enough.) As we have already
seen (p. 53), the internal dissension of an experience leads
to detaching certain values previously absorptively inte-
grated into the concrete experience as part of its own quali-
tative coloring; and to relegating them, for the time being,
(pending integration into further immediate values of a recon-
stituted experience) into a world of bare meanings, a sphere
qualified as ideal throughout. These meanings then become
the tools of thought in interpreting the data, just as the sense-
qualities which define the presented situation are the imme-
diate object to thought. The two as mutually referred are
content. That is, the datum and the thought-mode or idea
as connected are the object of thought.

To reach this unification is thought's objective or goal.
Exactly the same value is idea, as either tool or content, ac-
cording as it is taken as instrumental or as accomplishment.
Every successive cross-section of the thought-situation pre-
sents what may be taken for granted as the outcome of
previous thinking, and consequently as the determinant of
further reflective procedure. Taken as defining the point
reached in the thought-function and serving as constituent

The Content and Object of Thought 71

unit of further thought, it is content. Lotze's instinct is sure
in identifying and setting over against each other the material
given to thought and the content which is thought's own
"building-stone." His contradictions arise simply from the
fact that his absolute, non-historic method does not permit
him to interpret this joint identity and distinction in a work-
ing, and hence relative, sense.

II. The question of how the possibility of meanings, or
thought-contents, is to be understood merges imperceptibly
into the question of the real objectivity or validity of such
contents. The diflSculty for Lotze is the now familiar one:
So far as his logic compels him to insist that these meanings
are the possession and product of thought (since thought is
an independent activity), the ideas are merely ideas ; there is
no test of objectivity beyond the thoroughly unsatisfactory
and formal one of their own mutual consistency. In reaction
from this Lotze is thrown back upon the idea of these con-
tents as the original matter given in the impressions them-
selves. Here there seems to be an objective or external test
by which the reality of thought's operations may be tried ; a
given idea is verified or found false according to its measure
of correspondence with the matter of experience as such.
But now we are no better off. The original independence
and heterogeneity of impressions and of thought is so great
that there is no way to compare the results of the latter with
the former. We cannot compare or contrast distinctions of
worth with bare differences of factual existence (Vol. I, p. 2).
The standard or test of objectivity is so thoroughly external
that by original definition it is wholly outside the realm of
thought. How can thought conipare its own contents with
that which is wholly outside itself ?

Or again, the given material of experience apart from
thought is precisely the relatively chaotic and unorganized;
it even reduces itself to a mere sequence of psychical events.

72 Studies in Logical Theoey

What rational meaning is there in directing us to compare
the highest results of scientific inquiry with the bare se-
quence of our own states of feeling ; or even with the origi-
nal data whose fragmentary and uncertain character was the
exact motive for entering upon scientific inquiry ? How can
the former in any sense give a check or test of the value of
the latter ? This is professedly to test the validity of a sys-
tem of meanings by comparison with that whose defects and
errors call forth the construction of the system of meanings
by which to rectify and replace themselves. Our subsequent
inquiry simply consists in tracing some of the phases of the
characteristic seesaw from one to the other of the two horns
of the now familiar dilemma: either thought is separate,
from the matter of experience, and then its validity is wholly
its own private business; or else the objective results of
thought are already in the antecedent material, and then
thought is either unnecessary, or else has no way of check-
ing its own performances.

1. Lotze assumes, as we have seen, a certain independent
validity in each meaning or qualified content, taken in and of
itself. "Blue" has a certain validity, or meaning, in and of
itself; it is an object for consciousness as such. After the
original sense-irritation through which it was mediated has
entirely disappeared, it persists as a valid idea, as a mean-
ing. Moreover, it is an object or content of thought for
others as well. Thus it has a double mark of validity: in
the comparison of one part of my own experience with
another, and in the comparison of my experience as a whole
with that of others. Here we have a sort of validity which
does not raise at all the question of metaphysical reality
(Vol. I, pp. 14, 15). Lotze thus seems to have escaped
from the necessity of employing as check or test for the
validity of ideas any reference to a real outside the sphere
of thought itself. Such terms as "conjunction," "fran-

The Content and Object of Thought 73

chise," "constitution," "algebraic zero," etc., etc., claim to
possess objective validity. Yet none of these professes
to refer to a reality beyond thought. Generalizing this
point of view, validity or objectivity of meaning means
simply that which is "identical for all consciousness" (Vol.
I, p. 3); "it is quite indifferent whether certain parts of the
world of thought indicate something which has beside an
independent reality outside of thinking minds, or whether
all that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who
think it, but with equal validity for them all" (Vol. I, p. 16).

So far it seems clear sailing. Difficulties, however, show
themselves, the moment we inquire what is meant by a
self -identical content for all thought. Is this to be taken in
a static or in a dynamic way? That is to say: Does it
express the fact that a given content or meaning is de facto
presented to the consciousness of all alike? Does this
coequal presence guarantee an objectivity ? Or does validity
attach to a given meaning or content in so far as it directs
and controls the further exercise of thinking, and thus the
formation of further new contents of consciousness?

The former interpretation is alone consistent with Lotze's
notion that the independent idea as such is invested with a
certain validity or objectivity. It alone is consistent with
his assertion that concepts precede judgments. It alone, that
is to say, is consistent with the notion that reflective think-
ing has a sphere of ideas or meanings supplied to it at the
outset. But it is impossible to entertain this belief. The
stimulus which, according to Lotze, goads thought on from
ideas or concepts to judgments and inferences, is in truth
simply the lack of validity, of objectivity in its original inde-
pendent meanings or contents. A meaning as independ-
ent is precisely that which is not invested with validity, but
which is a mere idea, a " notion," a fancy, at best a
surmise which may turn out to be valid (and of course

74 Studies in Logical Theoey

■ this indicates possible reference) ; a standpoint to have its
value determined by its further active use. "Blue" as a
mere detached floating meaning, an idea at large, would
not gain in validity simply by being entertained continu-
ously in a given consciousness; or by being made at one
and the same time the persistent object of attentive regard
by all human consciousnesses. If this were all that were
required, the chimera, the centaur, or any other subjective
construction, coUld easily gain validity. " Christian Science"
has made just this notion the basis of its philosophy.

The simple fact is that in such illustrations as "blue,"
"franchise," "conjunction," Lotze instinctively takes cases
which are not mere independent and detached meanings,
but which involve reference to a region of cosmic experi-
ence, or to a region of mutually determining social activities.^
The conception that reference to a social activity does not
involve the same sort of reference of thought beyond itself
that is involved in physical matters, and hence may be taken
quite innocent and free of the metaphysical problem of
reference to reality beyond meaning, is one of the strangest
that has ever found lodgment in human thinking. Either
both physical and social reference or neither, is metaphysi-
cal ; if neither, then it is because the meaning functions, as
it originates, in a specific situation which carries with it
its own tests (see p. 17). Lotze'a conception is made possible
only by unconsciously substituting the idea of object as con-
tent' of thought for a large number of persons (or a de facto
somewhat for every consciousness), for the genuine defini-
tion of object as a determinant in a scheme of experience.
The former is consistent with Lotze's conception of thought,
but wholly indeterminate as to validity or intent. The
latter is the test used experimentally in all concrete thinking,
but involves a radical transformation of all Lotze's assump-
tions. A given idea of the conjunction of the franchise, or

The Content and Object of Thought 75

of blue, is valid, not because everybody happens to entertain
it, but because it expresses the factor of control or direction
in a given movement of experience. The test of validity
of idea' is its functional or instrumental use in effecting
the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a
relatively integrated one. If Lotze's view were correct, .
"blue" valid once would be valid always — even when red
or green were actually called for to fulfil specific conditions.
This is to say validity always refers to rightfulness or
adequacy of performance in an asserting of connection — not
to the meaning as detached and contemplated.

If we refer again to the fact that the genuine antecedent
of thought is a situation which is tensional as regards its
existing status, or disorganized in its structural elements,
yet organized as emerging out of the unified experience
of the past and as striving as a whole, or equally in all its
phases, to reinstate an experience harmonized in make-up, we
can easily understand how certain contents may be detached
and held apart as meanings or references, actual or possible
(according as they are viewed with reference to the past
or to the future). "We can understand how such detached
contents may be of use in effecting a review of the entire
experience, and as affording standpoints and methods of a
reconstruction which will maintain the integrity of expe-
rience. We can understand how validity of meaning is
measured by reference to something which is not mere
meaning; by reference to something which lies beyond the
idea as such — ^viz., the reconstitution of an experience into
which thought enters as mediator. That paradox of ordinary
experience and of scientific inquiry by which objectivity is
given alike to matter of perception and to conceived relations

1 As we have already seen, the concept, the meaning as such, is always a factor
or status in a reflective situation ; it is always a predicate of judgment, in use in
interpreting and developing the logical subject, or datum of perception. See
Study Vn, on the Hypothesis.

76 Studies in Logical Theory

— to facts and to laws — afPords no peculiar difficulty, because
we see that the test of objectivity is everywhere the same:
anything is objective in so far as, through the medium
of conflict, it controls the movement of experience in its
reconstructive transition from one unified form to another.
There is not first an object, whether of sense-perception or
of conception, which afterward somehow exercises this con-
trolling influence; but the objective is such in virtue of the
exercise of function of control. It may only control the act
of inquiry ; it may only set on foot doubt, but this is direc-
tion of subsequent experience, and, in so far, is a token of
objectivity.

So much for the thought-content or meaning as having
a validity of its own. It does not have it as isolated or
given or static; it has it in its dynamic reference, its use in
determining further movement of experience. In other
words, the "meaning" or idea as such, having been selected
and made-up with reference to performing a certain office in
the evolution of a unified experience, can be tested in no
other way than by discovering whether it does what it was
intended to do and what it purports to do.'

2. Lotze has to wrestle with this question of validity in a

I further aspect: What constitutes the objectivity of thinking

I as a total attitude, activity, or function? According to his

own statement, the meanings or valid ideas are after all only

building-stones for logical thought. Validity is thus not a

question of them in their independent existences, but of their

; mutual reference to each other. Thinking is the process of

I 1 KoTCB, in Ms World arid Individual^ Vol. I, chaps. 6 and 7, has criticised the

' conception of meaning as valid, but in a way which implies that there is a difference

' between validity and reality, in the sense that the meaning or content of the valid

idea becomes real only when it is experienced in direct feeling. The above implies,

of course, a diilerence between validity and reality, but finds the test of validity in

exercise of the function of direction or control to which the idea makes pretension

, or claim. The same point of view would profoundly modify Eoyce's interpretation

of what he terms "inner" and "outer" meaning. See MooBB, The University of

Chicago Decennial Publications, Vol. Ill, on "Existence, Meaning, and Beality."

The Content and Object of Thought 77

instituting these mutual references; of building up the
various scattered and independent building-stones into the
coherent system of thought. What is the validity of the
various forms of thinking which find expression in the
various types of judgment and in the various forms of infer-
ence ? Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive judgment ; infer-
ence by induction, by analogy, by mathematical equation;
classification, theory of explanation — all these are processes
of reflection by which mutual connection in an individualized
whole is given to the fragmentary meanings or ideas with
which thought as it sets out is supplied. What shall we say
of the validity of such processes ?

On one point Lotze is quite clear. These various logical
acts do not really enter into the constitution of the valid
world. The logical forms as such are maintained only in
the process of thinking. The world of valid truth does not
undergo a series of contortions and evolutions, paralleling in
any way the successive steps and missteps, the succession of
tentative trials, withdrawals, and retracings, which mark the
course of our own thinking.'

Lotze is explicit upon the point that it is only the thought-
content in which the process of thinking issues that has ob-
jective validity; the act of thinking is "purely and simply an
inner movement of our own minds, made necessary to us by
reason of the constitution of our nature and of our place
in the world" (Vol. II, p. 279).

Here the problem of validity presents itself as the prob-
lem of the relation of the act of thinking to its own product.

iVol. II, pp. 257, 265 and in general Book III, chap. 4. It is significant that
thought itself, appearing as an act of thinking over against its own content, is here
treated as psychical. Even this explicit placing of thinking in the psychical sphere,
along with sensations and the associative mechanism, does not, however, lead Lotze
to reconsider his statement that the psychological problem is totally irrelevant and
even corrupting as regards the logical. Consequently, as we see in the text, it only
gives him one more difficulty to wrestle with : how a process which is ex officio purely
psychical and subjective can yet yield results which are valid, in a logical, to say
nothing of an outological, sense.

78 Studies in Logical Theoey

In his solution Lotze uses two metaphors: one derived from
building operations, the other from traveling. The con-
struction of a building requires of necessity certain tools and
extraneous constructions, stagings, scaffoldings, etc., which
are necessary to effect the final construction, but yet which
do not enter into the building as such. The activity has an
instrumental, though not a constitutive, value as regards its
product. Similarly, in order to get a view from the top of
a mountain — this view being the objective — the traveler
has to go through preliminary movements along devious
courses. These again are antecedent prerequisites, but do
not constitute a portion of the attained view.
' The problem of thought as activity, as distinct from
thought as content, opens up altogether too large a question
, to receive complete consideration at this point. Fortunately,
however, the previous discussion enables us to narrow the
1 point which is in issue just here. It is once more the ques-
' tion whether the activity of thought is to be regarded as an
independent function supervening entirely from without
upon antecedents, and directed from without upon data; or
whether it marks merely a phase of the transformation which .
the course of experience (whether practical, or artistic, or
socially affectional or whatever) undergoes in entering into
a tensional status where the maintenance of its harmony
of content is problematic and hence an aim. If it be
the latter, a thoroughly intelligent sense can be given to
the proposition that the activity of thinking is instrumental,
I and that its worth is found, not in its own successive states
! as such, but in the result in which it comes to conclusion.
But the conception of thinking as an independent activity
somehow occurring after an independent antecedent, playing
upon an independent subject-matter, and finally effecting
an independent result, presents us with just one miracle the
more.

The Content and Object op Thought 79

I do not question the strictly instrumental character of
thinking. The problem lies not here, but in the interpre-
tation of the nature of the organ and instrument. The diffi-
culty with Lotze's position is that it forces us into the
assumption of a means and an end which are simply and
only external to each other, and yet necessarily dependent
upon each other — a position which, whenever found, is so
thoroughly self -contradictory as to necessitate critical recon-
sideration of the premises which lead to it. Lotze vibrates
between the notion of thought as a tool in the external sense,
a mere scaffolding to a finished building in which it has no
part nor lot, and the notion of thought as an immanent tool,
as a scaffolding which is an integral part of the very opera-
tion of building, and set up for the sake of the building-
activity which is carried on effectively only with and through
a scaffolding. Only in the former case can the scaffolding be
considered as a mere tool. In the latter case the external
scaffolding is not itself the instrumentality; the actual tool
is the action of erecting the building, and this action involves
the scaffolding as a constituent part of itself. The work of
erecting is not set over against the completed building as
mere means to an end; it is the end taken in process or
historically, longitudinally viewed. The scaffolding, more-
over, is not an external means to the process of erecting,
but an organic member of it. It is no mere accident of
language that "building" has a double sense — meaning at
once the process and the finished product. The outcome of
thought is the thinking activity carried on to its ovni com-
pletion; the activity, on the other hand, is the outcome
taken anywhere short of its own realization, and thereby stiU
going on.

The only consideration which prevents easy and imme-
diate acceptance of this view is the notion of thinking as
something purely formal. It is strange that the empiricist

80 Studies in Logical Thboet

does not see that his insistence upon a matter extrane-
ously given to thought only strengthens the hands of the
rationalist with his claim of thinking as an independent
activity, separate from the actual make-up of the affairs
of experience. Thinking as a merely formal activity exer-
cised upon certain sensations or images or objects sets forth
an absolutely meaningless proposition. ( The psychological
identification of thinking with the process of association is
much nearer the truth. It is, indeed, on the way to the
truth.) We need only to recognize that association is of con-
tents or matters or meanings, not of ideas as bare exist-
ences or events; and that the type of association we call
thinking differs from the associations of casual fancy and
revery in an eleme nt of contgll by reference to an end
which determines the fitness and thus the selection of the
associates, to apprehend how completely thinking is a recon-
structive movement of actual contents of experience in rela-
tion to each other, and for the sake of a redintegration of a
conflicting experience.

There is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are
adapted to each other in the process of reaching a valid con-
clusion. Were they external in origin to each other and
to the result, the whole affair would, indeed, present an
insoluble problem — so insoluble that, if this were the true
condition of affairs, we never should even know that there
was a problem. But, in truth, both material and tool have
been secured and determined with reference to economy and
efficiency in effecting the end desired — the maintenance of
a harmonious experience. The builder has discovered that
his building means building tools, and also building mate-
rial. Each has been slowly evolved with reference to its fit
employ in the entire function; and this evolution has been
checked at every point by reference to its own correspondent.
The carpenter has not thought at large on his building and

The Content and Object of Thought 81

then constructed tools at large, but has thought of his build-
ing in terms of the material which enters into it, and through
that medium has come to the consideration of the tools
which are helpful. Life proposes to maintain at all hazards
the unity of its own process. Experience insists on being
itself, on securing integrity even through and by means of
conflict.

This is not a formal question, but one of the pMcing and
relations of the matters or values actually entering into ex-
perience. And this in turn determines the taking up of just
those mental attitudes, and the employing of just those
intellectual operations, which most effectively handle and
organize the material. Thinking is adaptation to an end
through the adjustment of particular objective contents.

The thinker, like the carpenter, is at once stimulated and
checked in every stage of his procedure by the particular
situation which confronts him. A person is at the stage of
wanting a new house: well then, his materials are available
resources, the price of labor, the cost of building, the state
and needs of his family, profession, etc. ; his tools are paper
and pencil and compass, or possibly the bank as a credit
instrumentality, etc. Again, the work is beginning. The
foundations are laid. This in turn determines its own spe-
cific materials and tools. Again, the building is almost
ready for occupancy. The concrete process is that of taking
away the scaffolding, clearing up the grounds, furnishing
and decorating rooms, etc. This specific operation again
determines its own fit or relevant materials and tools. It
defines the time and mode and manner of beginning and

1 Professor James's satisfaction in the contemplation of bare pluralism, of dis-
connection, of radical having-nothing-to-do-with-one-another, is a case in point.
The satisfaction points to an aesthetic attitude in which the brute diversity becomes
itself one interesting object ; and thus unity asserts itself in its own denial. When
discords are hard and stubborn, and intellectual and practical unification are far to
seek nothing is commoner than the device of securing the needed unity by recourse
to an emotion which feeds on the very brute variety. Religion and art and romantic
affection are full of examples.

82 Studies in Logical Theoey

ceasing to use them. Logical theory will get along as well
as does reflective practice, when it sticks close by and
observes the directions and checks inherent in each successive
phase of the evolution of the cycle of experiencing. The
problem in general of validity of the thinking process as dis-
tinct from the validity of this or that process arises only
when thinking is isolated from its historic position and its
material context.

3. But Lotze is not yet done with the problem of validity,
even from his own standpoint. The ground shifts again
under his feet. It is no longer a question of the validity of
the idea or meaning with which thought is supposed to set
out; it is no longer a question of the validity of the process
of thinking in reference to its own product; it is the ques-
tion of the validity of the product. Supposing, after all,
that the final meaning, or logical idea, is thoroughly coher-
ent and organized; supposing it is an object for all conscious-
ness as such. Once more arises the question: What is the
validity of even the most coherent and complete idea? — a
question which rises and will not down. We may recon-
struct our notion of the chimera until it ceases to be an
independent idea and becomes a part of the system of Greek
mythology. Has it gained in validity in ceasing to be
an independent myth, in becoming an element in sys-
tematized myth? Myth it was and myth it remains.
Mythology does not get validity by growing bigger. How
do we know the same is not the case with the ideas which
are the product of our most deliberate and extended scien-
tific inquiry? The reference again to the content as the
self -identical object of all consciousness proves nothing;
the matter of a hallucination does not gain worth in propor-
tion to its social contagiousness. Or the reference proves
that we have not as yet reached any conclusion, but are enter-
taining a hypothesis — since social validity is not a matter of

The Content and Object op Thought 83

mere common content, but of securing participation in a
commonly adjudged social experience through action directed
thereto and directed by consensus of judgment.

According to Lotze, the final product is, after all, still
thought. Now, Lotze is committed once for all to the notion
that thought, in any form, is directed by and at an outside
reality. The ghost haunts him to the last. How, after all,
does even the ideally perfect valid thought apply or refer to
reality ? Its genuine subject is still beyond itself. At the
last Lotze can dispose of this question only by regarding
it as a metaphysical, not a logical, problem (Vol. II, pp.
281, 282). In other words, logically speaking, we are at the
end just exactly where we were at the beginning — in the
sphere of ideas, and of ideas only, plus a consciousness of
the necessity of referring these ideas to a reality which is
beyond them, which is utterly inaccessible to them, which is
out of reach of any influence which they may exercise, and
which transcends any possible comparison with their results.
"It is vain," says Lotze, "to shrink from acknowledging the
circle here involved .... all we know of the external world
depends upon the ideas of it which are within us" (Vol. II,
p. 185). "It is then this varied world of ideas within us
which forms the sole material directly given to us " (Vol. II,
p. 186). As it is the only material given to us, so it is the
only material with which thought can end. To talk about
knowing the external world through ideas which are merely
within us is to talk of an inherent self-contradiction. There
is no common ground in which the external world and our
ideas can meet. (^In other words, the original implication of
a separation between an independent thought-materiail and
an independent thought-function and purpose lands us inev-
itably in the metaphysics of subjective idealism, plus a
belief in an unknown reality beyond, which unknowable is yet
taken as the ultimate test of the value of our ideas as just

84 Studies in Logical Theoby

subjective.) The subjectivity of the psychical event infects
at the last the meaning or ideal object. Because it has been
taken to be something "in itself," thought is also something
"in itself," and at the end, after all our maneuvering we are
where we began: — with two separate disparates, one of
meaning, but no existence, the other of existence, but no
meaning.

The other aspect of Lotze's contradiction which completes
the circle is clear when we refer to his original propositions,
and recall that at the outset he was compelled to regard the
origination and conjunctions of the impressions, the elements
of ideas, as themselves the effects exercised by a world of
things already in existence (see p. 31). He sets up an
independent world of thought, and yet has to confess that
both at its origin and termination it points with absolute
necessity to a world beyond itself. Only the stubborn
refusal to take this initial and terminal reference of thought
beyond itself as having a historic meaning, indicating a par-
ticular place of generation and a particular point of fulfilment
in the drama of evolving experience, compels Lotze to give
such bifold objective reference a purely metaphysical turn.

When Lotze goes on to say (Vol. II, p. 191) that the
measure of truth of particular parts of experience is found in
asking whether, when judged by thought, they are in harmony
with other parts of experience ; when he goes on to say that
there is no sense in trying to compare the entire world of
ideas with a reality which is non-existent, excepting as it
itself should become an idea, Lotze lands where he might
better have frankly commenced.' He saves himself from utter

1 Lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the antithesis between
our ideas and the objects to which they are directed is itself a part of the world of
ideas (Vol. II, p. 192). Barring the phrase " world of ideas " (as against world of
continuous experiencing) he need only have commenced at this point to have traveled
straight and arrived somewhere. But it is absolutely impossible to hold both this
view and that of the original independent existence of something given to and in
thought and an independent existence of a thought-activity, thought-forms, and
thought-conteuts.

The Content and Object of Thought 85

skepticism only by claiming that the explicit assumption of
skepticism, the need of agreement of a ready-made idea as
such, with an extraneous independent material as such, is
meaningless. (He defines correctly the work of thought as
consisting in harmonizing the various portions of experi-
ence with each other: a definition which has meaning only
in connection with the fact that experience is continually inte-
grating itself into a wholeness of coherent meaning deep-
ened in significance by passing through an inner distraction
in which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered
partial and hence objectively conscious.^ In this case the
test of thought is the harmony or unity of experience actually
effected. In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought,
as thought, just as at the other limit thought originates out
of a situation which is not refiectional in character. Inter-
pret this before and beyond in a historic sense, as an affair of
the place occupied and r5le played by thinking as a function
in experience in relation to other functions, and the inter-
mediate and instrumental character of thought, its dependence
upon xmreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon a
consequent experience for its test of final validity, becomes
significant and necessary. Taken at large, it plunges us in
the depths of a hopelessly complicated and self-revolving
metaphysic.

A CRITICAIi STUDY OF BOSANQUBT'S THEORY OF

JUDGMENT'

Bosanquet's theory of the judgment, in common with all
such theories of the judgment, necessarily involves the
metaphysical problem of the nature of reality and of the
relation of thought to reality. That the judgment is the
function by which knowledge is attained is a proposition
which would meet with universal acceptance. But knowl-
edge is itself a relation of some sort between thought and
reality. The view which any logician adopts as to the
nature of the knowledge-process is accordingly conditioned
by his metaphysical presuppositions as to the nature of
reality. It is equally true that the theory of the judgment
developed from any metaphysical standpoint serves as a
test of the validity of that standpoint. We shall attempt in
the present paper to show how Bosanquet's theory of the
judgment develops from his view of the nature of reality,
and to inquire whether the theory succeeds in giving such
an account of the knowledge-process as to corroborate the
presupposition underlying it.

Bosanquet defines judgment as "the intellectual function
which defines reality by significant ideas and in so doing
affirms the reality of those ideas" (p. 104).^ The form of
the definition suggests the nature of his fundamental prob-

1 The criticism of Bosanctuet's theory of the judgment offered in this paper is
from the standpoint of the theory of the judgment developed by Professor John
Dewey, in his lectures on " The Theory of Logic." WhUe the chief interest of the
paper, as the title implies, is critical, it has been necessary to devote a portion of it
to the exposition of the point of view from which the criticism is made. — H. B. T.

2 The references throughout this paper are to the pages of Vol. I of Bebnabd
Bosanquet, Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge, Oxford, 1888.

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 87

lem. There is, on the one hand, a world of reality which
must be regarded as having existence outside of and inde-
pendently of the thoughts or ideas we are now applying to
it; and there is, on the other hand, a world of ideas whose
value is measured by the possibility of applying them to
reality, of qualifying reality by them. The judgment is the
function which makes the connection between these two
worlds. If judgment merely brought one set of ideas into
relation with another set, then it could never give us any-
thing more than purely hypothetical knowledge wliose
application to the real world would remain forever prob-
lematic. It would mean that knowledge is impossible,
a result which seems to be contradicted by the existence
of knowledge. The logician must, therefore, as Bosan-
quet tells us, regard it as an essential of the act of judg-
ment that it always refers to a reality which goes beyond
and is independent of the act itself (p. 104). His cen-
tral problem thus becomes that of understanding what the
nature of reality is which permits of being defined by
ideas, and what the nature of an idea is that it can ever be
affirmed to be real. How does the real world get represen-
tation in experience, and what is the guarantee that the
representation, when obtained, is correct?

The defining of the problem suggests the view of the
nature of reality out of which Bosanquet's theory of the
judgment grows. The real world is to him a world which
has its existence quite independently of the process by
which it is known. The real world is there to be known,
and is in no wise modified by the knowledge which we
obtain of it. The work of thought is to build up a world of
ideas which shall represent, or correspond to, the world of
reality. The more complete and perfect the correspondence,
the greater our store of knowledge.

Translated into terms of the judgment, this representa-

88 Studies in Logical Theoey

tional view means that the subject of the judgment must
always be reality, while the predicate is an idea. But when
we examine the content of any universal judgment, or even of
an ordinary judgment of perception, the subject which
I appears in the judgment is evidently not reality at all, if by
j reality we mean something which is in no sense constituted
I by the thought-process. CWhen I say, "The tree is green,"
the subject, tree, cannot be regarded as a bit of reality
which is given ready-made to the thought-process. The
ability to perceive a tree, to distinguish it from other
objects and single it out for the application of an idea,
evidently implies a long series of previous judgments.)
! The content "tree" is itself ideal. As Bosanquet forcibly
states it: "If a sensation or elementary perception is in
consciousness (andif not we have nothing to do with it
in logic), it already bears the form of thinking" (p. 33).
How, theii,~xaHr -it serve as the subject of a judgment?
Tj Bosanquet 's solution of the problem is to say that the real
subject of a judgment is not the grammatical subject which
appears in a proposition, but reality itself. In the more
complex forms of judgment the reference to reality is dis-
guised by the introduction of explicit ideas to designate
the portion of reality to which reference is made (pp. 78,
79). In the simplest type of judgment known, however, the
qualitative judgment of perception, the reference to reality
appears within the judgment itself. The relations of thought
to reality and of the elements of the judgment to one
another can, accordingly, most readily be seen in the con-
sideration of this rudimentary form of judgment in which
the various parts lie bare before us.
Bosanquet describes it as follows:

If I say, pointing to a particular house, " That is my home," it
is clear that in this act of judgment the reference conveyed by the
demonstrative is indispensable. The significant idea " my home "

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 89

is aflfirmed, not of any other general significant idea in my mind,
but of something which is rendered unique by being present to me
in perception In making the judgment, "That is my home," I
extend the present sense-perception of a house in a certain land-
scape by attaching to it the ideal content or meaning of " home ; "
and moreover, in doing this, I pronounce the ideal content to be,
so to speak, of one and the same tissue with what I have before
me in my actual perception That is to say, I affirm the meaning
of the idea, or the idea considered as a meaning, to be a real quality
of that which I perceive in my perception.

The same account holds good of every perceptive judgment ;
when I see a white substance on a plate and judge that "it is
bread " I affirm the reference, or general meaning which consti-
tutes the symbolic idea "bread" in my mind, to be a real quality
of the spot or point in present perception which I attempt to des-
ignate by the demonstrative "this." The act defines the given
but indefinite real by affirmation of a quality, and affirms reality of
the definite quality by attaching it to the previously imdefined
real. Reality is given for me in present sensuous perception, and
in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes
with it. (Pp. 76, 77.)

Again, he says that the general features of the judgment
of perception are as follows :

There is a presence of a something in contact with our sensi-
tive self, which, as being so in contact, has the character of reality;
and there is the qualification of this reality by the reference to it
of some meaning such as can be symbolized by a name (p. 77).

Our point of contact with reality, the place where reality \
gets into the thought-process, is, according to this view, to i
be found in the simplest, most indefinite type of judgment \
of perception. We meet with reality in the mere unde-
fined " this " of primitive experience. But each such ele-
mentary judgment about an undefined "this" is an isolated
bit of experience. Each " this" could give us only a detached
bit of reality at best, and the further problem now confronts
us of how we ever succeed in piecing our detached bits of

90 Studies in Logical Theoey

reality together to form a real world. Bosanquet's explana-
tion is, in his words, this:

The real world, as a definite organized system, is for me an
extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of
judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain
such an extension (p. 77).

Again he says:

The subject in every judgment of Perception is some given spot
or point in sensuous contact with the percipient self. But, as all
reality is continuous, the subject is not merely this given spot or
point. It is impossible to confine the real world within this or that
presentation. Every definition or qualification of a point in pres-
ent perception is afiSrmed of the real world which is continuous
with present perception. The ultimate subject of the perceptive
judgment is the real world as a whole, and it is of this that, in
judging, we aflSrm the qualities or characteristics. (P. 78.)

The problem is the same as that with which Bradley
struggles in his treatment of the subject of the judgment,
and the solution is also the same. Bradley's treatment
^. of the point is perhaps somewhat more explicit. Like
Bosanquet, he starts with the proposition that the subject of
the judgment must be reality itself and not an idea, be-
cause, if it were the latter, judgment could never give us
anything but a union of ideas, and a union of ideas remains
forever universal and hypothetical. It can never acquire
the uniqueness, the singularity, which is necessary to make
it refer to the real. Uniqueness can be found only in our
contact with the real. But just where does our contact
with the real occur? Bradley recognizes the fact that it
cannot be the content — even in the case of a simple sensa-
tion — which gives us reality. The content of a sensation is a
thing which is in my consciousness, and which has the form
which it presents because it is in my consciousness. Keality
is precisely something which is not itself sensation, and can-
not be in my consciousness. If I say, "This is white," the

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 91

"this" has a content -which is a sensation of whiteness.
But the sensation of whiteness is not reality. The experi-
ence brings with it an assurance of reality, not because its
content is the real, but because it is " my direct encounter
in sensible presentation with the real world.'" To make]
the matter clearer, Bradley draws a distinction between the
this and the thisness. In every experience, however simple,
there is a content — a "thisness" — which is not itself^
unique. ( Considered merely as content, it is applicable to an
indefinite number of existences; in other words, it is an
idea.j But there is also in every experience a "this" which
is unique, but which is not a content. It is a mere sign of
existence which gives the experience uniqueness, but nothing
else. The "thisness" falls on the side of the content, and
the " this " on the side of existence. (^It is exactly the dis-
tinction which Bosanquet has in mind in the passages quoted
in which he tells us that "reality is given for me in present
sensuous perception, and in the immediate feeling of my
own sentient existence which goes with it;"jand again when
he says: " There is a presence of a something in contact
with our sensitive self, which, as being so in contact, has the
character of reality." The same point is made somewhat
more explicitly in his introduction when he says that the
individual's present perception is not, indeed, reality as
such, but is his present point of contact with reality as
such (p. 3).

(But has this distinction between the content of an ex-
perience and its existence solved the problem of how we
know reality?} When Bosanquet talks of knowing reality,
he means possessing ideas which are an accurate reproduc-
tion of reality. It is still far from clear how, according to
his own account, we could ever have any assurance that our
ideas do represent reality accurately, if we can nowhere find

I F. H, BsADiiEX, Principles of Logic, p. 64.

„:t-Vv

92 Studies in Logical Theoby

a point at which the content of an experience can be held to
give us reality. The case is still worse when we go beyond
the problem of how any particular bit of reality can be
known, and ask ourselves how reality as a whole can be
known. The explanation offered by both Bradley and
Bosanquet is that by means of judgment we extend the bit
> I of reality of whose existence we get a glimpse through a
peep-hole in the curtain of sensuous perception, and thus
build up the organized system of reality. In a passage pre-
viously quoted, Bosanquet tells us that all reality is continu-
ous, and therefore the real subject of a judgment cannot be
the mere spot or point which is given in sensuous percep-
tion, but must be the real world as a whole. But how does
he know that reality is continuous, and that the real world is
an organized system ? Our only knowledge of reality coines
through judgment, and judgment brings us into contact with
reality only at isolated points. When he tells us that reality
is a continuous whole, he does so on the basis of a meta-
physical presupposition which is not justifiable by his theory
of the judgment. The only statement about reality which
could be maintained on the basis of his theory is that some
sort of a reality exists, but the theory furnishes equal justifi-
cation for the assurance that this reality is of such a nature
that we can never know anything more about it than the
bare fact of its existence. Moreover, the bare fact of the exist-
ence of reality comes to us merely in the form of a feeling of
our own sentient existence which goes with sense-perception.
But the mere assurance that somewhere behind the curtain
of sensuous perception reality exists (even if this could go
unchallenged), accompanied by the certainty that we can never
by any possibility know anything more about it, is practi-
cally equivalent to the denial of the possibility of knowledge.'

1 The difficulty, of course, is not a merely formal one, much less a verbal one.
Instinctively we grant to Bosanquet his statement that reality is a continuous
whole; we feel it almost captious to question his right to it. But why? Because

Bosanqubt's Thboet op Judgment 93

Although the denial of the possibility of knowledge seems
to be the logical outcome of the premises, it is not the con-
clusion reached by Bosanquet. At the outset of his treatise,
Bosanquet propounds the fundamental question we have
been considering in these words: "How does the analysis
of knowledge as a systematic function, or system of func-
tions, explain that relationship in which truth appears to
consist, between the human intelligence on the one hand,
and fact or reality on the other?" His answer is: "To this
difficulty there is only one reply. If the object-matter of I
reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not only
our analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of
reality." (Pp. 2, 3.) The statement is an explicit recognition
of the impossibility of bridging the chasm between a reality
outside the content of knowledge and a known real world.
It brings before us the dilemma contained in Bosanquet's
treatment of the subject of the judgment. On the one hand ] ^''
the subject of the judgment must be outside the realm of my
thoughts. If it were not, judgment would merely establish
a relation between my ideas and would give me no knowledge
of the real world. On the other hand, the subject of the '■
judgment must be within the realm of my thoughts. If it
were not, I could never assert anything of it; could never
judge, or know it. The stress he lays on the first horn of
the dilemma has been shown. It remains to show his recog-
nition of the second horn, and to find out whether or not he
discovers any real reconciliation between the two.

Bosanquet sums up the section of the introduction on
knowledge and its content, truth, with the following para-
graph;

the content of judgment is continuous; judgment is always engaged with the deter-
mination of a related totality. But if all content-is ideal, and judgment is just the
application of this content to reality in virtue of an isolated contact, surely it begs
the entire question to say that reality apart from the content applied is continuous,
and then to use this assertion to justify the objective validity of the judgment — its
element of permanent truth.

94 Studies in Logical Theory

The real world for every individual is thus emphatically his
world; an extension and determination of his present perception,
which perception is to him not indeed reality as such, but his point
of contact with reality as such. Thus in the enquiry which will
have to be undertaken as to the logical subject of the judgment, we
shall find that the subject, however it may shift, contract, and
expand, is always in the last resort some greater or smaller element
of this determinate reality, which the individual has constructed by
identifying significant ideas with that world of which he has assur-
ance through his own perceptive experience. In analyzing common
judgment it is ultimately one to say that I judge and that the real
world for me, my real world, extends itself, or maintains its organ-
ized extension. This is the ultimate connection by which the dis-
tinction of subject and predication is involved in the act of aflBrma-
tion or enunciation which is the differentia of judgment. (Pp. 3, 4).

' Here the subject of the judgment appears as an element
of a reality which the individual has constructed by identify-
ing significant ideas with that world of which he has assur-

I ance through his own perceptive experience. (But the very
point with reference to the subject of the judgment pre-
viously emphasized is that it is not and cannot be something
which the individual has constructed.) The subject of the
judgment must be reality, and reality does not consist of
ideas, even if it be determined by them. It does not mend
matters to explain that the individual has constructed his
real world by identifying significant ideas with that world of
which he has assurance through his own perceptive experi-
ences, because, as we have seen, " the individual's perceptive
experiences" either turn out to be merely similar mental
constructions made at a prior time, so that nothing is gained
by attaching to them, or else they mean once more the mere
shock of contact which is supposed to give assurance that some
sort of reality exists, but which gives no assurance of what
it is. That and what, this and thisness still remain detached.
When he talks of the real world for any individual we are
left entirely in the dark as to what the relation between the

Bosanquet's Theory op Judgment 95

real world as it is for any individual and the real world as
it is for itself may be, or how the individual is to gain any
assurance that the real world as it is for him represents the
real world as it is for itself.

Another attempt at a reconciliation of these opposing views
leaves us no better satisfied. The passage is as follows:

The real world, as a definite organized system, is for me an
extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of
judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to eflFect and sustain
such an extension. It makes no essential difiFerence whether the
ideas whose content is pronounced to be an attribute of reality
appear to fall within what is given in perception, or not. We shall !
find hereafter that it is vain to attempt to lay down boundaries
between the given and its extension. The moment we try to do
this we are on the wrong track. The given and its extension diflfer
not absolutely but relatively; they are continuous with each other,
and the metaphor by which we speak of an extension conceals from
us that the so-called "given"' is no less artificial than that by
which it is extended. It is the character and quality of being
directly in contact with sense-perception, not any fixed datiun of
content, that forms the constantly shifting center of the individual's
real world, and spreads from that center over every extension which
the system of reality receives from judgment. (P. 77.)

In this passage by the "given" he evidently means the
content of sensory experience, the thisness, the what. It is,
as he says, of the same stuff as that by which it is extended.
Both the given and that by which it is extended are artificial
in the sense of not being real according to Bosanquet's
interpretation of reality ; they are ideas. But if all this is
admitted, what becomes of the possibility of knowledge?
Bosanquet undertakes to rescue it by assuring us again that
it is the character and quality of being directly in contact
with sense-perception, not any fixed datum of content, that
forms the center of the individual's real world and gives the
stamp of reality to his otherwise ideal extension of this
center. Here again we find ourselves with no evidence

96 Studies in Logical Theory

that the content of our knowledge bears any relation to
reality. We have merely the feeling of vividness attached
to sensory experience which seems to bring us the certainty
that there is some sort of a reality behind it, but this is
not to give assurance that our ideal content even belongs
rightfully to that against which we have bumped, much
less of how it belongs— and only this deserves the title
"knowledge."

In the chapter on "Quality and Comparison," in which
he takes up the more detailed treatment of the simplest
types of judgment of perception, he comes back to the same
contradiction, and again attempts to explain how both horns
of his dilemma must be true. The passage is this :

1 The Eeality to which we ascribe the predicate is imdoubtedly
self-existent ; it is not merely in my mind or in my act of judg-

' ment ; if it were, the judgment would only be a game with my

i ideas. It is well to make this clear in the case before us, for in the
later forms of the judgment it will be much disguised. Still the
reality which attracts my concentrated attention is also within my
act of judgment ; it is not even the whole reality present to my
perception ; still less of course the whole self -existent Reality
which I dimly presuppose. The immediate subject of the judg-
ment is a mere aspect, too indefinite to be described by explicit
ideas except in as far as the qualitative predication imposes a first
specification upon it. This Reality is in my judgment ; it is the
point at which the actual world impinges upon my consciousness
as real, and it is only by judging with reference to this point that I
can refer the ideal content before my mind to the whole of reality
which I at once believe to exist, and am attempting to construct.

I The Subject is both in and out of the Judgment, as Eeality is both

; in and out of my consciousness. (Pp. 113, 114.)

The conclusion he reaches is a mere restatement of the

I difficulty. The problem he is trying to solve is how the

- subject can be both in and out of the judgment, and how

1 the subject without is related to the subject within. The

mere assertion that it is so does not help us to understand it.

Bosanquet's Theoby op Judgment 97

His procedure seems like taking advantage of two mean-
ings of sense-perception, its conscious quality and its brute
abrupt immediacy, and then utilizing this ambiguity to solve
a problem which grows out of the conception of judgment
as a reference of idea to reality.

Turning from his treatment of the world of fact to his
discussion of the world of idea, from the subject to the
predicate, as it appears in his theory of the judgment we
find again a paradox which must be recognized and cannot
be obviated. An idea is essentially a meaning. It is not
a particular existence whose essence is uniqueness as is the
case with the subject of the judgment, but is a meaning
whose importance is that it may apply to an indefinite num-
ber of unique existences. Its characteristic is universality.
And yet an idea regarded as a psychical existence, an idea
as a content in my mind, is just as particular and unique as
any other existence. How, then, does it obtain its charac-
teristic of universality ? Bosanquet's answer is that it must
be universal by means of a reference to something other
than itself. Its meaning resides, not in its existence as a
psychical image, but in its reference to something beyond
itself. Now, any idea that is affirmed is referred to reality,
but do ideas exist which are not being affirmed ? If so,
their reference cannot be to reality. Bosanquet discusses
the question in the second section of his introduction as fol-
lows:

It is not easy to deny that there is a world of ideas or of mean-
ings, which simply consists in that identical reference of symbols
by which mutual understanding between rational beings is made
possible. A mere suggestion, a mere question, a mere negation,
seem all of them to imply that we sometimes entertain ideas with-
out affirming them of reality, and therefore without affirming their
reference to be a reference to something real or their meaning to
be fact. We may be puzzled indeed to say what an idea can
mean, or to what it can refer, if it does not mean or refer to some-

98 Studies in Logical Theory

thing real — to some element in the fabric continuously sustained
by the judgment which is our consciousness. On the other hand,
it would be shirking a difficulty to neglect the consideration that
an idea, while denied of reality, may nevertheless, or even must,
possess an identical and so intelligible reference — a symbolic
value — for the rational beings who deny it. A reference, it may
be argued, must be a reference to something. But it seems as
if in this case the something were the fact of reference itself,
the rational convention between intelligent beings, or rather the
world which has existence, whether for one rational being or for
many, merely as contained in and sustained by such intellectual
reference.

I only adduce these ' considerations in order to explain that
transitional conception of an objective world or world of meanings,
distinct from the real world or world of facts, with which it is
impossible wholly to dispense in an account of thought starting
from the individtial subject. The paradox is that the real world
or world of fact thus seems for us to fall within and be included
in the objective world or world of meanings, as if all that is fact
were meaning, but not every meaning were fact. This results in
the contradiction that something is objective, which is not real.
(Pp. 4, 5.)

In the seventh section of the introduction Bosanquet
explains his meaning further by what the reader is privi-
leged to regard as a flight of the imagination — a mere
simile — which he thinks may, nevertheless, make the matter
clearer.

We might try to think that the world, as known to each of us,
is constructed and sustained by his individual consciousness ; and
that every other individual also frames for himself, and sustains by
the action of his intelligence, the world in which he in particuleir
lives and moves. Of course such a construction is to be taken as a
reconstruction, a construction by way of knowledge only ; but for
our present purpose this is indifferent. Thus we might think of
the ideas and objects of our private world rather as corresponding to
than as from the beginning identical with those which our fellow-
men are occupied in constructing each within his own sphere of
consciousness. And the same would be true even of the objects and

Bosanqubt's Theory op Judgment 99

contents within our own world, in as far as an act or effort would
be required to maintain them, of the same kind with that which

was originally required to construct them Thus the paradox

of reference would become clearer. We should understand that we
refer to a correspondence by means of a content. We should soften
down the contradiction of saying that a name to meet which we have
and can get nothing but an idea, nevertheless does not stand for that
idea but for something else. We should be able to say that the
name stands for those elements in the idea which correspond in all
our separate worlds, and in our own world of yesterday and of
today, considered as so corresponding. (Pp. 45, 46.)

According to this view, the idea obtains the universality
which constitutes it an idea by a sort of process of elimina-
tion. It is like a composite photograph. It selects only
the common elements in a large number of particular exist-
ences, and thus succeeds in representing, or referring to, all
the particular existences which have gone to make it up.
But when we come to consider the bearing which this view
of universality, or generalized significance, has on our esti-
mate of the knowledge-process, we feel that it has not solved
the problem for us. In the first place, the idea in its exist-
ence is just as particular when regarded as made up of the
common elements of many ideas as is any of the ideas whose
elements are taken. A composite photograph is just as
much a single photograph as any one of the photographs
which are taken to compose it. The chasm between the
particularity of the psychical image and the universality
of its meaning is not bridged by regarding the content
of the image as made up by eliminating unlike elements
in a number of images. The stuff with which thought has
to work is still nothing more than a particular psychical
image, and the problem of what gives it its logical value
as a general significance is still unsolved. Nor does it
seem possible to find anything in the existence of the image
which could account for its reference to something outside

100 Studies in Logical Theory

of itself. The fact of reference itself becomes an ultimate
mystery.'

But even waiving this difficulty, the judgment must still
appear truncated, if it really totally disregard a part of its
content — i. e., the particular existence of the image as part
of the judging consciousness. The theory holds that the
particular existence of the image has no logical value. It
is only its meaning, or general reference, which has logi-
cal value. But the image qua image is just as real as that
to which it is supposed to refer. If the judgment really
does ignore its existence, then it ignores a portion of the
reality it attempts to represent, and stands self-confessed
as a failure.^ At still another point, ideas, as Bosanquet rep-
resents them, prove to be unsatisfactory tools to use in the
work of building up reality. In Bosanquet's words : "The
meaning tyrannizes over the psychical image in another
respect. Besides crushing out of sight its particular and
exclusive existence, it also crushes out part of its content"
(p. 74). The idea, as we use it, is not, as to content, a
complete or accurate representation of anything real. To
take Bosanquet's illustration :

Some one speaks to me of the ^Egean sea, which I have never
seen. He tells me that it is a deep blue sea under a cloudless sky,
studded with rocky islands. The meanings of these words are a
problem set to my thought. I have to meet him in the world of
objective references, which as intelligent beings we have in com-
mon. How I do this is my own affair, and the precise images at
my command will vary from day to day, and from minute to min-
ute. It sounds simple to say that I combine my recollections of
sea and sky at Torbay with those of the island-studded waters of

1 There is good reason for believing that Mr. Bosanqnet escapes, in his own
mind, the difficulty by the term " correspondence." " The name stands for these ele-
ments in the idea which correspond in the separate worlds ; " we may even be accused
of injustice in confusing this correspondence with bare identity of existence. But if
one idea corresponds to another in the sense of referring to it, what is this but the
fact to be explained — how an existence can refer beyond itself?

2 This conclusion is clearly recognized by Bbadley, Appearance and Beality,
chap. i.

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 101

Orkney or the Hebrides. Even so, there is much to adjust and
to neglect ; the red cliffs of Torbay, and the cloudy skies of the
north. But then again, my recollections are already themselves
symbolic ideas ; the reference to Torbay or the Hebrides is itself
a problem set to thought, and puts me upon the selection of index-
elements in fugitive images that are never twice the same. I have
first to symbolize the color of Torbay, using for the purpose any
blue that I can call to mind, and fixing, correcting, subtracting
from, the color so recalled, till I reduce it to a mere index quality;
and then I have to deal in the same way with the meaning or sig-
nificant idea so obtained, clipping and adjusting the qualities of
Torbay till it seems to serve as a symbol of the .fflgean. (Pp. 74, 75.)

And by the time all this is performed what sort of a rep-
resentation of reality is the idea? Evidently a very poor and
meager and fragmentary one.

It is so poor and fragmentary, that it cannot itself be
that which is affirmed of reality. It must be some other
fuller existence to be found in the world of meanings which
is affirmed. And yet how the meager content of the idea
succeeds in referring to the world of meanings, and acting
as the instrument for referring a meaning to reality, is not
at all clear. It seems impossible to explain reference intel-
ligibly by the concept of a correspondence of contents.

The fundamental difficulty in the interpretation of the
predicate is the same one that we encountered in the inter-
pretation of the subject. If the predicate is to be affirmed
of reality (and if it be not, it has no logical value), then it
must, when affirmed, be in some sense an accurate represen-
tation of reality. But the predicate is an idea, and, more-
over an idea which is, both in its existence and in its mean-
ing palpably the outcome of transformations wrought upon
given sensory contents by the individual consciousness. Since
the one poiat of contact vnth reality is in sensory experience,
the more simple sensory experiences are reacted upon and
-worked aver, the farther they recede from reality. The idea

102 Studies in Logical Theory

seems, therefore, in its very essence, a thing which never
can be affirmed of reality. As image it is itself a reality,
but not affirmed; as meaning it is that reality (the image)
manipulated for individual ends. "Why suppose that by dis-
torting reality we get it in shape to affirm of reality ? More-
over, the farther an idea is removed from immediate sen-
sory experience — in other words, the more abstract it
becomes — the less is the possibility of affirming it of reality.
The final outcome of this point of view, if we adhere rigor-
ously to its logic is that the more thinking we do, the less we
know about the real world. Bosanquet avoids this conclu-
sion by a pure act of faith. If knowledge is to be rescued,
we must believe that the work done by consciousness upon
the bits of reality given in sensory experience really does
succeed in building up a knowledge of reality for us. As
Bosanquet puts it : "The presentation of Reality, qualified
by an ideal content, is one aspect of Subject and Predication;
and my individual percipient consciousness determining
itself by a symbolic idea is the other. That the latter is
identified with the former follows from the claim of con-
scious thought that its nature is to know.'" (P. 83.)

To sum up the situation, Bosanquet starts out with the
assumption that by knowledge we must mean knowledge of a
world entirely independent of our ideas. If we fail to make
this assumption, knowledge becomes merely a relation between
ideas. But its whole importance seems to us to rest on
the conviction that it does give us knowledge of a world
which is what it is quite independently of our ideas about it,
and cannot in any sense be modified by what we think about
it. What knowledge does is to give us a copy or represen-
tation of the real world, whose value depends on the accuracy

I It would be suggestive to iuquiie in what sense conscious thought claims to
know. Is it a general claim which thought qua thought puts forth, or is it the claim
of the content of some particular thought? The former, of course, is a mere pious
aspiration having no reference to specific validity or truth ; the latter is precisely the
problem under consideration.

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 103

of the representation. And yet when we examine any indi-
vidual knowing consciousness, the subject which appears
within the judgment is never some portion of the world
which exists outside of the knowing consciousness, but always
some portion of the world which exists within the knowing
consciousness, and which is constituted by the knowledge
process. The predicate which is affirmed of reality is con-
stantly found to derive its meaning, its generalized signifi-
cance, not from its correspondence with, or reference to, the
real world outside of the knowing consciousness, but from
reference to a world of meanings, which consists in a sort of
convention among rational beings — a world whose existence
is distinctly within the knowing consciousness and not out-
side of it.' Between the real world, as Bosanquet conceives
it, and the world of knowledge, we find inserted on the side
of the subject, the world as known to each of us, and on the
side of the predicate, the objective world of meanings.
Neither of these is the real world. Both of them are ideal, i. e. ,
are constructions of the individual consciousness. We nowhere
find any satisfactory explanation of how these ideal worlds
are related to the real world. There is merely the assertion
that we must believe that they represent the real world in
order that we may believe that knowledge exists. But the
fact remains that whenever we try to analyze and explain
any particular judgment, what we find ourselves dealing with
is always the world as it exists to us as subject, and the
objective world of meanings as predicate. If we stop here, i
then knowledge turns out to be just what Bosanquet asserted
at the outset that it was not, i. e., a relation between ideas.
When we demand a justification for going farther than
this, we find none except the claim of conscious thought
that its nature is to know — a claim whose justice we have

1 Bosanquet would seem to have followed Lotze in this insertion of a world of
" meanings " intermediate between the individual idea as such and the real object
as such. See the criticism already passed, pp. 93-5.

104 Studies in Logical Theory

no possible means of testing, and which would not, even if
admitted, be of the slightest value in deciding which par-
ticular judgment is true and which false.

Bosanquet's development of his subject has proved to be
throughout the necessary logical outcome of the presuppo-
sitions with reference to reality from which he starts. The
fundamental difficulty of erecting a theory of the knowledge-
process upon such a basis is recognized by him at the start
in a passage already quoted: "If the object-matter of reality
lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not only our
analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of
reality" (p. 2). But, in spite of this assertion, his funda-
mental conception of reality remains that of a system which
does lie outside the thought-process. His theory is an
attempt to reconcile the essentially irreconcilable views that
reality is outside of the thought-process, and that it is inside
of the thought-process, and he succeeds only by calling upon
our faith that so it is.

If it be true, as it seems to him to be, that we are com-
pelled to adhere to both of these views of reality, then surely
there is no other outcome. It means, however, that we finally
resign all hope of knowing reality. We may have faith in
its existence, but we have no way of deciding what particu-
lar judgment has reality in it as it should have it, and what
as it should not. All stand (and fall) on the same basis.
But does not Bosanquet himself point out a pathway which,
if followed farther, would reach a more satisfactory view of
the realm of knowledge? He has shown us that the only
sort of reality we know, or can know, is the reality which
appears within our judgment-process — the reality as known
to us. Would it not be possible to drop the presupposed
reality outside of the judgment-process (with which judg-
ment is endeavoring to make connections) and content our-
selves with the sort of reality which appears within the

Bosanquet's Theoey of Judgment 105

judgment-process? In other words, may there not be a
satisfactory view of reality which frankly recognizes its
organic relation to the knowledge-process, without at the
same time destroying its value as reality? Is it possible to
admit that reality is in a sense constituted in the judgment
without making it at the same time the figment of the indi-
vickial imagination — " a game with ideas" ?

Let us assume for the moment that the real difficulty
with Mr. Bosanquet's conception, the error that keeps him
traveling in his hopeless circles, is the notion that truth is a
matter of reference of ideas as such to reality as such, lead-
ing us to oscillate between the alternatives that either all
ideas have such reference, and so are true, constitute knowl-
edge; or else none have such reference, and so are false; or
else are mere ideas to which neither truth nor falsity can be
attributed. Let us ask if truth is not rather some specific
relation witlnn experience, something which characterizes
one idea rather than another, so that our problem is not how
an idea can refer to a reality beyond itself, but what are the
marks by which we discriminate a true reference from a
false one. Then let us ask for the criterion used in daily
life and in science by which to test reality.

\ If we ask the philosophically unsophisticated individual
why he believes that his house still exists when he is away
from it and has no immediate evidence of the fact, he will tell
you it is because he has found that he can go back to it time
and again and see it and walk into it. It never fails him when
he acts upon the assumption that it is there.^ He would
never tell you that he believed in its existence when he was
not experiencing it because his mental picture of his house
stood for and represented accurately an object in the real
world which was nevertheless of a different order of existence
from his mental picture. When you ask the physicist why
he believes that the laws of motion are true, he will tell you

106 Studies in Logical Theoky

that it is because he finds that bodies always do behave
according to them. He can predict just what a body will
do under given circumstances. He is never disappointed
however long he takes it for granted that the laws of motion
are true and that bodies behave according to them. The
only thing that could make him question their truth would
be to find some body which did not prove to behave -in
accordance with them. The criterion is the same in both
cases. It is the practical criterion of what as a matter of
fact will work. That which can safely be taken for granted
as a basis for further action is regarded as real and true. It
remains real so long, and only so long, as it continues to
fulfil this condition. As soon as it ceases to do so, it
ceases to be regarded as real. When a man finds that he
can no longer obtain the accustomed experience of seeing
and entering his house, he ceases to regard it as real. It
has burned down, or been pulled down. When a physicist
finds that a body does not, as a matter of fact, behave as a
given law leads him to expect it would behave, he ceases to
regard the law as true.

The contrast between the naive view of the criterion
of reality and the one we have just been discussing may
be brought out by considering how we should have to
interpret from each standpoint the constant succession of
facts in the history of science which have ceased to be facts.
For illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat.
It ceased to be a fact, says the theory we have been
reviewing, because further thought-constructions of the real
world convinced us that there is no reality which the idea
"flat-world" represents. The idea " round- world " alone
reproduces reality. It ceased to be a fact, says the naive
view, because it ceased to be a safe guide for action. Men
found they could sail around the world. Correspondence in
one case is pictorial, and its existence or non-existence can,

Bosanquet's Thboby op Judgment 107

as we have seen, never be ascertained. In the other, corre-
spondence is response, adjustment, the co-meeting of specific
conditions in further constituting of experience.

(In actual life, therefore, the criterion of reality which we
use is a practical one. ) The test of reality does not consist
in ascertaining the relationship between an idea and an x
which is not idea, but in ascertaining what experience can
be taken for granted as a safe basis for securing other expe-
riences. The evident advantage of the latter view, leaving
aside for the moment the question of its adequacy in other
respects, is that it avoids the fundamental skepticism at once
suggested by the former. How can we ever be sure that the
fact which we have discovered will stand the test of further
thought-constructions ? Perhaps it comes no nearer to reality
than the discarded one. Obviously we never can be sure
that any particular content of thought represents reality so
accurately and perfectly that it will never be subject to revi-
sion. If, however, the test of reality is the adequacy of a
given content of consciousness as a stimulus to action, as a
mode of control, we have an applicable standard. A given
content of consciousness is real — is a fact — so long as the
act resulting from it is adequate in adaptation to other con-
tents. It ceases to be real as soon as the act it stimulates
proves to be inadequate.

The view which places the ultimate test of facts, not in
any relationship of contents or existences, but in the prac-
tical outcome of thought, is the one which seems to follow
necessarily from a thoroughgoing conception of the judg-
ment as a function — an act. (Our fundamental biological
conception of the activities of living organisms is that acts
exist for the sake of their results.] Acts are always stimu-
lated by some definite set of conditions, and their value is
always tested by the adequacy with which they meet this set
of conditions. The judgment is no exception to the rule. It

108 Studies in Logical Theoky

is always an act stimulated by some set of conditions which
needs readjusting. Its outcome is a readjustment whose

! value is and can be tested only by its adequacy. It is
accordingly entirely in line with our reigning biological
conceptions to expect to find the ultimate criterion of truth

! and reality in the practical outcome of thought, and to seek
for an understanding of the nature of the "real" and of
the "ideal" within the total activity of judgment.

One difficulty besets us at the outset of such an investiga-
tion — that of being sure that we have a genuine judgment
under examination. A large portion of the so-called judg-
ments considered by logicians, even by those who emphasize
the truth that a judgment is an act, are really not judgments
at all, but contents of thought which are the outcome of
judgments — what might be called dead judgments, instead
of live judgments. \When we analyze a real act of judgment,
as it occurs in a living process of thought, we find given
elements which are always present^ There is always a cer-
tain situation which demands a reaction. The situation is
always in part determined and taken for grantgd, and in
part questioned, fit is determined in so far as it is a definite
situation of some sort ; it is undetermined in so far as it fur-
nishes an inadequate basis for further action and therefore
comes to consciousness as a problem.) For example, take one
of the judgments Bosanquet uses. "This is bread." We
have first to inquire when such a judgment actually occurs
in the living process of thought. A man does not make
such a judgment in the course of his thinking unless there
is some instigation to do so. Perhaps he is in doubt as to
whether the white object he perceives is bread or cake. He
wants some bread, but does not want cake. A closer inspec-
tion convinces him that it is bread, and the finished judg-
ment is formulated in the proposition: "This is bread."
What is the test of the reality of the bread, and the truth of

Bosanquet's Theoet of Judgment 109

the judgment? Evidently the act based on it. He eats the
bread. If it tastes like bread and affects him like bread, l
then the bread was real and the judgment true. If, on the 1
other hand, it does not taste like bread, or if it makes him
violently ill, then the "bread" was not real and the judgment
was false. In either case, the "this" — the experience to be
interpreted — is unquestioned. The man does not question
the fact that he has a perception of a white object. So much
is taken for granted and is imquestioned within that judg-
ment. But there is another part of the experience which is
questioned, and which remains tentative up to the conclusion
of the act of judgment; that is the doubt as to whether the
perceived white object is bread or something else. Every
live judgment, every judgment as it normally occurs in the
vital process of thought, must have these phases. It is only
when a judgment is taken out of its context and reduced to
a mere memorandum of past judgments that it fails to reveal
such parts. The man may, of course, go farther back. He
may wonder whether this is really white or not. But he falls
back then on something else which he takes unquestioningly
— a "this" experience of some sort or other.

So far we have considered the practical criterion of reality
merely as the one which is actually operative in everyday
Me, and as the one suggested by our biological theory of the
functions of living organisms. It also offers a suggestion
for the modified view of the nature of reality for which we
are in search. Our previous discussion brought out inci-
dentally a contradiction in the traditional theory of the
nature of reality which it will be worth while to consider
further. In dealing with the subject of the judgment,
reality seemed to be made synonymous with fact. In this
sense fact, or the real, was set off against the ideal. Knowl-
edge was viewed as the correspondence between real and
ideal. When we came to deal with the ideal itself — with

110 Studies in Logical Theory

the predicate of the judgment — there appeared in it an ele-
ment of fact or reality which proved a serious stumbling-
block for the theory. As image in my mind, the idea is
just as real as the so-called facts ; but this sort of reality
according to the theory in question is neither the reality
about which we are judging nor a real quality of it. Both
Bradley and Bosanquet are forced to admit that the judg-
ment ignores it, and is in so far by nature inadequate to its
appointed task of knowing reality.

The suggestion which the situation offers for a new theory
is that the view of reality has been too narrow. Reality
must evidently be a broad enough term to cover both fact
and idea. If so, the reality must be nothing more nor less
than the total process of experience with its continual
opposition of fact and idea, and their continual resolution
I through activity. That which previous theory has been
I calling the real is not the total reality, but merely one aspect
j of it. ( The problem of relation of fact and idea is thus the
problem of the relation of one form of reality to another,
and so a determinate soluble one, not a merely metaphysical
or general one.) Granting this, does it still remain true that
reality in the narrower sense, reality as fact, can be regarded
as a different order of existence from the ideal, and set over
against the thought-process? Evidently not. Fact and idea
become merely two aspects of a total reality. The way in
which fact and idea are distinguished has already been sug-
gested by the practical and biological criterion of fact, or
reality in the narrower sense. From this point of view,
fact is not a different order of existence from idea, but is
merely a part of the total process of experience which func-
tions in a given way. It is merely that part of experience
which is taken as given, and which serves as a stimulus to
action. Thus the essential nature of fact, or reality in the
popular sense, falls not at all on the side of its content, but

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 111

on the side of its function. Similarly the ideal is merely
that part of the total experience which is taken as tentative.
There is no problem as to how either of them is related to
reality. In this relationship they are reality. That which
previous theories had been calling the whole of reality now
appears as merely one aspect of it — the fact aspect — arti-
ficially isolated from the rest.

(When we translate this view of the nature of reality into
terms of a theory of the judgment, we find that we can agree
with Bosanquet in his definition of a judgment. It is an
act, and an act which refers an ideal content to reality. ]
The judgment must be an act, because it is essentially an
adaptation — a reaction toward a given situation. The sub-
ject of the judgment is that part of the content of experience
which represents the situation to be reacted to. It is that
which is taken for granted as given in each case. Now this
is, as we have seen, reality — in the narrower sense of that
term. What Bosanquet has been calling reality now appears
merely as the subject of the judgment taken out of its nor-
mal function and considered as an isolated thing. It is an
artificial abstraction. (It is accordingly true, as Bosanquet
insists, that the subject of the judgment must always be
reality — both in his sense of the term and in ours.^ This
reality is not real, however, by virtue of its independence
from the judgment, but by virtue of its function within the
judgment. His fundamental problem with reference to the
subject of the judgment is disposed of from this point of
view. The subject is wholly within the judgment, not in
any sense outside of it; but it is at the same time true that
the subject of the judgment is reality. The fact that the
subjects of all judgments — even, those of the most elementary
type — bear evident marks of the work done by thought upon
them, ceases to be a problem. The subject is essentially a
thing constituted by the doubt-inquiry process, and func-

112 Studies in Logical Thboey

tioning within it. The necessity for an intermediate real
world as it is to me between the real world and the knowing
process disappears, because the real world as it is to me is
the only real world of which the judgment can take account.
There is no longer any divorce between the content of the
subject and its existence. Reality in his sense of the term
— reality as fact — does not fall on the side of existence in
distinction from content, but on the side of function in dis-
tinction from content.

The predicate of the judgment is that part of the total
experience which is taken as doubtful, or tentative. As we
have seen, every act of adaptation involves a definite situa-
tion to be reacted to (subject) and an indefinite or tenta-
tive material with which to react (predicate). We have
pointed out that a situation which demands a judgment never
appears in consciousness as mere questioned or questionable
situation.' There is always present, as soon as the doubt
arises, some sort of tentative solution. This is the predicate
or idea. Just as the fact, or real in the narrower sense, is
that which is taken as given in the situation, so the ideal
is that which is taken as tentative. Its ideality does not
consist in its reference to another order of existence, the
objective world of meanings, but in its function within the
judgment, the estimate of the whole situation as leading up
to the adequate act. Just as we no longer have any need for
the mediation of the real world as known to me between sub-
ject and reality, so we no longer need the objective world of
meanings to bridge the chasm between the predicate and
reality. The difficulty of understanding how ideas can be
used to build up facts disappears when we regard fact and
idea, not as different orders of existence, but as contents
marking different phases of a total function.

1 Or, the situation as questioned is itself a fact, and tt perfectly determinate
(though not determined) one. See pp. 38, 50.

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 113

Ideas, as Bosanqnet represented them, proved to be |
extremely iiiisatisf actory tools to use in building up a knowl- ■
edge of reality. In the first place, their value as instruments i
of thought depends upon their universality. (We have
already reviewed Bosanquet's difficulties in attempting to
explain the universality of ideas.) The universality of an idea
cannot reside in its mere existence as image. Its existence
is purely particular. Its universality must reside in its ref-
erence to sdmething outside of itself. But no explanation of
how the particular existence — image — could refer to another
and fuller content of a different order of existence could be
discovered. The fact of reference remained an ultimate
mystery. { From the new point of view the image gains its
imiversality through its organizing function. It represents
an organized habit which may be brought to bear upon the
present situation, and which serves, by directing action, to
organize and unify experience as a^hole./' It is only as func-
tion that the concept of reference can be made intelligible.

Of course, considered as content, the idea is just as par-
ticular from this point of view as from any other. We still '
have to discuss the question as to whether or not the particu-
larity of the idea has a logical value. The fact that it had none
in Bosanquet's theory sets a limit to the validity of thought.
But if the real test of the validity of a judgment is the act
in which it issues, then the existential aspect of the idea
must have logical value. The existential aspect of the idea
is the "my" side of it. It is as my personal experience that
it exists. (But it is only as my idea that it has any impulsive
power, or can issue in action. Far from being ignored,
therefore, the existential aspect is essential to the logical,
the determinative, value of an idea.)

Ideas, according to the representational theory of knowl-
edge, proved to be a poor medium for knowing reality in
stiil another respect. They are in their very nature contents

114 Stddibs in Logical Theoey

that have been reduced from the fulness of experience to
mere index-signs. Even though their reference to a fuller
content in the objective world of meanings presented no
problem, still this objective world of meanings is far removed
from reality. And yet, in order to know, we must be able
to affirm ideas of reality. ( On the functional theory of ideas,
their value does not rest at all upon their representational
nature.) They are not taken either in their existence or in
their meaning as representations of any other content. They
are taken as contents which mark a given function, and their
value is determined entirely by the adequacy of the function
of which they are the conscious expression. Their content
may be as meager as you please. It may have been obtained
by a long process of reducing and transforming sensory
experience, but if it serve to enable its possessor to meet the
situation which called it up with the appropriate act, then it
has truth and value in th§ fullest sense. The reduction of
the idea to a mere index-sign presents no problem when we
realize that it is the tool of a given function, not the sign
for a different and fuller content. The idea thus becomes a
commendable economy in the thought-process, rather than a
reprehensible departure from reality.

We have already upon general considerations criticised
the point of view which holds that ideality consists in refer-
ence to another content. In arguing that this reference
cannot be primarily to reality itself, but rather to an inter-
mediate world of meanings, Bosanquet cites the question
and the negative judgment. In the question ideas are not
affirmed of reality, and in negation they are definitely denied
of reality, hence their reference cannot be to reality. It must
therefore be to an objective world of meanings. It may be
worth while to point out in passing that, from the functional
point of view, the part played by ideas in the question and
in negative judgment is the same that it is in affirmation.

Bosanquet's Theoky of Judgment 115

We have brought out the fact that all judgment arises in
a doubt. The earliest stage of judgment is accordingly a
question. Whether the process stops at that point, or is
carried on to an affirmation or negation, depends upon the
particular conditions. The ideas which appear in questions
present no other problem than those of affirmation. ( They
are ideas, not by virtue of their reference to another content
in the world of meanings, but by virtue of their function,
i. e., that of constituting that part of the total experience
which is taken as doubtful, and hence as in process. )

In order to make this point clear with reference to nega-
tive judgments, it will be necessary to consider the relation
of negative and positive judgments somewhat more in detail.
All judgment is in its earliest stages a question, but a ques-
tion is never mere question. There are always present some
suggestions of an answer, which make the process really a
disjunctive judgment. A question might be defined as a
disjunctive judgment in which one member of the disjunc-
tion is expressed and the others implied. If the process
goes on to take the form of affirmation or negation, one of
the suggested answers is selected. To follow out the illus-
tration of the bread used above, the judgment arises in a
doubt as to the nature of the white object perceived, but the
doubt never takes the form of a blank question. It at once
suggests certain possible solutions drawn from the mass of
organized experience at the command of the person judging.
At this stage the judgment is disjunctive. In the illustra-
tion it would probably take the form: "This is either bread
or cake." The further course of the judgment rejects the
cake alternative, and selects the bread, and the final outcome
of the judgment is formulated in the proposition: "This is
bread." But how did it happen that it did not take the
form: "This is not cake" ? That proposition is also involved
in the outcome, and implied in the judgment made. The

116 Studies in Logical Theoey

answer is that the form taken by the final outcome depends
entirely on the direction of interest of the person making
the judgment. If his interest happened to lie in obtaining
bread, then the outcome would naturally take the form:
"This is bread," and his act would consist in eating it. If
he happened to want cake, the natural form would be, "This
is not cake," and his act would consist in refraining from
eating. In other words, the question as to whether a judg-
ment turns out to be negative or positive is a question of
whether the stress of interest happens to fall on the selected
or on the rejected portions of the original disjunction. Every
determination of a subject through a predicate includes both.
The selection of one or the other according to interest affects
the final formulation of the process, but does not change the
relations of its various phases. An idea in a negative judg-
ment is just what it is in a positive judgment. In neither case
is it constituted an idea by reference to some other content.

So far we have outlined Bosanquet's theory of the judg-
ment ; have noted the apparently insoluble problems inherent
in his system, and have sketched a radically different theory
which offered a possible solution for his difficulties. ( It now
remains to develop the implications of the new theory fur-
ther by comparing its application to some of the more impor-
tant problems of logic with that of Bosanquet.) In closing
we shall have to inquire to what extent the new theory of
the judgment with its metaphysical implications has proved
more satisfactory than that of Bosanquet.

The special problems to be considered are (1) the rela-
tion of judgment to inference ; (2) the parts of the judg-
ment and their relationship; (3) the time element in the
judgment; and (4) the way in which one judgment can be
separated from another.

1. The discussion of the relation between judgment and
inference comes up incidentally in Bosanquet's treatment of

Bosanquet's Theoky op Judgment 117

the distinction between a judgment and a proposition (p. 79).
The proposition, he says, is merely the enunciative sentence
-which represents the act of thought called judgment. With
this distinction we should agree. In his discussion of the
point, however, he criticises Hegel's doctrine that a judg-
ment is distinguished from a proposition in that a judgment
maintains itself against a doubt, while a proposition is a
mere temporal affirmation, not implying the presence of a
doubt. The ground of his criticism is that judgment must
be regarded as operative before the existence of a conscious
doubt, and that, while it is true, as Hegel suggests, that
judgment and inference begin together, they both begin far-
ther back than the point at which conscious doubt arises.
Doubt marks the point at which inference becomes conscious
of its ground. Now, it is undoubted that inferences in
which the ground is implicit exist at an earlier stage of
experience than those in which it is explicit. The former
we usually call simple apprehension, and the latter judgment.
What Bosanquet wishes to do is to make the term "judg-
ment" cover both the implicit and the explicit activities.
The question at once arises whether such a use of terms is
accurate. (There is certainly a wide difference between an
inference which is conscious of its ground, and one which is
not.) It is conceivably a distinction of philosophic impor-
tance. To slur the difference by applying one name to both
accomplishes nothing. It will be remembered that the pres-
ence of a conscious doubt is the criterion of judgment
adopted in the standpoint from which we have been criticis-
ing Bosanquet's theory. We should accordingly make the
term "inference" a wider one than the term "judgment."
A judgment is an inference which is conscious of its ground.
Since fact and idea have been represented as constituted in
and through judgment, the question which at once suggests
itself is: What, from such a standpoint, is the criterion of

118 Studies in Logical Theory

fact and idea in the stage of experience previous to the
appearance of judgment? The answer is that the question
involves the psychological fallacy. There is no such distinc-
tion as fact and idea in experience previous to the appear-
ance of judgment. The distinction between fact and idea
arises only at the higher level of experience at which infer-
ence becomes conscious of its grounds. To ask what they
were previous to that is to ask what they were before they
were — a question which, of course, cannot be answered.

Our reason for not adopting Hegel's distinction between
a judgment and a proposition would accordingly not be the
same as Bosanquet's-. ( The question has already been
touched upon in the distinction between dead and live judg-
ments.] What Hegel calls a proposition is really nothing
but a dead judgment. His illustration of a temporal affirma-
tion is the sentence: "A carriage is passing the house."
That sentence would be a judgment, he says, only in case
there were some doubt as to whether or not a carriage was
passing. But the question to be answered first is: When
would such a "statement" occur in the course of our expe-
rience? It is impossible to conceive of any circumstances
in which it would naturally occur, unless there were some
doubt to be solved either of our own or of another. Per-
haps one is expecting a friend, and does not know at first
whether it is a carriage or a cart which is passing. Perhaps
some one has been startled, and asks: "What is this
noise?" What Hegel wishes to call a proposition is, accord-
ingly, nothing but a judgment taken out of its setting.

2. In dealing with the traditional three parts of the judg-
ment. — subject, predicate, and copula — Bosanquet disposes
of the copula at once, by dividing the judgment into subject
and predication. But the two terms "subject" and "predi-
cation" are not co-ordinate. Subject, as he uses it, is a
static term indicating a content. Predication is a dynamic

Bosanquet's Theoey of Judgment 119

term indicating the act of predicating. It implies some- [
thing which is predicated of something else, i. e., two con- !
tents and the act of bringing them into relation. ( Now, if |
what we understand by the copula is the act of predicating
abstracted from the content which is predicated of another
content, then it does not dispose of the copula as a separate
factor in judgment to include thing predicated and act of
predicating under the single term "predication." ) The term
"predication" might just as reasonably be made to absorb
the subject as well, and would then appear — as it really is
— synonymous with the term "judgment."

But Bosanquet's difficulties with the parts of the judg-
ment are not disposed of even by the reduction to subject
and predication. He goes on to say:

It is plain that the judgment, however complex, is a single idea.
The relations within it are not relations between ideas, but are
themselves a part of the idea which is predicated. In other words,
the subject must be outside the judgment in order that the content
of the judgment may be predicated of it. If not, we fall back into
" my idea of the earth goes round my idea of the sun," and this, as
we have seen, is never the meaning of " The earth goes roimd the
Sim.'' What we want is, " The real world has in it as a fact what
I mean by earth-going-round-sun." (P. 81.)

We have already pointed out the difficulties into which
Bosanquet's presupposition as to the nature of reality
plunges him. This is but another technical statement of
the same problem. If the subject is really outside of judg-
ment, then the entire content of the judgment must fall on
the side of predicate, or idea. In the paragraphs that fol-
low, Bosanquet brings out the point that the judgment must
nevertheless contain the distinction of subject and predi-
cate, since it is impossible to affirm without introducing a
distinction into the content of the affirmation. Yet he con-
siders this distinction to be merely a difference within an
identity. It serves to mark off the grammatical subject !

120 Studies in Logical Theory

and predicate, but cannot be the essential distinction of
subject and predicate. His solution of the puzzle is really
the one for which we have been contending, i. e., that "the
rear world is primarily and emphatically my world," but he
still cannot be satisfied with that kind of a real world as
ultimate. Behind the subject which presents my world he
postulates a real world which is not my world, but which my
world represents. It is the relation between this real world
and the total content of a judgment which he considers the
essential relation of judgment. This leaves him — as we
have pointed out — as far as ever from a theory of the rela-
tion of thought to reality, and, moreover, with no criterion
for the distinction of subject and predicate within the judg-
ment. To say that it is a difference within an identity does
not explain how, on a mere basis of content, such a difference
is distinguished within an identity or how it assumes the

j importance it actually has. He vibrates between taking the
whole intellectual content as predicate, the reality to be rep-

j resented as subject (in which case the copula would be the
"contact of sense-perception") and a distinction appearing
without reasonable ground or bearing within the intellectual

i content. When subject and predicate are regarded as the

i contents in which phases of a function appear, this difficulty

j no longer exists.

I 3. In discussing the time relations within judgment (p. 85)
Bosanquet first disposes of the view which holds that the sub-

I ject is prior to the predicate in time, and is distinguished from

i the predicate by its priority. ( He emphasizes the fact that no
content of consciousness can have the significance of a sub-
ject, except with reference to something already referred to
it as predicate.) But while it cannot be true that the parts
of the judgment fall outside of one another in time, it is yet
evident that in one sense at least the judgment is in time.
To make this clear, Bosanquet draws a provisional distinc-

Bosanquet's Theokt op Judgment 121

tion between the process of arriving at a judgment and the
completed judgment. The process of arriving at a judg-
ment is a process of passing from a subject with an indefinite
provisional predicate — a sort of disjunctive judgment — to
a subject with a defined predicate. (This process is evidently
in time, but it is as evidently not a transition from subject
to predicate. It is, as he says, a modification, pari passu,
of both subject and predicate.) The same distinction, he
thinks, must hold of the judgment when completed. But this
throws us into a dilemma with reference to the time-factor
in judgment. ( Time either is or is not an essential factor in
judgment. If it is not essential, then how explain the evi-
dent fact that the judgment as an intellectual process does
have duration? If it is essential, then how explain the fact
that its parts do not fall outside one another in time? ) Bosan-
quet evidently regards the former problem as the easier of
the two. His solution is that, while the judgment is an
intellectual process in time, still this is a purely external
aspect. The essential relation between subject and predicate
is not in time, since they are coexistent ; therefore time is not
an essential element in judgment.

The first point at which we take issue with this treatment
of time in relation to judgment is in the distinction between
the process of arriving at the judgment and the completed
judgment. Bosanquet himself defines judgment as an intel-
lectual act by which an ideal content is referred to reality.
Now, at what point does this act begin? Certainly at the
point where an ideal content is first applying to reality, and
this, as he points out, is at the beginning of the process
which he describes as the process of arriving at a judgment.
It is nothing to the point that at this stage the predicate is
tentative, while later it becomes defined. His process of
arriving at the judgment is exactly the process we have
been describing as the early stages of any and every judg-

122 Studies in Logical Theoey

ment. When he talks about the judgment as completed, he
has apparently shifted from the dynamic view of judgment
implied in his definition to a static view. CAU he could mean
by a completed judgment — in distinction to the total activity
of arriving at a judgment — is the new content of which we
find ourselves possessed when the total process of predication
is complete. But this content is not a judgment at all. It
is a new construction of reality which may serve either as
subject or as predicate in future judgments. }

I Now, if we regard the judgment as the total activity by
which an ideal content is referred to reality, then must we

I not regard time as an essential element? Bosanquet answers
this question in the negative, because he believes that if
time is an essential element, then the parts of the judgment
must necessarily fall outside one another in time. But is
this necessary? If the essence of judgment is the very
modification, pari passu, of subject and predicate, then
time must be an essential element in it, but it is not at all
necessary that its elements should fall outside of one another
in time. In other words, the dilemma which Bosanquet points

I out on p. 87 is not a genuine one. There is no difficulty

I involved in admitting that the judgment is a transition in
time, and still holding that its parts do not fall outside one

' another in time. (His own solution of the problem — i.e., that,
although judgment is an intellectual process in time, still time
is not an essential feature of it, because subject and predicate
are coexistent and judgment is a relation between them —
involves a desertion of his dynamic view of judgment. He
defines judgment, not as a relation between subject and
predicate, but as an intellectual act.^)

1 Of course, the distinction between the process of arriving as temporal, and the
essential relation of subject and predicate as eternal, harks back to the notion of
judgment as the process by which " we " reproduce, or make real for ourselves, o
reality already real within itself. And it involves just the same difficulties. The
relation of subject and predicate — this simultaneous distinction and mutual
reference — has meaning only in an act of adjustment, of attempt to control, within

Bosanquet's Theoey of Judgment 123

4. The discussion of the time-element in judgment leads
up to the next puzzle — that as to the way in which one
judgment can be marked off from another in the total activity
of thought. Bosanquet has pointed out that subject and pted-
icate are both of them present at every stage of the judging
process, and are undergoing progressive modification. If,
therefore, we take a cross-section of the process at any point,
we find both subject and predicate present; but a cross-
section at one point would not reveal quite the same subject
and predicate as the cross-section at another point. He comes |
to the conclusion that judgment breaks up into judgments as ■
rhomboidal spar into rhomboids (p. 88). It is, accordingly,
quite arbitrary to mark out any limits for a single judgment.
The illustration he gives of the point is as follows:

Take such an every-day judgment of mixed perception and
inference as, "He is coming down stairs and going into the
street." It is the merest chance whether I break up the process
thus, into two judgments as united by a mere conjunction, or,
knowing the man's habits, say, when I hear him half way down
stairs, " He is going out." In the latter case I smnmarize a more
various set of observations and inferences in a single judgment; but
the judgment is as truly single as each of the two which were before
separated by a conjunction; for each of them was also a summary
of a set of perceptions, which might, had I chosen, have been sub-
divided into distinct propositions expressing separate judgments;
e. g., " He has opened his door, and is going toward the staircase,

which we distribute' our conditions. When the act is completed, the relation
of subject and predicate, as subject and predicate, quite disappears. An eternal
relation of the two is meaningless ; we might as well talk of an eternal reaching
for the same distant object by the same hand. In such conceptions, we have only
grasped a momentary phase of a situation, isolated it, and set it up as an entity. Sig-
nificant results would be reached by considering the " synthetic " character (in the
Kantian sense) of judgment from this point of view. All modem logicians agree that
judgment must be ampliative, must extend knowledge ; that a " trifling proposition "
is no judgment at all. What does this mean save that judgment is developmental,
transitive, in effect and purport? And yet these same writers conceive of Beality as
St finished syst&m of content in a complete and unchanijeable single Judgment/ It is
impossible to evade the contradiction save by recognizing that since it is the busi-
ness of judgment to transform, its test (or Truth) is successful performance of the
particular transformation it has set itself, and that transformation is temporal.

124 Studies in Logical Theory

and is half way down, and is in the passage," etc. If I simply say,
" He is going out," I am not a whit the less conscious that I judge
all these different relations, but I then include them all in a single
systematic content " going out." (P. 89.)

But is it a question of merest chance which of these
various possibilities is actualized? Is Bosanquet really
looking — as he thinks — at the actual life of thought, or is he
considering, not what as a matter of fact does take place under
a concrete set of circumstances, but what might take place
under slightly differing sets of circumstances ? If it is true
that judgment is a crisis developing through adequate inter-
action of stimulus and response into a definite situation,
beginning with doubt and ending with a solution of the
doubt, then it is not true that its limits are purely arbitrary.
It begins with the appearance of the problem and its tenta-
tive solutions, and ends with the solution of a final response.
It does, of course, depend upon momentary interest, but this
does not make its limits arbitrary, for the interest is inherent,
I not external. In the case of Bosanquet's illustration, the
j question of whether one judgment or half a dozen is made
I is not a question of merest chance. It depends upon where
ithe interest of the person making the judgment is centered
i — in other words, upon what is the particular doubt to be
! solved. If the real doubt is as to whether the man will stay in
his room or go out, then when he is heard leaving his room
the solution comes in the form: "He is going out." But if
the doubt is as to whether he will stay in his room, go out, or
go into some other room, then the succession of judgments
occurs, each of which solves a problem. "He has opened
his door" — then he is not going to stay in his room; "He
is going toward the staircase" — then he is not going into a
room in the opposite direction, etc. It is impossible to con-
ceive of such a series of judgments as actually being made,
unless each one represents a problematic situation and its

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 125

determination. The only time that a man would, as a mat-
ter of fact, choose to break up the judgment, "He is going
out," into such a series, would be the time when each mem-
ber of the series had its own special interest as representing
a specific uncertain aim or problem. Nor is it altogether
true that in making the judgment, "He is going out," one is
not a whit the less conscious that he judges all these different
relations. He judges only such relations as are necessary to
the solution of the problem in hand. If hearing the man
open his door is a sufficient basis for the solution, then that
is the only one which consciously enters into the formation
of the judgment.

We have attempted to bring out in the preceding pages
what seem to be the contradictions and insoluble problems
involved in Bosanquet's theory of the jiidgment, and to
exhibit them as the logical outcome of his metaphysical pre-
suppositions. We have also tried to develop another theory
of the judgment involving a different view of the nature of
reality, and to show that the new theory is able to avoid
the difficulties inherent in Bosanquet's system. The change
in view-point briefly is this: Instead of regarding the real
world as self-existent, independently of the judgments we
make about it, we viewed it as the totality of experience
which is assured, i. e., determined as to certainty or specific
availability, through the instrumentality of judgment. We
thus avoided the essentially insoluble problem of how a
real world whose content is self-existent quite outside of
knowledge can ever be correctly represented by ideas. The
difficulty in understanding the relation of the subject and
the predicate of judgment to reality disappears when we
cease to regard reality as self-existent outside of knowledge.
Subject and predicate become instrumentalities in the pro-
cess of building up reality. Thought no longer seems to
carry us farther and farther from reality as ideas become

126 Studies in Logical Theoey

abstract and recede from the immediate sensory experience
in which contact with the real occurs. On the contrary,
thought carries us constantly toward reality. Finally, we
avoid the fundamental skepticism about the possibility of
knowledge which, from the other standpoint, is forced upon
us by the long succession of facts which have faded into the
realm of false opinions, and the lack of any guarantee that
our present so-called knowledge of reality shall not meet the
same fate. From that point of view, reality seems to be not
only unknown, but unknowable.

The criticism sure to be passed upon the alternative view
developed is that the solution of Bosanquet's problems
which it affords is not a real solution, but rather the aban-
donment of an attempt at a solution. ( It represents reality
as a thing which is itself in process of development. It
would force us to admit that the reality of a hundred years
ago, or even of yesterday, was not in content the reality of
today.> A growing, developing reality is, it will be said,
an imperfect reality, while we must conceive of reality as
complete and perfect in itself. ( The only answer which can
be made is to insist again that we have no right to assume
that reality is such an already completed existence, unless
such an assumption enables us to understand experience and
organize it into a consistent whole.) The attempt of this
paper has been to show that such a conception of reality
really makes it inherently impossible to give an intelligible
account of experience as a whole, while the view which
regards reality as developing in and through judgment does
enable us to build up a consistent and understandable view
of the world. (This suggests that the "perfect" may not
after all be that which is finished and ended, but that whose
reality is so abundant and vital as to issue in continuous
self -modification.] The Reality that evolves and moves may
be more perfect, less finite, than that which has exhausted

Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 127

itself. Moreover, only the view that Reality is develop-
mental in quality, and that the instrument of its develop-
ment is judgment involving the psychical in its determina-
tion of subject and predicate gives the psychical as such any
significant place in knowledge or in reality. According to
the view of knowledge as representation of an eternal con-
tent, the psychical is a mere logical surd.

TYPICAL STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OP JUDGMENT

Logic aims at investigating the general function of
knowing. But knowing, it is commonly asserted, is consti-
tuted as judgment. Purtliermore, there is reason to believe
that judgment undergoes well-marked changes in its devel-
opment. Consequently, an understanding of the judgment-
function and of its epochs in development is of prime impor-
tance. In carrying through the investigation we shall
endeavor, first, to state and to defend a certain presupposition
with reference to the character of the judgment-function;
second, to exhibit the application of this presupposition in
the typical stages of judgment.

Judgment is essentially instrumental. This is the pre-
supposition which we must explain and make good. And
we shall accomplish this by way of an analysis of judgment
as meaning.

It cannot be denied that what we call knowledge is con-
cerned with the discrimination of valid meaning. To know
is to appreciate the meaning of things and the meaning of
things is the same with valid meaning. Judging determines
knowledge, and in the same act develops meaning. To put
it otherwise, knowledge is a matter of content; content is
meaning, and we have knowledge Vhen we have meaning
satisfactorily determined. It is evident, therefore, that if
we would understand the judging-function, we must first
make clear to ourselves the nature and rQle of meaning.

Meaning is universally embodied in ideas. To know, to

128

Stages in Development of Judgment 129

understand the meaning, to get ideas, are the same. Now,
in ideas two factors may be distinguished. First, every
idea has as its base an image or emphasized portion of
experience. In some forms of ideation we are more immedi-
ately aware of the presence of images than in others, but no
idea — even the most abstract — can exist apart from an
ultimate base. Second, every idea is equally a function of
reference and control. As reference, the idea projects in the
mind's view an anticipation of experiences and of the condi-
tions upon which these experiences depend for their realiza-
tion; as control, ideas are agencies in turning anticipations
into realizations.'

To be more specific on both points: Since the days of
Galton it has been almost a commonplace in psychology that
ideas are embodied in forms of imagery which vary for and
in different individuals. It has been maintained, it is true,
that in abstract forms of thought, imagery disappears. This
objection is met in two ways. For one, words — the vehicle
of many abstract ideas — involve imagery of a most pro-
nounced type: for another, every idea, when examined
closely, discloses an image, no matter how much for the time
being this has been driven into obscurity by the character-
istics of reference and control. Furthermore, when we
examine the anticipatory aspect of ideas, the presence of
imagery both with reference to outcome and to conditions is
so evident that its presence will scarcely be denied.

The second point may be illustrated in several ways. In
everyday life anticipation and realization are inseparable
from the nature and use of ideas. "Hat" means anticipa-
tion of protection to the head and the tendency toward set-
ting in motion the conditions appropriate to the realization

lit is worth considering whether this may not be the reality of Koyce's distinc-
tion between outer and inner meaning. An anticipation of experience is the working
prerequisite of the control which will realize the idea, i. e., the experience antici-
pated. One is no more " inner " or " outer " than the other.

130 Studies in Logical Theoey

of this anticipation. The same factors are evident in the
boy's definition of a knife as "something to whittle with."
Again it is maintained that intelligence is an essential factor
in human self -consciousness. By this is meant that human
beings are universally aware in some degree of what they
are about. And this awareness consists in understanding
the meaning of their actions, of forecasting the outcome of
various kinds of activity, of apprehending beforehand the
conditions connected with determinate results. Within this
sphere we speak of certain men as being pre-eminently
intelligent, meaning that for such men outcomes are pre-
viewed and connected with their appropriate conditions far
beyond the range of ordinary foresight. Finally, scientific
intelligence is essentially of this kind. It aims at under-
standing the varying types of process which operate in
nature and thus at possessing itself of information with
reference to results to be expected under determinate con-
ditions. For example, the knowledge acquired in his
researches by Louis Pasteur enabled him to predict the life
or death of animals inoculated with charbon virus according
as they had or had not been vaccinated previously. His
information, in other words, became an instrument for the
control and eradication of the disease. And what is true of
this case is true of all science. To the scientist ideas are
"working hypotheses" and have their value only as they
enable him to predict, and to control. And while it is true
that the scientist usually overlooks the so-called practical
value of his discoveries, it is none the less true that in due
time the inventor follows the investigator. The investigator
is content to construct and show the truth of his idea.
The inventor assumes the truth of the investigator's work
and carries his idea as a constructive principle into the
complications of life. To both men "knowledge is power,"
although the "power" may be realized in connection with

Stages in Development op Judgment 131

different interests. But if this be true, ideas can no longer
be regarded as copies in individual experience of some pre-
existing reality. They are rather instruments for transform-
ing and directing experience, by way of constructing antici-
pations and the conditions appropriate to their realization.
Herein also consists their truth or falsity. The true idea is
reliable, carrying us from anticipation to realization; the
false idea is unreliable, and fails in bringing the promised
result.

Now, in the development of instruments generally, we
may distinguish a rule-of-thumb or more or less unreflective
stage of construction, and one entirely reflective. As to use
there is the distinction of inexpert and expert control. This
leads us to expect that in the thought-function also certain
typical stages of construction and of control may be found.
To the investigation of this point we shall next direct atten-
tion.

In its development from crude to expert forms judgment
exhibits three typical stages — the impersonal, the reflective,
and the intuitive. These we shall consider in order of
development. But first it is to be noticed that these stages
of judgment are not to be regarded as hard and fast distinc-
tions of the kind that no indications of the higher are to be
found in the lower types, but rather as working distinctions
within a process of continuous development.

1. The impersonal judgment. — Ever since the days of the
Greek grammarians the impersonal judgment has been con-
sidered an anomaly in logic. And the reason is not far to
seek. Prom the time of Aristotle it has been customary to
maintain that judgments, when analyzed, disclose a subject
and a predicate. Logically considered, these appear to be
entirely correlative, for, as Erdmann puts it,' "an event

^Logik, p. 30i.

132 Studies in Logical Theoey

without a substrate, a quality without a subject, is altogether
unpresentable." But there is in all languages a class of
judgments, such as, " It rains," "It snows," " Fire!" in which
no directly asserted subject is discoverable. To these the
name impersonal and subjectless has been given. Here then
is the difficulty. If we admit that the impersonal expression
involves predication, we must, in all consistency, search for
a subject, while at the same time the subject refuses to dis-
close itself. In ancient days the orthodox logician confined
his search to language and to the spoken or written proposi-
tion. The unorthodox critic maintained, in opposition to
this, that a subject was provided only by warping and twist-
ing the natural sense of the impersonal expression. And
thus the matter stood until the development of modern com-
parative philology. It was then demonstrated- beyond the
possibility of doubt that the "it" (or its equivalent) of the
impersonal is a purely contentless form word. Language
provides no subject whatsoever. So strong, however, is the
hold of tradition that the search has been renewed. Atten-
tion has been turned upon the mental processes involved,
and this time with more apparent result. Although there
has been no general agreement with reference to the subject,
a classification of the different views may still be made,
(a) The subject is universal and undetermined; (6) it is
individual and more or less determined; (c) between these
extremes lies almost every intermediate degree conceivable.
Ueberweg maintains that the subject of the impersonal
is the actual totality of present experience. When we ask,
" What rains ?" we must understand a reference to our general
environment, in which no special element is singled out.
Sigwart, on the other hand, maintains that the subject can
be construed only as the actual sense-impression. This
diversity of opinion might seem to indicate that, were it not
for the constraining power of theory, a subject would scarcely

Stages in Development of Judgment 133

be thought of for the impersonal. Still it must be admitted
that when we examine the impersonal expression closely we
can discover a sense-impression, whether definite or indefi-
nite, combined with an idea. This would seem to give the
case to the orthodox logician, for he will at once claim the
sense-impression as the subject and the idea as the predicate
of the judgment. But we must have a care. Predication is
usually held to consist in a reference of predicate to subject.
The factors of the judgment are, as it were, held apart. In
the impersonal no such thing as this can be discovered. The
meaning is so close a unity that impression and idea are
entirely fused. We may analyze the expression and find
them there, but by so doing we destroy the immediacy which
is an essential characteristic of the impersonal. In other
words, the impersonal does not analyze itself. It is entirely
unconscious of its make-up. And yet it is definite and
applies itself with precision: If I am in a lecture-hall and
hear the fire-alarm, the thought "Fire!" which enters my
mind leads to an immediate change in my conduct. I arise,
move quietly out, and prepare for duty. If, on the other
hand, I open the street door and the rain strikes my face, I
ejaculate " Raining!" turn, reach for my umbrella, and pass
out protected. In both cases I act knowingly and with
meaning, but I do not analyze the movement either of thought
or of action. A correlate to the unreflective impersonal judg-
ment is found in early custom. Custom embodies social
ideas and is an instrument for the determination and control
of action. Individuals moved by custom know what they
are about and act with precision according as custom may
demand. But it is notorious that custom is direct and unre-
flective. It represents social instruments of control which
have grown up without method and which represent the
slow accretion of rule-of-thumb activities through many
ages. So in the impersonal judgment we have a type of

134 Studies in Logical Theory

intellectual instrument which has been brought to a high
degree of precision in use, but which still retains the sim-
plicity and certainty of an unquestioned instrument of action.
For this reason, whatever complexity of elements the imper-
sonal may present to a reflective view, it does not contain to
itself. Consequently it may be best to say that to the imper-
sonal there is neither subject, predicate, nor reference of the
one to the other. These are distinctions which arise only
when the instrument of action has been questioned and the
mind turns back upon the meaning which it has unhesita-
tingly used, analyzing, investigating, constructing, laying
bare the method and function of its tools. Thus arises a
new and distinctive type of judgment, viz., the reflective.

2. The reflective judgment. — By the reflective judgment
is to be understood that form of meaning whose structure
and function have become a problem to itself. The days of
naive trust and spontaneous action have gone by. Inquiry,
criticism, aloofness, stay the tendency to immediate action.
Meaning has grown worldly wise and demands that each
situation shall explain itself and that the general principles
and concrete applications of its own instruments shall be
made manifest. Hence in the various forms of reflective
thought we find the progressive steps in which meaning
comes to full consciousness of its function in experience.

The demonstrative judgment (the simplest of the reflective
type) carries doubt, criticism, construction, and assertion
written on the face of it. For example, in the expression,
" That is hot," we do not find the directness and immediacy
of response characteristic of the simpler impersonal "hot."
Instead, we note a clash of tendencies, a suspension of the
proposed action, a demand for and a carrying out of a recon-
sideration of the course of action, the emergence of a new
meaning, and the consequent redirection of activities. An
iron lies upon the hearth ; I stretch out my hand to return it

Stages in Development of Judgment 135

to its place; I stop suddenly, having become conscious of
signs of warmth ; the thought arises in my mind, " That is
hot;" I experiment and find my judgment correct; I search
for a cloth, and thus protected carry out my first intention.
Again, a hunter notes a movement in the thicket, quickly
raises his gun, and is about to fire. Something in the
movement of the object arrests him. He stops, thinking,
"That is a man, perhaps." What has caught the eye has
arrested his action, has become a demand, and not until
the situation has become clear can the hunter determine
what to do. In other words, he must reflectively assure
himself what the object is before he can satisfy himseK as to
how he should act. Subject and predicate have arisen and
have consciously played their parts in the passage from
doubt to decision. ,

Under the heading " individual judgments " are classed
such expressions as, "That ship is a man-o'-war," "Russia
opposes the policy of the open door in China." In both
these cases it is evident that an advance in definiteness of
conception and of complexity of meaning has been made,
while at the same time we recognize that the instrumental
characteristics of the thought-movement remain the same.
In considering the subject of the judgment we note that the
stimulus presents itself partly as a • determinate factor and
partly as a problem — an insistent demand. The expression,
" That ship is a man-o'-war," might be written, " That is a
ship and of the kind man-o'-war," and it thus constitutes
what Sigwart calls a " double synthesis." As used in actual
judgment, however, the two are held together and constitute
the statement of a single stimulus of which a certain portion
is evident and a certain portion is in doubt. The working
out of the difficulty is given in the predicate " is a man-o'-
war," in which we at once detect the instrumental character-
istics fundamental to all judgment. To illustrate: At the

136 Studies in Logical Theoby

close of the battle of Santiago, in the Spanish-American
war, smoke appeared upon the horizon revealing the presence
of a strange ship. Instantly attention was directed to it,
and it became a problem for action — a demand for instru-
mental information. Soon it was identified as a man-o'-war,
and the American ships were cleared for action. Closer
approach raised a further question with reference to its
nationality. After some debate this also was resolved, and
hostile demonstrations were abandoned.

The universal judgment is sometimes said to exhibit two
distinct forms. Investigation, however, has proved this
statement to be incorrect. Instances taken in themselves
and apart from their character are of no logical significance.
Advance is made by weighing instances and not by counting
them. In short, the true universal is the hypothetical judg-
ment, and the reason for this may be readily shown. The
hypothetical judgment is essentially double-ended. On the
one hand, it is a statement of the problem of action in terms
of the conditions which will turn the problem into a solution.
On the other hand, it is an assertion that once the conditions
of action have been determined the result desired may be
attained. Here we note that the judgment has come to clear
consciousness of itself and of the part which it plays in
experience. It has now obtained an insight into the crite-
rion of its legitimate employment, i. e., of its truth and
falsity. And this insight makes the justification of its claim
almost self-evident. For, inasmuch as the hypothetical j udg-
ment says, " If such and such conditions be realized, such
and such a result will be obtained," the test of the claim is
made by putting the conditions into effect and watching
whether the promised experience is given. And further,
since it has been found that the judgment formulated as a
hypothesis actually accomplishes what it promises, we must
admit that the hypothetical judgment is also categorical.

Stages in Development of Judgment 137

These two factors cannot be separated from each other. It
is true that the hypothetical judgment reduces every valid
meaning to the form, "If certain conditions be realized,"
but it as plainly and positively asserts, "such and such
results will be obtained." When we grasp the absolute cor-
relativity of the hypothetical and categorical aspects of
judgment, we realize at once the essentially instrumental
character of judgment, when it comes to consciousness of its
structure and function. It arises in the self-conscious reali-
zation of a problem. This it reflects upon and sizes up.
When the difficulty has been apprehended, the judgment
emerges as the consciousness of the conditions which will
attain the desired end of action freed and unimpeded. This
may be illustrated by reference to the work of Pasteur cited
above. His investigations began in a problem set for him
by agricultural conditions in France. A certain disease had
made the profitable rearing of sheep and cattle almost an
impossibility. After long and careful examination he dis-
covered the beneficial effects of vaccination. To him the
conditions which governed the presence of the disease became
apparent, and this knowledge furnished him with an iastru-
■ ment by means of which one difficulty was removed from the
path of the stock-raiser. In this illustration we have an
epitome of the work accomplished everywhere by the scien-
tist. It is his task to develop and to reduce to exact terms
instruments of control for the varied activities of life. In
its parts and as a whole each instrument is intelligently con-
structed and tested so that its make-up and function are exactly
known. Because of this, reasoned belief now takes the place
of unreflective trust as that was experienced in the impersonal
stage of judgment. What at first hand might appear to be
a loss was in reality a gain ; the breakdown of the impersonal
was the first step in the development of an instrument of
action conscious of its reason for being, its methods and

138 Studies in Logical Theoey

conditions of action. These latter constitute the distinctive
subject and predicate of the reflective judgment.

This brings us to the connection between the hypotheti-
cal character of this form of judgment and its universality.
And this perhaps will now be quite apparent. The reflect-
ive judgment lays bare an objective connection between the
conditions and outcomes of actions. It proves its point by
actually constructing the event. Such being the case, uni-
versality is no more than a statenient of identical results
being predictable wherever like conditions are realized. If
it be true that " man is mortal," then it is an identical state-
ment to insist that, " Wherever we find men there we shall
also find mortality."

And this point brings us naturally to the treatment of
the disjunctive judgment: "A is either B or C or D." In the
disjunctive judgment the demand is not for the construction
of a reliable instrument of action, but for the resolution of a
doubt as to which instrument is precisely fitted to the cir-
cumstances. In fact, the disjunctive judgment involves the
identification of the practical problem. When we say of a
man, "He is either very simple or very deep," we have no
doubt as to our proper course of action in either case. If he
is simple, then we shall do so and so; if he is deep, then
another course of action follows. We can lay out alternative
courses beforehand, but the point of difficulty lies here: "But
just which is he?" In short, the disjunctive judgment is
the demand for and the attempt at a precise diagnosis of a
concrete problem. To illustrate: A patient afflicted with
aphasia is brought to a physician. The fact that the trouble
is aphasia may be quite evident. But what precisely is the
form and seat of the aphasia? To the mind of the educated
physician the problem will take on the disjunctive form:
" This is either subcortical or cortical aphasia. If subcor-
tical, intelligence will not be impaired ; if cortical, the sensor

Stages in Development of Judgment 139

and motor tracts will be in good condition." Appropriate
tests are made and the subcortical possibilities are shut out.
The disjunction disappears and the judgment emerges: "This
is a case of cortical aphasia. But now a new disjunction
arises. It is either the sensory or motor form of cortical
aphasia, and, whichever one of these, it is again one of several
possibilities. As the alternatives arise, the means for dis-
criminating them arise also; determinate symptoms are
observed, and in due time the physician arrives at the final
conclusion: "This is sensory cortical aphasia of the visual
type." Having determined this, his method of action is
assured, and he proceeds to the appropriate operation. Thus,
finally, we are brought to a form of judgment aware not
only of its motive, method, and justification, but also to one
aware of its specific application to individual cases. Thus it
would seem as though judgment had returned upon itself
and had completed the determination of its sphere of action.
And in one sense this is true. In the disjunctive judgment,
as inclusive of the motives of the hypothetical and categori-
cal forms, the reflective judgment would appear to have come
to its limit of development. One thing, however, remains
to be considered, viz., the development from crude to expert
uses of intellectual instruments.

3. The intuitive judgment. — As stated above, the intuitive
type of judgment depends upon eflBciency in the use of judg-
ment. In this regard there is a great similarity between
the impersonal and the intuitive judgments. Both are
immediate and precise. But there is a radical and essential
difEerence. The impersonal judgment knows nothing of the
strict analysis, insight, and constructive power of the reflect-
ive judgment. The intuitive judgment, on the other hand,
includes the results of reflection and brings them to their
highest power. Paradoxically put, in the intuitive judg-
ment there is so much reflection that there is no need for

140 Studies in Logical Theoey

it at all. To the intuitive judgment there is no hesitation,
no aloofness. Action is direct, but entirely self-conscious.
That such a type of judgment as the intuitive exists there
can be no doubt. There is all the difference in the world
between the quality of consciousness of a mere layman and
that of an expert, no matter what the line. The layman
must size up a situation. It is a process whose parts are
successive, whether much or little difficulty be experienced.
For the expert situations are taken in at a glance, parts and
whole are simultaneous and immediate. Yet the meaning is
entirely exact. The expert judgment is self-conscious to the
last degree. While other individuals are thinking out what
to do, the expert has it, sees the advantage, adjusts, and
moves. Demand and solution jump together. How other-
wise can we explain, for example, the action of an expert
ball-player? Witness his rapid reactions, his instantaneous
adjustments. Mistakes of opponents which would never be
noticed by the average player are recognized and seized
upon. On the instant the new opening is seen, the adjust-
ment is evident, the movement made. Illustrations to the
same effect could be drawn from other modes of life, e. g.,
music, the military life, etc. That intuitive judgments are
not more common is a proof in itself of their distinctive
character and value. Only in so far as we become experts
in our special fields of experience and have reduced our
instruments of action to precise control, can we expect the
presence of intuitive judgments. They remain, therefore, as
the final outcome of the judgment-function made perfect in
its technique and use.

In conclusion we shall make a brief summary of our
investigation and a criticism of certain current theories of
judgment.

Judgment is essentially instrumental. Its function is to
construct, justify, and refine experience into exact instruments

Stages in Development of Judgment 141

for the direction and control of future experience through
action. It exhibits itself first in the form of instruments
developed unsystematically in response to the hard neces-
sities of life. In a higher stage of development the instru-
mental process itself is taken into account, and systematically
developed until in the methodical procedure of science the
general principles of knowledge are laid bare and efficient
instruments of action constructed. Finally, constant, intel-
ligent use results in complete control, so that within certain
spheres doubt and hesitancy would seem to disappear as
to the character of the tools used, and remain only as a
moment in determining their wisest or most appropriate
employ.

The criticism indicated is based upon the instrumental
character of judgment and is directed against all theories
which contend that knowledge is a "copying" or "reprodu-
cing" of reality. In whatever form this "copy" theory be
stated, the question inevitably arises how we can compare
our ideas with reality and thus know their truth. On this
theory, what we possess is ever the copy; the reality is
beyond. In other words, such a theory logically carried
out leads to the breakdown of knowledge. Only a theory
which contains and constructs its criterion within its own
specific movement can verify its constructions. Such a
theory is the instrumental. Judgment constructs a situation
in consciousness. The values assigned in this situation have
a determining influence upon values further appreciated.
The construction arrived at concerns future weal and woe.
Thus gradually a sense of truth and falsity attaches to the
construing of situations. One sees that he must look beyond
this situation, because the way he estimates this situation is
fraught with meaning beyond itself. Hence the critically
reflective judgment in which hesitancy and doubt direct
themselves at the attitude, elements, and tools involved in

142 Studies in Logical Theoet

defining and identifying the situation, instead of at tlie situa-
tion itself in toto. Instead of developing a complex of
experience through assigning qualities and meanings to the
situation as such, some one of the quales is selected, to have
its significance determined. It becomes, pro tempore, the
situation judged. Or the same thing takes place as regards
some "idea" or value hitherto immediately fastened upon
and employed. In either case we get the reflective judg-
ment, the judgment of pure relationship as distinct from
the constructive judgment. But the judgment of relation,
employing the copula to refer a specified predicate to a speci-
fied object, is after all only for the sake of controlling some
immediate judgment of constructive experience. It realizes
itself in forming the confident habit of prompt and precise
mental adjustment to individualized situations.

YII

THE NATURE OP HYPOTHESIS

In the various discussions of the hypothesis which have
appeared in works on inductive logic and in writings on
scientific method, its structure and function have received
considerable attention, while its origin has been compara-
tively neglected. The hypothesis has generally been treated
as that part of scientific procedure which marks the stage
where a definite plan or method is proposed for dealing with
new or unexplained facts. It is regarded as an invention
for the purpose of explaining the given, as a definite con-
jecture which is to be tested by an appeal to experience to
see whether deductions made in accordance with it will be
found true in fact. The function of the hypothesis is to
unify, to furnish a method of dealing with things, and its
structure must be suitable to this end. It must be so
formed that it will be likely to prove valid, and writers
have formulated various rules to be followed in the forma-
tion of hypotheses. These rules state the main require-
ments of a good hypothesis, and are intended to aid in a
general way by pointing out certain limits within which it
must fall.

In respect to the origin of the hypothesis, writers have
usually contented themselves with pointing out the kind of
situations in which hypotheses are likely to appear. But
after this has been done, after favorable external conditions
have been given, the rest must be left to "genius," for
hypotheses arise as "happy guesses," for which no rule or
law can be given. In fact, the genius differs from the
ordinary plodding mortal in just this ability to form fruitful

143

144 Studies in Logical Theoetj

hypotheses in the midst of the same facts which to other less
gifted individuals remain only so many disconnected expe-
riences.

This unequal stress which has been laid on the structure
and function of the hypothesis in comparison with its origin
may be attributed to three reasons: (1) The facts, or data,
which constitute the working material of hypotheses are
regarded as given to all alike, and all alike are more or less
interested in systematizing and unifying experience. The
purpose of the hypothesis and the opportunity for forming it
are thus practically the same for all, and hence certain defi-
nite rules can be laid down which will apply to all cases
where hypotheses are to be employed. (2) But beyond this
there seems to be no clue that can be formulated. There is
apparently a more or less open acceptance of the final answer
of the boy Zerah Colburn, who, when pressed to give an
explanation of his method of instantaneous calculation, ex-
claimed in despair: "God put it into my head, and I can't
put it into yours." ' (3) And, furthermore, there is very often
a strong tendency to disregard investigation into the origin
of that which is taken as given, for, since it is already
present, its origin, whatever it may have been, can have
nothing to do with what it is now. The facts, the data,
are here, and must be dealt with as they are. Their past,
their history or development, is entirely irrelevant. So,
even if we could trace the hypothesis farther back on the
psychological side, the investigation would be useless, for
the rules to which a good hypothesis must conform would
remain the same.

Whether or not it can be shown that Zerah Colburn's
ultimate explanation is needed in logic as little as Laplace
asserted a similar one to be required in his celestial me-

1 Db Moboan, Budget of Paradoxes, pp. 55, 56; quoted by Welion, Logic, Vol.
II, p. 60.

The Natuee of Hypothesis 145

chanics, it may at least be possible to defer it to some extent
by means of a further psychological inquiry. It will be
found that psychological inquiry into the origin of the
hypothesis is not irrelevant in respect to an understanding
of its structure and function ; for origin and function can-
not be understood apart from each other, and, since struc-
ture must be adapted to function, it cannot be independent
of origin. In fact, origin, structure, and function are organ-
ically connected, and each loses its meaning when absolutely
separated from each other. It will be found, moreover, that
the data which are commonly taken as the given material
are not something to which the hypothesis is subsequently
applied, but that, instead of this external relation between
data and hypothesis, the hypothesis exercises a directive func-
tion in determining what are the data. In a word, the main
object of this discussion will be to contend against making
a merely convenient and special way of regarding the
hypothesis a full and adequate one. Though we speak of
facts and of hypotheses that may be applied to them, it
must not be forgotten that there are no facts which remaia
the same whatever hypothesis be applied to them ; and that
there are no hypotheses which are hypotheses at all except
in reference to their function in dealing with our subject-
matter in such a way as to facilitate its factual apprehension.
Data are selected in order to be determined, and hypotheses
are the ways in which this determination is carried on. If,
as we shall attempt to show, the relation between data and
hypothesis is not external, but strictly correlative, it is evi-
dent that this fact must be taken into account in questions
concerning deduction and induction, analytic and synthetic
judgments, and the criterion of truth. Its bearing must be
recognized in the investigation of metaphysical problems as
well, for reality cannot be independent of the knowing
process. In a word, the purpose of this discussion of the

146 Studies in Logical Theory

hypothesis is to determine its nature a little more precisely
through an investigation of its rather obscure origin, and to
call attention to certain features of its function which have
not generally been accorded their due significance.

The hypothesis as predicate. — It is generally admitted
that the function of the hypothesis is to provide a way of
dealing with the data or subject-matter which we need to
organize. In this use of the hypothesis it appears in the
rSle of predicate in a judgment of which the data, or facts,
to be construed constitute the subject.

In his attempts to reduce the movements of the planets
about the sun to some general formula, Kepler finally hit
upon the law since known as Kepler's law, viz., that the
squares of the periodic times of the several planets are pro-
portional to the cubes of their mean distances from the sun.
This law was first tentatively advanced as a hypothesis.
Kepler was not certain of its truth till it had proved its
claim to acceptance. Neither did Newton have at first any
great degree of assurance in regard to his law of gravitation,
and was ready to give it up when he failed in his first attempt
to test it by observation of the moon. And the same thing
may be said about the caution of Darwin and other investi-
gators in regard to accepting hypotheses. The only reason
for their extreme care in not accepting at once their tentative
formulations or suggestions was the fear that some other
explanation might be the correct one. This rejection of
other possibilities is the negative side of the matter. We
become confident that our hypothesis is the right one as we
lose confidence in other possible explanations ; and it might
be added, without falling into a circle, that we lose confidence
in the other possibilities as we become more convinced of
our hypothesis.

The Nature of Hypothesis 147

It appears that such may be the relation of the positive
and negative sides in case of such elaborate hypotheses as
those of Kepler and Newton; but is it true where our
hypotheses are more simple? It is not easy to understand
why the fact that the hypothesis is more simple, and the
time required for its formulation and test a good deal
shorter, should materially change the state of affairs. The
question remains: Why, if there is no opposition, should
there be any uncertainty ? In all instances, then, the hypothe-
sis appears as one among other possible predicates which
may be applied to our data taken as subject-matter of a
judgment.

The predicate as hypothesis. — Suppose, then, the
hypothesis is a predicate; is the predicate necessarily a
hypothesis? This is the next question we are called upon
to answer, and, since the predicate cannot very well be taken
aside from the judgment, our question involves the nature
of the judgment.

While it will not be necessary to give a very complete
account of the various definitions of the judgment that might
be adduced, still the mention of a few of the more prominent
ones may serve to indicate that something further is needed.
In definitions of the judgment sometimes the subjective side
is emphasized, sometimes the objective side, and in other
instances there are attempts to combine the two. For
instance, Lotze regards the judgment as the idea of a unity
or relation between two concepts, with the further implica-
tion that this connection holds true of the object referred
to. J. S. Mill says that every proposition either affirms or
denies existence, coexistence, sequence, causation, or resem-
blance. Trendelenburg regards the judgment as a form of
thought which corresponds to the real connection of things,
while Ueberweg states the case a little differently, and says
that the essence of judgment consists in recognizing the

148 Studies in Logical Theoky

objective validity of a subjective connection of ideas. Koyce
points to a process of imitation and holds that in the judg-
ment we try to portray by means of the ideas that enter into
it. Ideas are imitative in their nature. Sigwart's view of
the judgment is that in it we say something about some-
thing. With him the judgment is a synthetic process, while
Wundt considers its nature analytic and holds that, instead
of uniting, or combining, concepts into a whole, it separates
them out of a total idea or presentation. Instead of blend-
ing parts into a whole, it separates the whole into its con-
stituent parts. Bradley and Bosanquet both hold that in
the judgment an ideal content comes into relation with
reality. Bradley says that in every judgment reality is
qualified by an idea, which is symbolic. The ideal content
is recognized as such, and is referred to a reality beyond the
act. This is the essence of judgment. Bosanquet seems
to perceive a closer relation between idea and reality, for
although he says that judgment is the "intellectual function
which defines reality by significant ideas," he also tells us
that "the subject is both in and out of the judgment, as
Reality is both in and out of my consciousness."

In all these definitions of judgment the predicate appears
as ideal. An ideal content is predicated of something,
whether we regard this something as an idea or as reality
beyond, or as reality partly within and partly without the
act of judging ; and it is ideal whether we consider it as one
of the three parts into which judgments are usually divided,
or whether we say, with Bosanquet and Bradley, that sub-
ject, predicate, and copula all taken together form a single
ideal content, which is somehow applied to reality. More-
over, we not only judge about reality, but it seems to be
quite immaterial to reality whether we judge concerning it
or not.

Many of our judgments prove false. Not only do we err

The Nature op Hypothesis 149

in our judgments, but we often hesitate in making them for
fear of being wrong; we feel there are other possibilities,
and our predication becomes tentative. Here we have some-
thing very like the hypothesis, for our ideal content shows
itself to be a tentative attempt in the presence of alterna-
tives to qualify and systematize reality. It appears, then,
on the basis of the views of the judgment that have been
mentioned, that not only do we find the hypothesis taking
its place as the predicate of a judgment, but the predicate is
itself essentially of the nature of a hypothesis.

In the views of the judgment so far brought out, reality,
with which it is generally admitted that the judgment
attempts to deal in some way, appears to lie outside the act
of judging. Now, everyone would say that we make some
advance in judging, and that we have a better grasp of
things after than before. But how is this possible if reality
lies without or beyond our act of judging? Is the reaUty
we now have the same that we had to begin with ? If so,
then we have made no advance as far as the real itself is
concerned. If merely our conception of it has changed,
then it is not clear why we may not be even worse off than
before. If reality does lie beyond our judgment, then how,
in the nature of the case, can we ever know whether we
have approached it or have gone still farther away? To
make any claim of approximation implies that we do reach
reality in some measure, at least, and, if so, it is difficult to
understand how it lies beyond, and is independent of, the
act of judging.

Further analysis of judgment. — It remains to be seen
whether a further investigation of the judgment will still
show the predicate to be a hypothesis. It is evident that in
some cases the judgment appears at the end of a more or
less pronounced reflective process, during which other pos-
sible judgments have suggested themselves, but have been

150 Studies in Logical Theoey

rejected. The history of scientific discovery is filled with
cases which illustrate the nature of the process by which a
new theory is developed. For instance, in Darwin's Forma^
tion of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Earth Worms,
we find the record of successive steps in the development of
his hypothesis. Darwin suspected from his observations that
vegetable mold was due to some agency which was not yet
determined. He reasoned that if vegetable mold is the result
of the life-habits of earthworms, i. e., if earth is brought up
by them from beneath the surface and afterward spread out
by wind and rain, then small objects lying on the surface of the
ground would tend to disappear gradually below the surface.
Pacts seemed to support his theory, for layers of red sand,
pieces of chalk, and stones were found to have disappeared
below the surface in a greater or less degree. A common
explanation had been that heavy objects tend to sink in soft
soil through their own weight, but the earthworm hypothe-
sis led to a more careful examination of the data. It was
found that the weight of the object and the softness of the
ground made no marked difference, for sand and light objects
sank, and the ground was not always soft. In general, it
was shown that where earthworms were found vegetable
mold was also present, and vice versa.

In this investigation of Darwin's the conflicting explana-
tions of sinking stones appear within the main question of
the formation of vegetable mold by earthworms. The facts
that disagreed with the old theory about sinking stones were
approached through this new one. But the theories had some-
thing in common, viz., the disappearance of the stones or
other objects: they differed in their further determination of
this disappearance. In this case it may seem as if the facts
which were opposed to the current theory of sinking stones
were seen to be discrepant only after the earthworm hypothe-
sis had been advanced ; the conflict between the new facts

The Nature op Hypothesis 151

and the old theory appears to have arisen through the influ-
ence of the new theory.

There are cases, however, where the facts seem clearly to
contradict the old theory and thus give rise to a new one.
For example, we find in Darwin's introduction to his Origin
of Species the following: "In considering the origin of
species it is quite conceivable that a naturalist reflecting on
the mental affinities of organic beings, on their embryologi-
cal relations, their geographical distribution, geological suc-
cession, and other such facts, might come to the conclusion
that species had not been independently created but had
descended, like varieties, from other species." It would
seem from this statement that certain data were found for
which the older theory of independent creation did not offer
an adequate explanation. And yet the naturalist would
hardly "reflect" on all these topics in a comparative way
unless some other mode of interpretation were already dawn-
ing upon him, which led him to review the accepted reflec-
tions or views.

As a more simple illustration, we may cite the common
experience of a person who is uncertain concerning the
identity of an approaching object, say, another person. At
first he may not be sure it is a person at all. He then sees
that it is someone, and as the person approaches he is inclined
to believe him to be an acquaintance. As the supposed
acquaintance continues to approach, the observer may dis-
tinguish certain features that cause him to doubt, and then
relinquish his supposition that it is an acquaintance. Or,
he may conclude at once that the approaching person is
another individual he knows, and the transition may be so
readily made from one to the other that it would be difficult
to determine whether the discordant features are discordant
before the new supposition arises, or whether they are not
recognized as conflicting till this second person is in mind.

152 Studies in Logical Theoey

Or, again, the identification of the new individual and the
discovery of the features that are in conflict with the first
sujiposition may appear to go on together.

Now, marked lines of likeness appear between this
relatively simple judgment and the far more involved ones
of scientific research. In the more extended scientific
process we find data contradicting an old theory and a new
hypothesis arising to account for them. The hypothesis is
tested, and along with its verification we have the rejection,
or rather the modification, of the old theory. Similarly, in
case of the approaching stranger all these features are
present, though in less pronounced degree. In scientific
investigation there is an interval of testing by means of more
careful consideration of the data and even actual experimen-
tation. Before an explanation is accepted subject to test, a
number of others may have been suggested and rejected.
They may not have received even explicit recognition. In
case of the identification of the stranger this feature is
also present. Between two fairly definite attempts to
identify the mind does not remain a mere blank or station-
ary, but other possible identifications may be suggested
which do not have sufficient plausibility to command serious
attention; they are only comparatively brief suggestions or
tendencies.

It is to be noted that in all these instances the first sup-
position was not entirely abandoned, but was modified and
more exactly determined. (Why it could not be wholly
false and the new one wholly new, will be considered later
in connection with discussion of the persistence and re-
formation of habit.) There was such a modification of the
old theory as would meet the requirements of the new data,
and the new explanations thus contained both old and new
features.

"We have seen that the predicate of the scientific judg-

The Nature of Hypothesis 153

ment is a hypothesis which is consciously applied to certain
data. If the similarity between the scientific judgment and
the more immediate and simple judgment is to be main-
tained, it is clear that the predicate of the simple judgment
must be of like nature. The structure of the two varieties
of judgment differs only in the degree of explicitness which
the hypothesis acquires. That is, the predicate of a judg-
ment, as such, is ideal; it is meaning, significant quality.
If conditions are such as to make the one judging hesitant
or doubtful the mind wavers; the predicate is not applied
at once to the determination or qualification of data, and
hence comes to more distinct consciousness on its own
account. Prom being " ideal," it becomes an idea. Yet its
sole purpose and value remains in its possible use to inter-
pret data. Let the idea remain detached, and let the query
whether it be a true predicate (i. e., really fit to be employed
in determining the present data) become more critical, and
the idea becomes clearly a hypothesis.^ In other words, the
hypothesis is just the predicate-function of judgment defi-
nitely apprehended and regarded with reference to its nature
and adequacy.

Psychological analysis of judgment. — This hypothetical
nature of the predicate will be even more apparent after a
further psychological analysis, which, while applying more
directly to the simpler and more immediate judgments, may
be extended to the more involved ones as well.

In psychological terms, we may say, in explanation of
the judging process, that some stimulus to action has failed
to function properly as a stimulus, and that the activity

lAdvanced grammarians treat this matter in a way which should be instructive
to logicians. The hypothesis, says Sweet (§ 295 of A New English GraTnmar, Logical
and Historical, Oxford, 1892), suggests an affirmation or negation "as objects of
thought." " In fact, we often say supposing (that is, ' thinking ') it is true, instead
of if it is true." In a word, the hypothetical judgment as such puts explicitly before
ns the content of thought, of the predicate or hypothesis ; and in so far is a moment
in judgment rather than adequate judgment itself.

154 Studies in Logical Theoky

which was going on has thus been interrupted. Response
in the accustomed way has failed. In such a case there
arises a division in experience into sensation content as sub-
ject and ideal content as predicate. In other words, an
activity has been going on in accordance with established
habits, but upon failure of the accustomed stimulus to be
longer an adequate stimulus this particular activity ceases,
and is resumed in an integral form only when a new habit
is set up to which the new or altered stimulus is adequate. It
is in this process of reconstruction that subject and predicate
appear. Sensory quality marks the point of stress, or
seeming arrest, while the ideal or imaged aspect defines the
continuing activity as projected, and hence that with which
start is to be made in coping with the obstacle. It serves as
standpoint of regard and mode of indicated behavior. The
sensation stands for the interrupted habit, while the image
stands for the new habit, that is, the new way of dealing
with the subject-matter.'

It appears, then, that the purpose of the judgment is to
obtain an adequate stimulus in that, when stimulus and
response are adjusted to each other, activity will be resumed.
But if this reconstruction and response were to follow at
once, would there be any clearly defined act of judging at
all? In such a case there would be no judgment, properly
speaking, and no occasion for it. There would be simply a
ready transition from one line of activity to another; we
should have changed our method of reaction easily and
readily to meet the new requirements. On the one hand,
our subject-matter would not have become a clearly recog-
nized datum with which we must deal; on the other hand,
there would be no ideal method of construing it.'' Activity

1 This carries with it, of course, the notion that " sensation " and " image " are
not distinct psycliicai existences in themselves, but are distinguished logical forces.

2 Concerning the strict correlatlvity of subject and predicate, data and hypo-
thesis, see p. 34.

The Nature of Hypothesis 155

would have changed without interruption, and neither sub-
ject nor predicate would have arisen.

In order that judgment may take place there must be
interruption and suspense. Under what conditions, then, is
this suspense and uncertainty possible ? Our reply must be
that we hesitate because of more or less sharply defined
alternatives ; we are not sure which predicate, which method
of reaction, is the right one. The clearness with which
these alternatives come to miad depends upon the degree of
explicitness of the judgment, or, more exactly, the explicit-
ness of the judgment depends upon the sharpness of these
alternatives. Alternatives may be carefully weighed one
against the other, as in deliberative judgments ; or they may
be scarcely recognized as alternatives, as in the case in the
greater portion of our more simple judgments of daily con-
duct.

The predicate is essentially hypothetical. — If we review
in a brief r6sum6 the types of judgment we have considered,
we find in the explicit scientific judgment a fairly well-
defined subject-matter which we seek further to determine.
Different suggestions present themselves with varying
degrees of plausibility. Some are passed by as soon as
they arise. Others gain a temporary recognition. Some
are explicitly tested with resulting acceptance or rejec-
tion. The acceptance of any one explanation involves the
rejection of some other explanation. During the process of
verification or test the newly advanced supposition is recog-
nized to be more or less doubtful. Besides the hypothesis
which is tentatively applied there is recognized the possi-
bility of others. In the disjunctive judgment these possible
reactions are thought to be limited to certain clearly defined
alternatives, while in the less explicit judgments they are
not so clearly brought out. Throughout the various forms
of judgment, from the most complex and deliberate down to

156 Studies in Logical Theoey

the most simple and immediate, we found that a process
could be traced which was like in kind and varied only in
degree. And, finally, in the most immediate judgments
where some of these features seem to disappear, the same
account not only appears to be the most reasonable one, but
there is the additional consideration, from the psychological
side, that were not the judgment of this doubtful, tentative
character, it would be difficult to understand how there could
be judgment as distinct from a reflex. It appears, then, that
throughout, the predicate is essentially of the nature of a
hypothesis for dealing with the subject-matter. And, how-
ever simple and immediate, or however involved and pro-
longed, the judgment may be, it is to be regarded as
essentially a process of reconstruction which aims at the
resumption of an interrupted experience ; and when experi-
ence has become itself a consciously intellectual affair, at the
restoration of a unified objective situation.

Criticism of certain views concerning the hypothesis. —
The explanation we have given of the hypothesis will enable
us to criticise the treatment it has received from the
empirical and the rationalistic schools. We shall endeavor
to point out that these schools have, in spite of their opposed
views, an assumption in common — something given in a
fixed, or non-instrumental way ; and that consequently the
hypothesis is either impossible or else futile.

Bacon is commonly recognized as a leader in the reac-
tionary inductive movement, which arose with the decline
of scholasticism, and will serve as a good example of the
extreme empirical position. In place of authority and the
deductive method. Bacon advocated a return to nature and
induction from data given through observation. The new
method which he advanced has both a positive and a

The Nature of Hypothesis 157

negative side. Before any positive steps can be taken, the
mind must be cleared of the various false opinions and
prejudices that have been acquired. This preliminary task
of freeing the mind from "phantoms," or "eidola," which
Bacon likened to the cleansing of the threshing-floor, having
been accomplished, nature should be carefully interrogated.
There must be no hasty generalization, for the true method
"collects axioms from sense and particulars, ascending con-
tinuously and by de'grees, so that in the end it arrives at
the most general axioms." These axioms of Bacon's are
generalizations based on observation, and are to be applied
deductively, but the distinguishing feature of Bacon's
induction is its carefully graduated steps. Others, too, had
proceeded with caution (for instance Galileo), but Bacon laid
more stress than they on the subordination of steps.

It is evident that Bacon left very little room for hypothe-
ses, and this is in keeping with his aversion to anticipa-
tion of nature by means of "phantoms" of any sort; he
even said explicitly that " our method of discovery in science
is of such a nature that there is not much left to acuteness
and strength of genius, but all degrees of genius and intel-
lect are brought nearly to the same level.'" Bacon gave no
explanation of the function of the hypothesis ; in his opinion
it had no lawful place in scientific procedure and must be
banished as a disturbing element. Instead of the recipro-
cal relation between hypothesis and data, in which hypothe-
sis is not only tested in experience, but at the same time
controls in a measure the very experience which tests it.
Bacon would have a gradual extraction of general laws from
nature through direct observation. He is so afraid of the
distorting influence of conception that he will have nothing
to do with conception upon any terms. So fearful is he of
the influence of pre-judgment, of prejudice, that he will have

1 Novum OrganuTti^ Vol. I, p. 61.

158 Studies in Logical Theory

no judging which depends upon ideas, since the idea
involves anticipation of the fact. Particulars are some-
how to arrange and classify themselves, and to record or
register, in a mind free from conception, certain generaliza-
tions. Ideas are to be registered derivatives of the given
particulars. This view is the essence of empiricism as a
logical theory. If the views regarding the logic of thought
before set forth are correct, it goes without saying that such
empiricism is condemned to self-contradiction. It endeavors
to construct judgment in terms of its subject alone; and
the subject, as we have seen, is always a co-respondent to a
predicate — an idea or mental attitude or tendency of intellec-
tual determination. Thus the subject of judgment can be deter-
mined only with reference to a corresponding determination
of the predicate. Subject and predicate, fact and idea, are con-
temporaneous, not serial in their relations (see pp. 110-12).

Less technically the failure of Bacon's denial of the worth
of hypothesis — which is in such exact accord with empiri-
cism in logic — shows itself in his attitude toward experi-
mentation and toward observation. Bacon's neglect of
experimentation is not an accidental oversight, but is bound
up with his view regarding the worthlessness of conception
or anticipation. To experiment means to set out from an
idea as well as from facts, and to try to construe, or even to
discover, facts in accordance with the idea. Experimenta-
tion not only anticipates, but strives to make good an antici-
pation. Of course, this struggle is checked at every point
by success or failure, and thus the hypothesis is continuously
undergoing in varying ratios both confirmation and transfor-
mation. But this is not to make the hypothesis secondary to
the fact. It is simply to remain true to the proposition that
the distinction and the relationship of the two is a thoroughly
contemporaneous one. But it is impossible to draw any
fixed line between experimentation and scientific observa-

The Nature of Hypothesis 159

tions. To insist upon the need of systematic observation
and collection of particulars is to set up a principle which is
as distinct from the casual accumulation of impressions as
it is from nebulous speculation. If there is to be observa-
tion of a directed sort, it must be with reference to some
problem, some doubt, and this, as we have seen, is a stimu-
lus which throws the mind into a certain attitude of response.
Controlled observation is inquiry, it is search ; consequently
it must be search for something. Nature cannot answer
interrogations excepting as such interrogations are put; and
the putting of a question involves anticipation. The observer
does not inquire about anything or look for anything except-
ing as he is after something. This search implies at once
the incompleteness of the particular given facts, and the
possibility — that is ideal ^ — of their completion.

It was not long until the development of natural science
compelled a better understanding of its actual procedure
than Bacon possessed. Empiricism changed to experimen-
talism. With experimentalism inevitably came the recog-
nition of hypotheses in observing, collecting, and comparing
facts. It is clear, for instance,that Newton's fruitful investi-
gations are not conducted in accordance with the Baconian
notion. It is quite clear that his celebrated four rules for
philosophizing' are in truth statements of certain principles
which are to be observed in forming hypotheses. They
imply that scientific technique had advanced to a point

'Newton's " Rules for Philosophizing " (Principia, Book III) are as follows:

Rule I. '^ No more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such as are
both true, and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those things."

Rule n. *^ Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred as far as possible
to the same causes."

Rule HI.' *^ Those qualities of bodies that can neither be increased nor dimin-
ished in intensity, and which are found to belong to all bodies within reach of our
experiments are to be regarded as qualities of all bodies whatever."

Rule IV. *'In experimental philosophy propositions collected by induction
from phenomena are to be regarded either as accurately true or very nearly true
notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, till other phenomena occur, by which they
are made more accurate, or are rendered subject to exceptions."

160 Studies in Logical Theoey

where hypotheses were such regular and indispensable fac-
tors that certain uniform conditions might be laid down for
their use. The fourth rule in particular is a statement of
the relative validity of hypothesis as such until there is
ground for entertaining a contrary hypothesis.

The subsequent history of logical theory in England is
conditioned upon its attempt to combine into one system the
theories of empiristic logic with recognition of the procedure
of experimental science. This attempt finds its culmination
in the logic of John Stuart Mill. Of his interest in and
fidelity to the actual procedure of experimental science, as
he saw it, there can be no doubt. Of his good faith in con-
cluding his Introduction with the words following there can
be no doubt: "I can conscientiously affirm that no one
proposition laid down in this work has been adopted for the
sake of establishing, or with any reference for its fitness in
being employed in establishing, preconceived opinions in
any department of knowledge or of inquiry on which the
speculative world is still undecided." Yet Mill was equally
attached to the belief that ultimate reality, as it is for the
human mind, is given in sensations, independent of ideas;
and that all valid ideas are combinations and convenient
ways of using such given material. Mill's very sincerity made
it impossible that this belief should not determine, at every
point, his treatment of the thinking process and of its various
instrumentalities.

In Book III, chap. 14, Mill discusses the logic of expla-
nation, and in discussing this topic naturally finds it neces-
sary to consider the matter of the proper use of scientific
hypotheses. This is conducted from the standpoint of their
use as that is refiected in the technique of scientific dis-
covery. In Book IV, chap. 2, he discusses "Abstraction or
the Formation of Conceptions " — a topic which obviously
involves the forming of hypotheses. In this chapter, his con-

The Nature of Hypothesis 161

sideration is conducted in terms, not of scientific procedure,

but of general philosopliical theory, and this point of view

is emphasized by the fact that he is opposing a certain view

of Dr. Whewell.

The contradiction between the statements in the two

chapters will serve to brjng out the two points already made,

viz., the correspondent character of datum and hypothesis,

and the origin of the latter in a problematic situation and its

consequent use as an instrument of unification and solution.

Mill first points out that hypotheses are invented to enable

the deductive method to be applied earlier to phenomena ;

that it does this by suppressing the first of the three steps,

induction, ratiocination, and verification. He states that:

The process of tracing regularity in any complicated, and at
first sight confused, set of appearances is necessarily tentative; we
begin by making any supposition, even a false one, to see what con-
sequences will follow from it; and by observing how these differ
from the real phenomena, we learn what corrections to make in our

assumption Neither induction nor deduction would enable

us to understand even the simplest phenomena, if we did not
often commence by anticipating the results; by making a provi-
sional supposition, at first essentially conjectural, as tosome^of the
very notions which constitute the final object of the inquiry.'

If in addition we recognize that, according to Mill, our
direct experience of nature always presents us with a compli-
cated and confused set of appearances, we shall be in no
doubt as to the importance of ideas as anticipations of a pos-
sible experience not yet had. Thus he says:

The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at
every instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decom-
pose each chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the
chaotic antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the cha-
otic consequent a multitude of distinct consequents.^

iBook m, chap. 2, sec. 5 ; italics mine. The latter part of the passage, begin-
niag with the words " If we did not often commence," etc., is quoted by Mill from
Comte. The words " neither induction nor deduction would enable us to understand
even the simplest phenomena" are his own.

a Book III, chap. 7, sec. 1.

162 Studies in Logical Theoky

In tlie next section of the same chapter he goes on to state
that, having discriminated the various antecedents and con-
sequents, we then " are to inquire which is connected with
which." This requires a still further resolution of the complex
and of the confused. To effect this we must vary the cir-
cumstances; we must modify the e^iperience as given with
reference to accomplishing our purpose. To accomplish
this purpose we have recourse either to observation or to
experiment: "We may either find an instance in nature
suited to our purposes, or, by an artificial arrangement of
circumstances, make one" (the italics in "suited to our pur-
pose" are mine; the others are Mill's). He then goes on to
say that there is no real logical distinction between observa-
tion and experimentation. The four methods of experimen-
tal inquiry are expressly discussed by Mill in terms of their
worth in singling out and connecting the antecedents and
consequents which actually belong together, from the chaos
and confusion of direct experience.

We have only to take these statements in their logical
connection with each other (and this connection runs through
the entire treatment by Mill of scientific inquiry), to recog-
nize the absolute necessity of hypothesis to undertaking any
directed inquiry or scientific operation. Consequently we
are not surprised at finding him saying that ' ' the function
of hypotheses is one which must be reckoned absolutely
indispensable in science ;" and again that " the hypothesis
by suggesting observations and experiments puts us on the
road to independent evidence."'

Since Mill's virtual retraction, from the theoretical point
of view, of what is here said from the standpoint of scientific
procedure, regarding the necessity of ideas is an accompani-
ment of his criticism of Whewell, it will put the discussion
in better perspective if we turn first to Whewell's views.''

1 Book III, chap. 14, sees, i and 5.

2 WiiiLiAM Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, London, 1840.

The Natuee op Hypothesis 163

The latter began by stating a distinction which easily might
have been developed into a theory of the relation of fact and
idea which is in line with that advanced in this chapter, and
indeed in this volume as a whole. He questions (chap. 2)
the fixity of the distinction between theory and practice.
He points out that what we term facts are in effect simply
accepted inferences; and that what we call theories are
describable as facts, in proportion as they become thoroughly
established. A true theory is a fact. "All the great theories
which have successively been established in the world are
now thought of as facts." "The most recondite theories
when firmly established are accepted as facts; the simplest
facts seem to involve something of the nature of theory."

The conclusion is that the distinction is a historic one,
depending upon the state of knowledge at the time, and
upon the attitude of the individual. What is theory for one
epoch, or for one inquirer in a given epoch, is fact for some
other epoch, or even for some other more advanced inquirer
in the same epoch. It is theory when the element of infer-
ence involved in judging any fact is consciously brought
out; it is fact when the conditions are such that we have
never been led to question the inference involved, or else,
having questioned it, have so thoroughly examined into the
inferential process that there is no need of holding it further
before the mind, and it relapses into unconsciousness again.
" If this greater or less consciousness of our own internal act
be all that distinguishes fact from theory, we must allow that
the distinction is still untenable " (untenable, that is to say,
as a fixed separation). Again, "fact and theory have no
essential difference except in the degree of their certainty
and familiarity. Theory, when it becomes firmly estab-
lished and steadily lodged in the mind becomes fact." (P. 45;
italics mine.) And, of course, it is equally true that as fast
as facts are suspected or doubted, certain aspects of them

164 Studies in Logical Theoet

are transferred into the class of theories and even of mere
opinions.

I say this conception might have been developed in a
way entirely congruous with the position of this chapter.
This would have happened if the final distinction between
fact and idea had been formulated upon the basis simply of
the points, " relative certainty and familiarity." From
this point of view the distinction between fact and idea is
one purely relative to the doubt-inquiry function. It has
to do with the evolution of an experience as regards its con-
scious surety. It has its origin in problematic situations.
Whatever appears to us as a problem appears as contrasted
with a possible solution. Whatever objects of thought refer
particularly to the problematic side are theories, ideas,
hypotheses; whatever relates to the solution side is surety,
unquestioned familiarity, fact. This point of view makes
the distinctions entirely relative to the exigencies of the pro-
cess of reflective transformation of experience.

Whewell, however, had no sooner started in this train of
thought than he turns his back upon it. In chap. 3 he trans-
forms what he had proclaimed to be a relative, historic, and
working distinction into a fixed and absolute one. He
distinguishes between sensations and ideas, not upon a
genetic basis with reference to establishing the conditions
of further operation ; but with reference to a fundamentally
fixed line of demarkation between what is passively given to
the mind and the activity put forth by the mind. Thus he
reinstates in its most generalized and fixed, and therefore
most vicious, form the separation which he has just rejected.
Sensations are a brute unchangeable element of fact which
exists and persists independent of ideas; an idea is a
mode of mental operation which occurs and recurs in an
independent individuality of its own. If he had carried out
the line of thought with which he began, sensation as fact

The Nature of Hypothesis 165

would have been that residuum of familiarity and certainty
which cannot be eliminated, however much else of an expe-
rience is dissolved in the inner conflict. Idea as hypothe-
sis or theory would have been the corresponding element
in experience which is necessary to redintegrate this resi-
duum into a coherent and significant experience.

But since Whewell did not follow out his own line of
thought, choosing rather to fall back on the Kantian anti-
thesis of sense and thought, he had no sooner separated his
fact and idea, his given datum and his mental relation, than
he is compelled to get them together again. The idea be-
comes "a general relation which is imposed upon perception
by an act of the mind, and which is different from anything
which our senses directly offer to us" (p. 26). Such con-
ceptions are necessary to connect the facts which we learn
from our senses into truths. " The ideal conception which
the mind itself supplies is superinduced upon the facts as
they are originally presented to observation. Before the
inductive truth is detected, the facts are there, but they are
many and unconnected. The conception which the dis-
coverer applies to them gives them connection and unity."
(P. 42.) All induction, according to Whewell, thus depends
upon superinduction — imposition upon sensory data of cer-
tain ideas or general relations existing independently in
the mind.'

We do not need to present again the objections already
offered to this view: the impossibility of any orderly stimu-
lation of ideas by facts, and the impossibility of any check
in the imposition of idea upon fact. "Facts" and concep-
tion are so thoroughly separate and independent that any
sensory datum is indifferently and equally related to any
conceivable idea. There is no basis for " superinducing"

1 The essential similarity between Whewell 's view and that of Lotze, already dis-
cussed (see chap. 3) is of course explainable on the basis of their common relation-
ship to Kant.

166 Studies in Logical Theory

one idea or hypothesis, rather than any other, upon any
particular set of data.

In the chapter already referred to upon abstraction, or
the formation of conceptions, Mill seizes upon this difficulty.
Yet he and Whewell have one point in common: they both
agree in the existence of a certain subject-matter which is
given for logical purposes quite outside of the logical pro-
cess itself. Mill agrees with Whewell in postulating a
raw material of pure sensational data. In criticising Whew-
ell's theory of superinduction of idea upon fact, he is
therefore led to the opposite assertion of the complete depend-
ence of ideas as such upon the given facts as such — in
other words, he is led to a reiteration of the fundamental
Baconian empiricism; and thus to a virtual retraction of
what he had asserted regarding the necessity of ideas to
fruitful scientific inquiry, whether in the way of observa-
tion or experimentation. The following quotation gives a
fair notion of the extent of Mill's retraction:

The conceptions then which we employ for the colligation and
methodization of facts, do not develop themselves from within, but
are impressed upon the mind from urithout ; they are never ob-
tained otherwise than by way of comparison and abstraction, and,
in the most important and most numerous cases, are evolved by ab-
straction from the very phenomena which it is their office to colli-
gate}

Even here Mill's sense for the positive side of scientific in-
quiry suffices to reveal to him that the "facts" are some-
how inadequate and defective, and are in need of assistance
from ideas — and yet the ideas which are to help out the
facts are to be the impress of the unsure facts! The con-
tradiction comes out very clearly when Mill says : " The
really difficult cases are those in which the conception des-
tined to create light and order out of darkness and confu-

I Logic, Book IV, chap. 2, sec, 2 ; italics mine.

The Nature of Hypothesis 167

sion has to be sought for among the very phenomena which
it afterward serves to arrange.'"

Of course, there is a sense in which Mill's view is very
much nearer the truth than is Whewell's. Mill at least sees
that " idea " must be relevant to the facts or data which it is
to arrange, which are to have "light and order" introduced
into them by means of the idea. He sees clearly enough
that this is impossible save as the idea develops within the
same experience in which the "dark and confused" facts are
presented. He goes on to show correctly enough how con-
flicting data lead the mind to a "confused feeling of an
analogy " between the data of the confused experience and
of some other experience which is orderly (or already colli-
gated and methodized) ; and how this vague feeling, through
processes of further exploration and comparison of experi-
ences, gets a clearer and more adequate form until we finally
accept it. He shows how in this process we continually
judge of the worth of the idea which is in process of forma-
tion, by reference to its appropriateness to our purpose. He
goes so far as to say : " The question of appropriateness is
relative to the particular object we have in view."' He sums
up his discussion by stating: "We cannot frame good gen-
eral conceptions beforehand. That the conception we have
obtained is the one we want can only be known when we have
done the work for the sake of which we wanted it." ^

This all describes the actual state of the case, but it is
consistent only with a logical theory which makes the dis-
tinction between fact and hypothesis instrumental in the
transformation of experience from a confused into an organ-
ized form ; not with Mill's notion that sensations are some-
how finally and completely given as ultimate facts, and

ilbid.

2 Ibid., sec. 4; in sec. 6 he states even more expressly that any conception is ap-
propriate in the degree in which it " helps ns toward what we wish to understand.'*

3 Ibid., sec. 6 ; italics mine.

168 Studies in Logical Theokt

that ideas are mere re-registrations of such facts. It is
perfectly jast to say that the hypothesis is impressed upon
the mind (in the sense that any notion which occurs to the
mind is impressed) in the course of an experience. It is
well enough, if one define what he means, to say that the
hypothesis is impressed (that is to say, occurs or is sug-
gested) through the medium of given facts, or even of sen-
sations. But it is equally true that the facts are presented
and that sensations occur within the course of an experience
which is larger than the bare facts, because involving the
conflicts among them and the corresponding intention to
treat them in some fashion which will secure a unified expe-
rience. Facts get power to suggest ideas to the mind — to
" impress" — only through their position in an entire expe-
rience which is in process of disintegration and of recon-
struction — their "fringe" or feeling of tendency is quite
as factual as they are. The fact that "the conception we
have obtained is the one we want can be known only when
we have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it,"
is enough to show that it is not bare facts, but facts in rela-
tion to want and purpose and purpose in relation to facts,
which originate the hypothesis.

It would be interesting to follow the history of discus-
sion of the hypothesis since the time of Whewell and of Mill,
particularly in the writings of Jevons, Venn, and Bosanquet.
This history would refine the terms of our discussion by
introducing more complex distinctions and relations. But
it would be found, I think, only to refine, not to introduce
any fundamentally new principles. In each case, we find the
writer struggling with the necessity of distinguishing
between fact and idea ; of giving the fact a certain primacy
with respect to testing of idea and of giving the idea a primacy
with respect to the significance and orderliness of the fact ;
and of holding throughout to a relationship of idea with

The Nature of Hypothesis 169

fact so intimate that the idea develops only by being "com-
pared" with facts (that is, used in construing them), and facts
get to be known only as they are " connected " through the
idea — and we find that what is a maze of paradoxes and
inconsistencies from an absolute, from a non-historic stand-
point, is a matter of course the moment it is looked at from
the standpoint of experience engaged in self -transformation
of meaning through conflict and reconstitution.

But we can only note one or two points. Jevons's "infi-
nite ballot-box " of nature which is absolutely neutral as to
any particular conception or idea, and which accordingly
requires as its correlate the formation of every possible hy-
pothesis (all standing in themselves upon the same level of
probability) is an interesting example of the logical conse-
quences of feeling the need of both fact and hypothesis for
scientific procedure and yet regarding them as somehow
arising independently of each other. It is an attempt to
combine extreme empiricism and extreme rationalism. The
process of forming hypotheses and of deducing their rational
consequences goes on at random, because the disconnectedness
of facts as given is so ultimate that the facts suggest one hypo-
thesis no more readily than another. Mathematics, in its two
forms of measurements as applied to the facts, and of calcula-
tion as applied in deduction, furnishes Jevons the bridge by
which he finally covers the gulf which he has first himself cre-
ated. Venn's theory requires little or no restatement to bring
it into Kne with the position taken in the text. He holds to
the origin of hypothesis in the original practical needs of
mankind, and to its gradual development into present scien-
tific form.' He states expressly:

The distinction between what is known and what is not
known is essential to Logic, and peculiarly characteristic of it
in a degree not to be found in any other science. Inference is the

1 Venn, Empirical Logic, p. 383.

170 Studies in Logical Theory

process of passing from one to the other; from facts which we had
accepted as premises, to those which we have not yet accepted,
but are in the act of doing so by the very process in question. No
scrutiny of the facts themselves, regarded as objective, can ever
detect these characteristics of their greater or less familiarity to
our minds. We must introduce also the subjective element if we
wish to give any adequate explanation of them.^

Venn, however, does not attempt a thoroughgoing state-
ment of logical distinctions, relations, and operations, as
parts "of the act of passing from the unknown to the known."
He recognizes the relation of reflection to a historic process,
which we have here termed "reconstruction," and the origin
and worth of hypothesis as a tool in the movement, but does
not carry his analysis to a systematic form.

Ill

Origin of the hypothesis. — In our analysis of the process
of judgment, we attempted to show that the predicate arises
in case of failure of some line of activity going on in terms
of an established habit. When the old habit is checked
through failure to deal with new conditions (i. e., when the
situation is such as to stimulate two habits with distinct
aims) the problem is to find a new method of response —
that is, to co-ordinate the conflicting tendencies by building
up a single aim which will function the existing situation.
As we saw that, in case of judgment, habit when checked
became ideal, an idea, so the new habit is first formalized as
an ideal type of reaction and is the hypothesis by which we
attempt to construe new data. In our inquiry as to how this
formulation is effected, i. e. , how the hypothesis is developed,
it will be convenient to take some of the currently accepted
statements as to their origin, and show how these statements
stand in reference to the analysis proposed.

1 Venn, Empirical Logic, p. 25 ; italics mine.

The Nature of Hypothesis 171

Enumerative induction and allied processes. — It is
pointed out by Welton' that the various ways in which
hypotheses are suggested may be reduced to three classes,
viz., enumerative induction, conversion of propositions, and
analogy. Under the head of "enumeration" he reminds us
that "every observed regularity of connection between phe-
nomena suggests a question as to whether it is universal."
There are numerous instances of this in mathematics. For
example, it is noticed that 1 + 3 = 2^ 1 + 3 + 5 = 3', 1+3 +
5 + 7=: 4', etc.; and one is led to ask whether there is any
general principle involved, so that the sum of the first n odd
numbers will be w', where n is any number, however great.
In this early form of inductive inference there are two diver-
gent tendencies. One is the tendency to complete enumera-
tion. This tendency is clearly ideal — it transcends the facts
as given. To look for all the cases is thus itself an experi-
mental inquiry, based upon a hypothesis which it endeavors
to test. But in most cases enumeration can be only incom-
plete, and we are able to reach nothing better than proba-
bility. Hence the other tendency in the direction of an
analysis of content in search for a principle of connection in
the elements in any one case. For if a characteristic belong-
ing to a number of individuals suggests a class where it
belongs to all individuals, it must be that it is found in
every individual as such. The hypothesis of complete class
involves a hypothesis as to the character of each individual
in the class. Thus a hypothesis as to extension transforms
itself into one as to intension.

But it is analogy which Welton considers "the chief
source from which new hypotheses are drawn." In the
second tendency mentioned under enumerative induction,
that is, the tendency to analysis of content or intension, we
are naturally led to analogy, for in our search for the char-

I Welton, Manual of Logic, Vol. II, chap. 3.

172 Studies in Logical Theory

acteristic feature wliicli determines classification among the
concrete particulars our first step will be an inference by
analogy. In analogy attention is turned from the number
of observed instances to their character, and, because par-
ticulars have some feature in common, they are supposed to
be the same in still other respects. While the best we can
reach in analogy is probability, the arguments may be such
as to result in a high degree of certainty. The form of the
argument is valuable in so far as we are able to distinguish
between essential and nonessential characteristics on which
to base our analogy. What is essential and what nonessen-
tial depends upon the particular end we have in view.

In addition to enumerative induction, which Welton has
mentioned, it is to be noted that there are a number of other
processes which are very similar to it in that a number of
particulars appear to furnish a basis for a general' principle
or method. Such instances are common in induction, in
instruction, and in methods of proof.

If one is to be instructed in some new kind of labor, he
is supposed to acquire a grasp of the method after having
been shown in a few instances how this particular work is to
be done; and, if he performs the manipulations himself, so
much the better. It is not asked why the experience of a
few cases should be of any assistance, for it seems self-
evident that an experienced man, a man who has acquired
the skill, or knack, of doing things, should deal better with
all other cases of similar nature.

There is something very similar in inductive proofs, as
they are called. The inductive proof is common in algebra.
Suppose we are concerned in proving the law of expansion
of the binomial theorem. We show by actual calculation
that, if the law holds good for the nth power, it is true for
the n -f- first power. That is, if it holds for any power, it
holds for the next also. But we can easily show that it does

The Nature of Hypothesis 173

hold for, say, the second power. Then it must be true for
the third, and hence for the fourth, and so on. Whether
this law, though discovered by inductive processes, depends
on deduction for the conclusiveness of its proof, as Jevons
holds;' whether, as Erdmann^ contends, the proof is thor-
oughly deductive; or whether Wundt' is right in' maintain-
ing that it is based on an exact analogy, while the
fundamental axioms of mathematics are inductive, it is clear
that in such proofs a few instances are employed to give the
learner a start in the right direction. Something suggests
itself, and is found true in this case, in the next, and again
in the next, and so on. It may be questioned whether there
is usually a very clear notion of what is involved in the "so
on." To many it appears to mark the point where, after
having been taken a few steps, the learner is carried on by
the acquired momentum somewhat after the fashion of one
of Newton's laws of motion. Whether the few successive
steps are an integral part of the proof or merely serve as
illustration, they are very generally resorted to. In fact,
they are often employed where there is no attempt to intro-
duce a general term such as n, or h, or I, but the few indi-
vidual instances are deemed quite sufficient. Such, for
instance, is the custom in arithmetical processes. We call
attention to these facts in order to show that successive
cases are utilized in the course of explanation as an aid in
establishing the generality of a law.

In geometry we find a class of proofs in which the suc-
cessive steps seem to have great significance. A common
proof of the area of the circle will serve as a fair example.
A regular polygon is circumscribed about the circle. Then
as the number of its sides are increased its area will approach

1 W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, pp. 231, 232.

2B. Ekdmann, "Zur Theorie des Syllogismus und der Indnktion," Philoso-
phische Abhandlungen, Vol. VI, p. 230.

3 Wdndt, Logik, 2d ed.. Vol. II, p. 131.

174 Studies in Logical Theory

that of the circle, as its perimeter approaches the circumfer-
ence of the circle. The area of the circle is thus inferred to
be irl^, since the area of the polygon is always -^iSx perim-
eter, and in case of the circle the circumference ^27ri2.
Here again we get under such headway by means of the
polygon that we arrive at the circle with but little difficulty.
Had we attempted the transition at once, say, from a cir-
cumscribed square, we should doubtless have experienced
some uncertainty and might have recoiled from what would
seem a rash attempt; but as the number of the sides of our
polygon approach infinity — that mysterious realm where
many paradoxical things become possible — the transition
becomes so easy that our polygon is often said to have truly
become a circle.

Similarly, some statements of the infinitesimal calculus
rest on the assumption that slight degrees of difference may
be neglected. Though the more modern theory of limits
has largely displaced this attitude in calculus and has also
changed the method of proof in such geometrical problems
as the area of the circle, the underlying motive seems to
have been to make transitions easy, and thus to make possible
a continued application of some particular method or way of
dealing with things.

But granted that this is all true, what has it to do with
the origin of the hypothesis? It seems likely that the
hypothesis may be suggested by a few successive instances;
but are these to be classed with the successive steps in proof
to which we have referred ? In the first place, we attempt
to prove our hypothesis because we are not sure it is true;
we are not satisfied that there are no other tenable hypothe-
ses. But if we do test it, is not such test enough? It
depends upon how thorough a grasp we have of the situa-
tion; but, in general, each test case adds to its probability.
The value of tests lies in the fact that they strengthen and

The Natuee of Hypothesis 175

tend to confirm our hypothesis by checking the force of
alternatives. One instance is not sufficient because there
are other possible incipient hypotheses, or more properly
tendencies, and the enumeration serves to bring one of these
tendencies into prominence in that it diminishes other vague
and perhaps subconscious tendencies and strengthens the
one which suddenly appears as the mysterious product of
genius.

The question might arise why the mere repetition of con-
flicting tendencies would lead to a predominance of one of
them. Why would they not all remain in conflict and con-
tinue to check any positive result? It is probably because
there never is any absolute equilibrium. The successive
instances tend to intensify and bring into prominence some
tendency which is already taking a lead, so to speak. And
it may be said further in this connection that only as seen
from the outside, only as a mechanical view is taken, does
there appear to be an excluding of definitely made out alter-
natives.

In explanation of the part played by analogy in the origin
of hypotheses, Welton points out that a mere number of
instances do not take us very far, and that there must be
some " specification of the instances as well as numbering of
them," and goes on to show that the argument by enumera-
tive induction passes readily into one from analogy, as soon
as attention is turned from the number of the observed
instances to their character. It is not necessary, however,
to pass to analogy through enumerative induction. " When
the inst?.nces presented to observation offer immediately the
characteristic marks on which we base the inference to the
connection of S and P, we can proceed at once to an infer-
ence from analogy, without any preliminary enumeration of
the instances.'"

I Welton, Manual of Logic, Vol. II, p. 72.

176 Studies in Logical Theoey

Welton, and logicians generally, regard analogy as an
inference on the basis of partial identity. Because of cer-
tain common features we are led to infer a still greater like-
ness.

Both enumerative induction and analogy are explicable
in terms of habit. We saw in our examination of enume-
rative induction that a form of reaction gains strength
through a series of successful applications. Analogy marks
the presence of an identical element together with the ten-
dency to extend this "partial identity" (as it is commonly
called) still farther. In other words, in analogy it is sug-
gested that a type of reaction which is the same in certain
respects may be made similar in a greater degree. In enu-
merative induction we lay stress on the number of instances
in which the habit is applied. In analogy we emphasize the
content side and take note of the partial identity. In fact,
the relation between enumerative induction and analogy is
of the same sort as that existing between association by con-
tiguity and association by similarity. In association by
contiguity we think of the things associated as merely stand-
ing in certain temporal or spatial relations, and disregard the
fact that they were elements in a larger experience. In case
of association by similarity we regard the like feature in the
things associated as a basis for further correction.

In conversion of propositions we try to reverse the direc-
tion of the reaction, so to speak, and thereby to free the habit,
to get a mode of response so generalized as to act with a
minimum cue. For instance, we can deal with A in a
way called B, or, in other words, in the same way that
we did with other things called B. If we say, "Man is
an animal," then to a certain extent the term "animal"
signifies the way in which we regard "man." But the
question arises whether we can regard all animals as we
do man. Evidently not, for the reaction which is fitting in

The Nature of Hypothesis 177

case of animals woiild be only partially applicable to man.
With the animals that are also men we have the beginning
of a habit which, if unchecked, would lead to a similar reac-
tion toward all animals, i.e., we would say: "All animals
are men." Man may be said to be the richer concept, in
that only a part of the reaction which determines an object
to be a man is required to designate it as an animal. On
the other hand, if we start with animal, then (except in case
of the animals which are men) there is lacking the subject-
matter which would permit the fuller concept to be applied.
By supplying the conditions under which animal = man we
get a reversible habit. The equation of technical science has
just this character. It represents the maximum freeing or
abstraction of a predicate qua predicate, and thereby multi-
plies the possible applications of it to subjects of future
judgments, and lessens the amount of shearing away of
irrelevancies and of re-adaptation necessary when so used
in any particular case.

Formation and test of the hypothesis. — The formation of
the hypothesis is commonly regarded as essentially different
from the process of testing, which it subsequently under-
goes. We are said to observe facts, invent hypotheses, and
then test them. The hypothesis is not required for our pre-
liminary observations; and some writers, regarding the
hypothesis as a formulation which requires a difficult and
elaborate test, decline to admit as hypotheses those more
simple suppositions, which are readily confirmed or rejected.
A very good illustration of this point of view is met with in
Wundt's discussion of the hypothesis, by an examination of
which we hope to show that such distinctions are rather arti-
ficial than real.

The subject-matter of science, says Wundt," is constituted
by that which is actually given and that which is actually to

l-Op. ci<.,Vol. I, p.452a.

178 Studies in Logical Theoey

be expected. The whole content is not limited to this,
however, for these facts must be supplemented by certain
presuppositions, which are not given in a factual sense.
Such presuppositions are called hypotheses and are justified
by our fundamental demand for unity. However valuable
the hypothesis may be when rightly used, there is constant
danger of illegitimately extending it by additions that spring
from mere inclinations of fancy. Furthermore, the hypothe-
sis in this proper scientific sense must be carefully dis-
tinguished from the various inaccurate uses, which are
prevalent. For instance, hypotheses must not be confused
with expectations of fact. As caises in point Wundt men-
tions Galileo's suppositions that small vibrations of the
pendulum are isochronous, and that the space traversed by
a falling body is proportional to the square of the time it
has been falling. It is true that such anticipations play an
important part in science, but so long as they relate to the
facts themselves or to their connections, and can be con-
firmed or rejected any moment through observation, they
should not be classed with those added presuppositions
which are used to co-ordinate facts. Hence not all supposi-
tions are hypotheses. On the other hand, not every
hypothesis can be actually experienced. For example, one
employs in physics the hypothesis of electric fluid, but does
not expect actually to meet with it. In many cases, how-
ever, the hypothesis becomes proved as an experienced fact.
Such was the course of the Copernican theory, which was at
first only a hypothesis, but was transformed into fact
through the evidence afforded by subsequent astronomical
observation.

Wundt defines a theory as a hypothesis taken together
with the facts for whose elucidation it was invented. In
thus establishing a connection between the facts which the
hypothesis merely suggested, the theory furnishes at the

The Natueb op Hypothesis 179

same time partly the foundation (Begrilndung) and partly
the confirmation (Bestdtigung) of the hypothesis.' These
aspects, Wundt insists, must be sharply distinguished.
Every hypothesis must have its Begrilndung, but there can
be Bestdtigung only in so far as the hypothesis contains
elements which are accessible to actual processes of verifica-
tion. In most cases verification is attainable in only cer-
tain elements of the hypothesis. For example, Newton was
obliged to limit himself to one instance in the verification of
his theory of gravitation, viz., the movements of the moon.
The other heavenly bodies afforded nothing better than a
foundation in that the supposition that gravity decreases as
the square of the distance increases enabled him to deduce
the movements of the planets. The main object of his
theory, however, lay in the deduction of these movements
and not in the proof of universal gravity. With the Dar-
winian theory, on the contrary, the main interest is in seek-
ing its verification through examination of actual cases of
development. Thus, while the Newtonian and the greater
part of the other physical theories lead to a deduction of
the facts from the hypotheses, which can be verified only
in individual instances, the Darwinian theory is concerned
in evolving as far as possible the hypothesis out of the
facts.

Let us look more closely at Wundt's position. We will
ask, first, whether the distinction between hypotheses and
expectations is as pronounced as he maintains; and, second,
whether the relation between Begrundung and Bestdtigung
may not be closer than Wundt would have us believe.

As examples of the hypothesis Wundt mentions the
Copernican hypothesis, Newton's hypothesis of gravitation,
and the predictions of the astronomers which led to the dis-
covery of Neptune. As examples of mere expectations we

1 Op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 454-461.

180 Studies in Logical Thboet

are referred to Galileo's experiments with falling bodies and
pendulums. In case of Newton's hypothesis there was the
assumption of a general law, which was verified after much
labor and delay. The heliocentric hypothesis of Coperni-
cus, which was invented for the purpose of bringing system
and unity into the movements of the planets, has also been
fairly well substantiated. In the discovery of Neptune we
have, apparently, not the proof of a general law or the dis-
covery of further peculiarities of previously known data, but
rather the discovery of a new object or agent by means of
its observed effects. In each of these instances we admit
that the hypothesis was not readily suggested or easily
and directly tested.

If we turn to Galileo's pendulum and falling bodies, it is
clear first of all that he did not have in mind the discovery
of some object, as was the case in the discovery of Neptune.
Did he, then, either contribute to the proof of a general law
or discover further characteristics of things already known
in a more general way? Wundt tells us that Galileo only
determined a little more exactly what he already knew, and
that he did this with but little labor or delay.

What, then, is the real difference between hypothesis and
expectation? If we compare Galileo's determination of the
law of falling bodies with Newton's test of his hypothesis of
gravitation, we see that both expectation and hypothesis
were founded on observation and took the form of mathe-
matical formulae. Each tended to confirm the general law
expressed in its formula, though there was, of course, much
difference in the time and labor required. If we compare
the Copernican hypothesis with Galileo's supposition con-
cerning the pendulum, we find again that they agree in
regard to general purpose and method, and differ in the
difficulty of verification. If the experiment with the pen-
dulum only substituted exactness for inexactness, did the

The Natuee of Hypothesis 181

Copernican theory do anything difPerent in kind ? It is true
that the more exact statement of the swing of the pendulum
was expressed in quantitative form, but quantitative state-
ment is no criterion of either the presence or the absence of
the hypothesis.

Again, we may compare the pendulum with Kepler's laws.
What was Kepler's hypothesis, that the square of the periodic
times of the several planets are proportional to the cubes of
their mean distances from the sun, except a more exact for-
mulation of facts which were already known in a more gen-
eral way? Wundt's position seems to be this: whenever a
supposition or suggestion can be tested readily, it should
not be classed as a hypothesis. This would make the dis-
tinction one of degree rather than kind, and it does not
appear how much labor we must expend, or how long our
supposition must evade our efforts to test it, before it can
win the title of hypothesis.

In the second place, we have seen that Wundt draws a
sharp line between Begrilndung and Bestdtigung. It is
doubtless true that every hypothesis requires a certaiu justi-
fication, for unless other facts can be found which agree
with deductions made in accordance with it, its only sup-
port would be the data from which it is drawn. Such sup-
port as this would be obtained through a process too clearly
circular to be seriously entertained. The distinction which
Wundt draws between Begrilndung and Bestdtigung is
evidently due to the presence of the experimental element
in the latter. For descriptive purposes this distinction is
useful, but is misleading if it is understood to mean that
there is mere experience in one case and mere inference in the
other. The difference is rather due to the relative parts played
by inference and by accepted experience in each. In Begriln-
dung the inferential feature is the more prominent, while in
Bestdtigung the main emphasis is on the experiential aspect.

182 Studies in Logical Theoey

It must not be supposed, however, that either of these
aspects can be wholly absent. It is difficult to understand
how any hypothesis can be entertained at all unless it meets
in some measure the demand with reference to which it was
invented, viz., a unification of conflicts in experience. And,
in so far, it is confirmed. The motive which casts doubt
upon its adequacy is the same that leads to its re-forming
as a hypothesis, as a mental concept.

The difficulties in Wundt's position are thus due to a
failure to take account of the reconstructive nature of the
judgment. The predicate, supposition, or hypothesis, what-
ever we may choose to call it, is formed because of the check
of a former habit. The judgment is an ideal application of
a new habit, and its test is the attempt to act in accordance
with this ideal reconstruction. It must not be thought, how-
ever, that our supposition is first fully developed and then
tried and accepted or rejected without modification. On
the contrary, its growth is the result of successive minor
tests and corresponding minor modifications in its form.
Formation and test are merely convenient distinctions in a
larger process in which forming, testing, and re-forming go
on together. The activity of experimental verification is not
only a testing, a confirming or weakening of the validity of
a hypothesis, but it is equally well an evolution of the mean-
ing of the hypothesis through bringing it into closer rela-
tions with specific data not previously included in defining
its import. Per contra, a purely reflective and deductive
consideration which develops the idea as hypothesis, in
so far as it introduces the determinateness of previously
accepted facts within the scope, comprehension, or intension
of the idea, is in so far forth, a verification.

If the view which we have maintained is correct, the hypo-
thesis is not to be limited to those elaborate formulations of
the scientist which he seeks to confirm by crucial tests. The

The Nature of Hypothesis 183

hypothesis of the investigator differs from the comparatively
rough conjecture of the plain man only in its greater preci-
sion. Indeed, as we have attempted to show, the hypothesis
is not a method which we may employ or not as we choose;
on the contrary, as predicate of the judgment it is present
in a more or less explicit form if we judge at all. Whether
the time and labor required for its confirmation or rejection
is a matter of a lifetime or a moment, its nature remains the
same. Its function is identical with that of the predicate.
In short, the hypothesis is the predicate so brought to con-
sciousness and defined that those features which are not
noticed in the ordinary judgment are brought into promi-
nence. We then recognize the hypothesis to be what in
fact the predicate always is, viz., a method of organization
and control.

YIll

IMAGE AND IDEA IN LOGIC

The logic of sense-impressions and of ideas as copies of
sense-impressions has had its day. It engaged in a conflict
with dogmatism, and scored a decisive victory. It over-
threw the dynasty of prescribed formulae and innate ideas,
of ideas derived ready-made from custom and social usage,
ancient enough to be lost in the remote obscurity of divine
sources; and enthroned in their place ideffs derived from,
and representative of, the sense-experiences of a very real
and present world. It marked a reaction from dogma back
to the original meaning of dogma, back to the seeming, the
appearance, of things. So thoroughly did Bacon and Hobbes,
Locke and Hume, to mention only these four, do their work,
that many of the problems growing out of the conflict itself,
to say nothing of the scholastic traditions that were com-
bated, have come to have merely a historical rather than a
logical interest. Logic no longer concerns itself very
eagerly with the content or sensuous qualities of ideas, with
their derivation from sense-impressions, or with questions as
to the relation of copy to original, of representative to that
which is presented. It is concerned rather with the con-
structive operations of thought, with meaning, reference to
reality, inference — with intellectual processes. Perhaps in
no respect is this shifting of logical standpoint indicated
more clearly than in the unregretful way with which the old
logical interest in the sense-qualities of ideas is now made
over to psychology. States of consciousness as such, we are
told, are the proper study of psychology ; whereas logic con-
cerns itself with the relation of thought to its object. True,

184

Image and Idea in Logic 185

these states of consciousness include thought-states, as well
as sense-impressions ; ideas and concepts, as well as feelings
and fancies ; and the business of psychology is to observe,
compare and classify, describe and chronicle, these states
and whatever else is carried along in the stream of conscious-
ness. But logic is concerned, not with these states of con-
sciousness per se, least of all with the flotsam and jetsam of
the stream, but with its reference to reality; not with the
true, but with truth; not even with what consciousness does,
but with how consciousness is to outdo itself, transcend itself,
in a rational and universal whole. Even an empirical logic
has to arrange somehow the way to get from one sense-
impression to another.

In drawing this distinction between logic and psychology
— a distinction which virtually amounts to a separation — two
things are overlooked: first, that the distinction itself is a
logical distinction, and may properly constitute a problem
falling under the province of logical inquiry and theory;
and, second, that the rather arbitrary and official setting
apart of psychology to look after the task of studying states
of consciousness does not carry with it the guarantee that
psychology will confine itself exclusively to that task. This
last point in particular must be my excuse for discussing the
question of image and idea from the psychological rather
than from the logical standpoint. The logic of ideas derived
from sense-impressions has had its day. But even the very
leavings of the past may have been gathered up and recon-
structed by psychology in such a way as to anticipate some
of the newer developments of logical theory and meet some
of its difficulties. One can hardly hope to justify in advance
a discussion based on such a sheer possibility. Let us begin,
rather, by noting down from the standpoint of logic some of
the distinctions between image and idea, and the estimate
of the logical function and value of mental imagery, and see

186 Studies in Logical Thboey

in what direction they take us and whether they suggest a
resort to an analysis from the standpoint of psychology.

Proceeding from the standpoint of logic to inquire into
the logical function of mental imagery and into the distinc-
tion between image and idea, we shall come upon two
opposed but characteristic answers. If the inquiry be
directed to a member of the empirical school of logic, he
would be bound to answer in the affirmative, so far as the
question regarding the function of mental imagery is con-
cerned. He would be likely to say, if he were loyal to the
traditions of his school, that mental imagery is the counter-
part of sense-perception, and is thus the representative of the
data with which empirical logic is concerned. Mental
imagery, he would continue, is a representative in a literal
sense, a copy, a reflection, of what comes to us through the
avenues of sensation. True, it is not the perfect twin of
sense-experience ; else we could not tell them apart ; indeed,
there are times when the copy becomes so much like the
original that we are deceived by it, as in dreams or in
hallucinations. Ordinarily, however, we are able to distin-
guish one from the other. Two criteria are usually present ;
(1) imagery is fainter, more fleeting, than the corresponding
sense-experience; and (2), save in the case of accurate
memory-images, it is subject to a more or less arbitrary
rearrangement of its parts, as when, for example, we make
over the images of scenes we have actually experienced, to
furnish fprth the setting of some remote historical event.

Barring, or controlling and rectifying, its tendencies
toward both arbitrary and constructive variations from
the original, mental imagery is on the same level as
sense-experience, and serves the same logical purpose.
That is to say, it contributes to the data which consti-
tute the foundations of empirical logic. It furnishes mate-
rials for the operations of observing, comparing, abstracting

Image and Idea in Logic 187

and generalizing. Mental imagery helps to piece out the
fragments that may be presented to sense-experience. It
supplies the entire anatomy when only a single bone, say,
is actually given. Yet, however useful as a servant of truth,
it has to be carefully watched, lest its spontaneous tendency
to vary the actual order and coexistence of data lead the
investigator astray. The copy it presents is, after all, a
temporary makeshift, until it can be shown to correspond
point for point to the now absent reality. Mental imagery
furnishes one with an illustrated edition of the book of
nature, but the illustrations await the confirmation of com-
parison with the originals.

Mental imagery functions logically when it extends the
area of data beyond the range of the immediate sense-per-
ceptions of any given time, and thus makes possible a more
comprehensive application of the empirical methods of
observation, comparison, abstraction, and generalization. It
functions logically when it acts as a feeder of logical
machinery, though it is not indispensable to this machinery
and does not modify its principles. The logical mill could
grind up in the same way the pure grain of sense-percep-
tions, unmixed with mental images, but it would have to
grind more slowly for lack of material. In other words,
empirical logic could carry on its operations of observing,
comparing, abstracting, and generalizing, solely on the basis
of objects or data present to the senses, and with no exten-
sion of this basis in terms of imagery, or copies of objects
not immediately present; but it would take more time for it
to apply and carry through its operations. The logical
machinery is the same in each case. The materials fed and
the product issuing are the same in each case. Imagery
simply fulfils the function of providing a more copious grist.

The empiricist's answer to our question regarding the
logical function of mental imagery leaves that function in an

188 Studies in Logical Theory

uncertain and parlous state. Imagery lacks the security of
sense-perception on the one hand, and it has no part in the
operation of thought on the other. It is a sort of hod-car-
rier, whose function it is to convey the raw materials of
sense-perception to a more exalted position where someone
else does all the work. I suppose this could be called a
functional interpretation of a logical element. The ques-
tion, then, would be whether an element so functioning is
in any sense logical. As an element lying outside of the
thought-process it owes no responsibility to logic; it is not
amenable to its regulations. Thought simply finds it expe-
dient to operate with an agent over which it has no intrinsic
control. The case might be allowed to rest here. Yet were
this extra-logical element of imagery to abandon thought,
all conscious thinking as opposed to sense-perception would
cease. A false alarm, perhaps. Imagery may be so consti-
tuted that it is inseparably subordinated to thought and can
never abandon it. Thought may simply exude imagery.
But imagery somehow has to represent sense-perception,
also. It can hardly be a secretion of thought and a copy of
sense-perceptions at one and the same time, unless the
empiricist is willing to turn absolute idealist ! Before tak-
ing such a desperate plunge as this, it might be desirable to
see whether there is any other recourse.

There is another and a very different answer to the ques-
tion regarding the logical function of mental imagery. To
distinguish this answer from that of the associationist or
empiricist, I will call it the answer of the conceptualist. I
am not at all positive that this label would stick even to
those to whom it might be applied with considerable justifi-
cation. The terms "rationalistic" and "transcendental"
might be preferred in opposition to the term "empirical."
And we have the term " apperceptionist " in opposition to
the term " associationist." If the term "conceptualist" is

Image and Idea in Logic 189

admissible, it should be brought down to date, perhaps, by
making it "neo-conceptualist." The present difficulties
regarding terminology would be eased considerably if we
only had a convenient set of derivatives made from the word
" meaning." Since we have not, I will use derivatives made
from the word "concept" to denote views opposite to those
held by the empirical school.

The concept aalist could be depended upon to answer our
question in the negative. Logical functions begin where
the image leaves off. They begin with the idea, with mean-
ing. The oonceptualist distinguishes sharply between the
image as a psychical existence and the idea, or concept, as
logical meaning. On the one hand, you have the "image,"
not only as a mere psychical existence, but a mocking exist-
ence at that, fleeting, inconstant, shifting, never perhaps
twice alike; yet, mind you, an existence, a fact — that must
be admitted. On the other hand, you have the " idea," with
" a fixed content or logical meaning," ' which is referred by
an act of judgment to a reality beyond the act.''

The "idea," the logical meaning, begins where the
"image" leaves off. Does this mean that the "idea" is
wholly independent of the "image"? Yes and no. The
" idea " is independent of that which is ordinarily regarded
as the special characteristic of an "image," namely, its
quality, its sense -content. That is to say, the " idea " is
independent of any particular " image," any special embodi-
ment of sense-content. Any image will do. As Mr. Bosan-
quet remarks in comparing the psychical images that pass
through our minds to a store of signal flags :

Not only is it indiflferent whether your signal flag of today is
the same bit of cloth that you hoisted yesterday, but also, no one
knows or cares whether it is clean or dirty, thick or thin, frayed or

1 BosANQUET, Logic, Vol. I, p. 46.

2 Beadlet, Principles of Logic, p. 10.

190 Studies in Logical Theoey

smooth, as long as it is distinctly legible as an element of the sig-
nal code. Part of its content, of its attributes and relations, is a
fixed index which "carries a distinct reference ; all the rest is
nothing to us, and, except in a moment of idle curiosity, we are
unaware that it exists.'

On the other hand, the "idea" could not operate as an
idea, could not be in consciousness, save as it involves some
imagery, however old, dirty, thin, and frayed. Take the
statement, "The angles of a triangle are equal to two right
angles." If the statement means anything to a given indi-
vidual, if it conveys an idea, it must necessarily involve some
form of imagery, some qualitative or conscious content.
But so far as the meaning is concerned, it is a matter of
complete indifference as to what qualities are involved.
These qualities may be in terms of visual, auditory, tactual,
kinaesthetic, or verbal imagery. The individual may visual-
ize a blackboard drawing of a triangle with its sides pro-
duced, or he may imagine himself to be generating a
triangle while revolving through an angle of 180°. Any
imagery anyone pleases may be employed, so long as there
goes with it somehow the idea of the relation of equality
between the angles of a triangle and two right angles. But
the conceptualist does not stop here. The act of judgment
comes in to affirm that the " idea " is no mere idea, but is a
quality of the real. " The act [of judgment] attaches the
floating adjective [the idea, the logical meaning] to the
nature of the world, and, at the same ume, tells one it was
there already."" The "idea," the logical meaning, begins
where the " image " leaves off. Yet, somehow, the " idea "
could not begin, unless there were an " image " to leave off.
An "image" is not an "idea," says the conceptualist.
An "idea" is not an "image." (1) An "image" is not an
"idea," because an "image" is a particular, individual frag-

1 Op. Bit., Vol. I, p. 74. 2 Bbadlby, Principles of Logic, p. 11,

Image and Idea in Logic 191

ment of consciousness. It is so bound up with its own
existence that it cannot reach out to the existence of an
"idea," or to anything beyond itself. Chemically speaking,
it is an avalent atom of consciousness, if such a thing is
thinkable. Mr. Bosanquet raises the question:

Are there at all ideas which are not symbolic? .... The
answer is that (a) in judgment itself the idea can be distinguished
qua particular in time or psychical fact, and so far is not sym-
bohc ; and (6) in all those human experiences from which we draw
our conjectures as to the animal intelligence, when in languor or
in ignorance image succeeds image without conscious judgment, we
feel what it is to have ideas as facts and not as symbols.'

(2) An " idea" is not an "image," because an idea is mean-
ing, which consists in a part of the content of the image,
cut off, and considered apart from the existence of the con-
tent or sign itself." This meaning, this fragment of
psychical existence, lays down all claim to existence on its
own account, that it may refer through an act of judgment
to a reality beyond itself and beyond the act also. An
" image " is not an " idea " and an " idea " is not an
"image," because an "image" exists only as a quality, a
sense-content, whereas an " idea " exists only as a relation,
a reference to reality beyond. " On the one hand," to recall
Bradley's antinomy, "no possible idea [as a psychical

image] can be that which it means On the other

hand, no idea [as logical signification] is anything but just
what it means."

There is a significant point of agreement between the
conceptualist and the empiricist. Both regard imagery as
on the level with sense -perception. For the empiricist, as
we have seen, the fact that imagery may be compelled to
serve as a yoke-fellow of sense-experience constitutes its
logical value. For the conceptualist, however, the associa-

1 Op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 75, 76. 2 Bbadlby, op. cit., pp. 4-6.

192 Studies in Logical Theory

tion of imagery with sense-experience is of no logical conse-
quence whatsoever, save as it may help to intensify the
distinction between imagery and meaning. To quote again
from Bradley :

For logical purposes the psychological distinction of idea and
sensation may be said to be irrelevant, while the distinction of idea
and fact is vital. The image, or psychological idea, is for logic
nothing but a sensible reality. It is on a level with the mere sen-
sations of the senses. For both are facts and neither are meanings.
Neither are cut from a mutilated presentation and fixed as a con-
nection. Neither are indifferent to their place in the stream of
psychical events, their time and their relations to the presented
congeries. Neither are adjectives to be referred from their exist-
ence, to live on strange soils, under other skies, and through
changing seasons. The lives of both are so entangled with their
environment, so one with their setting of sensuous particulars, that
their character is destroyed if but one thread is broken.'

This point of agreement between conceptualism and
empiricism, this placing of imagery and sense-experience on
a common level, serves to bring into relief fundamental dif-
ferences between the two schools of thought; fundamental,
because they have to do with the nature of reality itself.
The conceptualist in his zealous endeavor to distinguish
between imagery and logical meaning has come perilously
near driving imagery into the arms of reality. It is the
opportunity of empiricism to make them one. How can
conceptualism prevent the union? Has it not disarmed
itself ? The act of judgment, which includes within itself
logical meaning as predicate, refers to a reality beyond the
act. Both imagery and reality, then, lie outside of the act
of judgment ! What alliance, or rh^salliance, may they not
form, one with the other?

The difficulties we have noted thus far in the discussion
are due to a large extent, I believe, to incomplete psychologi-

1 Op. cit., pp. 7, 8.

Image and Idea in Logic 193

cal analysis of logical machinery. The empiricist has not
carried the psychology of logic as far as the conceptualist,
although the latter might be the loudest to disclaim the
honor. I will not try to prove this statement, but simply
give it as a reason why, in the interest of brevity, I shall
pass with little comment over the psychological shortcomings
and contributions of empirical logic, and devote what space
remains to the psychology implicitly worked out by con-
ceptual logic, and to its possible development, with special
reference, of course, to the problem of the logical function
of imagery.

The logical distinction, which practically amounts to a
separation between imagery and meaning, is the counterpart of
the psychological distinction between stimulus and response,
between the two poles of sensori-motor activity, where the
stimulus is defined in consciousness in the form of imagery,
in the form of sense-qualities centrally excited, and where
the response is directed and controlled via this imagery, so
as to function in bringing some end, project, purpose, or
ideal, nearer to realization, some problem nearer to solution.

Psychologically, there is no break between image and
response, between thought and action. The stimulus is a
condition of action, in both senses of the ambiguity of the
word "condition." (1) It is action; it is a state or condi-
tion of action. (2) It is also an initiation of action. If the
appropriate stimulus, then the desired action. The response
to an image is the meaning of the image. Or, the response
to any stimulus via an image — mediated, controlled or
directed by an image — is the meaning of that image. The
less imagery involved in any response, the greater the pre-
sumption in favor of the belief that the response is either
an instinctive impulse or else has become a habit of mind, an
adequate idea. The reduction and loss of sense-content
which an image may undergo — the wearing away of an

194 Studies in Logical Theoey

image, it is. sometimes called — is not a sign that this sense-
content has no logical function ; but rather that it has fulfilled
a logical function so well that it has made part of itself use-
less. The husk, to recall one of Mr. Bradley's comparisons,
that useless husk, tends to fall away, to lapse from conscious-
ness, after it has served the purpose of helping to bring the
kernel of truth to fruition.

This raises again the original question as to whether the
sense-content, the quality, the existential quality, of an
image has a logical function. I will ask first whether it has
a function from the standpoint of psychology. We will
agree with the empiricist that the content of an image is
representative, that it is a return, a revival, of a sense-content
previously experienced through the activity of sense-organs
stimulated from the periphery. What is the function, then,
of the representative image ? Sensation, quality, as we have
implied above, is the stimulus come to consciousness. To
explain how a stimulus can "come" to consciousness is a
problem I will not attempt to go into here. I assume as a
fact that there are times when we know what we are about ;
when we are conscious of the stimuli, or conditions of action,
which are tending in this direction or in that, and when
through this consciousness we exercise a controlling influence
over action by selecting and reinforcing certain stimuli and
suppressing or inhibiting others. It is true that we do not
always realize to how great an extent our actions are con-
trolled by stimuli which do not come to consciousness, by
reflexes, instincts, and habits which do not rise above the
threshold of imagery. And when this vast complex of hid-
den machinery is partly revealed to us, it may either cause
the beholder to take a materialistic, mechanical, or fatalistic
view of existence, to say that we are the victims of our own
machinery, or else it may induce the other extreme of more
or less mystic pronouncements regarding the province of the

Image and Idea in Logic 195

subconscious, of the subliminal self; thus out of partial
views, out of half-truths, metaphysical problems arise and
arm for mutual conflict. Nevertheless, there is a presump-
tion, amounting in most minds to a conviction, that we do
at times consciously control some of our actions. And it is
only making this conviction a little more explicit to say thai;
we consciously control our actions through becoming aware
of the stimuli, or conditions of action, and through selecting
and reinforcing them.

Is it begging the question to speak of consciousness as
exercising a selective function with reference to stimuli?
From the standpoint of psychology, I cannot see that it is.
No characteristic of consciousness has been more clearly
made out, both reflectively and experimentally, than its
selective function, than its ability to pick out and intensify
within certain limits the stimuli or conditions of action.

The representational image is a stimulus come to con-
sciousness in the same way that a sensation is a stimulus
come to consciousness. It is both a direct and an indirect
stimulus. The terms "direct" and "indirect" are used as
relative solely to the demands of the particular situation out
of which they arise. By direct stimulus I mean a stimulus
which initiates with almost no appreciable delay the response
or attitude appropriate to the demands of a given situation,
bridging the difficulties, removing the obstacles, or solving
the problem with the minimum of conscious reflection. As
an image becomes more and more of a working symbol, an
idea, it tends to become simply a direct stimulus.

By an "indirect stimulus" is meant a stimulus initiating
a response which, if not inhibited, would be irrelevant to the
situation, yet which may represent stimuli which are not
found in the immediate field of sense-perception, and which
are essential to the carrying on of the activity. The situa-
tion is a problematic one. Acquired habits or mental

196 Studies in Logical Theory

adjustments break down at some point or fail to operate
smoothly, either owing to the absence of customary stimuli
or to the presence of new and untried conditions of action.
Part of the stress of meeting such a situation as this falls on
the side of discovering appropriate stimuli and part on the
side of developing out of habits already acquired new
methods of response.

In such a situation as this, imagery may function on the
side of stimulus when, taking its cue from the stimuli which
are actually present, and which grow out of the strain and
friction, it represents the missing conditions of action suffi-
ciently to direct a search for them. It projects a map, so to
speak, in which the fragmentary conditions immediately
present to sense-perception may find their bearings, or in
which in some way the missing members may be discovered.
A familiar instance of this would be the experience one
sometimes has in trying to recall the forgotten name of an
acquaintance. The images of scenes associated with the
acquaintance, of various letters and sounds of words associ-
ated with his name, which may be called to mind, do not
function so much as direct stimuli as they do as intermediate
or indirect stimuli. It is a case of casting about for the
image that will function as a direct stimulus in bringing an
acquired but temporarily lost adjustment into play.

Image functions on the side of response, on the side of
developing new habits, new forms of adjustment, in so far as
the conditions of action which it represents, or projects, are
not the actual conditions of action, either because they are
so inaccessible as to demand development of new habits for
purposes of attaining them, or else because, though actually
present, they stimulate relatively uncontrolled aesthetic or
emotional responses, whose very expression, however, may
be translated into a demand for more adequate, intelligent,
controlled habits or adjustments. The conscious projection

Image and Idea in Logic 197

of the unattained, even of the unattainable, not only marks
a certain degree of attainment, but is the initiation of fur-
ther development. Here we see again that a stimulus is a
condition of action in both senses of the ambiguity of the
word "condition." It is both a state or condition of activity,
and an initiation or condition of further activity.

As an indirect stimulus growing out of a problematic sit-
uation imagery necessarily brings in more or less irrelevant
material. If I may be permitted the paradox, imagery
would not be relevant if it did not bring in the irrelevant.
The novelty of the situation makes it impossible to say in
advance what will be relevant. Hence the demand for range
and play of imagery. It is only the successful adjustment
finally hit upon and worked out that is the test of the rele-
vancy of the imagery which anticipated it. Even this test
may be unfair, since it is likely to discount the value of
imagery which is now ruled out, but which may have been
indispensable in turning up the proper cues in the course of
the process of reflection and experiment.

To restate the point in regard to the psychological func-
tion of imagery. Imagery functions in representing control
as ideal, not as fact. It represents a possible process of
reconstructing adjustments and habits; it is not an actual
and complete readjustment. It arises normally in a stress,
in the presence of fresh demands and new problems. It
looks forward in every possible direction, because it is
important and difficult to foresee consequences. But sup-
pose the new adjustment to be made with reasonable success —
reasonable, note. Suppose the ideal to be realized. With
practice the adjustment becomes less problematic, more
under control — that is, it comes to require less conscious
attention to bring it about. The image loses some of its
sensuous content. It becomes worn away, more remote,
until at last it becomes respectably vague and abstract

198 Studies in Logical Theoet

enough to be classed as a concept. Imagery is the stimulus
of the reconstructive process between habit and habit, con-
cept and concept, idea and idea.

We now return to the original question regarding the
logical function of imagery. There is only one condition, I
believe, on which we can accept the assumption of both
empiricist and conceptualist that imagery is on the same
level with sense-perception, and that is the assumption that
meaning, logical meaning, is on the same level with habit,
habit naming the more obvious, overt forms of response to
stimuli, logical meaning naming the more internal forms of
response or reference. Psychical response and logical ref-
erence thus become equivalent terms.

We have seen that imagery may exercise two functions
with reference to habit, as direct and as indirect stimulus ; so
also with reference to logical meaning, imagery may be the
stimulus to a direct reference of the idea to reality, or it may
present, or mirror, conditions with regard to which some
new meaning is to be worked out. The quality, the sense-
content, of imagery may per se suffice directly to arouse a
habitual attitude, to call forth an immediate reference to
reality. It may cause one to "tumble" to what is taking
place, to "catch on," to apprehend (pardon these expressions
for the sake of their description of the motor aspect of
meaning), as when we say, for example: "It came over me
like a flash what I was to do, and I did it " Our more
abstract and complicated forms of judgment and reasoning,
in which the imagery involved is reduced to the minimum
of conscious, qualitative content, are of the same order,
though at the other extreme, so far as immediate overt
expression is concerned. We are working along lines of
habitual activity so familiar that we can work almost in the
dark. We need no elaborate imagery. Guided only by the
waving of a signal flag or by the shifting gleam of a sema-

Image and Idea in Logic 199

phore, we thread our way swiftly througli the maze of tracks
worn smooth by use and habit. But suppose a new line of
habit is to be constructed. No signal flags or semaphores
will suffice. A detailed survey of the proposed route must
be had, and here is where imagery with a rich and varied
yet flexible sensuous content, growing out of previous sur-
veys, may function in projecting and anticipating the new
set of conditions, and thus become the stimulus of a new
line of habit, of a new and more far-reaching meaning. As
this new line of habit, of meaning, gets into working order
with the rest of the system, imagery tends normally to
decline again to the r5le of signal flags and semaphores.

The distinction in logical theory between "image" and
"idea" which we have been considering is only a half-truth
from the point of view of psychology. It virtually limits
the "idea" to a fixed, unalterable reference of a fragment
of a desiccated image to a reality beyond. It indifferently
loses the play and richness of imagery to the floating rem-
nants of sense-content, or to an external reality. It limits
itself to an examination of a flnal stage in thinking, a stage
in which the image acts as a direct stimulus, a stage in
which the sense-content of the image has little or no func-
tion per se, because this content now initiates directly a
habitual adjustment, a worked-out and established adapta-
tion of means to end. It overlooks the process of conscious
reflection which logically precedes every such adjustment
not purely instinctive or accidental, a process in which
imagery as representational functions indirectly in bringing
the resources of past experience, the fund of acquired habits,
to bear upon the fragmentary and problematic elements of
sense-experience actually present, thus maintaining the flow
and continuity of experience. It fails to recognize that in
the inseparable association of meaning with quality, of
"idea" with "image," there goes the possibility of working

200 Studies in Logical Theory

out and applying new meanings from old, of developing
deeper meanings, of testing and affirming more inclusive
and universal meaning.

We are confronted with this alternative. Either the
image has a logical function in virtue of its sense-content, or
else the image functions logically merely as a symbol, the
sense-content of which is a matter of complete logical indif-
ference. According to the empiricist, the former is the case,
according to the conceptualist, the latter. The empiricist
would say that he needs the image to piece out the data upon
which logical processes operate. Having met this need, the
image is retired from active service. For the empiricist the
processes of thought, observing, comparing, generalizing,
etc., are as independent of the data they use as, for the
conceptualist, logical meaning, reference, and "idea" are
independent of the sense-content of the "image." In reality
he agrees with the conceptualist in excluding the sense-
content of the image from the processes of thought, and
hence from the domain of logic.

From the standpoint of psychological theory the concep-
tualist is an improvement over the empiricist. He has gone
a step farther in the analysis of thought-processes by show-
ing that they are bound up with some kind of imagery,
however irrelevant, inconsequential, and worn down the
sense-quality of that imagery may be. His statement of
ideas as references to reality lends itself readily, as we have
seen, to the unitary conception in psychology of ideo-motor,
or sensori-motor, activity. But is this where logical theory
is to stop, while psychology as a study of " states of con-
sciousness" takes up the unfinished tale and carries it for-
ward? It seems hardly possible, unless logic is willing to
give over its task of thinking about thinking.

Reduce the image to a mere symbol. Let its sense-
quality be a matter of complete indifPerence. What have

Image and Idea in Logic 201

you, then, but an elementary and primitive type of reflex
action? It is of no particular consequence even from what
sense-organ it appears to proceed, or whether it appears to
be peripherally or centrally excited. It is simply a case of
feel and act ; touch and go. Is this thinking ? It may be
regarded as either the germ or the finality of thinking, but
what most of us are inclined to believe is the true subject-
matter of logic is not to be limited to a simple reflex, or
even to a chain of reflexes. It is something more complex,
even if nothing more than an intricate tangle of chains of
reflexes.

The complexity of the process called thinking does not
reside alone in the instinctive or habitual reflexes involved.
The more instinctive and habitual any adjustment may be,
the less is it a matter of thought, as everyone knows, although
its biological complexity is none the less patent to one who
looks at it from the outside. The complexity of the thinking
process resides in consciousness also ; it resides in the imagery,
the stimuli, the mere symbols, if you like, that have "come"
to consciousness. As soon as the complexity begins to be
felt, as soon as any discrimination whatsoever begins to be
introduced or appreciated, at that instant the sense-content,
the quale, of imagery begins to have a logical function.
Conscious discrimination, however vague and evanescent,
and the logical function of the quale of imagery are born
together, imless one chooses to regard the more obvious and
deliberate forms of conscious discrimination as more charac-
teristic of a logical process. It is only as the sense-contents
of various images are discriminated and compared that any-
thing like thinking can be conceived to go on. The particular
sense-content of an image, instead of being a matter of logical
indifference, is the condition, the possibility, of thinking.

The conceptualist has contributed to the data of descriptive
psychology by calling attention, by implication at least, to

202 Studies in Logical Theoet

the remote and reduced character of the imagery which may
characterize thinking. But it by no means follows that the
more remote and reduced the sense-content of an image
becomes, the less important is that sense-content for thinking,
the less demand for discrimination. On the contrary, the
sense-content that remains may be of supreme logical impor-
tance. It may be the quintessence of meaning. It may be
the conscious factor which, when discriminated from another
almost equally sublimated conscious factor, may determine a
whole course of action. The delicacy and rapidity with
which these reduced forms of imagery as they hover about
the margin of consciousness or flit across its focus are dis-
criminated and caught, are points in the technique of that
long art of thinking, begun in early childhood. The fact
that questionnaire investigations — like that of Galton's, for
example — have in many instances failed to discover in the
minds of scientists and advanced thinkers a rich and varied
furniture of imagery does not argue the poverty of imagery
in such minds; it argues, rather, a highly developed tech-
nique, a species of virtuosity, with reference to the sense-
content of the types of imagery actually in use.

To push a step farther the alternative we have already
stated in a preliminary way: Either the " idea," or "logical
meaning," lies outside of the process of thinking, as a mere
impulse or reflex; or else, in virtue of the sense-content of
its "image," it enters into that conscious process of dis-
crimination, comparison, and selection, of light and shade,
of doubt and inquiry, which constitutes the evolution of a
judgment, which makes the life-history of a movement of
thought.

THE LOGIC OP THE PRE-SOCKATIC PHILOSOPHY'

It is not the purpose of this study to show that the Pre-
Socratics possessed a system of logic which is now for the
first time brought to the notice of the modern world. Indeed,
there is nothing to indicate that they had reflected on men-
tal processes in such a way as to call for an organized body
of canons regulating the forms of concepts and conclusions.
Aristotle attributed the discovery of the art of dialectic to
Zeno the Eleatic, and we shall see in the sequel that there
was much to justify the opinion. But logic, in the technical
sense, is inconceivable without concepts, and from the days
of Aristotle it has been universally believed that proper defi-
nitions owe their origin to Socrates. _A few crude attempts
at definition, if such they may be rightly called, are referred
to Empedocles and Democritus. But in so far as they were
conceived in the spirit of science, they essayed to define
things materially by giving, so to speak, the chemical for-
mula for their production. Significant as this very fact is,
it shows that even the rudiments of the canons of thought
were not the subjects of reflection.

In his Organon Aristotle makes it evident that the demand
for a regulative art of scientific discourse was created by the
eristic logic-chopping of those who were most deeply influ-
enced by the Eleatic philosophy. Indeed, the case is quite
parallel to the rise of the art of rhetoric. Aristotle regarded
Empedocles as the originator of that art, as he referred the

iThis study may be regarded as in some sense a development of pp. 7-10 of
The Necessary and the Contingent in the Aristotelian System, published in 1896
by The University of Chicago Press. While qnite independent in treatment, the two
papers supplement each other.

203

204 Studies in Logical Theoey

beginnings of dialectic to Zeno. But the formulation of both
arts in well-rounded systems came much later. As men
conducted lawsuits before the days of Tisias and Corai, so
also were the essential principles of logic operative and
effective in practice before Aristotle gave them their abstract
formulation.

While it is true, therefore, that the Pre-Socratics had no
formal logic, it is equally true, and far more significant, that
they either received from their predecessors or themselves
developed the conceptions and the presuppositions on which
the Aristotelian logic is founded. One of the objects of this
study is to institute a search for some of these basic concep-
tions of Greek thought, almost all of which existed before
the days of Socrates, and to consider their origin as well as
their logical significance. The other aim here kept in view
is to trace the course of thought in which the logical princi-
ples, latent in all attempts to construct and verify theories,
came into play.

It is impossible, no doubt, to discover a body of thought
which does not ground itself upon presuppositions. They
are the warp into which the woof of the system, itself too
often consisting of frayed ends of other fabrics, is woven
with the delight of a supposed creator. Rarely is the thinker
so conscious of his own mental processes that he is aware of
what he takes for granted. Ordinarily this retirement to an
interior line takes place only when one has been driven back
from the advanced position which could no longer be main-
tained. Emerson has somewhere said: "The foregoing gen-
erations beheld God and Nature face to face; we through
their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation
to the universe ? Why should not we have a poetry and philoso-
phy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revela-
tion to us and not the history of theirs?" The difficulty lies
precisely in our faith in immediate insight and revelation,

Logic of the Pre-Soobatio Philosophy 205

which are themselves only short-cuts of induction, psycho-
logical short circuits, conducted by media we have disre-
garded. Only a fundamentally critical philosophy pushes
its doubt to the limit of demanding the credentials of those
conceptions which have come to be regarded as axiomatic.

The need of going back of Aristotle in our quest for the
truth is well shown by his attitude toward the first principles
of the several sciences. To him they are immediately given
— dfjtea-oi ■n-poTcicTeK — and hence are ultimate a priori. The
historical significance of this fact is already apparent. It
means that in his day these first principles, which sum up
the outcome of previous inductive movements of thought,
were regarded as so conclusively established that the steps
by which they had been inferred were allowed to lapse from
memory.

No account of the history of thought can hope to satisfy
the demands of reason that does not explain the origin of the
convictions thus embodied in principles. The only accept-
able explanation would be in terms of will and interest. To
give such an account would, however, require the knowledge
of secular pursuits and ambitions no longer obtainable. It
might be fruitful of results if we could discover even the
theoretical interests of the age before Thales; but we know
that in modern times the direction of interest characteristic
of the purely practical pursuits manifests its reformative
influences in speculation a century or more after it has begun
to shape the course of common life. Hence we might mis-
interpret the historical data if they were obtainable. But
general considerations, which we need not now rehearse, as
well as indications contained in the later history of thought,
hereinafter sketched, point to the primacy of the practical as
yielding the direction of interest that determines the course
it shall take.

It was said above that the principles of science are the

206 Studies in Logical Theoey

result of an inductive movement, and that the inductive
movement is directed by an interest. • Hence the principles
are contained in, or rather are the express definition of, the
interest that gave them birth. In other words, there is
implied in all induction a process of deduction. Every
stream of thought embraces not only the main current, but
also an eddy, which here and there re-enters it. And this is
one way of explaining the phenomenon which has long
engaged the thought of philosophers, namely, the fact of
successful anticipations of the discoveries of science or, more
generally still, the possibility of synthetic judgments a ^Wori.
The solution of the problem is ultimately contained in its
statement."

To arrive at a stage of mentality not based on assumptions
one would have, no doubt, to go back to its beginnings.
Greek thought, even in the time of Thales, was well furnished
with them. We cannot pause to catalogue them, but it may
further our project if we consider a few of the more impor-
tant. The precondition of thought as of life is that nature
be uniform, or ultimately that the world be rational. This
is not even, as it becomes later, a conscious demand; it is the
primary ethical postulate which expresses itself in the con-
fidence that it is so. Viewed from a certain angle it
may be called the principle of sufficient reason. Closely
associated with it is the universal belief of the early philoso-
phers of Greece that everything that comes into being is
bound up inseparably with that which has been before ; more
precisely, that there is no absolute, but only relative. Becom-
ing. Corollaries of this axiom soon appeared in the postu-
lates of the conservation of matter or mass, and the conserva-
tion of energy, or more properly for the ancients, of motion.

iThe best special illustration of this tinth with which I am acquainted is pre-
sented for the science of chemistry in an article by F. Wald, " Die Genesis der
stOchiometrisohen Grundgesetze," in ZeiUchrift filr physikalische Chemie, Vol.
XVIII (1895), pp. 337 £E.

Logic of tAe Pbe-Sooratic Philosophy 207

Logically these principles appear to signify that the subject,
while under definition, shall remain just what it is ; and that,
in the system constituted of subject, predicate, and copula,
the terms shall "stay put" while the adjustment of verifica-
tion is in progress. It is a matter of course that the constants
in the great problem should become permanent landmarks.

Other corollaries derive from this same principle of
uniformity. Seeing that all that comes to be in some sense
already is, there appears the postulate of the unity of the
world ; and this unity manifests itself not only in the integrity
and homogeneity of the world-ground, but also in the more
ideal conception of a universal law to which all special
modes of procedure in nature are ancillary. In these we
recognize the insistent demand for the organization of predi-
cate and copula. Side by side with these formulae stands
the other, which requires an ordered process of becoming
and a graduated scale of existences, such as can mediate
between the extremes of polarity. Such series meet us on
every hand in early Greek thought. The process of rare-
faction and condensation in Anaximenes, the dSo? ava «aTa>
of Heraclitus, the regular succession of the four Empedoclean
elements in almost all later systems — these and other exam-
ples spontaneously occur to the mind. The significance of
this conception, as the representative of an effective copula,
will presently be seen. More subtle, perhaps, than any of
these principles, though not allowed to go so long unchal-
lenged, is the assumption of a ^vai'i, that is, the assumption
that all nature is instinct with life. The logical interpreta-
tion of this postulate would seem to be that the concrete
system of things — subject, predicate, copula — constitutes a
totality complete in itself and needing no jog from without.

In this survey of the preconceptions of the early Greek
philosophers I have employed the terms of the judgment with-
out apology. The justification for this course must come

208 Studies in Logical Theoky

ultimately, as for any assumption, from the success of its
application to the facts. But if "logic" merely formulates
in a schematic way that which in life is the manipulation of
concrete experience, with a view to attaining practical ends,
then its forms must apply here as well as anywhere. Logical
terminology may therefore be assumed to be welcome to this
field where judgments are formed, induction is made from
certain facts to defined conceptions, and deductions are
derived from principles or premises assumed. Speaking then
in these terms we may say that the Pre-Socratics had three
logical problems set for them: First, there was a demand
for a predicate, or, in other words, for a theory of the world.
Secondly, there was the need of ascertaining just what should
be regarded as the subject, or, otherwise stated, just what
it was that required explanation. Thirdly, there arose the
necessity of discovering ways and means by which the theory
could be predicated of the world and by which, in turn, the
hypothesis erected could be made to account for the concrete
experience of life: in terms of logic this problem is that of
maintaining an efficient copula. It is not assumed that the
sequence thus stated was historically observed without cross-
ing and overlapping ; but a survey of the history of the period
will show that, in a general way, the logical requirements
asserted themselves in this order.

1. Greek philosophy began its career with induction.
We have already stated that the preconceptions with which
it approached its task were the result of previous inductions,
and indeed the' epic and theogonic poetry of the Greeks
abounds in thoughts indicative of the consciousness of all of
these problems. Thus Homer is familiar with the notion
that all things proceed from water,' and that, when the
human body decays, it resolves itself into earth and water.'
Other opinions might be enumerated, but they would add

IB 201,246. 2H 99.

Logic of the Pbe-Soobatio Philosophy 209

nothing to the purpose. When men began, in the spirit of
philosophy, to theorize about the world, they assumed that
it — the subject — was sufficiently known. Its existence was
taken for granted, and that which engaged their attention
was the problem of its meaning. What predicate — so we
may formulate their question — should be given to the sub-
ject? It is noticeable that their induction was quite per-
functory. But such is always the case until there are rival
theories competing for acceptance, and even then the impulse
to gather up evidence derived from a wide field and assured
by resort to experiment comes rather with the desire to test
a hypothesis than to form it. It is the effort to verify that
brings out details and also the negative instances. Hence
we are not to blame Thales for rashness in making his
generalization that all is Water. We do not know what indi-
cations led to this conclusion. Aristotle ventured a guess,
but the motives assumed for Thales agree too well with those
which weighed with Hippo to admit of ready acceptance.

Anaximander, feeling the need of deduction as a sequel
to induction, found his predicate in the Infinite. We can-
not now delay to inquire just what he meant by the
term ; but it is not unlikely that its very vagueness recom-
mended it to a man of genius who caught enthusiastically
at the skirts of knowledge. Anaximenes, having pushed
verification somewhat farther and eliciting some negative
instances, rejected water and the Infinite and inferred
that all was air. His apxH must have the quality of infinity,
but, a copula having been found in the process of rarefaction
and condensation, it must occupy a determinate place in the
series of typical forms of existence. The logical signifi-
cance of this thought will engage our attention later.

Meanwhile it may be well to note that thus far only owe
predicate has been offered by each philosopher. This is
doubtless due to the preconception of the unity and homo-

210 Studies in Logical Theoky

geneity of the world, of which we have already made mention.
Although at the beginning its significance was little realized,
the conception was destined to play a prominent part in
Greek thought. It may be regarded from different points
of view not necessarily antagonistic. One may say, as
indeed has oftentimes been said, that it was due to ignorance.
Men did not know the complexity of the world, and hence
declared its substance to be simple. Again, it may be
affirmed that the assumption was merely the naive reflex of
the ethical postulate that we shall unify our experience and
organize it for the realization of our ideals. While increased
knowledge has multiplied the so-called chemical elements,
physics knows nothing of their differences, and chemistry
itself demands their reduction.

The extension and enlarged scope of homogeneity came
in two ways: First, it presented itself by way of abstraction
from the particular predicates that may be given to things.
This was due to the operation of the fundamental assump-
tion that the world must be intelligible. Thus, even in
Anaximander, the world-ground takes no account of the
diversity of things except in the negative way of providing
that the contrariety of experience shall arise from it. We
are therefore referred for our predicate to a somewhat
behind concrete experience. The Pythagoreans fix upon a
single aspect of things as the essential, and find the mean-
ing of the world in mathematical relations. The Eleatics
press the conception of homogeneity until it is reduced to
identity. Identity means the absence of difference ; hence,
spatially considered, it requires the negation of a void and
the indivisibility of the world ; viewed temporally, it pre-
cludes the succession of different states and hence the
possibility of change.

We thus reach the acute stage of the problem of the One
and the Many. The One is here the predicate, the subject

Logic of the Pbe-Soceatic Philosophy 211

is the Many. The solution of the difficulty is the task of
the copula, and we shall recur to the theme in due time.
It may be well, however, at this point to draw attention to
the fact that the One is not always identical with the predi-
cate, nor the Many with the subject. In the rhythmic
movement of erecting and verifying hypotheses the interest
shifts and what was but now the predicate, by taking the
place of the premises, comes to be regarded as the given
from which the particular is to be derived or deduced.
There is thus likewise a shift in the positions of existence
and meaning. The subject, or the world, was first assumed
as the given means with which to construct the predicate,
its meaning; once the hypothesis has been erected, the
direction of interest shifts back to the beginning, and in
the process of verification or deduction the quondam predi-
cate, now the premises, becomes the given, and the task set
for thought is the derivation of fact. For the moment, or
until the return to the world is accomplished, the One is the
only real, the Manifold remains mere appearance.

The second form in which the sense of the homogeneity
of the world embodies itself is not, like the first, static, but
is altogether dynamic. That which makes the whole world
kin is neither the presence nor the absence of a quality, but a
principle. The law thus revealed is, therefore, not a matter
of the predicate, but is the copula itself. Hence we must
defer a fuller consideration of it for the present.

2. As has already been said, the inductive movement
implies the deductive, and not only as something preceding
or accompanying it, but as its inner meaning and ultimate
purpose. So too it was with the earliest Greek thinkers.
Their object in setting up a predicate was the derivation of
the subject from it. In other words their ambition was to
discover the apxn from which the genesis of the world pro-
ceeds. But deduction is really a much more serious task

212 Studies in Logical Theory

than would at first appear to one who is familiar with the
Aristotelian machinery of premises and middle terms. The
business of deduction is to reveal the subject, and ordi-
narily the subject quite vanishes from view. Induction is
rapid, but deduction lags far behind. It may require but a
momentary flash of "insight" on the part of the physical phi-
losopher to discover a principle ; if it is really significant,
inventors will be engaged for centuries in deducing from it
applications to the needs of life by means of contrivances.
Thus after ages we come to know more of the subject, which
is thereby enriched. The contrivances are the representa-
tives of the copula in practical affairs ; in quasi-theoretical
spheres they are the apparatus for experimentation. It has
just been remarked that by the application of the principles
to life it is enriched ; in other words, it receives new mean-
ing, and new meaning signifies a new predicate. Theory
is at times painfully aware of the multitude of new predicates
proposed ; rarely does it realize that there has been created
a new heaven and a new earth. Without the latter, the for-
mer would /be absurd.

Men take very much for granted and regard almost every
achievement as a matter of course. Hence they do not become
aware of their changed position except as it reflects itself in
new schemes and in a larger outlook. The subject receives
only a summary glance to discover what new predicate shall
be evolved. Hence, while there is in Greek philosophy a
strongly marked deductive movement, the theoretical results
to the subject are insignificant. Thales seems, indeed, to
have had no means to offer for the derivation of the world,
but he evidently had no doubt that it was possible. With him
and with others the assumption, however vaguely understood,
seems to have been that the subject, like the predicate, was sim-
ple. Thus the essential unity of the world, considered as exist-
ence no less than as meaning, is a foregone conclusion. The

Logic of the Pbe-Soobatic Philosophy 213

sense of a division in the subject seems to arise witli Empe-
docles when, reaping the harvest of the Eleatic definition of
substance, he parted the world, as subject and as predicate,
into four elements.

We may, perhaps, pause a moment to consider the signifi-
cance of the assumption of four elements which plays so
large a part in subsequent philosophies. There is no need
of enlarging on the importance of the association of multiple
elements with the postulate that nothing is absolutely created
and nothing absolutely passes away. These are indeed the
pillars that support chemical science, and they further imply
the existence of qualities of different rank; but that implica-
tion, as we shall see, lay even in the process of rarefaction
and condensation introduced by Anaximenes. The four
elements concern us here chiefly as testifying to the fact that
certain practical interests had summed up the essential
characteristics of nature in forms sufficiently significant to
have maintained themselves even to our day. In regard to
fire, air, and water this is not greatly to be wondered at; it
is a somewhat different case with earth. If metallurgy and
other pursuits which deal with that which is roughly classed
as earth had been highly enough developed to have reacted
upon the popular mind, this element could not possibly have
been assumed to be so homogeneous. The conception
clearly reflects the predominantly agricultural interest of
the Greeks in their relation to the earth. This further
illustrates the slow progress which deduction makes in the
reconstitution of the subject.

It is different, however, with Anaxagoras and the Ato-
mists. Apparently the movement begun by Empedocles
soon ran its extreme course. Instead of four elements there
is now an infinite number of substances, each differentiated
from the other. The meaning of this wide swing of the
pendulum is not altogether clear; but it is evident from the

214 Studies in Logical Theoby

system of Anaxagoras that the metals, for example, possessed
a significance which they can not have had for Empedocles.

The opposite swing of the pendulum is seen in the later
course of the Eleatics. Given a predicate as fixed and
unified as they assumed, the subject cannot possibly be con-
ceived in terms of it and hence it is denied outright. In the
dialectic of Zeno and Melissus, dealing with the problems
of the One and the Many, there is much that suggests the
solution offered by the Atomists ; but it is probably impossible
now to ascertain whether these passages criticise a doctrine
already propoimded or pointed the way for successors.
While the Eleatics asserted the sole reality of the One,
Anaxagoras and the Atomists postulated a multiplicity without
essential unity. But the human mind seems to be incapable
of resting in that decision; it demands that the world shall
have not meanings, but a meaning. This demand calls not
only for a unified predicate, but also for an effective copula.

3. We have already remarked that the steps by which
the predicate was inferred are for the most part unknown.
Certain suggestions are contained in the reports of Aristotle,
but it is safe to say that they are generally guesses well or
ill founded. The summary inductive mediation has left few
traces ; and the process of verification, in the course of which
hypotheses were rejected and modified, can be followed only
here and there in the records. Almost our only source of
information is the dialectic of systems. Fortunately for our
present purpose we do not need to know the precise form
which a question assumed to the minds of the several phi-
losophers ; the efforts which they made to meet the imperious
demands of logic here speak for themselves.

At first there was no scheme for the mediation of the
predicate back to the subject. Indeed there seems not to
have existed in the mind of Thales a sense of its need.
Anaximander raised the question, but the process of segrega-

Logic op the Pee-Soceatio Philosophy 215

tion or separation (eKKpivea-Oai) which he propounded was so
vaguely conceived that it has created more problems than it
solved. Anaximenes first proposed a scheme that has borne
fruits. He said that things are produced from air by rare-
faction and condensation. This process offers not only a
principle of difference, but also a regulative conception, the
evaluation of which engaged the thought of almost all the
later Pre-Socratics. It implies that extension and mass con-
stitute the essential characters of substance, and, fully appre-
hended, contains in germ the whole materialistic philosophy
from Parmenides at one extreme to Democritus and Anax-
agoras at the other. The difficulties inherent in the view
were unknown to Anaximenes ; for, having a unitary predi-
cate, he assumed also a homogeneous subject.

The logical position of Heraclitus is similar to that of
Anaximenes. He likewise posits a simple predicate and
further signalizes its functional character by naming it Fire.
Without venturing upon debatable ground we may say that
it was the restless activity of the element that caused him to
single it out as best expressing the meaning of things. Its
rhythmic libration typified to him the principle of change in
existence and of existence in change. It is the "ever-living"
copula, devouring subject and predicate alike and re-creating
them functionally as co-ordinate expressions of itself. That
which alone is, the abiding, is not the physical composition
of a thing, but the law of reciprocity by which it maintains
a balance. This he calls variously by the names of Harmony,
Logos, Necessity, Justice. In this system of functional
co-ordinates nothing escapes the accounting on 'Change;'

iln allnsion to fr. 90 (Diels). Diels finds in fr. 108 (fr. 18, Bywatee), oti
ao^tov etTTL iravTittv jc£xupi<r^€t/uf the thought that God is the Absolute, compariog the
Nov? of Anaxagoras and the xiapttrrij tSea of Plato and the ovtria xwpnTTij of Aristotle.
He assumes that ao^tov = \6yo^ and concedes great significance to the fragment.
But this interpretation is utterly incompatible with everything else that we know
of Heraclitus, and should be admitted only if it were the only one admissible.
Zellee discusses the fragment at length. Vol. I, p. 629, 1. If Diels's interpretation
be accepted, the exposition above given of Heraclitus's logical position must be
abandoned.

216 Studies in Logical Theory

all things are in continuous flux, only the nodes of the rhythm
remaining constant. It is not surprising therefore that
Heraclitus has been the subject of so much speculation and
comment in modern times ; for the functional character of all
distinctions in his system marks the affinity of his doctrines
for those of modern psychology and logic'

The Pythagoreans, having by abstraction obtained a
predicate, acknowledged the existence of the subject, but did
not feel the need of a copula in the theoretical sphere, except
as it concerned the inner relation of the predicate. To them
the world was number, but number itself was pluralistic, or
let us rather say dualistic. The odd and the even, the generic
constituents of number, had somehow to be brought together.
The bond was found in Unity, or, again, in Harmony. When
they inquired how numbers constituted the world, their
answer was in general only a nugatory exercise of an un-
bridled fancy.^ Such and such a number was Justice, such
another, Man. It was only in the wholly practical sphere of
experiment that they reached a conclusion worth recording.
Its significance they themselves did not perceive. Here, by
the application of mathematical measurements to sounds,
they discovered how to produce tones of a given pitch, and
thus successfully demonstrated the efficiency of their copula.

The Eleatics followed the same general course of abstrac-
tion; but with them the sense of the unity of the world
effaced its rich diversity. Xenophanes does not appear to
have pressed the conception so far as to deny all change
within the world. Parmenides, however, bated no jot of the
legitimate consequences of his logical position, interpreting,
as he did, the predicate, originally conceived as meaning, in

1 It has been, and in some qnarteis is still, the fashion to say that Heraclitns is
the originator of the doctrine of relativity ; but Zeller is quite right in denying the
charge. No doubt his teachings lent themselves readily to such a development, but
he did not so express himself. According to him the contrarieties coexist in the process.

'Cf. Rittee-Peellek, §65c.

Logic of the Pse-Sooratio Philosophy 217

terms of existence. That which is simply is. Thus there
is left only a one-time predicate, now converted into a sub-
ject of which only itself, as a brute fact, can be predicated.
Stated logically, Parmenides is capable only of uttering
identical propositions: A=;A. The fallacious character of
the report of the senses and the impossibility of Becoming
followed as a matter of course. Where the logical copula is
a mere sign of equation there can be neither induction nor
deduction. We are caught in a theoretical cul-de-sac.

We are not now concerned to know in what light the
demand for a treatise on the world of Opinion may have
appeared to Parmenides himself. The avenues by which
men reach conclusions which are capable of simplification
and syllogistic statement are too various to admit of plaus-
ible conjecture in the absence of specific evidence. But it is
clear that his resort to the expedient reflected a conscious-
ness of the state of deadlock. In that part of his philosophi-
cal poem he dealt with many questions of detail in a rather
more practical spirit. Following the lead of Heraclitus and
the Pythagoreans he was more successful here than in the
field of metaphysics. Thus we see once more that the wounds
of theory are healed by practice. But, as usual, even though
the metaphysician does receive the answer to his doubts by
falling into a severely practical pit and extricating himself
by steps which he fashions with his hands, his mental habit
is not thereby reconstructed. The fixed predicate of the
Eleatics was bequeathed to the Platonic- Aristotelian formal
logic, and induction and deduction remained for centuries in
theory a race between the hedgehog and the hare.' The
true significance of the destructive criticism brought to bear
by Zeno and Melissus on the concepts of unity, plurality,
continuity, extension, time, and motion is simply this: that

1 This, in a word, is the burden of my study of The Necessary and the Contingent
in the Aristotelian System.

218 Studies in Logical Theory

when by a shift of the attention a predicate becomes subject
or meaning fossilizes as existence, the terms of the logical
process lose their functional reference and grow to be
unmeaning and self-contradictory.

We have already remarked that Empedocles, Anaxagoras,
and the Atomists sought to solve the problem of the One and
the Many, of the subject and the predicate, by shattering
the unitary predicate and thus leaving the field to plurality
in both spheres. But obviously they were merely postpon-
ing the real question. Thought, as well as action, demands
a unity somewhere. Hence the absorbing task of these phi-
losophers is to disclose or contrive such a bond of unity.
The form which their quest assumed was the search for a
basis for physical interaction.'

Empedocles clearly believed that he was solving the diffi-
culty in one form when he instituted the rhythmic libration
between unity under the sway of Love and multiplicity
under the domination of Hate. But even he was not satisfied
with that. While Love brought all the elements together
into a sphere and thus produced a unity, it was a unity con-
stituted of a mixture of elements possessing inalienable char-
acters not only different but actually antagonistic. On the
other hand, Hate did indeed separate the confused particles,
but it effected a sort of unity in that, by segregating the
particles of the several elements from the others, it brought
like and like together. In so far Aristotle was clearly right in
attributing to Love the power to separate as well as to unite.
Moreover, it would seem that there never was a moment in
which both agencies were not conceived to be operative, to
however small an extent.

Empedocles asserted, however, that a world could arise
only in the intervals between the extremes of victory in the

1 1 have in preparation a study of the problem of physical interaction in Pre-
Socratic philosophy which deals with this question in all its phases.

Logic of the Peb-Soobatio Philosophy 219

contest between Love and Hate, when, so to speak, the battle
was drawn and there was a general mSl^e of the combatants.
It may be questioned, perhaps, whether he distinctly stated
that in our world everything possessed its portion of each of
the elements ; but so indispensable did he consider this mix-
ture that its function of providing a physical unity is unmis-
takable. A further evidence of his insistent demand for
unity — the copula — is found in his doctrine that only like
can act on like ; and the scheme of pores and effluvia which
he contrived bears eloquent testimony to the earnest consid-
eration he gave to this matter. For he conceived that all
interaction took place by means of them.

Empedocles, then, may be said to have annulled the de-
cree of divorce he had issued for the elements at the begin-
ning. But the solution here too is found, not in the
theoretical, but in the practical, sphere ; for he never retracts
his assertion that the elements are distinct and antagonistic.
But even so his problem is defined rather than solved; for
after the elements have been brought within microscopic
distance of each other in the mixture, since like can act only
on like, the narrow space that separates them is still an
impassable gulf.'

Anaxagoras endowed his infinitely numerous substances
with the same characters of fixity and contrariety that mark
the four elements of Empedocles. For him, therefore, the
diflBculty of securing imity and co-operation in an effective
copula is, if that be possible, further aggravated. His grasp
of the problem, if we may judge from the relatively small
body of documentary evidence, was not so sure as that of
Empedocles, though he employed in general the same
means for its solution. He too postulates a mixture of all
substances, more consciously and definitely indeed than his

t This statement is, of course, figurative, since Empedocles denied the existence
of a void.

220 Studies in Logical Theoby

predecessor. Believing that only like can act on like,' he is
led to assume not only an infinite multiplicity of substances,
but also their complete mixture, so that everything, however
small, contains a portion of every other. Food, for example,
however seeming-simple, nourishes the most diverse tissues
of the body. Thus we discover in the universal mixture of
substances the basis for co-operation and interaction.

Anaxagoras, therefore, like Empedocles, feels the need of
bridging the chasm which he has assumed to exist between
his distinct substances. Their failure is alike great, and
is due to the presuppositions they inherited from the Ele-
atic conception of a severe homogeneity which implies an
absolute difference from everything else. The embarrass-
ment of Anaxagoras increases with the introduction of the
Now. This agency was conceived with a view to explaining
the formation of the world ; that is, with a view to mediating
between the myriad substances in their essential aloofness
and effecting the harmonious concord of concrete things.
While, even on the basis of a universal mixture, the function
of the Nous was foredoomed to failure, its task was made more
difficult still by the definition given to its nature. According
to Anaxagoras it was the sole exception to the composite
character of things; it is absolutely pure and simple in
nature.^ By its definition, then, it is prevented from accom-
plishing the work it was contrived to do ; and hence we can-
not be surprised at the lamentations raised by Plato and
Aristotle about the failure of Anaxagoras to employ the

1 1 cannot now undertake a defense of this statement, which rnns counter to cer-
tain ancient reports, but must reserve a full discussion for my account of physical
interaction.

2 The motive for making this assumption was clearly the desire to make of the
NoC? the prime mover in the world while exempting it from reaction on the part of
the world, which would have been unavoidable if its nature had contained parts of
other things. It is the same problem of '^touching without being touched in return"
that led Aristotle to a similar definition of God and of the rational soul. The same
difficulty besets the absolutely "simple" soul of Plato's Phaedo and the causality of
the Ideas.

Logic of the Pre-Sooeatio Philosophy 221

agency he had introduced. To be sure, the Now is no more
a deus ex machina than were the ideas of Plato or the God
of Aristotle. They all labored under the same restrictions.

The Atomists followed with the same recognition of the
Many, in the infinitely various kinds of atoms; but it was
tempered by the assumption of an essential homogeneity.
One atom is distinguished from another by characteristics
due to its spatial relations. Mass and weight are propor-
tional to size. Aristotle reports that, though things and
atoms have differences, it is not in virtue of their differences,
but in virtue of their essential identity, that they interact."
There is thus introduced a distinction which runs nearly, but
not quite, parallel to that between primary and secondary
qualities.^ Primary qualities are those of size, shape, and
perhaps' position; all others are secondary. On the other
hand, that which is common to all atoms is their corporeity,
which does indeed define itself with reference to the primary
(spatial) qualities, but not alike in all. The atoms of which
the world is constituted are alike in essential nature, but
they differ most widely in position.

It is the void that breaks up the unity of the world —
atomizes it, if we may use the expression. It is the basis of
all discontinuity. Atoms and void are thus polar extremes
reciprocally exclusive. The atoms in their utter isolation
in space are incapable of producing a world. In order to
bridge the chasm between atom and atom, recourse is had
to motion eternal, omnipresent, and necessary. This it
is that annihilates distances. In the course of their motion
atoms collide, and in their impact one upon the other the

1 Aeistotlb, De Generatione el Corruptione, SSS> 10 f .

2 We have seen that this distinctioa was latent in Anaximenes's process of rare-
faction and condensation. For other matters see Chaignet, Histoire de la Psy-
chologie. Vol. I, p. 114, whose account, however, needs to be corrected in some
particulars.

3 1 say "perhaps'* because ancient reports differ as to the precise relation of posi-
tion and arrangement to the distinction between qualities, primary and secondary.

222 Studies in Logical Theory

Atomists find the precise mode of co-operation by which the
world is formed.' To this agency are due what Lucretius
happily called "generating motions."

The problem, however, so insistently pursued the philoso-
phers of this time that the Atomists did not content them-
selves with this solution, satisfactory as modern science has
pretended to consider it. They followed the lead of Emped-
ocles and Anaxagoras in postulating a widespread, if not
absolutely universal, mixture. Having on principle excluded
"essential" difPerences among the atoms, the impossibility of
finally distinguishing essential and non-essential had its
revenge. Important as the device of mixture was to
Empedocles and Anaxagoras, just so unmeaning ought it to
have been in the Atomic philosophy, provided that the
hypothesis could accomplish what was claimed for it. It is not
necesaryto reassert that the assumption of "individua," utterly
alienated one from the other by a void, rendered the problem
of the copula insoluble for the Atomists. ,

Diogenes of ApoUonia is commonly treated contemptu-
ously as a mere reactionary who harked back to Anaximenes
and had no significance of his own. The best that can be
said of such an attitude is that it regards philosophical
theories as accidental utterances of individuals, naturally
well or ill endowed, who happen to express conclusions with
which men in after times agree or disagree. A philosophical
tenetis an atom, setsomewhere in a vacuum, utterly out of rela-
tion to everything else. But it is impossible to see how, on this
theory, any system of thought should possess any significance
for anybody, or how there should be any progress even, or
retardation.

Viewed entirely from without, the doctrine of Diogenes
would seem to be substantially a recrudescence of that of

1 This is only another instance of what Me. Venn {Empirical Logic, p. 56) has
wittily alluded to as "screwing up the cause and the effect intoclose juxtaposition."

Logic of the Pee-Sooratio Philosophy 223

Anaximenes. Air is once more the element or apxv out of
which all proceeds and into which all returns. Again the pro-
cess of transformation is seen in rarefaction and condensation ;
and the attributes of substance are those which were com-
mon to the early hylozoists. But there is present a keen
sense of a problem unknown to Anaximenes. What the
early philosopher asserted in the innocence of the youth of
thought, the later physiologist reiterates with emphasis
because he believes that the words are words of life.

The motive for recurring to the earlier systfem is supplied
by the imperious demand for a copula which had so much
distressed Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. And
here we are not left to conjecture, but are able to refer to
the ipsissima verba of our philosopher. After a brief pro-
logue, in which he stated that one's starting-point must be
beyond dispute, he immediately ' turned to his theme in these
words:" "In my opinion, to put the whole matter in a nut-
shell, all things are derived by alteration from the same
substance, and indeed all are one and the same. And this
is altogether evident. For if the things that now exist in
the world — earth and water and air and fire and whatsoever
else appears to exist in this world — if, I say, any one of
these were different from the other, different that is to say
in its proper peculiar nature, and did not rather, being one
and the same, change and alter in many ways, then in no-
wise would things be able to mix with one another, nor would
help or harm come to one from the other, nor would any
plant spring from the earth, nor any other living thing come
into being, if things were not so constituted as to be one
and the same."

These words contain a singularly interesting expression

1 Simplicins says evflus /lera to irpoot/iiov; see DiELS, Die Fragmente der Vorsokra*
tj&er (Berlin, 1903), p. 347, 1. 18.
2Fr. 2, DiBLS.

224 Studies in Logical Theoky

of the need of restoring the integrity of the process which
had been lost in the effort to solve the problem of the One
and the Many without abandoning the point of view won by
the Eleatics. Aristotle and Theophrastus paraphrase and
sum up the passage above quoted by saying' that interaction
is impossible except on the assumption that all the world is
one and the same. Hence it is manifest, as was said above,
that the return of Diogenes to the monistic system of Anax-
imenes had for its conscious motive the avoidance of the
dualism that had sprung up in the interval and had rendered
futile the multiplied efforts to secure an effective copula.

We should note, however, that in the attempt thus made
to undo the work of several generations Diogenes retained
the principle which had wrought the mischief. We have
before remarked that the germ of the Atomic philosophy
was contained in the process of rarefaction and condensation.
Hence, in accepting it along with the remainder of Anax-
imenes's theory, the fatal assumption was reinstated. It is
the story of human systems in epitome. The superstructure
is overthrown, and with the debris a new edifice is built upon
the old foundations.

In the entire course of philosophical thought from Thales
onward the suggestion of an opposition between the subject
and the predicate had appeared. It has often been said that
it was expressed by the search for a <f>vaK, or a true nature,
in contrast with the world as practically accepted. There is
a certain truth in this view ; for the effort to attain a predi-
cate which does not merely repeat the subject does imply
that there is an opposition. But the efforts made to return
from the predicate to the subject, in a deductive movement,
shows that the difference was not believed to be absolute.
This is true, however, only of those fields of speculation
that lie next to the highways of practical life, which lead

1 See DiBLS, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, p. 343, 1. 2 ; p. 344, 1. 27.

Logic op the Pbe-Soobatio Philosophy 225

equally in both directions, or, let us rather say, which unite
while they mark separation. In the sphere of abstract ideas
the sense of embarrassment was deep and constantly growing
deeper. The reconstruction, accomplished on lower levels,
did not attain unto those heights. Men doubted conclusions,
but did not think to demand the credentials of their common
presuppositions.

Side by side with the later philosophers whom we have
mentioned there walked men whom we are wont to call the
Sophists. They were the journalists and pamphleteers of
those days, men who, without dealing profoundly with any
special problem, familiarized themselves with the generali-
zations of workers in special fields and combined these ideas
for the entertainment of the public. They were neither
philosophers nor physicists, but, like some men whom we
might cite from our own times, endeavored to popularize
the teachings of both. Naturally they seized upon the most
sweeping generalizations and the preconceptions which dis-
closed themselves in manifold forms. Just as naturally they
had no eyes with which to detect the significance of the
besetting problems at which, in matters more concrete, the
masters were toiling. Hence the contradictions, revealed in
the analysis we have just given of the philosophy of the age,
stood out in utter nakedness.

The result was inevitable. The inability to discover a
unitary predicate, more still, the failure to attain a working
copula, led directly to the denial of the possibility of predi-
cation. There was no truth. Granted that it existed, it
could not be known. Even if known, it could not be com-
municated. In these incisive words of Gorgias the conclu-
sion of the ineffectual effort to establish a logic of science is
clearly stated. But the statement is happily only the half-
truth, which is almost a complete falsehood. It takes no
account of the indications, everywhere present, of a needed

226 Studies in Logical Theory

reconstruction. Least of all does it catch, the meaning of
snch a demand.

The Sophists did not, however, merely repeat in abstract
from the teachings of the philosophers. It matters not
whether they originated the movement or not ; at all events
they were pioneers in the field of moral philosophy. Here
it was that they chiefly drew the inferences from the dis-
tinction between <f>va-ei and vofiay. Nothing could have been
more effective in disengaging the firmly rooted moral pre-
possessions and rendering them amenable to philosophy.
Just here, at last, we catch a hint of the significance of the
logical process. In a striking passage in Plato's Protagoras,^
which one is fain to regard as an essentially true reproduction
of a discourse by that great man. Justice and Keverence
are accorded true validity. On inquiring to what character-
istic this honorable distinction is due, we find that it does
not reside in themselves ; it is due to the assumption that a
state must exist.

Here, then, in a word, is the upshot of the logical
movement. Logical predicates are essentially hypothetical,
deriving their validity from the interest that moves men to
affirm them. When they lose this hypothetical character,
as terms within a volitional system, and set up as entities at
large, they cease to function and forfeit their right to exist.

1320C f.

VALUATION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS

The purpose of this discussion is to supply the main out-
lines of a theory of value based upon analysis of the valua-
tion-process from the logical point of view. The general
principle which we shall seek to establish is that judgments
of value, whether passed upon things or upon modes of
conduct, are essentially objective in import, and that they
are reached through a process of valuation which is essen-
tially of the same logical character as the judgment-process
whereby conclusions of physical fact are established —
in a word, that the valuation-process, issuing in the finished
judgment of value expressive of the judging person's defini-
tive attitude toward the thing in question, is constructive of
an order of reality in the same sense as, in current theories
of knowledge, is the judgment of sense-perception and sci-
ence. Our method of procedure to this end will be that of
assuming, and adhering to as consistently as possible, the
standpoint of the individual in the process of deliberating
upon an ethical or economic problem (for, as we shall hold,
all values properly so called are either ethical or economic),
and of ascertaining, as accurately as may be, the meaning of
the deliberative or evaluating process and of the various fac-
tors in it as these are presented in the individual's apprehen-
sion. It is in this sense that our procedure will be logical
rather than psychological. We shall be concerned to deter-
mine the meaning of the object of valuation as object, of the
standard of value as standard, and of the valued object as
valued, in terms of the individual's own apprehension of
these, rather than to ascertain the nature and conditions of
his apprehensions of these considered as psychical events.

227

228 Studies in Logical Thbokt

Our attention will througliout be directed to these factors
or phases of the valuation-process in their functional aspect
of determinants of the valuing agent's practical attitude, and
never, excepting for purposes of incidental illustration and
in a very general and tentative way, as events in conscious-
ness mediated by more "elementary" psychical processes.
The results which we shall gain by adhering to this method
will enable us to see not merely that our judgments of value
are in function and meaning objective, but also that our
judgments of sense-perception and science are, as such,
capable of satisfactory interpretation only as being incidental
to the attainment and progressive reconstruction of judg-
ments of value.

The first three main divisions will be given over to estab-
lishing the objectivity of content and function of judgments
of value. The fourth division will present a detailed analy-
sis of the two types of judgment of value, the ethical and
economic, defining them and relating them to each other,
and correlating them in the manner just suggested with
judgment of the physical type. After considering, in the
fifth part, certain general objections to the positions thus
stated, we shall proceed in the sixth and concluding division
to define the function of the consciousness of value in the
economy of life.'

The system of judgments which defines what one calls
the objective order of things is inevitably unique for each
particular individual. No two men can view the world from
the standpoint of the same theoretical and practical inter-

1 Considerations of space as weU as circumstances attending the immediate
preparation of this discussion for the press have precluded any but the most general
and casual reference to the recent literature of the subject. Much of this literature
only imperfectly distinguishes the logical and psychological points of view, so that
critical reference to it, unaccompanied by detailed restatement and analysis of the
positions criticised, would be useless.

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 229

ests, nor can any two proceed in the work of gaining for
themselves knowledge of the world with precisely equal
degrees of skill and accuracy. Each must be prompted and
guided, in the construction of his knowledge of single things
find of the system in which they have their being, by his
own particular interests and aims ; and even when one per-
son in a measure shares in the interests and aims of another,
the rate and manner of procedure will not be the same for
both, nor will the knowledge gained be for both equally
systematic in arrangement or in interrelation of its parts.
Each man lives in a world of his own — a world, indeed,
identical in certain fundamental respects with the worlds
which his fellow-men have constructed for themselves, but
one nevertheless necessarily unique through and through
because each man is a unique individual. There is, doubt-
less, a "social currency" of objects which implies a certain
identity of meaning in objects as experienced by different
individuals. The existence of society presupposes, and its
evolution in turn develops and extends, a system of generally
accepted objects and relations. Nevertheless, the "socially
current object " is, as such, an abstraction just as the uniform
social individual is likewise an abstraction. The only con-
crete object ever actually known or in any wise experienced
by any person is the object as constructed by that person in
accordance with his own aims and purposes, and in which
there is, therefore, a large and important share of meaning
which is significant to no one else.

It is needless in this discussion to dwell at length upon
the general principle of recent "functional" psychology, that
practical ends are the controlling factors in the acquisition
of our knowledge of objective things. We shall take for
granted the truth of the general proposition that cognition,
in whatever sphere of science or of practical life, is essen-
tially teleological in the sense of being iacidental always.

230 Studies in Logical Theory

more or less directly, to the attainment of ends. Cognition,
as the apperceptive or attentive process, is essentially the
process of scrutinizing a situation (whether theoretical or
practical) with a view to determining the availability for one's
intended purpose of such objects and conditions as the
situation may present. The objects and conditions thus
determined will be made use of or ignored, counted upon as
advantageous or guarded against as unfavorable- — -in a word,
responded to — in ways suggested by their character as
ascertained through reference to the interest in question.
In this sense, then, objective things as known by individual
persons are essentially complex stimuli whose proper func-
tion and reason for being it is to elicit useful responses in
the way of conduct — responses conducive to the realization
of ends.

From this point of view, then, the difPerence between one
person's knowledge of a particular object and another's
signifies (1) a difference between these persons' original
purposes in setting out to gain knowledge of the object, and
(2) consequently a difference between their present ways
of acting with reference to the object. The bare object as
socially current is, at best, for each individual simply a ground
upon which subsequent construction may be made ; and the
subsequent construction which each individual is prompted
by his circumstances and is able to work out in judgment
first makes the object, for this individual, real and for his
purposes complete.

Now, it is our primary intention to show that objects are,
in cases of a certain important class, not yet ready to serve
the person who knows them in their proper character of
stimuli, when they have been, even exhaustively, defined in
merely physical terms. It is very often not enough that the
dimensions of an object and its physical properties, even the
more recondite ones as well as those more commonly under-

Valuation as a Logical Process 231

stood — it is often not enough for the purposes of an agent
that these characters should make up the whole sum of his
knowledge of the object in question. A measure of knowl-
edge in terms of physical categories is often only a begin-
ning — the result of a preliminary stage of the entire process
of teleological determination, which must be carried through
before the object of attention can be satisfactorily known.
In the present study of the logic of valuation we shall be
occupied exclusively with the discussion of cases of this kind.
In our judgments of sense -perception and physical science
we have presented to us material objects in their physical
aspect. When these latter are inadequate to suggest or war-
rant overt conduct, our knowledge of them must be supple-
mented and reconstructed in ways presently to be specified.
It is in the outcome of judgment-processes in which this
work of supplementing and reconstructing is carried through
that the consciousness of value, in the proper sense, arises,
and these processes, then, are those which we shall here con-
sider under the name of "processes of valuation." They will
therefore best be approached through specification of the
ways in which our physical judgments may be inadequate.

Let us, then, assume, as has been indicated, that the pro-
cess of acquiring knowledge — that is to say, the process of
judgment or attention — is in every case of its occurrence
incidental to the attainment of an end. We must make this
assumption without attempting formally to justify it — though
in the course of our discussion it will be abundantly illus-
trated. Let us, in accordance with this view, think of the
typical judgment-process as proceeding, in the main, as fol-
lows: First of all must come a sense of need or deficiency,
which may, on occasion, be preceded by a more or less violent
and sudden shock to the senses, forcibly turning one's atten-
tion to the need of immediate action. By degrees this sense
of need will grow more definite and come to express itself in

232 Studies in Logical Theory

a more or less " clear and distinct " image of an end, toward
which end the agent is drawn by desire and to which he
looks with much or little of emotion. The emergence of
the end into consciousness immediately makes possible and
occasions definite analysis of the situation in which the end
must be worked out. Salient features of the situation forth-
with are noticed — whether useful things or favoring condi-
tions, or, on the other hand, the absence of any such. Thus
predicates and then subjects for many subsidiary judgments
in the comprehensive judgment-process emerge together in
action and interaction upon each other. The predicates,
developed out of the general end toward which the agent
strives, afford successive points of view for fresh analyses of
the situation. The logical subjects thus discovered — objects
of attention and knowledge — require, on the other hand, as
they are scrutinized and judged, modification and re-exami-
nation of the end. The end grows clearer and fuller of
detail as the predicates or implied ("constituent") ideas
which are developed out of it are distinguished from each
other and used in making one's inventory of the objective
situation. Conversely, the situation loses its first aspect of
confusion and takes on more and more the aspect of an
orderly assemblage of objects and conditions, useful, indif-
ferent, and adverse, by means of which the end may in
greater or less measure be attained or must, in however
greatly modified a form, be defeated. Now, in this develop-
ment of the judgment-process, it must be observed, the end
must be more or less clearly and consistently conceived
throughout as an activity, if the objective means of action
which have been determined in the process are not to be, at the
last, separate and unrelated data still requiring co-ordination.
If the end has been so conceived, the means will inevitably be
known as members of a mechanical system, since the predi-
cates by which they have been determined have at every

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 233

point involved this factor of amenability to co-ordination.
The judgment-process, if properly conducted and brought to
a conclusion, must issue at the end in the functional unity of
a finished plan of conduct with a perfected mechanical
co-ordination of the available means.

We have now to see that much more may be involved in
such a process as this than has been explicitly stated in our
brief analysis. For the end itself may be a matter of delib-
eration, just as must be the physical means of accomplishing
it; and, again, the means may call for scrutiny and deter-
mination from other points of view than the physical and
mechanical. The final action taken at the end may express
the outcome of deliberate ethical and economic judgment
as well as of judgments in the sphere of sense-perception
and physical science. Let us consider, for example, that
one's end is the construction of a house upon a certain plot
of ground. This end expresses the felt need of a more com-
fortable or more reputable abode, and has so much of gen-
eral presumption in its favor. There may, however, be
many reasons for hesitation. The cost in time or money or
materials on hand may tax one's resources and injuriously
curtail one's activities along other lines. And there may be
ethical reasons why the plan should not be carried out. The
house may shut off a pleasing prospect from the view of the
entire neighborhood and serve no better end than the grati-
fication of its owner's selfish vanity. It will cost a sum of
money which might be used in paying just, though outlawed^
debts.

Now, from the standpoint of such problems as these the
fullest possible preliminary knowledge of the physical and
mechanical fitness of our means must still be very abstract
and general. It would be of use in any undertaking like the
one we have supposed, but it is not sufficient in so far as the
problem is one's own problem, concrete, particular, and so

234 Studies in Logical Theoey

unique. One may, of course, proceed to the stage of physi-
cal judgment without having settled the ethical problems
which may have presented themselves at the outset. The
end may be entertained tentatively as a hypothesis until
certain mechanical problems have been dealt with. But
manifestly this is only postponement of the issue. The agent
is still quite unprepared, even after the means have been so
far determined, to take the first step in the execution of the
plan; indeed, his uncertainty is probably only the more har-
assing than before. Moreover, the economic problems in
the case are now more sharply defined, and these for the time
being still further darken counsel. Manifestly the need for
deliberation is at this point quite as urgent as the need for
physical determination can ever be, and the need is evidenced
in the same way by the actual arrest and postponement of
overt conduct. The agent, despite his physical knowledge,
is not yet free to embrace the end and, having done so, use
thereto the means at his disposal. It is plainly impossible
to use the physical means until one knows in terms of Sub-
stance and Attribute or Cause and Effect, or whatever other
physical categories one may please, what manner of behavior
may be expected of them. So likewise is it as truly impos-
sible, for one intellectually and morally capable of appreciat-
ing problems of a more advanced and complex sort, to exploit
the physical properties thus discovered until ethical deter-
mination of the end and economic determination of the means
have been completed.'

There are, then, we conclude, cases in which physical
determination of the means is by itself not a sufficient prepa-

1 In order to avoid complicating the problems, we have here employed the com-
mon notion that the physical world, physical object, and property may be taken for
granted as possible adequate contents of judgment, and that the problem is only as
to the objectivity of economic and ethical contents. Of course we may, in the
end, come to believe that the " physical '^ object is itself an economic construct, in
the large sense of '^economic;'^ that is, an instrument of an effective or successful
experience. Thus in terms of the illustration used above, in the attitude of enter-
taining in a general way the plan of building a house of some sort or other, one may

Valuation as a Logical Process 235

ration for conduct — in which there are ethical and economic
problems which delay the application of the physical means to
the end to which they may be physically adapted. Indeed,
so much as this may well appear as suflSciently obvious
without extended illustration. Everyone knows that it is
nearly always necessary, in undertaking any work in which
material things are used as means, to count the cost; and
everyone knows likewise that not every end that is in any
way attractive and within one's reach may without more ado
be taken as an object of settled desire and effort. It is
indeed needless to elaborate these commonplaces in the
sense in which they are commonly understood. However,
such is not our present purpose. Our purpose is the more
specific one of showing that the meaning of Objectivity must
be widened so as to include (1) the "universe" of ends in
their ethical aspect and (2) the economic aspect of the
means of action, as well as (3) the physical aspect to which
the character of Objectivity is commonly restricted. We
shall maintain that these are parts or phases of a complete
conception of Reality, and that of them, consequently, Objec-
tivity must be predicated for every essential reason connoted
by such characterization of the world of things "external"
to the senses. It has been with this conclusion in mind,
then, that we have sought to emphasize the frequent serious
inadequacy, for practical purposes, of the merely physical
determination of the means in one's environment.

The principle thus suggested would imply that the
ethical and economic stages in the one inclusive process
of reflective attention should be regarded as involving,

have before Mm various building materials the ascertained qualities of which are,
it may be, socially recognized as in a general way fitting them for such a use. There
is doubtless so much of real foundation for the common notion here referred to.
But along with the dejiniticm of the plan in ethical and economic judgment, along
with the determination actually to build a house, and a house of a certain specific
kind, must go further determination of the means in their physical aspects, a deter-
mination which all the whUe reacts into the process of determination of the end.
See below, p. 246, note 3.

236 Studies in Logical Theory

when they occur, the same logical function of judgment
as is operative in the sphere of sense-perception and
the sciences generally. Ethical and economic factors
must on occasion be present at the final choice and
shaping of one's course of conduct, along with the physi-
cal determinations of environing means and conditions which
one has made in sense-perception. There is, then, it would
appear, at least a fair presumption, though not indeed an a
priori certainty, that these ethical and economic factors or
conditions have, like the physical, taken form in a judgment-
process which will admit of profitable analysis in accordance
with whatever general theory of judgment one may hold as
valid elsewhere in the field of knowledge. This presumption
we shall seek to verify. Now, our interest in thus determin-
ing, first of all, the logical character of these processes will
readily be understood from this, that, in the present view,
these are the processes, and the only ones in our experience,
which are properly to be regarded as processes of Valuation.
We shall hold that Valuation, and so all consciousness of
Value, properly so called, must be either ethical or economic ;
that the only conscious processes in which Values can come
to definition are these processes of ethical and economic
judgment. The present theory of Value is, then, essentially
a logical one, in the sense of holding that Values are deter-
mined in and by a logical — that is, a judgmental — valuation-
process and in its details is closely dependent upon the
general conception of judgment of which the outlines have
been sketched above. Accordingly, the exposition must pro-
ceed in the following general order: Assuming the concep-
tion of judgment which has been presented (which our
discussion will in several ways further illustrate and so tend
to confirm), we shall seek to show that the determinations
made in ethical and economic judgment are in the proper
sense objective. This will involve, first of all, a statement

Valuation as a Logical Process 237

of the conditions under which the ethical and economic
judgments respectively arise — which statement will serve to
distinguish the two types of judgment from each other. We
shall then proceed to the special analysis of the ethical and
economic forms from the standpoint of our general theory
of judgment, thereby establishing in detail the judgmental
character of these parts of the reflective process. This
analysis will serve to introduce our interpretation of the
consciousness of Value as a factor in the conduct and econo-
my of life.

Let us then define the problem of the objective reference
of the valuational judgments by stating, as distinctly as may
be, the conditions by which ethical and economic deliberation,
respectively, are prompted. A study of these conditions will
make it easier to see in what way the judgments reached in
dealing with them can be objective.

When will an end, presenting itself in consciousness in
the manner indicated in our brief analysis of the judgment-
process, become the center of attention, thereby checking
the advance, through investigation of the possible means, to
final overt action? This is the general statement of the
problem of the typical ethical situation. Manifestly there
will be no ethical deliberation if the imaged end at once
turns the attention toward the environment of possible
means, instead of first of all itself becoming the object
instead of the director of attention; there will be no sus-
pension of progress toward final action, excepting such as
may later come through difficulty in the discovery and
co-ordination of the means. However, there are cases in
which the emergence of the end forthwith is followed by a
check to the reflective process, and the agent shrinks from
the end presented in imagination as being, let us say, one

238 Studies in Logical Theory

forbidden by authority or one repugnant to his own estab-
lished standards. The end may in such a case disappear at
once; very often it will insistently remain. On this latter
supposition, the simplest possibility will be the development
of a mere mechanical tension, a "pull and haul" between
the end, or properly the impulses which it represents, and
the agent's habit of suppressing impulses of the class to
which the present one is, perhaps intuitively, recognized as
belonging. The case is the common one of "temptation"
on the one side and "principle" or "conscience" on the
other, and so long as the two forces remain thus in hard-and-
fast opposition to each other there can be no ethical delib-
eration or judgment in a proper sense. The standard or
habit may gain the day by sheer mechanical excess of power,
or the new impulse, the temptation, may prevail because its
onset can break down the mechanical resistance.

Out of such a situation as this, however, genuine ethical
deliberation may arise on condition that standard and
"temptation" can lose something of their abstractness and
their hard-and-fast opposition, and develop into terms of
concrete meaning. The agent may come to see that the
end is in some definite way of really vital interest and too
important to be put aside without consideration. He may,
of course, in this fall into gross self -sophistication, like the
drunkard in the classical instance who takes another glass
to test his self-control and thereby gain assurance, or he
may act with wisdom and with full sincerity, like Dorothea
Casaubon when she renounced the impossible task imposed
by her departed husband. In the moral life one can ask or
hope for complete exemption from the risk of self-deception
with as little reason as in scientific research. But however
this may be, our present interest is in the method, not in par-
ticular results of ethical reflection. Whether properly so in
a particular case or not, the imaged end may come to seem

Valuation as a Logical Peocess 239

at least plausibly defensible on grounds of principle which
serve to sanction certain other modes of conduct to which a
place is given in the accepted scheme of life; or the end
may simply press for a relatively independent recognition on
the very general ground that its emergence represents an
enlargement and new development of the personality.' The
end may thus cease to stand ia the character of blind self-
assertive impulse, and press its claim as a positive means of
future moral growth, as bringing freedom from repressive
and enfeebling restraints and as tending to the reinforce-
ment of other already valued modes of conduct. On the
other hand, the standard will cease to stand as mere resist-
ance and negation, and may discover something of its hidden
meaning as a product of long experience and slow growth,
and as perhaps a vital part of the organization of one's pres-
ent life, not to be touched without grave risk.

Now, on whichever side the development may first com-
mence, a like development must soon follow on the other,
and it is the action and reaction of standard and prospec-
tive or problematic end upon each other that constitutes
the process of ethical deliberation or judgment. Just as
in the typical judgment-process, as sketched above, so also
here predicate and subject develop each other, when once
they have given over their first antagonism and come to
the attitude of reasoning together. The predicate explains
itself that the subject or new end may be searchingly and
fairly tested; and under this scrutiny the subject develops
its full meaning as a course of conduct, thereby prompting
further analysis and reinterpretation of the standard. But
this is not the place for detailed analysis of the process;^
here we are concerned only to define the type of situation,

1 In the moral life^ as elsewhere, the distinction of deduction and induction is
one of degree. There is but one type or method of inference, though some inferences
may approach more closely than do others the limit of pure ^^ subsumption."

2 See III below.

240 Studies in Logical Theoky

and this we may now do in the following terms: The indis-
pensable condition of ethical judgment is the presence in
the agent's mind of at least two rival interesting ends or
systems of such ends. In the foregoing, the subject of the
judgment is the new end that has arisen; the predicate or
"standard" is the symbol for the old ends or values which
in the tension of the judgment-process must be brought to
more or less explicit enumeration — and, we must add,
reconstruction also. Indeed, it is important, even at this
stage of our discussion, to observe that Predicate and Stand-
ard are not equivalent in meaning. The predicate, or predi-
cative side, of judgment is the imagery of control in the
process, which, as we have seen, develops with the subject
side; while the term "Standard" connotes the rigid fixity
which belongs to the inhibiting concept or ideal in the stage
before the judgment-process proper can begin. The ethical
judgment-process is, in a word, just the process of recon-
structing standards — as in its other and corresponding
aspect 'it is the process of interpreting new ends. Those who
oppose measures of social reform or new modes of conduct
or belief on alleged grounds of "immorality" instinctively
feel in doing so that the change may make its way more easily
against a resistance that will candidly explain itself; and,
on the other side of the social judgment-process, the more
fanatical know how to turn to good advantage for their
propaganda the bitterness or contempt of those who repre-
sent the established order. On both sides there are those
who trust more in mechanical "pull and haul" than in the
intrinsic merits of their cause.

Thus it is by encountering some rival end or entire sys-
tem of ends, as symbolized by an ideal, that a new end
emerging out of impulse comes to stand for an agent, as
the center of a problem of conduct, and so to occupy the
center of attention. And it thereby becomes an Object, as

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 241

we shall hold, which must be more fully defined in order
that it may be valued, and accordingly be held to warrant a
determinate attitude toward itself on the agent's part. We
have now to define in the same general terms the typical
economic situation.

In economic theory as in common thought it is not the
contemplated act of applying certain means to the attain-
ment of an end regarded as desirable that functions as the
logical subject of valuation. The thing or object valued in
the economic situation is one's present wealth, whether
material or immaterial, one's services or labor — whatever one
gives in exchange or otherwise sets apart for the attainment
of a desired end or, proximately, to secure possession of the
necessary and sufficient means to the attainment of a desired
end. The object of attention in the valuing process is here
not itself an end of action. In this respect the economic type
of judgment is like the physical, for in both the object to be
valued is a certain means which one is seeking to adapt to
some more or less definitely imaged purpose; or a condition
of which one wishes, likewise for some special purpose, to
take advantage. The ultimate goal of all judgment is the
determination of a course of conduct looking toward an
end, and our present problem may accordingly be stated in
the following terms: Under what circumstances in the
judgment-process does it become necessary to the defini-
tion and attainment of an end as yet vague and indeter-
minate that the requisite means, as in part already physically
determined, should be further scrutinized in attention and
determined from the economic point of view? Or, in a
word: What is the "jurisdiction" of the economic point of
view?

For ordinary judgments of sense-perception the presence
in consciousness of a single unquestioned end is the adequate
occasion, as our analysis (assuming its validity) has shown.

242 Studies in Logical Theoky

For ethical judgment we have seen that the presence of con-
flicting ends is necessary; and we shall now hold that this
condition is necessary, though not, without a certain quali-
fication, adequate, for the economic type as well. If an
imaged end can hold its place in consciousness without a
rival, and the physical means of attaining it have been found
and co-ordinated, then the use or consumption of the means
must inevitably follow, without either ethical or economic
judgment ; for, to paraphrase the saying of Professor James,
nothing but an end can displace or inhibit effort toward
another end. The economic situation differs, then, from the
ethical in this, that the end or system of ends entering into
competition with the one for the time being of chief and pri-
mary interest has been brought to consciousness through ref-
erence to those " physical " means which already have been
determined as necessary to this latter end. The conflict of ends
in the economic situation, that is to say, is not due to a direct
and intrinsic incompatibility between them. Where there
manifestly is such incompatibility, judgment will be of the
ethical type — as when building the house involves the fore-
closure of a mortgage, and so, in working an injury to the
holder of the site, may do violence to one's ideal of friend-
ship or of more special obligation; or when an impulse to
intemperate self-indulgence is met by one's ideal of social
usefulness. In cases such as these one clearly sees, or can
on reflection come to see, in what way an evil result to per-
sonal character will follow upon the imminent misdeed, and
in what way suppression of the momentary impulse will con-
serve the entire approved and established way of life. Very
often, however, the conflicting ends are related in no such
mutually exclusive way. Each may be in itself permissible
and compatible with the other, and, so far as any possible
ethical discrimination can determine, there is no ground for
choice between them. Thus it is only through the fact that

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 243

both ends are dependent upon a limited supply of means
that one would, for example, ever bring together and deliber-
ately oppose in judgment the purpose of making additions
to his library and the necessity of providing a store of fuel
for the winter. Both ends in such a case are in themselves
indeed permissible in a general way, but they may very well
not both of them be economically possible, and hence, for
the person in question and in the presence of the economic
conditions which confront him, not, in the last analysis, both
ethically possible. When there is a conflict between two
ends that stand in close organic relation in the sense
explained above, the problem is an ethical one ; when the con-
flict is, in the sense explained, one of competition between
ends ethically permissible — not at variance, either one, that
is, with other ends directly — for the whole or for a share
of one's supply of means, the problem is of the economic
type.'

There are three typical cases in which economic judg-
ment or valuation of the means is necessary, and the enu-
meration of these will make clear the relation between the

1 It is no part of the present view that the ends which enter into economic conflict
are incapable of becoming organic and intrinsically interrelated members of the
provisional system of life. On the contrary, the very essence 'of our contention is
that adjustment established between two such conflicting ends in economic judgment
is in itself ethical and a member of the provisional system of the individual's ends of
life, and will stand as such, subject to modification through changes elsewhere in
the system, so long as the economic conditions in view of which it was determined
remained unchanged. The " mutual exclusiveness " of the ends in ethical delibera-
tion is simply the correlate of a relative fixity in certain of the conditions of life. A
man's command over the means of obtaining such things as books and fuel varies
much and often suddenly in a society like ours from time to time ; but, on the other
hand, his physical condition, his intelligence, his powers of sympathy, and his
spiritual capacity for social service commonly do not. Hence there can be and is a
certain more or less definite and permanent comprehensive scheme of conduct mor-
ally obligatory upon him so far as the exercise of these latter faculties is concerned,
but so far as his conduct depends upon the variable conditions mentioned, it cannot
be prescribed in general terms, nor wiU any provisional ideal of moral selfhood
admit any such prescriptions as integral elements into itself. The moral self is an
ideal construct based upon these fixed conditions of life— conditions so fixed that
the spiritual furtherance or deterioration likely to result from certain modes of con-
duct involving and affecting them can be estimated directly and with relative ease
by the " ethical " method of judgment. Implied in such a construct is, of course, a

24:4 Studies in Logical Theory

ethical and the economic types of judgment: (1) First may
be mentioned the case in which ethical deliberation has
apparently reached its end in the formation of apian of action
which, so far as one can see, on ethical grounds is unobjec-
tionable. A definite " temptation " may have been overcome,
or out of a more complex situation a satisfactory ethical com-
promise or readjustment may have been developed with much
difficulty. Now, there are very often cases in which such a
course of action still may not be entered on without further
hesitation; for, if the plan be one requiring for its working
out the use of material means, the fact of an existing limita-
tion of one's supply of means must bring hitherto unthought of
ends into conflict with it. There are doubtless many situa-
tions in which one's moral choice may be carried into prac-
tice without consideration of ways and means, as when one
forgives an injury or holds his instinctive nature under dis-
cipline in the effort to attain an ascetic or a genuinely social
ideal of character. But more often than the moral rigorist
cares to see, questions of an economic nature must be raised
after the ethical "evidence is all in" — questions which are
probably more trying to a sensitive moral nature than those
more dramatic situations in which the real perils of self-
sophistication are vastly less, and the simpler, sharper defini-

leference to certain relatively permanent social and also physical conditions. In so
far as society and physical nature, and for that matter the individual's own nature,
are variable^ these are the subjects of "scientific" or "factual" judgments inci-
dental to the determination of problems by the "economic" method — problems,
that is,forv7hich no general answer, through reference to a more or less definite and
stable working concept of the self, can be given. Thus our knowledge of the physi-
cal universe is largely, if not chiefly, incidental to and conditioned by our economic
experience. Again, our economic judgments are in every case determinative of the
self in situations in whidh, as presented by (perhaps even momentarily) variable con-
ditions, physical, social, or personal, the ethical method is inapplicable. In a social-
istic state, in which economic conditions might be more stable than in our present
one, many problems in consumption which now are economic in one sense would be
ethical because admitting of solution by reference to the type of self presupposed
in the established state program of production and distribution. Even now it is not
easy to specify an economic situation the solution of which is absolutely indifferent
ethically. There is a possibility of intemperance even in so "sesthetic" an indul-
gence as Turkish rugs.

Valuation as a Logical Peocess 245

tion of the issue makes possible a less difficult, though a more
decisive and edifying, victory. (2) In the second place are
those cases in which the end that has emerged is without
conspicuous moral quality, because, although it may represent
some worthy impulse, it has not been obliged to make its
way to acceptance against the resistance of desires less
worthy than itself. This is the ideal case of economic theory
in which "moral distinctions are irrelevant," and the eco-
nomic man is free, according to the myth, to perform his
hedonistic calculations without thought of moral scruple. The
end ethically acceptable in itself, like the enriching of one's
library, must, when the means are limited, divert a portion of
the means from other uses, and will thus, through reference
to the indispensable means, engage in conflict with other ends
quite remotely, if in the agent's knowledge at all, related
with itself. (3) Finally we reach the limit of apparent free-
dom from ethical considerations in the operations of business
institutions, and perhaps especially in those of large business
corporations. Apart from the routine operations of a business
which involve no present exercise of the valuing judgment,
there are constantly in such institutions new projects which
must be considered, and which commonly must involve
revaluation of the means. In this revaluation the principle
of greatest revenue is supposed to be the sole criterion,
regardless of other personal or social points of view from
which confessedly the measure might be considered. But
such a supposition, however true to the facts of current
business practice it may be, we must hold to be an abstrac-
tion when viewed from the standpoint of the social life at
large, and hence no real exception to our general principle.
The economic and the ethical situations differ, as types, only
in the closeness of relation between the ends that are in con-
flict and in the manner in which the ends are first brought
into conflict — not in respect of the intrinsic nature of the

246 Studies in Logical Theory

ends which are involved in them.' It is this difference which,
as we shall see, explains why ethical valuation must be of
ends, and economic valuation, on the other hand, of means.

We have yet to see in what way valuation of the means
of action can serve to resolve a difficulty of the type which
has thus been designated as Economic. The question must be
deferred until a more detailed analysis of the economic judg-
ment-process can be undertaken. It is enough for our pres-
ent purpose to note that the subject of valuation in this
process is the means, and to see that under the typical con-
ditions which have been described some further determina-
tion of the means than the merely physical one of their
factual availability for the competing ends is needed.^
Physically and mechanically the means are available for each
one of the ends or groups of ends in question; the pressing
problem is to determine for which one of the ends, if any,
or to what compromise or readjustment of certain of the
ends or all of them, the means at hand are in an economic
sense most properly available.'

1 Accordingly there can be no distinction of ends, some as ethical, others as eco-
nomic, but from an ethical standpoint indifferent, and yet others as amenable
neither to ethical nor to economic judgment. The type of situation and the corre-
sponding mode of judgment employed determines whether an end shall be for the
time being ethical, economic, or of neither sort conspicuously.

2 The right of Prudence to rank among the virtues cannot, on our present view,
be questioned. Economic judgment, though it must be valuation of means, is essen-
tially choice of ends — and, as would appear, choice of a sort peculiarly difficult by
reason of the usually slight intrinsic relation between the ends involved and also
by reason of the absence of effective points of view for comparison. Culture, as
Emerson remarks, " sees prudence not to be a several faculty, but a name for wis-
dom and virtue conversing with the body and its wants." And again, " The spurious
prudence, making the senses final, is the god of sots and cowards, and is the subject

of all comedy [The true prudence] takes the laws of the world whereby

man's being is conditioned, as they are, and keeps these laws that it may enjoy their
proper good" (Essay on Prwdejice).

3 Here again we purposely use inaccurate language. Strictly, the ends here
spoken of as competing are such, we must say, only because they are as yet in a
measure indeterminate, wanting in " clearness," and are not yet understood in their
true economic character; likewise the means are wanting in that final shade or
degree of physical and mechanical determinateness which they are presently to
possess as means to a finally determinate economic end. Thus economic judgment,
by which is to be understood determination of an end of action by the economic

Valuation as a Logical Pkooess 247

From this preliminary discussion of the ethical and eco-
nomic situations we must now pass to discuss the objectivity
of the judgments by which the agent meets the difficulties
which such situations as these present. We shall seek to
show that these judgments are constructive of an objective
order of reality. It will be necessary in the first place to
determine the psychological conditions of the more commonly
recognized experience of Objectivity in the restricted sphere
of sense-perception. There might otherwise remain a certain
antecedent presumption against the thesis which we wish to
establish even after the direct argument had been presented.'

Ill

Common-sense and natural science certainly tend to iden-
tify the objectively real with the existent in space and time.
The physical universe is held to be palpably real in a way
in which nothing not presented in sensuous terms can be.
To most minds doubtless it is difficult to understand why
Plato should have ascribed to the Ideas a higher degree of
reality than that possessed by the particular objects of sense-
perception, and still more difficult to understand his ascrip-
tion of real existence to such Ideas as those of Beauty,
Justice, and the Good. There is a certain apparent stability
in a universe presented in "immediate" sense-perception —
a universe with which we are in constant bodily intercourse

method and in accordance with economic principles, involves in general physical
re-determination of the means. The means which at the outset of the present eco.
nomic jndgment-process appear as physically available indifferently for either of the
tentative ends under consideration are only in a general way the same means for
knowledge as they will be when the economic problem has been solved. They are,
so far as now determinate, the outcome of former physical judgment-processes inci-
dental to the definition of economic ends in former situations like the present.

1 In our discussion of this preliminary question there is no attempt to furnish
what might be called an analysis of the consciousness of objectivity. This has been
undertaken by various psychologists in recent well-known contributions to the sub-
ject. For our purpose it is necessary only to specify the intellectual and practical
attitude out of which the consciousness of objectivity arises ; not the sensory "ele-
ments" or factors involved in its production as an experience.

248 Studies in Logical Theoet

— that seems not to belong to a mere order of relations
which, if known in any sense, is not known to us through
the senses. Moreover, knowledge of the physical world is
felt to possess a higher degree of certainty than does any
knowledge we can have of supposed economic or moral truth,
or of economic or moral standards. Of such knowledge one
is disposed to say, as Mr. Spencer does of metaphysics, that
at the best it presupposes a long and elaborate inferential
process which, as long, is likely to be faulty ; whereas physi-
cal truth is immediate or else, when inference is involved in
it, easy to be tested by appeal to immediate facts. Physi-
cal reality is a reality that can be seen and handled and felt
as offering resistance, and this is evidence of objectivity of a
sort not to be found in other spheres of knowledge for which
the like claim is made.

The force of these impressions (and it would not be diffi-
cult to find stronger statements in the history of scientific
and ethical nominalism) diminishes if one tries to determine
in what consists that objectivity which they uncritically
assume as given in sense-perception. For one must recog-
nize that not all our possible modes of sense-experience are
equally concerned in the presentation of this perceived
objective world. Certain sensory "quales" are immediately
referred to outward objects as belonging to them. Certain
others are, in a way, "inward," either not more definitely local-
ized at all or merely localized in the sense-organ which
mediates them. Now, the reason for this difference cannot
lie in the content of the various sense-qualities abstractly
taken. A visual sensation, apart from the setting in which
it occurs- in common experience, can be no more objective in
its reference — indeed, can have no more reference of any
kind — than the least definite and instructive organic sensa-
tion. For the degree of distinctness with which one dis-
criminates sense-qualities depends upon the number and

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 249

importance of the interpretative associations which it is
important from time to time to "connect" with them; or, con-
versely, the sense-qualities are not seZ/-discriminating in
virtue of an intrinsic objective reference or meaning which
each possesses and which drives it apart from all the rest.
Indeed, an intrinsic meaning, if a sensation could possess
one, would not only be superfluous in the development of
knowledge, but, as likely to be mistaken for the acquired or
functional meaning, even seriously confusing.'

Now, it must be granted that, if the "simple idea of sen-
sation" is without objective reference, no association with
it of similarly abstract sensations can supply the lack. A
"movement" sensation, or a tactual, having in itself no such
meaning, cannot merely by being " associated " with a simi-
larly meaningless visual sensation endow this latter with
reference to an object. Objective reference is, in fact, not a
sensuous thing ; it is not a conscious "element," nor does it
arise from any combination or fusion of such. It is neither
in the association of ideas as a constituent member, nor does
it belong to the association considered as a sequence of
psychical states. Instead, in our present view, it belongs to or
arises out of the activity through which and with reference

1 So, on the other hand, our vague organic sensations are possibly more instruct-
ive as they are, for their own purpose^ than they would be if more sharply dis-
criminated and comple^ily referred.

For convenience we here meet the view under consideration with its own termi-
nology ; we by no means wish to be understood as indorsing this terminology as psy-
chologically correct. The sense-quality of which we read in " structural psychology "
is, we hold, not a structural unit at all, but in fact a highly abstract development out
of that unorganized whole of sensory experience in which reflective attention begins.
There is, for example, no such thing as the simple unanalyzable sense-quality " red "
in consciousness until judgment has proceeded far enough to have constructed a
definite and measured experience which may be symbolized as *' object-before-me-
possessing-the-attribute-red." In place of the original sensory total-experience we
now have a more or less developed perceptual (i. e., judgmental) total-experience.
It is an instance of the " psychological fallacy" to interpret what are really elements
of meaniTig in a perceived object constructed in judgment (for this is the true nature
of the " simple idea of sensation " or " sense-element ") as so many bits of psychical
material which were isolated from each other at the outset, and have been externally
joined together in their present combination.

250 Studies in Logical Theory

to which associations are first of all established. It is an
aspect or kind of reference or category under which any
sense-quality or datum is apperceived when it is held apart
from the stream of consciousness in order that it may receive
new meaning as a stimulus ; and a sensation functioning in
such a "state of consciousness"' is a psychical phenomenon
very different from the conscious element of "analytical"
psychology. The extent to which it is true that the objec-
tive world of sense-perception is pre-eminently visual and
tactual is then merely an evidence of the extent to which
the exigencies of the life-process have required finer sense-
discrimination for the sake of more refined reaction within
these spheres as compared with others. Our conclusion,
then, must be that the consciousness of objectivity is not
as such sensuous, even as given in our perception of the
material world. The world, as viewed from the standpoint
of a particular, practical emergency, is an objective world,
not in virtue of its having a "sensuous" or a "material"
aspect as something existent per se, but because it is a
world of stimuli in course of definition for the guidance of
activity.''

It will be well to give further positive exposition of the
meaning of the view thus stated. To return once more to

1 The phrase is Etllpe's and is used in his sense of consciousness taken as a whole,
as, foi example, attentive, apperceptive, volitional, rather than in the sense made
familiar by Spencer and others.

2 The foregoing discnssion i^ in many ways similar to Brentano's upon the same
subject. In discussing his first class of modes of consciousness, the Vorstellungen^
he says : " We find no contrasts between presentations excepting those of the objects
to which the presentations refer. Only in so far as warm and cold, light and dark,
a high note and a low, form contrasts can we speak of the corresponding presenta-
tions as contrasted; and, in general, there Is in any other sense than this no contrast
within the entire range of these conscious processes" (Psychologie vom empi-
rischen Standpwnhte, Bd. I, p. 29) . This may stand as against any attempt to find
contrast between abstract sense-qualities taken apart from their objective reference.
What is, however, the ground of distinction between the presented objects? Appar-
ently this must be answered in the last resort as above. In this sense we should need
finally to interpret "sensuous" and "material" in terms of objectivity as above
defined, rather than the reverse. They are cases in or specifications of the deter-
mination of adequate stimuli.

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 251

our fundamental psychological conception, knowledge is
essentially relevant to the solution of particular problems of
more or less urgency and of various kinds and figures in the
solution of such problems as the assemblage of consciously
recognized symbols or stimuli by which various actions are
suggested. The object as known is therefore not the same
as the object as apprehended in other possible modes of being
conscious of it. The workman who is actually using his
tool in shaping his material, or the warrior who is actually
using his weapon in the thick of combat, is, if conscious of
these objects at all (and doubtless he may be conscious of
them at such times), not conscious of them as objects — as
the one might be, for example, in adjusting the tool for a
particular kind of use, and the other in giving a keen edge
to his blade. Under these latter circumstances the tool or
weapon is an object, and its observed condition, viewed in
the light of a purpose of using the object in a certain way,
is regarded as properly suggesting certain changes or
improvements. And likewise will the tool or the weapon
have an objective character in the agent's apprehension in
the moment of identifying and selecting it from among a
number of others, or even in the act of reaching for it, espe-
cially if it is inconveniently placed. But in the act of freely
using one's objective means the category of the objective
plays no part in consciousness, because at such times there
is no judgment respecting the means — because there is no
sufficient occasion for the isolation of certain conscious ele-
ments from the rest of the stream of conscious experience
to be defined as stimuli to certain needed responses. Such
isolation will not normally take place so long as the reac-
tions suggested by the conscious contents involved in the
experience are fully adequate to the situation. Objects are
not normally held apart as such from the stream of conscious-
ness in which they are presented and recognized as possess-

252 Studies in Logical Theory

ing qualities warranting certain modes of conduct, except-
ing as it has become necessary to the attainment of the
agent's purposes to modify or reconstruct his activity.'

Are things, then, apprehended as objective in virtue of
the agent's attitude toward them, or is the agent's attitude
in a typical case grounded upon an antecedent determination
of the objectivity of the things in question? We must
answer, in the first place, that there can be no such antece-
dent determination. We may, it is true, speak of believing,
on the evidence of sight or touch, that a certain object is
really present before us. But neither sight nor touch pos-
sesses in itself, as a particular sense-quality, any objective
meaning. If touch is par excellence the sense of the objec-
tive and the appeal to touch the test of objectivity, this can
only be because touch is the sense most closely and intimately
connected in our experience with action. After any interval
of hesitation and judgment, action begins with contact with
and manipulation of the physical means which have been
under investigation. Not only is touch the proximate stimu-
lus and guide to manipulation, but all relevant knowledge
which has been gained in any judgment-process, through the
other senses, and especially through sight, must ultimately
be reducible to terms of touch or other contact sense. The
alleged tactual evidence of objectivity is, then, rather a con-
firmation than a difficulty for our present view. In short,
we must dismiss as impossible the hypothesis that there can
be a consciousness of objectivity which is not dependent
upon and an expression of primary antecedent tendencies
toward motor response to the presented stimulus. It is our
attitude toward the prospective stimulus that mediates the
consciousness of an object standing over against us.

So far, indeed, is it from being true that objectivity is a

1 In this connection reference may be made to the well-known disturbing effect
of the forced introduction of attention to details into established sensoii- motor
co-ordinations, such as " typewriting," playing upon the piano, and the like.

Valuation as a Logical Process 253

matter for special determination antecedently to action that
by common testimony the conviction of objectivity comes to
us quite irresistibly. The object forces itself upon us, as we
say, and "whether we will or no" we must recognize its
presence there before us and its independence of any choice
of ours or of our knowledge. In the cautious manipulation
of an instrument, in the laborious shaping of some refrac-
tory material, in the performance of any delicate or difficult
task, one's sense of the objectivity of the thing with which
one works is as obtrusive as remorse or grief, and as little to
be shaken off. We shall revert to this suggested analogy at
a later stage in our discussion.

We are now in a position to define more precisely the
nature of the conditions in which the sense of objectivity
emerges, and this will bring us to the point at which the
objective import of our economic and ethical judgments can
profitably be discussed. We have said that the world of
the physical is objective, not in virtue of the sensuous terms
in which it is presented, but because it is a world of stimuli
for the guidance of human conduct. Under what circum-
stances, then, are we conscious of stimuli in their capacity
of guides or incentives or grounds of conduct ? And the
answer must be that stimuli are interpreted as such, and so
take on the character of objectivity, when their precise char-
acter as stimuli is still in doubt, and they must therefore
receive further definition.

For example, a man pursued by a wild beast must find
some means of escape or defense, and, seeing a tree which
he may climb or a stone which he may hurl, will inspect
these as well as may be with reference to their fitness for the
intended purpose. It is at just such moments as these,
then, that physical things become things for knowledge and
take on their stubbornly objective character — that is to say,
when they are essentially problematic. Now, in order that

254 Studies in Logical Theory

any physical thing may be thus problematic and so possess
objective character for knowledge, it must (1) be in part
understood, and so prompt certain more or less indiscrimi-
nate responses; and (2) be in part as yet not understood —
in such wise that, while there are certain indefinite or
unmeasured tendencies on the agent's part to respond to the
object — climb the tree or hurl the stone — there is also a
certain failure of complete unity in the co-ordination of
these activities, a certain contradiction between different
suggestions of conduct which different observed qualities of
the tree or stone may give, and so hesitation and arrest of
final action. The pursued man views the tree suspiciously
before trusting himself to its doubtful strength, or weighs
well the stone and tests its rough edges before pausing to
throw it. Thus, to state the matter negatively, there are
two possible situations in which the sense of objectivity, if
it emerge into consciousness at all, cannot long continue.
An object — as, for example, some strange shrub or flower —
which, in the case we are supposing, may attract the pur-
sued wayfarer's notice, may awaken no responses relevant
to the emergency in which the agent finds himself; and it
will therefore forthwith lapse from consciousness. Or, on
the other hand, the object, as the tree or stone, may rightly
or wrongly seem to the agent so completely satisfactory, or,
rather, in effect may he so, as instantly to prompt the action
which otherwise would come, if at all, only after a period of
more or less prolonged attention. In neither of these cases,
then, is there a problematic object. In the one the thing in
question is wholly apart from any present interest, and
therefore lapses. In the other case the thing seen is com-
prehended on the instant with reference to its general use
and merges immediately into the main stream of the agent's
consciousness without having been an object of express
attention. In neither case, therefore, is there hesitation

Valuation as a Logical Process 255

with reference to the thing in question — any conflict
between inconsiderate positive responses prompted by cer-
tain features of the object and inhibitions due to recognition
of its shortcomings. In a word, in neither case is there any
judgment or possibility of judgment, and hence no sense of
objectivity. We can have consciousness of an object, in the
strict sense of the term, only when some part or general
aspect of the total situation confronting an agent excites or
seems to warrant responses which must be held in check for
further determination. In terms of consciousness, an object
is always an object of attention — that is, an object which is
under process of development and reconstruction with refer-
ence to an end.

An inhibited impulse to react in a more or less definite
way to a stimulus is, then, the adequate condition of the
emergence in consciousness of the sense of objectivity. So
long as an activity is proceeding without check or interrup-
tion, and no conflict develops between motor responses
prompted by different parts or aspects of the situation, the
agent's consciousness will not present the distinction of
Objective and Subjective. The mode of being conscious
which accompanies free and harmonious activity of this sort
may be exemplified by such experiences as aesthetic apprecia-
tion, sensuous enjoyment, acquiescent absorption in pleasur-
able emotion, or even intellectual processes of the mechanical
sort, such as easy computation or the solution of simple alge-
braic problems — processes in which no more serious diffi-
culty is encountered than suffices to stimulate a moderate
degree of interest. If, however, reverting to the illustration,
our present need for a stone calls for some property which
the stone we have seized appears to lack, consciousness must
pass over into the reflective or attentive phase. The stone
will now figure as an object possessing certain qualities which
render it in a general way relevant to the emergency before

256 Studies in Logical Theoey

us. A needed quality is missing, and this defect must hold
in check all the imminent responses until discovery of the
missing quality can set them free. In a word, the stone as
known to us has assumed the station of subject in a judgment-
process, and our effort is, if possible, to assign to it a new
predicate relevant to our present situation. Psychologically
speaking, the stone is an object, a stimulus to which we are
endeavoring to find warrant for responding in some new or
reconstructed way.

In this process we must assume, then, first of all, an
interest on the agent's part in the situation as a whole,
which in the first place, in terms of the illustration, makes
the pursued one note the tree or stone — which might
otherwise have escaped his notice as completely as any
passing cloud or falling leaf — and suggests what particu-
lar qualities or adaptabilities should be looked for in it.
Given this interest in "making something" out of the total
situation as explaining the recognition of the stone and
the impulse to seize and hurl it, we find the sense of the
stone's objectivity emerging just in the arrest of the undis-
criminating impulse. The stone must have a certain mean-
ing as a stimulus first of all, but it must be a meaning not
yet quite defined and certain of acceptance. The stone will
be an object only if, and so long as, the undiscriminating
impulses suggested by these elements of meaning are held
in check in order that they may be ordered, supplemented,
or made more definite. It is, then, the essence of the pres-
ent contention that physical things are objective in our
experience in virtue of their recognized inadequacy as
means or incentives of action — an inadequacy which, in
turn, is felt as such in so far as we are seeking to use them
as means or grounds of conduct, or to avail ourselves of
them as conditions, in coping with the general situation
from which our attention has abstracted them.

Valuation as a Logical Process 257

From this analysis of the conditions of the consciousness
of objectivity we must now proceed to inquire whether in the
typical ethical and economic situations, as they have been
described, essentially these same conditions are present.

In the ethical situation, according to our statement, the
subject of the judgment (the object of attention) is the new
end which has just been presented in imagination, and we
have now to see that the agent's attitude toward this end is
for our present purpose essentially the same as toward a
physical object which is under scrutiny. For just as the
physical object is such for consciousness because it is partly
relevant (whether in the way of furthering or of hindering)
to the agent's purpose, but as yet partly not understood
from this point of view, so the imaged end may likewise be
ambiguous. The agent's moral purpose may be the (very
likely mythical) primitive one of which we read in "associa-
tional" discussions of the moral consciousness — that of avoid-
ing punishment. It may be that of "imitative," sympathetic
obedience to authority — a sentiment whose fundamental
importance for ethical psychology has long remained with-
out due recognition.' It may be loyalty to an ideal of
conscience, or yet again a purpose of enlargement and
development of personality. But on either supposition the
compatibility of the end with the prevailing standard or
principle of decision may be a matter of doubt and so call for
judgment. The problem will, of course, be a problem in the
full logical sense as involving judgment of the type described
in our discussion of the ethical situation only when the atti-
tudes of obedience to authority and to fixed ideals have been
outgrown ; but, on the other hand, as might be shown, it is
just the inevitable increasiug use of judgment with refer-
ence to these formulations of the moral life which gradually

iCf. Pkopessob Baldwin's Social and Ethical Interpretations, and Peofessoe
McGilvaey's recent paper on " Moral Obligation," Philosophical Review, Vol. XI,
especially pp. 349 f .

258 Studies in Logical Theory

undermines them and, by a kind of "internal dialectic" of
the moral consciousness, brings the agent to recognition as
well as to more perfect practice of a logical or deliberative
method.

The end, then, is, in the typical ethical situation, an
object which one must determine by analysis and reconstruc-
tion as a means or condition of moral "integrity" and prog-
ress. It is, accordingly, in the second place, an object
upon whose determination a definite activity of the agent is
regarded by him as depending. Just as in the physical
judgment-process the object is set off over against the self
and regarded as a given thing which, when once completely
defined, will prompt certain movements of the body, so here
the contemplated act is an object which, when fully defined
in all its relevant psychological and sociological bearings,
will prompt a definite act of rejection or acceptance by the
self. Now, it might be shown, as we believe, that the com-
plete psychological and sociological definition of the course
of conduct is in truth the full explanation of the choice;
there is no separate reaction of the moral self to which the
course of conduct is, as defined, an external stimulus. So
also in the sphere of physical judgment complete definition
passes over into action — or the appreciative mode of con-
sciousness which accompanies action — without breach of
continuity. But within the judgment-process in all its forms
there is in the agent's apprehension this characteristic fea-
ture of apparent separation between the subject as an objec-
tive thing presently to be known and used or responded to,
and the predicate as a response yet to be perfected in details,
but at the right time, when one has proper warrant, to be set
free. It is not our purpose here to speak of metaphysical
interpretations or misinterpretations of this functional dis-
tinction; but only to argue from the presence of the distinc-
tion in the ethical type of judgment as in the physical as

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 259

genuine an objectivity for the ethical type as can be ascribed
to the other. The ethical judgment is objective in the sense
that in it an object — an imaged mode of conduct taken as
such — is presented for development to a degree of adequacy
at which one can accept it or reject it as a mode of conduct.
The ethical predicates Eight and Wrong, Good and Bad,
each pair representing a particular standpoint, as we shall
later see, signify this accepting or rejecting movement of
the self, this " act of will," of which, as an act in due time
to be performed, the agent is more or less acutely conscious
in the course of moral judgment.

In the economic situation also, as above described, there
is present the requisite condition of the consciousness of
objectivity. Here, as in the ethical situation, an object is
presented which one must redetermine, and toward which
one must presently act in a way likewise to be determined in
detail in judgment. We shall defer until a later stage dis-
cussion of the reason why this subject of the economic judg-
ment is the means in the activity that is in progress. We
are not yet ready to show that the means must be the center
of attention imder the conditions which have been specified.
Here we need only note the fact of common experience that
economic judgment does center upon the means, and show
that in this fact is given the objective status of the means in
the judgment-process ; for the economic problem is essentially
that of withdrawing a portion, a " marginal increment," of
the means from some use or set of uses to which they are at
present set apart, and applying it to the new end that has
come to seem, on ethical grounds at least, desirable; and we
may regard this diversion as the essentially economic act
which, in the agent's apprehension during judgment, is con-
tingent upon the determination of the means. The object
as economic is accordingly the meaiis, or a marginal portion
of the means, which is to be thus diverted (or, so to speak.

260 Studies in Logical Theoet

exposed to the likeliliood of such diversion), and its deter-
mination must be of such a nature as to show the economic
urgency, or at least the permissibility, of this diversion.
Into this determination, manifestly, the results of much
auxiliary inquiry into physical properties of the means must
enter — such properties, for example, as have to do with its
technological fitness for its present use as compared with pos-
sible substitutes, and its adaptability for the new use pro-
posed. Taking the word in the broad sense of object of
thought, it is always an object in space and time to which
the economic judgment assigns an economic value ; and it is
true here (just the same is true, mutatis mutandis, of the
psychological and sociological determinations necessary to
the fixation of ethical value) that the economically motivated
physical determination of the objective means from the
standpoint of the emergency in hand is the full "causal"
explanation of the economic act. It must, however, be care-
fully observed that this physical determination is in the
typical case altogether incidental, from the agent's stand-
point, to the assignment of an economic character or value
to the means — a value which will at the close of the judg-
ment come to conscious recognition. As we shall see, the
process is directed throughout by reference to economic prin-
ciples and standards, and what shall be an adequate deter-
mination in the case depends upon the precision with which
these are formulated and the strenuousness with which they
are applied. In a word, the economic judgment assigns to
the physical object, as known at the outset, a new non-
physical character. Throughout the judgment-process this
character is gaining in distinctness, and at the end it is
accepted as the Value of the means, as warrant for the
diversion of them to the new use which has been decided on.'

1 Manifestly, as indicated jnst above, this accepted value of the object implies
fnllftr physical knowledge of the object than was possessed at the outset of the eco-
nomic judgment. See above, p. 234, note ; p. 216, note 3 ; and p, 271, below.

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 261

We have now to consider whether in the actual ethical
and economic experience of men there is any direct evidence
confirming the conclusions which our logical analysis of the
respective situations would appear to require. Can any
phases of the total experience of working out a satisfactory
course of conduct in these typical emergencies be appealed
to as actually showing at least some tacit recognition that
these types of judgment present each one an order of reality
or an aspect of the one reality ?

In the first place, then, one must recognize that in the
agent's own apprehension a judgment of value has some-
thing more than a purely subjective meaning. It is never
offered, by one who has taken the trouble to work it out
more or less laboriously and then to express it in terms
which are certainly objective, as a mere announcement of de
facto determination or a registration of arbitrary whim and
caprice. One no more means to announce a groundless
choice or a choice based upon pleasure felt in contemplation
of the imaged end than in his judgments concerning the
physical universe he means to affirm coexistences and
sequences, agreements and disagreements, of " ideas " as
psychical happenings. That there is an ethical or economic
truth to which one can appeal in doubtful cases is, indeed,
the tacit assumption in all criticism of another's deliberate
conduct; the contrary assumption, that criticism is merely
the opposition of one's own private prejudice or desire to the
equally private prejudice or desire of another, would render
all criticism and mutual discussion of ethical problems mean-
ingless and futile in the plain man's apprehension as in the
philosopher's. For the plain man has a spontaneous confi-
dence in his knowledge of the material world which makes
him look askance at any alleged analysis of his sense-
perceptions and scientific judgments into "associations of
ideas," and the same confidence, or something very like it.

262 Studies in Logical Theory

attaches to judgments of these other types. It may perhaps
be easier (though the concession is a very doubtful one) to
destroy a naive confidence in the objectivity of moral truth
than a like confidence in scientific knowledge, but it must
be remembered that the plain man's sense of the urgency, at
least of ethical problems, if not of economic, is commonly less
acute than for the physical. In the plain man's experience
serious moral problems are infrequent — problems of the
true type, that is, which cannot be disposed of as mere cases of
temptation; one must have attained a considerable capacity
for sympathy and a considerable knowledge of social rela-
tions before either the recognition of such problems or
proper understanding of their significance is possible. Moral
and economic crises are not vividly presented in sensuous
imagery excepting in minds of developed intelligence,
experience, and imaginative power; and the judgments
reached in coping with them do not, as a rule, obviously call
for nicely measured, calculated, and adjusted bodily move-
ments. The immediate act of executing an important
economic judgment may be a very commonplace perform-
ance, like the dictation of a letter, and an ethical decision
may, however great its importance for future overt conduct,
be expressed by no immediate visible movements of the
body. But this possible difference of impressiveness between
physical and other types of judgments is from our present
standpoint unessential; and indeed, after all, it cannot be
denied that there are persons whose sense of moral obliga-
tion is quite as distinct and influential, and even sensuously
vivid, as their conviction of the real existence of an external
world. To the average man it certainly is clear that, as Dr.
Martineau declares, "it is an inversion of moral truth to say
.... that honour is higher than appetite because we feel
it so; we feel it so because it is so. This 'is' we know to
be not contingent on our apprehension, not to arise from our

Valuation as a Logical Pkogess 263

constitution of faculty, but to be a reality irrespective of us
in adaptation to which our nature is constituted, and for the
recognition of which the faculty is given."' And the
impressiveness, to most minds, of likening the sublimity of
the moral law to the visible splendor of the starry heavens
would seem to suggest that the apprehension of moral truth
is a mode of consciousness, in form at least, so far akin to
sense-perception as to be capable of illustration and even
reinforcement from that type of experience.

At this point we must revert to a suggestion which pre-
sented itself above in another connection, but which at the
time could not be further developed. This was, in a word, that
there is often a feeling of obtrusweness in our appreciation
of the objectivity of the things before us in ordinary sense-
perception (or physical judgment) which is not unlike the
felt insistence of remorse and grief .^ This feeling is so con-
spicuous a feature of the state of consciousness in physical
judgment as frequently to serve the plain man as his last
and irrefragable evidence of the metaphysical independence
of the material world, and it is indeed a feature whose expla-
nation does throw much light upon the meaning of the con-
sciousness of objectivity as a factor within experience. Now,
there is another common feeling — or, as we do not scruple
to call it, another emotion — which is perhaps quite as often
appealed to in this way; though, as we believe, never in
quite the same connection in any argument in which the
two experiences are called upon to do service to the same
end. Material objects, we are told, are reliable and stable
as distinguished from the fleeting illusive images of a
dream — they have a "solidity" in virtue of which one
can "depend upon them," are "hard and fast" remaining
faithfully where one deposits them for future use or, if they
change and disappear, doing so in accordance with fixed

1 Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, p. 5. 2 See p. 253 above.

264 Studies in Logical Theory

laws which make the changes calculable in advance. The
material realm is the realm of "solid fact" in which one can
work with assurance that causes will infallibly produce their
right and proper effects, and to which one willingly returns
from the dream-world in which his adversary, the "idealist,"
would hold him spellbound. We propose now briefly to
consider these two modes of apprehension of external physi-
cal reality in the light of the general analysis of judgment
given above — from which it will appear that they are, psy-
chologically, emotional expressions of what have been set
forth as the essential features of the judgment-situation,
whether in its physical, ethical, or economic forms. From
this we shall argue that there should actually be in the ethi-
cal and economic spheres similar, or essentially identical,
" emotions of reality," and we shall then proceed to verify
the hypothesis by pointing to those ethical and economic
experiences which answer the description.

We have seen that the center of attention or subject in
the judgment-process is as such problematic — in the sense
that there are certain of its observed and recognized attri-
butes which make it in some sense relevant and useful to the
purpose in hand, while yet other of its attributes (or absences
of certain attributes) suggest conflicting activities. The
object which one sees is certainly a stone and of convenient
size for hurling at the pursuing animal. The situation has
been analyzed and found to demand a missile, and this
demand has led to search for and recognition of a stone.
The stone, however, may be of a color suggesting a soft and
crumbling texture, or its form may appear from a distance
to be such as to make it practically certain to miss the mark,
however carefully it may be aimed and thrown. Until these
points of difliculty have been ascertained, the stone is want-
ing still in certain essential determinations. So far as it has
been certainly determined, it prompts to the response directly

Valuation as a Logical Process 265

suggested by one's general end of defense and escape, but
there are these other indications which hold this response in
check and which, if verified, will cause the stone to be let lie
unused. Now, we have, in this situation of conflict or ten-
sion between opposed incitements given by the various dis-
criminated characters of the object, the explanation of the
aspect of obtrusiveness, of arbitrary resistance to and inde-
pendence of one's will, which for the time being seems the
unmistakable mark or coefficient of the thing's objectivity.
For it is not the object as a whole that is obtrusive; indeed,
clearly, there could be no obtrusiveness on the part of an
"object as a whole," and in such a case there could also be
no judgment. The obtrusion in the case before us is not a
sense of the energy of a recalcitrant metaphysical object put
forth upon a coerced and helpless human will, but simply
a conscious interpretation of the inhibition of certain of the
agent's motor tendencies by certain others prompted by the
object's "suspicious" and as yet undetermined appearances
or possible attributes. The object as amenable to use —
those of its qualities which taken by themselves are unques-
tionable and clearly conducive to the agent's purpose —
needs no attention for the moment, let us say. The
attention is rather upon the dubious and to all appearance
unfavorable qualities, and these for the time being make up
the sum and content of the agent's knowledge of the object.
On the other hand, the agent as an active self is identified
with the end and with those modes of response to the
object which promise to contribute directly to its realiza-
tion. It is in this direction that his interest is set and he
strains with all his powers of mind to move, and it is upon
the self as identified with, and for the time being expressed
in, the "effort of the agent's will" that the object as resist-
ant, refusing to be misconstrued, obtrudes. One must see
the object and must acknowledge its apparent, or in the end

266 Studies in Logical Theoet

its ascertained, unfitness. One is "coerced." The situation
is one of conflict, and it is out of the conflict that the essen-
tially emotional experience of "resistance" emerges.^ The
the more special emotions of impatience, anger, or discour-
agement may in a given case not be present or may be sup-
pressed, but the emotion of objectivity will still remain.^

On the same general principles the other of our two
coefficients of reality may be explained. Let us assume that
the stone in our illustration has at last been cleared of all
ambiguity in its suggestion, having been taken as a missile,
and that the man in flight now holds it ready awaiting the
most favorable moment for hurling it at his pursuer. It
will hardly be maintained that under these conditions the
coefficient of the stone's reality as an object consists in its
obtrusiveness, in its resistance to or coercion of the self.
The stone is now regarded as a fixed and determinate feature
of the situation — a condition which can be counted on,
whatever else may fail. Over against other still uncertain
aspects of the situation (which are now in their turn real
because resistant, coercive, and obtrusive) stands the stone
as a reassuring fact upon and about which the agent can
build up the whole plan of conduct which may, if all goes
well, bring him safely out of his predicament. The stone
has, so to speak, passed over to the " end " side of the situa-
tion, and although it may have to be rejected for some other

1 It is not so much the case that the object, on the one side, excites in the agent's
consciousness, on the other, the " sensations of resistance*' which have played such
a pait in recent controversy on the subject, as that (1) the object in certain of its
promptings is "resisting" certain other of its promptings, or that (2) certain
" positive " activities of the agent are being inhibited by certain " negative" activi-
ties, thereby giving rise to the "emotion of resistance." That "positive" and
" negative " are here used in a teleological way will be apparent. It is surely mis-
leading to speak of " seMations of resistance " even in deprecatory quotation marks,
except as " sensation " is used in its everyday meaning, viz., experience of strongly
sensory quality.

' The general theory of emotion which is here presupposed, and indeed is funda-
mental to the entire discussion, may be found in PEOrESSOB Dewet's papers on
" The Theory of Emotion," Psychological Review, Vol. I, p. 553; Vol. II, p. 13.

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 267

means of defense, as the definition of the situation proceeds
and the plan of action accordingly changes (as in some degree
it probably must), nevertheless for the time being the imaged
activities as stimulus to which the stone is now accepted are
a fixed part of the plan and guide in further judgment of
the means still undefined. The agent can hardly recur to
the stone, when, after attending for a time to the bewilder-
ing perplexities of the situation, he pauses once more to take
an inventory of his certain resources, without something of
an emotional thrill of assurance and encouragement. In
this emotional appreciation of the " solidity" and "dependa-
bility" of the object the second of our coeflBcients of reality
consists. This might be termed the Recognition, the other
the Perception, coefficient. Classifying them as emotions,
because both are phenomena of tension in activity, we should
group the Perception coefficient with emotions of the Con-
traction type, like grief and anger, and the Recognition
coefficient with the Expansion emotions, like joy and triumph.
Now, in the foregoing interpretation no reference has
been made to any conditions peculiar to the physical type of
judgment-situation. The ground of explanation has been
the feature of arrest of activity for the sake of reconstruction,
and this, if our analyses have been correct, is the essence of
the ethical and economic situations as well as of the physi-
cal. Can there then be found in these two spheres experi-
ences of the same nature and emerging under the same
general conditions as our Perception and Recognition coeffi-
cients of reality? If so, then our case for the objective
significance and value of ethical and economic judgment is
in so far strengthened. (1) In the first place, then, the
object in its economic character is problematic, assuming
a desire on the agent's part to apply it, as means, to some
new or freshly interesting end, because it has already been,
and accordingly now is, set apart for other uses and cannot

268 Studies in Logical Theoet

thoughtlessly be withdrawn from them. Extended illustra-
tion is not needed to remind one that these established and
hitherto unquestioned uses will haunt the economic con-
science as obtrusively and inhibit the desired course of eco-
nomic conduct with as much energy of resistance as in the
other case will any of the contrary promptings of a physical
object. Moreover, the Recognition coefficient may as easily
be identified in this connection. If one's scruples gain the
day, in such a case one has at least a sense of comforting
assurance in the conservatism of his choice and its accord-
ance with the facts, however unreconciled in another way
one may be to the deprivation that has thus seemed to be
necessary. If, however, the new end in a measure makes
good its case and the modes of expenditure which the " scru-
ples" represented have been readjusted in accordance with it,
then the means, no less than before the new interpretation had
been placed upon them, will enjoy the status of Reality in
the economic sense. They will be real now, however, not in
the obtrusive way, as presenting aspects which inhibit the
leading tendency in the judgment-process, but, instead, as
means having a fixed and certain character in one's economic
life, which, after the hesitation and doubt just now super-
seded, one may safely count upon and will do well to keep
in view henceforth. (2) In the second place, mere mention
of the corresponding ethical experiences must suffice, since
only extended illustration from literature and life would be
fully adequate: on the one hand, the "still small voice" of
Conscience or the authoritativeness of Duty, "stern daugh-
ter of the voice of God;" and, on the other, the restful
assurance with which, from the vantage-ground of a satisfy-
ing decision, one may look back in wonder at the possibility
of so serious a temptation or in rejoicing over the new-won
freedom from a burdensome and repressive prejudice.

This must for the present serve as positive exposition of

Valuation as a Logical Process 269

our view as to the objective significance of the valuational

types of judgment. There are certain essential points which

have as yet not been touched upon, and there are certain

objections to the general view the consideration of which

will serve further to explain it ; but the discussion of these

various matters will more conveniently follow the special

analysis of the valuational judgments, to which we shall now

proceed.

In the last analysis the ultimate motive of all reflective
thought is the progressive determination of the ends of
conduct. Physical judgment, or, in psychological terms,
reflective attention to objects in the physical world, is at
every turn directed and controlled by reference to a gradu-
ally developing purpose, so that the process may also be
described as one of bringing to fulness of definition an at
first vaguely conceived purpose through ascertainment and
determination of the means at hand. The problematic situa-
tion in which reflection takes its rise inevitably develops in
this two-sided way into consciousness of a definite end
on the one side, and of the means or conditions of attaining
it on the other.

It has been shown that there may be involved in any
finally satisfactory determination of a situation an explicit
reflection upon and definition of the controlling end which
is present and gives point and direction to the physical
determination. But very often such is not the case. When
a child sees a bright object at a distance and makes toward
it, availing himself more or less skilfully of such assistance
as intervening articles of furniture may afford, there is of
course no consciousness on his part of any definite purpose
as such, and this is to say that the child does not subject his
conduct to criticism from the standpoint of the value of its
ends. There is simply strong desire for the distant red ball.

270 Studies in Logical Theory

controlling all the child's movements for the time being and
prompting a more or less critical inspection of the interven-
ing territory with reference to the easiest way of crossing
it. The purpose is implicitly accepted, not explicitly de-
termined, as a preliminary to physical determination of the
situation. If one may speak of a development of the pur-
pose in such a case as this, one must say that the develop-
ment into details comes through judgment of the environing
conditions. To change the illustration in order not to
commit ourselves to the ascription of too developed a
faculty of judgment to the child, this is true likewise of
any process of reflective attention in the mind of an adult in
which a general purpose is accepted at the outset and is car-
ried through to execution without reflection upon its ethical
or economic character as a purpose. The specific purpose
as executed is certainly not the same as the general purpose
with which the reflective process took its rise. It is filled
out with details, or may perhaps even be quite different in
its general outlines. There has necessarily been develop-
ment and perhaps even transformation, but our contention is
that all this has been effected in and through a process of
judgment in which the conditions of action, and not the
purpose itself, have been the immediate objects of determi-
nation. Upon these the attention has been centered, though
of course the attention was directed to them by the purpose.
To state the case in logical terms, it has been only through
selection and determination of the means and conditions of
action from the standpoint of predicates suggested by the
general purpose accepted at the outset that this purpose
itself had been rendered definite and practical and possible
of execution. Probably such cases are seldom to be found in
the adult experience. As a rule, the course of physical or
technological judgment will almost always bring to light
implications involved in the accepted purpose which must

Valuation as a Logical Pkooess 271

inevitably raise ethical and economic questions; and the
resolution of these latter will in turn afford new points of
view for further physical determination of the situation. In
such processes the logical points of the problem of ethical
and economic valuation come clearly into view.

In our earlier account of the matter it was more con-
venient to use language which implied that ethical and
economic judgment must be preceded by implicit or explicit
acceptance of a definite situation presented in sense-
perception, and that these evaluating judgments could be
carried through to their goal only upon the basis of such an
inventory of fixed conditions. Thus the ultimate ethical
quality of the general purpose of building a house would
seem to depend upon the precise form which this purpose
comes to assume after the actual presence and the quality of
the means of building have been ascertained and the eco-
nomic bearings of the proposed expenditure have been
considered. Surely it is a waste of effort to debate with
oneself upon the ethical rightness of a project which is physi-
cally impossible or else out of the question from the economic
point of view. We are, however, now in a position to see
that this way of looking at the matter is both inaccurate and
self-contradictory. In the actual development of our pur-
poses there is no such orderly and inflexible arrangement of
stages; and if it is a waste of effort to deliberate upon a
purpose that is physically impossible, it may, with still
greater force, be argued that we cannot find, and judge the
fitness of, the necessary physical means until we know what,
precisely, it is that we wish to do. The truth is that there is
constant interplay and interaction between the various phases
of the inclusive judgment-process, or rather, more than this,
that there is a complete and thoroughgoing mutual implica-
tion. It is indeed true that our ethical purposes cannot take
form in a vacuum apart from consideration of their physical

272 Studies in Logical Thboet

and economic possibility, but it is also true that our physical
and economic problems are ultimately meaningless and
impossible, whether of statement or of solution, except as
they are interpreted as arising in the course of ethical
conflict.

We have, then, to do, in the present division, with situa-
tions in which, whether at the outset or from time to time
during the course of the reflective process, there is explicit
conflict between ends of conduct. These situations are the
special province of the judgment of valuation. Our line of
argument may be briefly indicated in advance as follows:

1. The judgment of valuation, whether expressed in terms
of the individual experience or in terms of social evolution, is
essentially the process of the explicit and deliberate resolu-
tion of conflict between ends. As an incidental, though
nearly always indispensable, step to the final resolution of
such conflict, physical judgment, or, in general, the judgment
of fact or existence, plays its part, this part being to define
the situation in terms of the means necessary for the execu-
tion of the end that is gradually taking form. The two
modes of judgment mutually incite and control each other,
and neither could continue to any useful purpose without
this incitement and control of the other. Both modes of
judgment are objective in content and significance. At the
end of the reflective process and immediately upon the verge
of execution of the end or purpose which has taken form the
result may be stated or apprehended in either of two ways :
(1) directly, in terms of the end, and (2) indirectly, in terms
of the ordered system of existent means which have been dis-
covered, determined, and arranged. If such final survey of
the result be taken by way of preparation for action, or for
whatever reason, the end will be apprehended as possessing
ethical value and the means, under conditions later to be
specified, as possessing economic value.

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 273

2. What then is the nature and source of this apprehen-
sion of end or means as valuable ? The consciousness of end
or means as valuable is an emotional consciousness expressive
of the agent's practical attitude as determined in the just
completed judgment of ethical or economic valuation and
arising in consequence of the inhibition placed upon the
activities which constitute the attitude by the effort of
apprehending or imaging the valued object. Ethical and
economic value are thus strictly correlative ; psychologically
they are emotional incidents of apprehending in the two
respective ways just indicated the same total result of the
inclusive complex judgment -process. Finally, as the mo-
ment of action comes on, the consciousness of the ethically
valued end lapses first ; then the consciousness of economic
value is lost in a purely "physical," i. e., technological, con-
sciousness of the means and their properties and interrela-
tions in the ordered system which has been arranged ; and
this finally merges into the immediate and undifferentiated
consciousness of activity as use of the means becomes sure
and unhesitating.

When we say that the ends which oppose each other in an
ethical situation (that is, a situation for the time being seen in
an ethical aspect) are related, and the ends in an economic
situation are not, we by no means wish to imply that in the one
case we have in this fact of relatedness a satisfactory solution
at hand which is wanting in the other. To feel, for example,
that there is a direct and inherent relationship between a
cherished purpose of self -culture and an ideal of social service
which seems now to require the abandonment of the purpose
does not mean that one yet knows just how the two ends should
be related in his life henceforth ; and again, to say that one
can see no inherent relation between a desire for books and
pictures and the need of food, excepting in so far as both ends
depend for their realization upon a limited supply of means,

274 Studies in Logical Thboby

is not to say that the issue of the conflict is not of ethical
significance. Such a view as we here reject would amount to
a denial of the possibility of genuinely problematic ethical
situations' and would accord with the opinion that economic
judgment as such lies apart from the sphere of ethics and is
at most subject only to occasional revision and control in the
light of ethical considerations.

By the relatedness of the ends in a situation we mean the
fact, more or less explicitly recognized by the agent, that the
new, and as yet undefined, purpose which has arisen belongs
in the same system with the end, or group of ends, which
the standard inhibiting immediate action represents. The
standard inhibits action in obedience to the impulse that has
come to consciousness, and the image of the new end is, on
its part, definite and impressive enough to inhibit action in
obedience to the standard. The relatedness of the two
factors is shown in a practical way by the fact that, in the
first instance at least, they are tacitly expected to work out
their own adjustment. By the process already described in
outline, subject and predicate begin to develop and thereby
to approach each other, and a provisional or partial solution
of the problem may thus be reached without resort to any
other method than that of direct comparison and adjustment
of the ends involved on either side. The standard which
has been called in question has enough of congruence with
the new imaged purpose to admit of at least some progress
toward a solution through this method.

We can best come to an understanding of this recogni-
tion of the relatedness of the ends in ethical valuation by
pausing to examine somewhat carefully into the conditions
involved in the acceptance or reflective acknowledgment of
a defined end of conduct as being one's own. Any new end

1 Such is, in fact, the teaching of the various forms of ethical iutuitionism,
and we find it not merely implied, but explicitly aflBrmed, in a work in many respects
so remote from intuitionism in its standpoint as Geben's Prolegomena to Bthict.
Sea pp. 178-81, and especially pp. 355-9.

Valuation as a Logical Peoobss 275

in coming to consciousness encounters some more or less
firmly established habit represented in consciousness by a
sign or symbolic image of some sort, the habit being itself
the outcome of past judgment-process. Our present problem
is the significance of the agent's recognition of a relatedness
between his new impulsive end and the end which represents
the habit, and we shall best approach its solution by consider-
ing the various factors and conditions involved in the agent's
conscious recognition of the established end as being such.

In any determinate end there is inevitably implied a
number of groups of factual judgments in which are pre-
sented the objective conditions under which execution of the
end or purpose must take place. There is in the first place
a general view of environing conditions, physical and social,
presented in a group of judgments (1) descriptive of the
means at hand, of the topography of the region in which the
purpose is to be carried out, of climatic conditions, and the
like, and (2) descriptive of the habits of thought and feeling
of the people with whom one is to deal, their prejudices,
their tastes, and their institutions. The project decided on
may, let us say, be an individual or a national enterprise,
whether philanthropic or commercial, which is to be launched
in a distant country peopled by partly civilized races. In
addition to these groups of judgments upon the physical and
sociological conditions under which the work must proceed,
there will also be a more or less adequate and impartial
knowledge of one's own physical and mental fitness for the
enterprise, since the work as projected may promise to tax
one's physical powers severely and to require, for its suc-
cessful conduct, large measure of industry, devotion, patience,
and wisdom. Indeed any determinate purpose whatever
inevitably implies a more or less varied and comprehensive
inventory of conditions. Further illustration is not neces-
sary for our present purpose. We may say that in a general

276 Studies in Logical Theoet

way the conditions relevant to a practical purpose will group
themselves naturally under four heads of classification, as
physical, sociological, physiological, and psychological. All
four classes are objective, though the last two embrace con-
ditions peculiar to the agent as an individual over against
the environment to which for purposes of his present activity
he stands in a sense opposed.

Now our present interest is not so much in the enumera-
tion and classification of possible relevant conditions in a typi-
cal situation as in the significance of these relevant conditions
in the agent's apprehension of them. Perhaps this signifi-
cance cannot better be described than by saying that essen-
tially and impressively the conditions are apprehended as,
taken together, warranting the purpose that has been de-
termined. We appeal, in support of this account of the
matter, to an impartial introspection of the way in which
the means and conditions of action stand related to the
formed purpose in the moment of survey of a situation. The
various details presented in the survey of a situation are
apprehended, not as bare facts such as one might find set
down in a scientist's notebook, but as warranting — as closely,
uniquely, and vitally relevant to — the action that is about to
be taken. This, as we believe, is a fair account of the situa-
tion in even the commoner and simpler emergencies that
confront the ordinary man. Quite conspicuously is it true
of cases in which the purpose is a purely technological one
that has been worked out with considerable difficulty and is
therefore not executed until after a somewhat careful survey
of conditions has been taken. It is often true likewise in
cases of express ethical judgment; if the ethical phases of
the reflective process have not been excessively long and
difficult, our definite sense of the ethical value of the act we
are about to do lapses quite easily, and the factual aspects
and features of the situation as given in one or more of the

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 277

four classes which we have distinguished take on an access
of significance in their character of warranting, confirming,
or even compelling the act determined upon. Of our ordi-
nary sense-perception in the moments of its actual function-
ing no less than of conscience in its aspect of a moral
perceptive faculty are the words of Bishop Butler sensibly
true that "to preside and govern, from the very economy
and constitution of man, belongs to it."' Even in cases of
more serious moral difficulty this sanctioning aspect of the
means and conditions of action is not overshadowed. If the
situation is one in which by reason of their complexity these
play a conspicuous r6le and must be surveyed, by way of
preparation on the agents' part, for performance of the act,
they inevitably assume, for the agent, their proper functional
character. In general, the conditions presented in the
system of factual judgments have a certain "rightful author-
ity" which they seem to lend to the purpose or end with
reference to which they were worked out to their present
degree of factual detail. The conditions can thus seem to
sanction the end because conditions and end have been
worked out together. Gradual development on the one side
prompts analytical inquiry upon the other and is in turn
directed and advanced by the results of this inquiry. In
the end the result may be read off either in terms of end or in
terms of conditions and means.'' The two readings must be
in accord and the agent's apprehension of the conditions as
warrant for the end is expression in consciousness of this
"agreement."'

Now in this mode of apprehension of factual conditions
there is a highly important logical implication — an implica-

1 Sermon II.

2 Not to imply of course that psychologically or logically the distinction of con-
ditions and means is other than a convenient superficial one.

3 Manifestly we have here been approaching from a new direction the " Becog-
nition coefficient " of reality described above. See p. 266.

278 Studies in Logical Theoey

tion which inevitably comes more and more clearly into view
with the continued exercise of judgment, even though the
agent's habit of interest in the scrutiny of perplexing situ-
ations may still remain, by reason of the want of trained
capacity for a broader view, limited in its range quite strictly
to the physical sphere. This implication is, we shall declare
at once, that of an endeavoring, striving, active principle or
self which can be helped or hindered in its unfolding by
particular purposes and sets of corresponding conditions-
can lose or gain, through devotion to particular purposes, in
the breadth, fulness, and energy of its life. The agent's
apprehension of and reference to this active principle of
course varies in all degrees of explicitness, according to cir-
cumstances, from the vague awareness that is present in a
simple case of physical judgment to the clear recognition and
endeavor at definition that are characteristic of serious
ethical crises.

That the situation should develop and bring to light this
factor is what should be expected on general grounds of
logic — for to say that a set of conditions warrants or sanctions
or confirms a given purpose implies that our purposes can
stand in need of warrant, and this would seem to be impos-
sible apart from reference to a process whose maintenance and
development in and through our purposes are assumed as being
as a matter of course desirable. It is of the essence of our con-
tention that the apprehension of the cpnditions of action as
warranting the end is a primordial and necessary feature of
the situation — indeed, its constitutive feature. If our concern
were with the psychological development of self -consciousness
as a phase of reflective experience, we should endeavor to show
that this development is mediated in the first instance by the
"subjective" phenomena of feeling, emotion, and desire
which find their place in the course of the judgment-process.
We should then hold that, with the conclusion of the judg-

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 279

ment-process and the accompanying sense of the known
conditions as reassuring and confirmatory of the end, comes
the earliest possibility of a discriminative recognition of the
self as having been all along a necessary factor in the
process. We should hold that outside of the process of re-
flective attention there can be no psychical or " elementary"
beginnings of self-consciousness, and then that, except as
a development out of the experience to which we have re-
ferred as marking the conclusion of the attentive process,
there can be no recognized specific and in any degree defin-
able consciousness of self. All this, however, lies rather
beside our present purpose. We wish simply to insist that
it is out of the apprehension of conditions as reassuring and
confirmatory, out of this " primordial germ," that the agent's
definite recognition of himself as a center of development
and expenditure of energy takes its rise. Here are the
beginnings of the possibility of self-conscious ethical and
economic valuation.

This apprehension of the means as warranting is, we have
held, a fact even when the means surveyed are wholly of the
physical sort, and we have thereby implied that consciousness
of the self as "energetic" may take its rise in situations of
this type or during the physical stage in the development of
a more complex total situation. It would be an interesting
speculation to consider to what extent and in what way the
development of the sciences of sociology and physiology may
have been essentially facilitated by the emergence of this
form of self-consciousness. But however the case may stand
with these sciences or with the rise of real interest in them
in the mind of a given individual, interest in the objective
psychological conditions of a contemplated act is certainly
very closely dependent upon interest in that subjective self
which one has learned to know through the past exercise of
judgment in definition and contemplation of conditions of

280 Studies in Logical Theoky

the three other kinds. The more diversified and complex
the array of physical and social conditions with reference to
which one is to act, the more important becomes not simply
a clearly articulated knowledge of these, but also a knowledge
of oneself. The self that is warranted in its purpose by the
surveyed conditions must hold itself in a steady and consistent
attitude during the performance on pain of "falling short of
its opportunity" and thereby rendering nugatory the reflect-
ive process in which the purpose was worked out. Experi-
ence abundantly shows how easily the assurance that comes
with the survey of conditions may come to grief, though
there may have been on the side of the conditions, so far as
defined, no visible change ; and in so far as self -consciousness
has already emerged as a distinguishable factor in such
situations, failures of the sort we here refer to are the more
easily identified and interpreted. Some sudden impulse may
have broken in upon the execution of the chosen purpose;
there may have been an unexpected shift of interest away
from that general phase of life which the purpose repre-
sented ; or in any one of a number of other ways may have
come about a wavering and a slackening in the resolution
which marked the commencement of action. The "energetic"
self forthwith (if we may so express it) recognizes that the
sanction which the conditions so far as then known gave to
its purpose was a misleading because an incomplete one, and
it proceeds to develop within itself a new range of objective
fact in which may be worked out the explanation, and thereby
a method of control, of these new disturbing phenomena.
The qualities of patience under disappointment, courage in
encountering resistance, steadiness and self-control in sus-
tained and difficult effort — these qualities and others of like
nature come to be discriminated from each other by intro-
spective analysis and may be as accurately measured, and in
general as objectively studied, as any of the conditions to a

Valuation as a Logical Pbocess 281

saving knowledge and respect of which one may abeady
have attained, and these newly determined psychological
conditions will henceforth play the same part in affording
sanction to one's purposes as do the rest. An ordered system
of psychological categories or points of view comes to be
developed, and an accurate statement of conditions of per-
sonal disposition and capacity relevant to each emergency as
it arises will hereafter be worked out — over against and in
tension with one's gradually forming purposes in like manner
as are statements of all the other relevant objective aspects
of the situation.'

In the "energetic" self, we shall now seek to show, we
have the common and essential principle of both ethical and
economic valuation which marks these off from other and sub-
ordinate types of judgment. Let us determine as definitely
as possible the nature and function of this principle.

The recognition of the chosen purpose as one favorable
or otherwise to the self, and so the recognition of the self as
capable of furtherance or retardation by its chosen purposes,
is not always a feature of the state of mind which may ensue
upon completed judgment. In the commoner situations of
the everyday life of normal persons, as practically always in
the lives of persons of relatively undeveloped reflective powers,
it is quite wanting as a separate distinguished phase of the
experience. In such cases it is present, if present at all,
merely as the vaguely felt implicit meaning of the recogni-
tion that the known conditions sanction and confirm the

1 This, if it were intended as an account of the genesis of psychology as a science
and of the psychological interest on the part of the individual, would doubtless be
most inadequate. We have, for one thing, made no mention of the part which error
and resulting practical failure play in stimulating an interest in the judgmental
processes of observation and the like, and in technique of the control of these. Here,
as well as in the processes of execution of our purposes, must be found many of the
roots of psychology as a science. Moreover, no explanation has been offered above
for the appropriation by the "energetic" self of these phenomena of interruption
and retardation of its energy as being, in fact, its own, or within itself. The problem
would appear to be psychological, and so without our province, and we gladly pass
it by.

282 Studies in Logical Theoet

purpose. Such situations yield easily to attack and threaten
none of those dangers, none of those possible occasions for
regret or remorse, of which complex situations make the per-
son of developed reflective capacity and long experience so
keenly apprehensive. They are disposed of with compara-
tively little of conscious reconstruction on either the subject or
the predicate side, and when a conclusion has been reached
the agent's recognition of the conditions carries with it the
comfortable though too often delusive assurance of the com-
plete and perfect eligibility of the purpose. If the question of
eligibility is raised at all, the answer is given on the tacit prin-
ciple that " whatever purpose is, is right." To the "plain
man," .and to all of us on certain sides of our lives, every pur-
pose for which the requisite means and factual conditions are
found to be at hand is, just as our purpose, therefore right.
The same experience of failure and disappointment which
proves our purpose to have been, from the standpoint of
enlargement and enrichment of the self, a mistaken one
brings a clearer consciousness of the logic implicit in our
first confident belief in the purpose, and at the same time
emphasizes the need of making this logic explicit. The pur-
pose, as warranted to us by the conditions and assembled
means that lay before us, was our own, and as our own was
implicitly a purpose of furtherance of the self. The disap-
pointment that has come brings this implication more clearly
into view, and likewise the need of methodical procedure,
not as before in the determination of conditions, but in the
determination of purposes as such; for the essence of the
situation is that the execution of the purpose has brought to
light some unforeseen consequence now recognized as having
been all the while in the nature of things involved in the
purpose. This consequence or group of consequences con-
sists (in general terms) in the abatement or arrest of desir-
able modes of activity which find their motivation elsewhere

Valuation as a Logical Process 283

in the agent's system of accepted ends, and it is registered
in consciousness in that sense of restriction or repression
from without which is a notable phase of all emotional experi-
ence, particularly in its early stages. The consequences are
as undesirable as they are unexpected, and the reaction against
them, at first emotional, presently passes over into the form
of a reflective interpretation of the situation to the effect that
the self has suffered a loss by reason of its thoughtless haste
in identifying itself with so unsafe a purpose.'

It is the essential logical function of the consciousness of
self to stimulate the valuation processes which take their rise
in the stage of reflective thought thus attained. The con-
sciousness of self is a peculiarly baffling theme for discussion
from whatever point of view, because one flnds its meaning
shifting constantly between the two extremes of a subjec-
tivity to which "all objects of all thought" are external and
an objective thing or system of energies which is known just
as other things are — known in a sense by itself, to be sure,
but Tcnown nevertheless, and thought of as an object standing
in possible relations to other objects. Now, it is of the
subjective self that we are speaking when we say that its
essential function is the stimulation or incitement of the
valuation processes, but manifestly in order to serve thus it
must nevertheless be presented in some sort of sensuous
imagery. The subjective self may, iu fact, be thought of in
many ways — presented in many different sorts of imagery —
but in all its forms it must be distinguished carefully from

1 We can, of course, tmdertake no minute analysis of the psychological mechan-
ism or concatenation of the process here sketched in barest outline. Our present
purpose is wholly that of description. Slight as our account of the process of transi-
tion is, we give it space only because it seems necessary to do so in order to make
intelligible the accounts yet to be given of the conscious valuation processes for
which the movement here described prepares the way.

It will be observed that we assume above that the purpose is lucceifful a>
planned and by succeeding brings about the undesirable results. Failure in eieou.
tion of the purpose as such could only, in the manner already outlined, prompt a
more adequate investigation of the/octua! conditiont.

284 Studies in Logical Theory

that objective self which, as described in psychology, is the
assemblage of conditions under which the subjective or
"energetic" self works out its purposes. It may be the
pale, attenuated double of the body, or a personal being
standing in need of deliverance from sin, or an atom of
soul-substance, or, in our present terminology, a center of
developing and unfolding energy. The significant fact is
that, however different in content and in motive these various
presentations of the subjective self may be, they are, one and
all, as presentations and as in so far objective, stimuli to
some definite response. The savage warrior deposits his
double in a tree or stone for safety while he goes into battle ;
the self that is to be saved from sin is a self that prompts
certain acceptable acts in satisfaction of the quasi-legal obli-
gations that the fact of sin has laid upon the agent. The
presented self, whatever the form it may assume as presen-
tation, has its function, and this function is in general that
of stimulus to the conservation and increase, in some sense,
of the self that is not presented, but for whom the presen-
tation is. Now our own present description of the self as
"energetic," as a center or source of developing and unfold-
ing energy is in its way a presentation. It consists of
sensuous imagery and suggests a mechanical process, or the
growth of a plant perhaps, which if properly safeguarded
will go on satisfactorily — a process which one must not
allow to be perturbed or hindered by external resistance or
internal friction or to run down. To many persons doubt-
less such an account would seem arbitrary and fantastic in
the extreme, but no great importance need be attached to
its details. The kind and number and sensuous vividness
of the details in which this essential content of presentation
may be clothed must of course depend, for each person, upon
his psychical idiosyncrasy.

Indeed, as the habit of reflection upon purposes comes

Valuation as a Logical Process 285

to be more firmly fixed, and the procedure of valuation to be
consciously methodical and orderly, the sensuous content of
the presented self must grow constantly more and more
attenuated until it has declined into a mere unexpressed
principle or maxim or tacit presumption, prescribing the free
and impartial application of the method of valuation to
particular practical emergencies as these arise. For a self,
consisting of presented content of whatever sort, which one
seeks to further through attentive deliberation upon con-
crete purposes, must, just in so far as it has content, deter-
mine the outcome of ethical judgment in definite ways.
Thus the soul that must be saved from sin (if this be the
content of the presented self) is one that has transgressed
the law in certain ways and the right relations that should
subsist between creature and Creator, and has thereby
incurred a more or less technically definable guilt. This
guilt can only be removed and the self rehabilitated in its
normal relations to the law by an appropriate response to the
situation — by a choice on the agent's part, first, of a certain
technical procedure of repentance, and then of a settled
purpose of living as the law prescribes.' So also our own
image of the self as "energetic" after the manner of a
growing organism may well seem, if taken too seriously as
to its presentational details, to foster a bias in favor of over-
conservative adherence to the established and the accredited
as such."

The argument of the last few paragraphs may be restated

1 The case is not essentially altered in logical character if for the Levitical law
be snbstituted the general principles of the new dispensation read off into details
by an authoritative church or by " private judgment."

2 A remark may be added here by way of caution. The presented self, we have
said, attenuates to a mere maxim or tacit presumption in favor of a certain type of
logical procedure in dealing with the situation. It must be remembered that the
presented self, like all other presentation, is and comes to be for the sake of its
function in experience, and so is practical from the start. The process sketched
above is therefore not from bare presented content as such to a methodological
presumption, which, as methodological and not contentual, is qualitatively dif-
ferent from what preceded it.

286 Studies in Logical Theoey

in the following way in terms of the evolution of the indi-
vidual's moral attitude or technique of self-control:

1. In the stage of moral evolution in which custom and
authority are the controlling principles of conduct, moral
judgment in the proper sense of self-conscious, critical, and
reconstructive valuation of purposes is wanting. Such judg-
ment as finds here a place is at best of the merely casuistical
type, looking to a determination of particular cases as falling
within the scope of fixed and definite concepts. There is no
self-consciousness except such as may be mediated by the
sentiment of willing obedience. It is, at this stage, not the
particular sort of conduct which the law prescribes that in
the agent's apprehension enlarges and develops the self; so
far as any thought of enlargement and development of the
self plays a part in influencing conduct, these effects are such
as, in the agent's trusting faith, will come from an entire and
willing acceptance of the law as such. "If any man will do
His will, he shall know of the doctrine." Moreover, the stage
of custom and authority goes along with, in social evolution,
either very simple social conditions or else conditions which,
though very complex, are stable, so that in either case the
conditions of conduct are in general in harmony with the
conduct which custom and authority prescribe. The law,
therefore, can be absolute and takes no account of possible
inability to obey. The divine justice punishes infraction of
the law simply as objective infraction ; not as sin, in propor-
tion to the sinner's responsibility.

2. But inevitably custom and authority come to be inade-
quate. As social conditions change, custom becomes anti-
quated and authority blunders, wavers, contradicts itself in
the endeavor to prescribe suitable modes of individual con-
duct. Obedience no longer is the way to light. The self
becomes self-conscious through feeling more and more the
repression and the misdirection of its energies that obedi-

Valuation as a Logical Process 287

ence now involves. This is the stage of subjective morality
or conscience; and the rise of conscience, the attitude of
appeal to conscience, means the beginning of endeavor at
methodical solution of those new problematic situations in the
attempt to deal with which authority as such has palpably
collapsed. We say, however, that conscience is the begin-
ning of this endeavor; for conscience is, in fact, an ambigu-
ous and essentially transitional phenomenon. On the one
hand conscience is the inner nature of a man speaking
within him, and so the self furthers its own growth in listen-
ing to this expression of itself. In this aspect conscience is
methodological. But on the other hand conscience speaks,
and, speaking, must say something determinate, however
general this something may be. In this aspect conscience is
a r6sum6 of the generic values realized under the system of
custom and authority, but to the present continued attainment
of which the particular prescriptions of custom and author-
ity are no longer adequate guides. Conscience is thus at
once an inward prompting to the application of logical
method to the case in hand and a body of general or specific
rules under some one of which the case can be subsumed.
In ethical theory we accordingly find no unanimity as to the
nature of conscience. At the one extreme it is the voice of
God speaking in us or through us, in detailed and specific
terms — and so, virtually, custom and authority in disguise.
At the other it is an empty abstract intuition that the right
is binding upon us — and, so, simply the hypostasis of
demand for a logical procedure. The history of ethics
presents us with all possible intermediate conceptions in
which these extreme motives are more or less skilfully inter-
woven or combined in varying proportions. The truth is
that conscience is essentially a transitional conception, and
so necessarily looks before and after. In one of its aspects
it is a self which has come to miss (and therefore to image

288 Studies in Logical Theory

for itself) the values and, it may be, a certain dawning sense
of vitality and growth which obedience to authority once
afforded.' In its other aspect it is a self that is looking for-
ward in a self-reliant way to the determination on its own
account of its purposes and values. And finally, as for the
environing world of means and conditions, clearly this is not
necessarily harmonious with and amenable to conscience;
indeed, in the nature of things it can be only partially so.
The morality of conscience is, therefore, either mystical, a
morality that seeks to escape the world in the very moment
of its affirmation that the world is unreal (because worthless),
or else it takes refuge in a virtual distinction between "abso-
lute" and "relative" morality (to borrow a terminology from
a system in which properly it should have no place), perhaps
setting up as an intermediary between heaven and earth a
machinery of special dispensation.^

3. Conscience professes in general,, that is, to be autono-
mous, and the profession is, strictly speaking, a contradiction
in terms. Moreover, apart from considerations of the logic
of the situation, theories of conscience have, as a matter of
fact, always lent themselves kindly to theological purposes
just as the theory of self-realization in its classic modern
statement rests upon a metaphysical doctrine of the Abso-
lute.' Inevitably the movement concealed within this essen-
tially unstable conception must have its legitimate outcome
(1) in a clearing of the presented self of its fixed elements
of content, thus setting it free in its character of a non-
presentational principle of valuation, and (2) a setting apart
of these elements of content from the principle of valuation

I Recognized authority is, of course, not the same thing by auy means as
authority unrecognized because absolutely dominant.

^ We may be pardoned for supplying from the history of ethics no illustrations
of this slight sketch.

sin fact, as suggested above, the Prolegomena to Ethics is in many respects
essentially intuitional in spirit, though its intuitionism Is of a modern discreetly
attenuated sort.

Valuation as a Logical Process 289

as standards for reference and consultation rather than as
law to be obeyed.

We have thus correlated our account of the logic whereby
the "energetic" self comes to explicit recognition as stimu-
lus to the valuation-process with the three main stages in the
moral evolution of the individual and the race. We were
brought to this first-mentioned part of our discussion by our
endeavor to find out the factors involved in the first accept-
ance of a conscious purpose (or, indifferently, the subsequent
recognition of it as a standard) — an endeavor prompted by
the need of distinguishing, with a view to their special
analysis, the two types of valuation -process. We now return
to this problem.

The following illustration will serve our present undertak-
ing: A lawyer or man of business is struck by the great
need of honest men in public office, or has had his attention
in some impressive way called to the fact of great inequality
in the present distribution of wealth, and to the diverse evils
resulting therefrom. These facts hold his attention, perhaps
against his will, and at last suggest the thought of his mak-
ing some personal endeavor toward improvement of condi-
tions, political or social, as the case may be. On the other
hand, however, the man has before him the promise of a
successful or even brilliant career in his chosen occupation,
and is already in the enjoyment of a substantial income, which
is rapidly increasing. Moreover, he has a family growing
up about him, and he is not simply strongly interested in the
early training and development of his children, and desirous
of having himself some share in conducting it, but he sees
that the suitable higher education of his children will in a
few years make heavy demands upon his pecuniary means.
Here, then, we have a situation the analysis of which will
enable us to distinguish and define the provinces of ethical
and economic judgment.

290 Studies in Logical Theoby

It is easy to see that we have here a conflict between
ends. On the one side is the thought of public service in
some important office or, let us say, the thought of bettering
society in a more fundamental way by joining the propa-
ganda of some proposed social reform. This end rests upon
certain social impulses in the man's nature and appeals to
him as strongly, we may fairly assume, as would any pur-
pose of immediate self-interest or self-indulgence, so that it
stands before him and urges him with an insistent pertinacity
that at first even puts him on his guard against it as a
temptation. Over against this concrete end or subject of
moral valuation stand other ends comprehended or symbol-
ized in the ideals of regular and steady industry, of material
provision for family, of paternal duty toward children, of
scholarly achievement as lawyer or judge, and the like —
ideals which are indeed practical and personal, but which, as
they now function, are general or universal in character,
are lacking in the concreteness and emotional quality which
belong to the new purpose which has just come to imagina-
tion and has brought these ideals into action on the predicate
side. Will this life of social agitation really be quite
"respectable," and befitting the character of a sober and
industrious man? Will it enable me to support and educate
my family ? Will it permit me to devote sufficient attention
to their present care and training? And will it not so warp
my nature, so narrow and concentrate my interests, as in a
measure to disqualify me for the right exercise of paternal
authority over them in years to come ? Moreover, will not a
life of agitation, of constant intercourse with minds and
natures in many ways inferior to my own and those of my
present professional associates, lower my intellectual and
moral standards, and so make of me in the end a less useful
member of society than I am at present ? These and other
questions like them present the issue in its earlier aspect.

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 291

Presently, however, the tentative purpose puts in its defense,
appealing to yet other recognized ideals or standards of self-
sacrifice, benevolence, or social justice as witnesses in its
favor. The conflict thus takes on the subject-predicate form,
as has already been explained. On the one hand we have
the undefined but strongly insistent concrete purpose; on
the other hand we have a number of symbolic concepts or uni-
versals standing for accepted and accredited habitual modes
of conduct. The problem is that of working the two sides
of the situation together into a unified and harmonious plan
of conduct which shall be at once concrete and particular,
as a plan chosen by way of solution of a given present
emergency, and universal, as having due regard for past
modes of conduct, and as itself worthy of consideration in
coping with future emergencies.

Now, how shall we discriminate the ethical and the eco-
nomic aspects of the situation which we have described?
We shall most satisfactorily do this through a consideration
of the various sorts of conditions and means of which account
must be taken in working the situation through to a solution,
or (to express it more accurately) the various sorts of con-
ditions and means which need to be defined over against the
purpose as the purpose gradually develops into detailed form.

We may say, first of all, that there are psychological
conditions which must be taken into consideration in the
case before us. Our thesis is that in so far as a situation gives
rise to the determination of psychological conditions and is
advanced along the way toward final solution through deter-
mination of these, the situation is an ethical one. In other
words, we hold that the ends at issue in the situation are
"related" in so far as they depend upon the same set of psycho-
logical conditions. In so far as these statements are not true
of the situation there must be a resort to economic judgment.

By the general questions suggested above as presenting

292 Studies in Logical Theory

themselves to the agent we hare indicated in what way the
course of action taken must have regard to certain psycho-
logical considerations. Entering upon the new way of life
will inevitably lessen the agent's interest in his present
professional pursuits and so make diflScult, and in the end
even irksome, any attempt at continuing in them either as a
partial means of livelihood or as a recreation. The new work
will be absorbing — as indeed it must be if it is to be worth
while. In the same way the man must recognize that his
nature is not one of the rare ones so richly endowed in
capacity for sympathy that constant familiarity with general
conditions of misery and suffering does not dull their fine-
ness of sensibility to the special concerns and interests of
particular individuals. If he takes his suffering fellow-men
at large for his children, his own children will probably
suffer just in so far the loss of a father's special sympathy
and understanding care. And likewise he must be drawn
away and isolated from his friends, for it will be hard for
him, he must foresee, to hold free and intimate converse with
men whose ways of thinking lie apart from his own con-
trolling interest and for whose insensibility to the things
that move him so profoundly he must come more and more
to feel a certain impatience if not contempt. Not to enlarge
upon these possibilities and others of like nature, we must
see that reflection upon the situation must presently bring
to consciousness these various consequences of the kind of
action which is proposed and a recognition that the ground
of relation between them and the action proposed lies in
certain qualities and limitations of his own nature. These
latter are for him the general psychological conditions of
action, his "empirical self," the general nature of which he
has doubtless already come to be familiar with in many
former situations perhaps wholly different in superficial
aspect from from the present one.

Valuation as a Logical Process 293

Now, just in so far as there is this relation of mutual
exclusiveness between the end proposed and certain of the
standard ends or modes of conduct which are involved, judg-
ment will be by the direct or ethical method of adjustment
presently to be described. Let us assume accordingly that
a tentative solution of the problem has been reached to
the effect that a portion of the lawyer's time shall be given
to his profession and to his family life, and that the remain-
der shall be given to a moderate participation in the social
propaganda. Over against this tentative ethical solution, as
its warrant in the sense explained above, will stand in the
survey of the situation that may now be taken a certain
fairly definite disposition or Anlage of the capacities and
functions of the empirical self.' Now on the basis of the
ethical solution thus reached there will be further study of
the situation, perhaps as a result of failure in the attempt to
carry the solution into practice, but more probably as a
further preparation for overt action. Forthwith it develops
that the compromise proposed will be impossible. Participa-
tion in the social agitation will excite hostility on the part
of the classes from which possible clients would come and
will cause distrust and a suspicion of inattention to details
of business among the lawyer's present clientage. There
are, in a word, a whole assemblage of "external" sociological
conditions (and we need not stop to speak of physical
conditions which co-operate with these and contribute to
their effect) which effectually veto the plan proposed. In
general these external conditions are such as to deprive the
agent of the means of living in the manner which the ethical
determination of the end proposes. In the present case,
unless some other more feasible compromise can be devised,
either the one extreme or the other must be chosen — either
continuance in the profession and the corresponding general

1 This would appear to be the logical value of functional psychology as a science
of mental piocess.

294 Studies in Logical Theoky

scheme of life or the social propaganda and reliance upon
such scant and precarious income as it may incidentally
afford.

We can now define the economic aspect of a situation in
terms of our present illustration. The end which the lawyer
had in view in a vague and tentative way was, as we saw,
defined with reference to his ethical standards — that is to
say, a certain measure of participation in the new work was
determined as satisfactory at once to his ideals of devotion
to the cause of social justice and to his sense of obligation to
himself and to his family. In this sense, logically speaking,
a subject was defined to which a system of predicates, com-
prehended perhaps under the general predicate of right or
good, applies. Now, however, it appears, from the inspection
of the material and social environment, that the execution of
this purpose, perfectly in accord though it may be with the
spiritual capacities and powers of the agent, is possible only
on pain of certain other consequences, certain other sacri-
fices, which have not hitherto been considered. That a
half-hearted interest in his profession would still not prevent
his earning a moderate income from it was never questioned
in the ethical "first approximation" to a final decision, but
now the issue is fairly presented, and, as we must see, in a
very difficult and distressing way; for the essence of the
situation is that the ends now in conflict, that of earning a
living and caring for his family and that of laboring for the
social good, are not intrinsically (that is, from the stand-
point of the empirical self) incompatible. On the contrary,
these two ends are psychologically quite compatible, as the
outcome of the ethical judgment shows; only the "external"
conditions oppose them to each other. The difficulty of the
case lies, then, just in the fact that the conflicting ends, both
standing, as they do, for strong personal interests of the self,
nevertheless cannot be brought to an adjustment by the

Valuation as a Logical Process 295

direct method of an appportionment between them of the
"spiritual resources" or "energies" of the self. Instead,
the case is one calling for an apportionment of the external
means, and so, proximately, not for immediate determination
of the final end, but for economic determination of the means.

We come now to the task of describing, so far as this
may be possible, the judgment or valuation-processes which
correspond to the types of situation thus distinguished. We
are able now to see that these must be constructive processes,
in the sense that in and through them courses of conduct
adapted to unique situations are shaped by the concourse of
established standards with a new end which has arisen and
put in its claim for recognition. We can see, moreover, that
these valuation-processes effect a construction of a different
order from that given in factual judgment. Factual judg-
ment determines external objects as means or conditions
of action from standpoints suggested by the analysis and
development of ends. Judgments of valuation determine
concrete purposes from standpoints given in recognized
general purposes of the self — purposes which are general in
virtue of their having been taken by abstraction from con-
crete cases, in which they have received particular formula-
tion as purposes, and set apart as typical modes of conduct
in general serviceable to the "energetic" self.' Logically
factual judgment is at all times subordinate to valuational;
when valuational judgment has become consciously deliber-
ate, this logical subordination becomes explicit and factual
judgment appears in its true character. Its essential func-
tion is that of presenting the conditions which sanction and
stimulate our ethically and economically determined pur-
poses.'' Finally, in the construction of purposes and recon-

1 We have already given a slight sketch of the historical process here character-
ized in the barest logical terms. «

2 Farther consideration of the problem of factual judgment mnst be deferred to
PartV.

296 Studies in Logical Theory

struction of standards in valuation the ideal of the expansion
and development of the "energetic" self controls — not as a
"presented" or contentual self prescribing particular modes
of conduct, but as a principle prescribing the greatest possible
openness to suggestion and an impartial application of the
method of valuation to the case in hand. As we have said,
in whatever sensuous image we figure the "energetic" self,
its essential character lies in its function of stimulating
methodical valuation. In place of the two-faced and ambigu-
ous "presented" self, which is characteristic of the stage
of conscience, we now have in the stage of valuation the
"energetic" self on the one hand and standards on the other.'
We have now to consider the actual procedure of valua-
tion, and first the ethical form as above defined. Bearing
in mind that we are not concerned with cases of obedience
to authority or deference to conscience, let us take a case of
genuine moral conflict such as we were considering some
time since. Suppose that one has the impulse to indulge in
some form of amusement which he has been in the habit of
considering frivolous or absolutely wrong. The end, as soon
as imaged, or rather as the condition of its being imaged,
encounters past habits of conduct symbolized by standards —
standards which may be presented under a variety of forms,
a maxim learned in early childhood, the ideal of a Stoic
sage or Christian saint, the example of some friend, or a pre-
cept put in abstract terms, but which, however presented,
are essentially symbolic of established habits of thought or
action." Solution of such a problem proceeds, in general,
along two closely interwoven lines: (1) collation and com-
parison of cases recognized as conforming to the standard,

1 The relation of the empirical self to the "energetic" and to standards will
come in for statement in Fart V in the connection just referred to.

2 It might be possible to construct a " logic " of these various types of working
moral standard in sucl^ a way as to show that in each type there is implied the one
next higher morphologically, and ultimately the highest — that is, some sort of con-
cept of the " energetic " self.

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 297

with a view to determining the standard type of conduct in
a less ambiguous way, and (2) definition of the relations
between this type of conduct and other recognized types in
the catalogue of virtues.

Now, these two movements are in fact inseparable, for,
without reference to the entire system of virtues of which
the one now asserting itself is a member, the comparison of
cases with a view to definition of the virtue would be blind
and hopeless of any outcome. The agent in the case before
us desires to be temperate in amusement and to make profit-
able use of leisure time, but after all he may wonder whether
these ideals really require the austerities of certain mediseval
saints or the Stoic ataraxy. The saint's feats of spiritual
athletics may have served a useful purpose, in ruder times,
as evidence of human power to lead a virtuous and thought-
ful life, but can such self-denial now be required of the
moral man? It is apparent, in short, that the superficially
conceived ideal must be analyzed. We must consider the
"spirit" of our saint or hero, not the letter of his conduct,
as we say, and in interpreting it make due allowance for the
conditions of the time in which he lived and the grade of
general intelligence of those he sought to edify. Whether
our standard is a person or a parable or an abstractly formu-
lated precept, the logic of the situation is the same in every
case of judgment. The analysis of a standard cannot pro-
ceed without the "synthesis" or co-ordination of the type of
conduct thereby defined with other distinguishable recog-
nized types of conduct into a comprehensive ideal of life as
a whole. In the last resort the implicit relations of all the
virtues will be made explicit in the process of defining accu-
rately any one of them.

In the last resort, then, the predicate of the ethical judg-
ment is the whole system of the recognized habits of the
agent, and each judgment-process is in its outcome a read-

298 Studies in Logical Theoey

justment of the system to accommodate the new habit that
has been seeking admission. Both the old habits and the
new impulse have been modified in the process just as the
intension of a class term and the particular "subsumed"
under the class are reciprocally modified in the ordinary judg-
ment of sense-perception. We are once more able to see
that the process of ethical judgment or valuation is not a pro-
cess of subsumption or classification, of ascertaining the value
of particular modes of conduct, but on the contrary a process
of determining or assigning value. Each judgment process
means a new and more or less thoroughgoing redetermina-
tion of the self and hence a fixation of the ethical value of
the conduct whose emergence as a purpose gave rise to the
process. The moral experience is not essentially and in its
typical emergencies a recognition of values with a view to
shaping one's course accordingly, but rather a determining
or a fixation of values which shall serve for the time being,
but be subject at all times to re-appraisal.

If the present discussion were primarily intended as a
contribution to general ethical theory, it would be a part of
our purpose to show in detail that any formulation of an
ethical ideal in contentual "material" terms must always be
inadequate for practical purposes and hence theoretically
indefensible. This, as we believe, could be shown true of the
popularly current ideal of self-realization as well as of hedon-
ism in its various forms and the older systems of conscience
or the moral sense. These all are essentially fixed ideals
admitting of more or less complete specification in point
of content and regarded as tests or canons by appeal to
which the moral quality of any concrete act can be deduct-
ively ascertained. They are the ethical analogues of such
metaphysical principles as the Cartesian God or the Sub-
stance of Spinoza, and the logic implied in regarding them
as adequate standards for the valuation of conduct is the

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 299

logic whereby the Rationalist sought to deduce from con-
cepts the world of particular things. The present desidera-
tum in ethical theory would appear to be, not further attempts
at definition of a moral ideal of any sort, but the development
of a logical method for the valuation of ideals and ends in
which the results of more modern researches in the theory of
knowledge should be made use of — in which the concept of
self should play the part, not of the concept of Substance in
a rationalistic metaphysics,' but of such a principle as that of
the conservation of energy, for example, in scientific infer-
ence."

We have, then, in each readjustment of the activities of
the self a reconstruction in knowledge of ethical reality — a
reconstruction which at the same time involves the assign-
ment of a definite value to the new mode of conduct which
has been worked out in the readjustment. We conclude, then,
that the ethical experience is one of continuous construction
and reconstruction of an order of objective reality, within
which the world of sense-perception is comprised as the world
of more or less refractory means to the attainment of ethical
purposes. In this process of construction of ethical reality
current moral standards play the same part as concepts
already defined — that is to say, the agent's present habits — •

lit matters not at all whether, in ethics or metaphysics, our universal be
abstract or on the other hand "concrete," like Green's conception of the self, or a
"Hegelian" Absolute. Its logical nse in the determination of particulars must be
essentially the same in either case.

2 In this connection reference may be made to Mk. Taylor's recent work, The
Problem of Conduct. Mr. Taylor reduces the moral life to terms of an ultimate con-
flict between the ideals of egoism and social justice, holding that the conflict is in
theory irreconcilable. With this negative attitude toward current standards in
ethical theory one may well be in accord without accepting Mr. Taylor's further con-
tention that a theory of ethics is therefore impossible. Because the " ethics of sub-
sumption " is demonstrably futile it by no means follows that a method of ethics
cannot be developed along the lines of modern scientific logic which shall be as valid
as the procedure of the investigator in the sciences. Mr. Taylor's logic is virtually
the same as that of the ethical theories which he criticises ; because an ethical ideal
is impossible, a theory of ethics is impossible also. One is reminded of Ms. Bead-
ley's criticism of knowledge in the closing chapters of the Logic as an interesting
parallel.

300 Studies in Logical Theory

do in the typical judgment of sense-perception. They play
the part of symbols suggestive of recognized and heretofore
habitual modes of action with reference to conduct of the
type of the particular instance that is under consideration,
serving thus to bring to bear upon the subject of the judg-
ment sooner or later the entire moral self. The outcome is
a new self, and so for the future a new standard, in which
the past self as represented by the former standard and the
new impulse have been brought to mutual adjustment. Our
position is that this adjustment is essentially experimental
and that in it the general principle of the unity and expan-
sion of the self must be presupposed, as in inductive infer-
ence general principles of teleology, of the conservation of
energy, and of organic interconnection of parts in living
things are presupposed. The unity and increase of the self
is not a test or canon, but a principle of moral experimenta-
tion.'

Finally, we must note one further parallel between ethical
judgment and the judgment of sense-perception and science.
However the man of science may, as a nominalist, regard
the laws of nature as mere observed uniformities of fact and
particulars as the true realities, these same laws will never-
theless on occasion have a distinctly objective character in
his actual apprehension of them. The stubbornness with
which a certain material may refuse to lend itself to a
desired purpose will commonly be reinforced, as a matter of
apprehension, by one's recognition of the "scientific neces-
sity" of the phenomenon. As offering resistance the thing
itself, as we have seen, becomes objective; so also does the
law of which this case may be recognized as only a particu-
lar example — and the other type of objectivity experience
we need not here do more than mention as likewise possible

I Mb. Bosanquet's discussion of the place of the principle of teleology in ana-
logical inference will be found suggestive in this connection (Logic, Vol. II,
chap. iii).

Valuation as a Logical Process 301

in one's apprehension of the law as well as of the "facts"
of natiire. Both types of objectivity attach to the moral law
as well. The standard that restrains is one "above" us or
"beyond" us. Even Kant, as the similitude of the starry
heavens would suggest, was not incapable of a faint "emo-
tion of the heteronomous," and authority in one form or
another is a moral force whose objective validity as moral,
both in its inhibiting and in its sanctioning aspects, human
nature is prone to acknowledge. The apprehension of
objectivity is everywhere, as we have held, emotional. One
type of situation in which the moral law takes on this char-
acter is found in the interposition of the law to check a for-
ward tendency ; the other is found in the instant of transition
from doubt to the new adjustment that has been reached.
In the one case the law is "inexorable" in its demands. In
the other case there are two possibilities: If the adjustment
has been essentially a rejection of the new "temptation,"
the law which one obeys is one no longer inexorable, but
sustaining, as a rock of salvation. If the adjustment is a
distinctly new attitude, the sense of the objectivity of the
principle embodied in it will commonly be less strong, if not
for the time being almost wholly wanting ; but in the mo-
ment of overt action it will in some degree wear the charac-
ter of a firm truth upon which one has taken his stand.

This general view of the logical constitution of the moral
experience may suggest a comparison with the fundamental
doctrine of the British Intellectualist school. The Intellec-
tualist writers were very largely guided in their expositions
by the desire of refuting on the one hand Hobbes and on
the other Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Against Hobbes
they wished to establish the obligatory character of the
moral law entirely apart from sanction or enactment by
political authority. Against the Sentimentalists they wished
to vindicate its objectivity and permanence. This twofold

302 Studies in Logical Theobt

purpose they accomplished by holding that the morality of
conduct lies in its conformity to the "objective nature of
things," the knowledge of which, in its moral aspects, is
logically deducible from certain moral axioms, self-evident
like those of mathematics. Now this mathematical analogy
is the key to the whole position of the Intellectualist writers.
By so conceiving the nature of knowledge these men seri-
ously weakened their strong general position. Mathematics
is just that species of knowledge which is most remote from
and apparently independent of any reference to conduct, and
the Intellectualists, by choosing it as their ideal, were
thereby rendered incapable of explaining the obligatoriness
of the moral law. An adequate psychology of knowledge
would have obviated this difficulty in their system.

The occasion for economic judgment is given, as we have
seen, in a conflict between ends not incompatible, in view of
any ascertainable conditions of the agent's nature as an
empirical self, but inhibitory of each other in view of what
we have described as conditions external to the agent. Thus
the lawyer in our illustration found his plan of compromise
thwarted by the existence of such sociological conditions as
would make the practice of his profession, in the manner
intended, impossible, and so cut off his income. Similarly
the peasant in a European country finds that (for reasons
which, more probably, he does not understand) he can no
longer earn a living in the accustomed way, and emigrates
to a country in which his capital and his physical energies
may be more profitably employed. So also in the everyday
lives of all of us ends and interests quite disparate, so far as
any relation to each other through our psychical capacities
is concerned, stand very frequently in opposition, neverthe-
less, and calling for adjustment. We must make a choice
between amusement or intellectual pursuits or the means of

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 303

BBsthetic culture, on the one hand, and the common necessa-
ries of life on the other, and the difficulty of the situation
lies just in absence of any sort of "spiritual affinity" be-
tween these ends. There is no necessary ratio between the
satisfaction of the common needs of life and the cultivation
of the higher faculties — no ratio for which the individual
can ever find a sanction in the constitution of his empirical
self through the direct method of ethical valuation. The
common needs must have their measure of recognition, but
no attempted ethical valuation of them can ever come to a
result convincingly warranted to the "energetic" self by
psychological conditions. The economic situation as such is
in this sense (that is, from the standpoint of any recognized
ethical standards) unintelligible. It is this ethical unintelli-
gibility that often lends a genuine element of tragedy to
situations which press urgently and in which the ends at
issue are of great ethical moment. It is no small matter to
the emigrant, for example, that he must cut the very
roots by which he has grown to the sort of man he finds
himself to be. His whole nature protests against this
violence, and questions its necessity, though the necessity is
unmistakable and it would be quite impossible for him not
to act accordingly. Nevertheless, tragic as such a conflict
may well be, it does not differ in any logically essential way,
does not differ in its degree of strictly logical difficulty, from
the ethically much less serious economic problems of our
everyday life.

Now, we have already defined the economic act for which
economic judgment is preparatory as being, in general terms,
the diversion of certain means from a present use to which
they have been devoted to a new use which has come to seem
in a general way desirable.' Thus, in the cases just men-
tioned, the lawyer contemplates the virtual purchase of his

1 See above, p. 213 and p. 259 ad fin.

304 Studies in Logical Theoet

new career by the income which his profession might in
years to come afford him, the emigrant seeks a better market
for his labor, and the pleasure-seeker and the ambitious student
and the buyer of a commodity in the market propose to them-
selves, each one, the diversion from some hitherto intended
use of a sum of money. Manifestly it is immaterial from
our logical point of view whether the means in question
which one proposes to apply in some new way are in the
nature of physical and mental strength, or materials and
implements of manufacture ready to be used, or means of
purchase of some sort wherewith the desired service or com-
modity may be obtained at once. The economic problem, to
state it technically, is the problem of the reapplicdbility of
the means, interpreting the category of means quite broadly.

In a word, then, the method of procedure adapted to the
economic type of situation is that of valuation of the means,
not that of direct valuation of the ends. This method is one
of valuation since, like the ethical method, it is determina-
tive of a purpose, but it accomplishes this result in its own
distinctive way. The problem of our present analysis will
accordingly be how this method of valuation of the means
is able to help toward an adjustment of disparate or unre-
lated ends which the ethical method is inadequate to effect.

Let us assume that a vague purpose of foreign travel, for
example, has presented itself in imagination, and that the
preliminary stage of ethical judgment has been passed
through, with the result that the purpose, in a more definite
form than it could have at first, is now ready for economic
consideration. In the first place the cost of the journey
must be determined, and this step, in terms of our present
point of view, is simply a methodological device whereby
certain ends which the standards involved in the stage of
ethical judgment could not suggest or could not effectually
take into co-operation with themselves in their determination

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 305

of the end are brouglit into play. Ascertaining the means
suggests these disparate ends, these established modes of
use of the means, with the result that the agent's "forward
tendency" is checked. Shall the necessary sums be spent
in foreign travel or shall they be spent in the present ways —
in providing various physical necessities and comforts, or
for various forms of amusement, or in increasing investments
in business enterprises? These modes of use do not admit
of ethical comparison with the plan of foreign travel, and
the agent's interest must therefore now be centered on the
means.

It is in this check to the agent's forward tendency that the
logical status of the means is evinced. As merely so much
money the means could only serve to further the execution
of the purpose that is forming, since under the circumstances
it could only prompt immediate expenditure. Like the subject
in factual judgment, the means in economic judgment have
their problematic aspect which as effectually hinders the
desired use of them as could any palpable physical defect.
This problematic aspect consists in the fact of the present
established mode of use which the now-forming purpose
threatens to disturb, and it is the agent's interest in this mode
of use that turns his attention to the valuation of the means.

It need hardly be pointed out that in the economic life
we find situations exactly corresponding to those of "con-
science and temptation" and mechanical "pull and haul"
which were discriminated in the ethical sphere and marked
off from judgment properly so called. Indeed it seems
reasonable to think, on general grounds of introspection, that
these methods of decision (if they deserve the name) are,
relatively speaking, more frequently relied upon in the eco-
nomic than in the moral life. The economic method of true
judgment is roundabout and more complex and more difficult
than ethical, and involves a more express recourse to those

306 Studies in Logical Theoey

abstract conceptions which for the most part are only im-
plicitly involved in valuation of the other type. The economic
type of valuation, in fact, differs from the ethical, not in an
absolute or essential way, but rather in the explicitness with
which it brings to light and lays bare the vital elements in
valuation as such. In general, then, the economic process
would seem necessarily to embrace three stages, which will first
of all be enumerated and then very briefly explained and dis-
cussed. These are: (1) a preliminary consideration of the
means necessary to attain the end — which must be vague and
tentative, of course, for the reason that the end as imagined
is so, as compared with the fulness of detail which must belong
to it before it can be finally accepted; (2) a consideration
of the means, as thus provisionally taken, in the light of their
present devotion to other purposes, this present devotion
of them being the outcome, in some degree at least, of past
valuation; (3) final definition of the means with reference
to the proposed use through an adjustment effected between
this and the factors involved in the past valuation.

1. In the first stage as throughout, it must be carefully
noted, the means are under consideration not primarily in
their physical aspect, but simply as subject to a possible
redisposition. Thus it is not money as lawful currency
receivable at the steamship office for an ocean passage, nor
tools and materials and labor-power technically suitable for
the production of a desired object, that is the subject of the
economic judgment. The problem of redisposition would of
course not be raised were the means not technically adapt-
able to the purpose, nor on the other hand can the means in
the course of economic judgment, as a rule, escape some
measure of further (factual) inquiry into their technical
properties; but the standpoints are nevertheless distinct.
Again, it must be noted that the means in this first stage
will be only roughly measured. The length of one's stay

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 307

abroad, the size of the house one wishes to build, the purpose
whatever it may be, is still undefined — these are in fact the
very matters which the process must determine — and in the
first instance it is "money in general" or "a large sum of
money" with reference to which we raise the economic
problem. The category of quantity is in fact essentially an
economic one ; it is essentially a standpoint for determining
the means of action in such a way as to facilitate their econo-
mic valuation. The reader familiar with the writings of the
Austrian school of economists will easily recall how uniformly
in their discussions of the principle of marginal utility these
writers assume outright in the first place the division of the
stock of goods into definite units, and then raise the question
of how the value of a unit is measured. The stock contains
already a hundred bushels of wheat or ten loaves of bread —
apparently as a matter of metaphysical necessity — whereas
in fact the essential economic problem is this very one of
how " wheat at large " comes to be put in sacks of a certain
size and " bread in general " to be baked in twelve-ounce
loaves. The subdivision of the stock and the valuation of
the unit are not successive stages, but inseparably correlative
phases of the valuation-process as a whole. The outcome
may be stated either way, in accordance with one's interest
in the situation.

2. But the immeasured means as redisposable in an as yet
undetermined way bring to consciousness established meas-
ured uses to which the means have been heretofore assigned
in definite amounts. In this way the process of determining
a definite quantum as redisposable (which is to say, of attain-
ing to a definite acceptable plan of conduct) can begin.
How, then, does this fact of past assignment to uses still
recognized as desirable figure in the situation? In the first
place the past assignment may have been (1) an outcome of
past economic valuation, (2) an unhesitating or non-economic

308 Studies in Logical Theory

act executive of an ethical decision, or (3) an act of more or
less conscious obedience to "conscience" or "authority."
In either case it now stands as a course of conduct which at
the time was, in the way explained above, sanctioned to the
agent, to the "energetic" self, by the means and conditions
recognized as bearing upon it. In this sense, then, we have,
in this recognition of the past adjustment and of the eco-
nomic character which the means now have in virtue of it,
what we may term a judgment of "energy-equivalence"
between the means and their established uses. For to the
agent it was the essential meaning of the sense of sanction
felt when the means were assigned to these uses that the
"energetic" self would on the whole be furthered thereby
— and this in view of all the sacrifices that this use would
entail, or in view of the sacrifices required for the production
of the means, if the case were one in which the means were
not at hand and could only be secured by a more or less
extended production process.

In the illustration we have been considering, it will be
observed, there is an extensive schedule of present uses
which the new project calls in question and from which the
means must be diverted. This is in fact the commoner case.
A new use of money will affect, as a rule, not simply a single
present mode of expenditure, but will very probably involve
a readjustment throughout the whole schedule of expendi-
ture which our separate past valuations of money have in
effect co-operated in establishing. So likewise if we wish to
use part of a store of building materials or of food, or of any
other subdivisible commodity, we encounter an ordered sys-
tem of consumption rather than a single predetermined use
which we have not yet enjoyed. Where this is the case the
whole process of valuation is greatly facilitated, but this is
not essential. The means in cases of true economic valua-
tion may be capable of but a single use, like a railroad ticket

Valuation as a Logical Peocess 309

or a perishable piece of fruit, or of a virtually endless
series of uses, like a painting or a literary masterpiece.
Whether the means figure as representing but a single use or
stand for the conservation of an extensive system, their econo-
mic significance is the same. They are the " energy-equiva-
lent" of this use or system of uses considered as an act or
system of acts of consumption in furtherance of the self.
Their past assignment meant then and means now simply
this, that the "energetic" self would thereby gain more than
it would lose through the inevitable sacrifices. This is the
economic significance of the means in virtue of which they
are now problematic to the extent of checking, for a time at
least, forward tendency toward the desired end.'

3. The judgment of energy-eqid valence, then, defines the
inhibiting economic aspect of the means, and moreover defines
it for the means as subdivided and set apart for a schedule of
uses if this was the form of the past adjustments to which
reference is made. The problem of the third stage of the
process is that of " bringing subject and predicate together,"
as we have elsewhere expressed it — that is, of determining,
in the light of the economic character of the means as just
ascertained, what measure of satisfaction, if any, may be
accorded to the new and as yet undefined desire. The new
disposition of the means, if one is to be made, must bring to
the "energetic" self a degree of furtherance and development
which shall be sensibly as great as would come from the estab-
lished method of consumption. The means, as economic,

1 We use the expression " eneigj-equivalent " because the ** excess ** gained by
the self through the past adjustment is not of importance at jnst this point. The
essential significance of the means now is not that they "cost" less than they promised
to bring in in energy, but that because they required sacrifice the self will now lose
unless they are allowed to fulfil the promise. They are the logical equivalent of the
established modes of consumption from the standpoint of conserration of the
energies of the self, not the mathematical equivalent.

It would be desirable, if there were space, to present a brief acconnt of the
psychological basis of the concepts of energy and energy-equivalence which here
come into play, but this must be omitted.

310 Studies in Logical Theory

are means to the conservation of the old adjustment, and
any new disposal of them or of any portion of them for a
full or partial execution of the new purpose must make out
at least as good a case. It must appear that the new dispo-
sition is not only physically possible, but also economically
necessary in the light of the same principle of expansion of
the self as sanctioned the disposition now in force. It must
make the self in some way more efficient— whether more
strong and symmetrical in body, more skilled in work, more
clear of brain, or more efficient in whatever other concrete
way may be desired.

Psychologically the sanction of any course of action
which is taken as evidence of conformity to the general rule
thus inadequately stated is the more or less strong sense of
"relaxation" of attentive strain which comes with the shift
of attention, in the final survey, from means to end. We may
accordingly, for the sake of greater definiteness, restate in
the following terms the process which has just been sketched:
The ends in conflict at the outset are ends which do not
sensibly bear upon each other through their dependence
upon a common fund of psychical capacities or energies.
They are related in the agent's experience solely through
their dependence upon a common stock of physical means,
and they do not therefore admit of adjustment through
the ethical type of process. The economic process consists
essentially of a revival in imagination of the experiences
accompanying the former disposition of the means and a
re-enforcement by these of the means in their adherence to
that former and still recognized disposition. If an adapted
form of the new end can be imagined which will mediate a
like experience of relaxation when the attention shifts from
the means, thus emotionally re-enforced in their economic
status, to the end as thus conceived, the means will be recog-
nized as economically redisposable. Thus the method of

Valuation as a Logical Process 311

valuation of the means makes possible, through appeal to the
sensibly invariable experience of relaxation or assurance in
the outcome of judgment, a co-ordination of disparate ends
which the ethical method of direct adjustment could not
effect.'

The economic process thus presents on analysis the same
factors as does the ethical. On the subject side we have the
means — which as economic are problematic as to their reap-
plicability. On the predicate side we have the suggested
mode of reapplication in tension against conservative ideals
of application to established purposes. Just as it may be
held that the general ethical predicate is that of Kight or
Good — that is, deserving of adoption into the system of
one's ends — so the economic predicate applied to the means
as these come in the end to be defined is the general con-
cept Keappliable. And in general the distinction of the
types is not an ultimate one, for the more deliberately and
rigorously the method of economic valuation is pursued —
in such a case, for example, as that of the prospective emigrant
— the stronger will be the agent's sense of a genuinely
ethical sanction as belonging to the decision which is in the
end worked out. The more certain and sincere, therefore,
will be the agent's judgment that the means must be reap-
plied, for on the sense of sanction of which we speak rests
the explicit judgment that the purpose formed is expansive
of the self.

Prom the analysis thus presented it must appear, there-
fore, that the economic type of judgment is in our sense a
constructive process. Its function is to determine a particu-
lar commodity or portion of a stock of some commodity in
its economic character as disposable, and in performing
this function it presents a definite reality in the economic

1 Putting it negatively, the renunciation of the new end involves a " greater "
sacrifice than all the sacrifices which adherence to the present system of consump-
tion can compensate.

312 Studies in Logical Theory

order. Moreover, in thus defining the particular, recourse is
had to more or less distinctively namable economic standards
which are in the last resort symbols representing established
habits of consumption in the light of which the means,
prima facie, seem not to be available for any other purposes.
These economic standards, like ethical standards and the
class concepts of science and our ordinary perceptual experi-
ence, are, with all due respect to nominalism, constitutive of
a real world — a world which is real because it lends form and
significance to our knowledge of particulars as stimuli to
conduct.

We have now before us sufficient reason for our thesis
that the valuation- process in both its forms is constructive
of an order of reality, and we have sufficiently explained the
relation which the economic order bears to the inclusive and
logically prior order of ethical objects and relations. We are
now in a position to see that in being thus constructive of
reality (taking the conception in its proper functional mean-
ing) they are at the same time constructive of the self, since
the reality which they construct is in its functional aspect
the assemblage of means and conditions, of stimuli, in short,
for the development and expansion of the self. We shall
bring this main division of our study to a close with a series
of remarks in explanation and illustration of this view.

Let us consider once more the factors present in the
agent's final survey of the situation after the completion of
the judgment -process and on the verge of action. These
factors are, as we have seen, (1) recognition of conditions
sanctioning the purpose formed, (2) recognition of the pur-
pose as, in view of this sanction, warranted to the "energetic"
self as an eligible method of expansion and development, and
(3) recognition of the "energetic" self, conversely, as in
possession, in virtue of the favorable conditions given in

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 313

factual judgment, of this new method of furtherance. These
three factors are manifestly not so much factors co-operating
in the situation as inseparable aspects of it distinguishable
from each other and admitting of discriminative emphasis in
accordance with the degree of reflective power which the
individual may possess or choose to exercise. Strictly speak-
ing these three aspects are present in every conscious recog-
nition of a purpose as one's own and as presently to be
carried into effect, but they are not always present in equal
conspicuousnesB, and never with equal logical importance for
the individual. In fact this enumeration of aspects coincides
with our enumeration of the three stages in the evolution of
the individual's conscious moral attitude toward new pur-
poses given in impulse — in the third of which the last
named of these aspects comes to the fore with the others in
logical or functional subordination to it.

Now it will be apparent on grounds of logic, as on the
evidence of simple introspection, that in this third type of
attitude — in the attitude of true valuation, that is to say —
the energetic self cannot be indentified with the chosen pur-
pose. The purpose is a determinate specified act to be per-
formed subject to recognized conditions, and with the use of
the co-ordinated means; the self, on the other hand, is a pro-
cess to which this particular purpose is, indeed, from the
standpoint of the self's conservation and increase, indispen-
sable, but which is nevertheless apart from the purpose in
the sense that without the purpose it would still be a self,
though perhaps a narrower and less developed one. Our
standpoint here as elsewhere, the reader must remember, is
the logical. It is the standpoint of the agent's own inter-
pretation of his experience of judgment during the judgment-
process and at its close, and not the standpoint of the psy-
chological mediation of this experience as a series of occur-
rences. Thus we are here far from wishing to deny the

314 Studies in Logical Theoey

general proposition that a man's purposes are an expression
of his nature, as the psychologist might describe it, or the
proposition that a man's conduct and his character are one
and the same thing viewed from different points of view. We
wish merely to insist upon the fact that these psychological
propositions are not a true account of the agent's own expe-
rience of himself and of his purposes while these latter are
in the making or are on the verge of execution. There is
indeed no conflict between this "inside view" of the judg-
ment-process and of the final survey and the psychological
propositions just mentioned. The identity of conduct and
character means not simply that as the man is so does he
act, but quite as much, and in a more important way, that as
he acts so is he and so does he become. It is, then, the
essence of the agent's own view of the situation that his
character is in the making and that the purpose is the
method to be taken. To the agent the self is not, indeed,
independent of the purpose, for plainly it is recognized that
upon just this purpose the self is, in the sense explained, in
a vital way dependent. Nevertheless the self is in the
agent's apprehension essentially beyond the purpose, and
larger than the purpose, and even, we may say, metaphysically
apart from it. Now the conclusion which we wish to draw
from this examination of the agent's attitude in judgment is
that no formulation of an ideal self can ever be adequate to
his purposes, not simply because any such formulation must,
as Green allows, inevitably be incomplete and inconsistent,
but because the self as a process is in the agent's own appre-
hension of it inherently incapable of formulation. Any
formulation that might be attempted must be in terms of
particular purposes (since in a modem ethical theory the self
must be a "concrete" and not an abstract universal), and it
is easy to see that any such would be, to the agent in the
attitude of true ethical judgment, worse than useless. It

Valuation as a Logical Process 315

could as contentual and concrete only be a composite of
existing standards, more or less coherently put together,
offered to the agent as a substitute for the new standard
which he is trying to work out. If there were not need of
a new standard there would be no judgment -process; the
agent must be, to say the least, embarrassed, even if the
unwitting imposture does not deceive him, when such a com-
posite, useful and indeed indispensable in its proper place as
a standard of reference and a source of suggestion, is urged
upon him as suitable for a purpose which in the very nature
of the case it is logically incapable of serving.'

To the agent, then, the "energetic" self can never be
represented as an ideal — can never be expressed in terms of
purpose — since it is in its very nature logically incongruous
with any possible particular purpose or generalization of
such purposes. It is commonly imaged by the agent in
some manner of sensuous terms, but it is imaged, in so far as
the case is one of judgment in a proper sense, for use as a
stimulus to the methodical process of valuation — not as a
standard, which if really adequate would make valuation
unnecessary. The agent's consciousness of himself as "en-
ergetic" cannot be an ideal; it comes to consciousness only
through the endeavor, first to follow, and then, in a later
stage of moral development, to use ideals, and has for its
function, as a presentation, the incitement of the process of
methodical use of standards in the control of the agent's

1 Green, as is well known, allows that any f ormnlation of the ideal self must be
incomplete, bnt holds that it is not for this reason useless. But this is to assume
that development in the ideal is never to be radically reconstructive, that the ideal
is to expand and fill out along established and unchangeable lines of growth so that all
increase shall be in the nature of accretion. The self as a system is fixed and all
individual moral growth is in the nature of approximation to this absolute ideal.
This would appear to be essentially identical in a logical sense with Mr. Spencer's
hypothesis of social evolution as a process of gradual approach to a condition of
perfect adaptation of society and the individual to each other in an environment to
which society is perfectly adapted — a condition in which " perfectly evolved " indi-
viduals shall live in a state of blessedness in conformity to the requirements of
"absolute ethics." For a criticism of this latter type of view see Me. Tatloe'3
above-mentioned work (chap, v, passim).

316 Studies in Logical Thboet

impulsive ends. It is not an anticipatory vision of the final
goal of life, but the agent's coming to consciousness of the
general impulse and movement of the life that is.

It is an inevitable consequence of acceptance of a con-
tentual view of the "energetic" self as one's ideal that
reflective morality should tend to degenerate into an intro-
spective conscientiousness constantly in unstable equilibrium
between a pharisaical selfishness on the one hand and a mor-
ally scarcely more dangerous hypocrisy on the other. There
is certainly much justice in the stinging characterization of
"Neo-Hegelian Egoism" which Mr. Taylor somewhere in
his unsearchable book applies to the currently prevailing
conventionalized type of idealistic ethics. If the self of the
valuation-process is an ultimate goal of effort, then there
must certainly be an irreconcilable contrast to the disadvantage
of the latter between the plain man's objective desire for right
conduct, as such, and for the welfare of his fellow-beings,
and the moralist's anxious questionings of the rectitude of
the motives by which his conformity to the fixed moral
standard are prompted.' Into the value and significance of
the attitude of conscientious examination of one's moral mo-
tives we are not here concerned to inquire, but need only
insist, in accordance with our present view, that its value
must be distinctly subordinate and incidental to the general
course and outcome of the valuation-process. In the valua-
tion-process, consciousness of self is not an object of solici-
tude, but simply, we repeat, a pure presentation of stimulus,
having for its office the incitement, and if need be the reincite-
ment, of the attitude of deference to the suggestions of old
standards and openness to the petitions of new impulse, and
of methodically bringing these to bear upon each other.

1 For Gbeen's cautious defense of conscientiousness as a moral attitude see the
Prolegomena to Ethics, Book IV, chap, i ; and for a statement of the present point
of -view as bearing upon Green's difficulty, see Dewbi, The Study of Ethics : A 8yl-
labru, p. 37 ad fin., and Philosophical Review, Vol. II, pp. 661, 662.

Valuation as a Logical Pkooess 317

The outcome of such a process, of course, cannot be pre-
dicted — and for the same reasons as make unpredictable the
scientist's factual hypothesis. Just as the scientist's data are
incomplete and ill-assorted and unorganized, for the reason
that they have, of necessity, been collected, and must at the
outset be interpreted, in the light of present concepts, whose
inadequacy the very existence of the problem at issue demon-
strates, so the final moral purpose that shall be developed is
not to be deduced from any possible inventory of the situa-
tion as it stands. The process in both cases is one of recon-
struction, and the test of the validity of the reconstruction
must in both cases be of the same essentially practical char-
acter. In both cases the process is constructive of reality,
in the functional signification of the term. In both, the
judgment process is constructive also of the self, in the
sense that upon the determination of the agent's future atti-
tude the cumulative outcome of his past attitudes is methodi-
cally brought to bear.'

Judgments of value are, then, objective in their import in
the same sense as are the factual judgments in which the
conditions of action are presented. The ideal problematic sit-
uation is, in the last resort, ethical, in the sense of requiring
for its solution determination of the new end that has arisen
with reference to existing standards. In structure and in
function the judgment in which the outcome of this process
is presented is knowledge, and objective in the only valid
acceptation of the term.

1 Along the line thus inadequately suggested might be found an answer to certain
criticisms of the attempt to dispense with a metaphysical idea of the self. Such
criticisms usually urge that without reference to a metaphysical ideal no meaning
attaches to such conceptions as "adjustment," "expansion," "furtherance," and
the like as predicated of the moral acts of an agent in their eSect upon the " ener-
getic " self. Anything that one may do, it is said, is expansive of the self, if it be
something new, except as we judge it by a metaphysical ideal of a rightly expanded
self. For an excellent statement of this general line of criticism see Stbatton, "A
Psychological Test of Virtue," IntematUmal Journal of Ethics, Vol. XI, p. 200.

318 Studies in Logical Theory

But, after all, it may be urged, is it not the essential
mark of the objective that it should be accessible to all
men, and not in the nature of the case valid for only a single
individual? At best the objectivity of content which has
been made out for the judgment of value is purely functional,
and not such as can be verified by appeal to the consensus
of other persons. The agent's assurance of the reality of
the economic or ethical subject-matter which he is endeavor-
ing to determine, and his sense of the objectivity of the
results which he reaches, need not be denied. These may
well enough be illusions of personal prejudice or passion, or
even normal illusions of the reflective faculty, like that of
interpreting the secondary qualities of bodies as objective in
the same sense as are the "bulk, figure, extension, number,
and motion of their solid parts."* Any man can see the
physical object to which I point, and verify with his own eyes
the qualities which I ascribe to it, but no man can either
understand or verify my judgment that the purpose I have
formed is in accord with rational ideals of industry and self-
denial, or that this portion of my winter's fuel may be given
to a neighbor who has none.

But this line of objection proves too much, for, made
consistent with itself, it really amounts to a denial that the
very judgment of sense-perception, to which it appeals so
confidently as a criterion, has objective import. The first
division of this study was intended to show that every object

1 The polemic of certain recent writers (as, for example, EHBBNrELS in his Sys-
tem der Werttheorie) against the objectivity of judgments of value appears to rest
upon an uncritical acceptance of the time-honored distinction between "primary"
and "secondary" qualities as equivalent to the logical distinction of subjective
and objective. Thus Ehrenfels confutes "das Vorurteil von der objectiven
Bedeutung des WertbegrifEes" by explaining it as due to a misleading usage of speech
expressive of " an impulse, deep-rooted in the human understanding, to objectify
its presentations" and then goes on to say "We do not desire things because we
recognize the presence in them of a mysterious impalpable essence of Value but we
ascribe value to them because we desire them." {Op. cit., Bd. I, p. 2.) This may serve
to illustrate the easy possibility of confusing the logical and psychological points of
view, as likewise does Eheenfels's formal definition of value. (Bd. I., p. 65.)

Valuation as a Logical Pbocess 319

in the experience of each individual is for the individual a
unique construction of his own, determined in form and in
details by individual interests and purposes, and therefore
difEerent from that object in the experience of any other
individual which in social intercourse passes current as
the same. The real object is for me the object which
functions in my experience, presenting problematic aspects
for solution, and lending itself more or less service-
ably to my purposes; and this object is, we hold, not the
object as socially current, but the complete object which, as
complete in its determination with reference to my unique
purposes, cannot possibly have social currency. The objec-
tion as stated cuts away the very ground on which it rests,
since the shortcoming which it finds in the judgment of
ethical or economic value is present in the particular judg-
ment of sense-perception also. The object about which I
can assure myself by an immediate appeal to other persons
is the object in its bare "conceptual" aspects — the object
as a dictionary might define it, the commodity as it might
be described in a trade catalogue, or the ethical act as defined
by the criminal code or in the treatise of a moral philoso-
pher. It is an object consisting of a central core or fixed
deposit of meaning, which renders it significant in a certain
general way to a number of persons, or even to all men, but
which is not yet adequately known by me from the stand-
point of my present forming purpose. In virtue of these
conceptual characters it is adaptable to my purpose, which is
as yet general and indeterminate; but in the nature of the
case it cannot yet be known to me as applicable to my
prospective concrete purpose, as this shall come to be
through judgment.

Thus, if the test of objectivity of import is to be that the
judgment shall present an object or a fact which, as pre-
sented, is socially current among men and not shut away in

320 Studies in Logical Theoky

the individual intelligence apart from the possibility of social
verification, then the apparent nominalism of the objection
we are considering turns out to be the uttermost extreme of
realism. Such a test amounts to a virtual affirmation that
the sole objective reality is the conceptual, and that the
"accidents" of one's particular object of sense-perception are
the arbitrary play of private preference or fancy. At this
point, however, the objection may shift its ground and take
refuge in some such position as the following: The real
object is indeed the object which the individual knows in
relation to his particular purpose, and it is indeed impossible
that the individual's judgment should be limited in its con-
tent to coincidence with the conceptual elements of meaning
which are socially current. The building-stone which one has
judged precisely fit for a special purpose, the specimen which
the mineralogist or the botanist examines under his micro-
scope, the tool whose peculiarity of working one has learned
to make allowance for in use — these all are, of course,
highly individual objects, possessing for the person in ques-
tion an indefinite number of objective aspects of which no
other person can possibly be conscious at the time. And,
more than this, even though the individual may, in his scru-
tiny of the object, have discovered no conspicuous new quali-
ties in it which were not present in the socially current
meaning, the object will still possess an individuality making
it genuinely unique merely through its co-ordination with
other objects in the mechanical process of working out the
purpose in hand. It is at least an object standing here at
just this time, a tool cutting this particular piece of stone
and striking at this instant with this particular ringing
sound, and these perhaps wholly nonessential facts will
nevertheless serve to individualize the object (if one chances
to think of them) in the sense of making it such a one as
no other person knows. All this may be granted, the objec-

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 321

tion may allow, and yet the vital point remains; for this is
not what it was intended, even in the first place, to deny.
The vital point at issue is not whether the object which I
know is known as I know it by any other person, but
whether, in the nature of things, it is one that can be so
known.

Herein, then, lies the difference between judgments of
fact and judgments of value. The mineralogist can train
his pupil to see precisely what he himself sees ; and so like-
wise in any case of sense-perception, the object, however
recondite may be the qualities or features which one may see
in it, can nevertheless be seen by any other person in pre-
cisely the same way on the single, more often not insuper-
ably difficult, condition that the discoverer shall point these
out or otherwise prepare the other for seeing them. But
with the ton of coal which one may judge economically dis-
posable for a charitable purpose the case stands differently,
since it is not in its visible or other physical aspects that the
ton of coal is here the subject of the judgment. It is as
having been set apart by oneself exclusively for other uses
that the ton of coal now functions as an object and now
possesses the character which the economic judgment has
given it ; and the case stands similarly with a contemplated
act, of telling the truth in a trying situation. The valuation
placed upon the commodity or upon the moral act depends
essentially upon psychological conditions of temperament,
disposition, mood, or whim into which it would be impos-
sible for another person to enter, and these depend upon
conditions of past training and native endowment which can
never occur or be combined in future in precisely the same
way for any other individual. In short, the physical object
is describable and can be made socially current, though
doubtless with more or less of difficulty, if other persons
will attend to it and learn to see it as I see it ; but the value

322 Studies in Logical Theoky

of an economic object or a moral act depends upon my
desires and feelings, and therefore must remain a matter of
my private appreciation.

In answering this amended form of the objection it is
entirely unnecessary to discuss the issue of fact which it has
raised as to whether or not complete description of a physical
object or event is a practical or theoretical possibility. It need
only be pointed out that at best such complete description can
only be successful in its purpose on condition that the individ-
ual upon whom the experiment is tried be willing to attend
and have the requisite "apperceptive background." The
accuracy with which another person's knowledge shall copy
the knowledge which I endeavor to impart to him must mani-
festly depend upon these two leading conditions, not to men-
tion also the measure of my own pedagogical and literary skill.
Any consideration of such a purely psychological problem
as is here suggested would be entirely out of place in a dis-
cussion the purpose of which is not that of analyzing the pro-
cess of judgment, but that of interpreting its meaning aspects.
Let us grant the entire psychological possibility of making
socially current in the manner here suggested the most
highly individual and concrete cognition of an object one
may please, and let us grant, moreover, that this possibility
has been actually realized. This concurrent testimony of
the witness will doubtless confirm one's impression of the
accuracy of the process of observation and inference whereby
the knowledge which has been imparted was first gained,
but we must deny that it can do more than this. For indeed,
apart from some independent self-reliant conviction of the
objective validity of the knowledge in question, how should
another's assent be taken as confirmation and not rather as
evidence of one's own mere skill in suggestion and of the
other's susceptibility thereto? We must deny that even in
the improved form the criterion of social currency is a valid

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 323

one. In a word, the social currency of knowledge to the
extent to which it can exist requires as its condition, and is
evidence of, the equal social currency of certain interests,
purposes, or points of view for predication; and if it be
possible to make socially current an item of concrete knowl-
edge, with all its concrete fulness of detail, then a fortiori it
must be possible to make socially current the concrete individ-
ual purpose with reference to which this item of knowledge
first of all took form. Whether such a thing be psychologi-
cally possible at all the reader may decide ; but if it be
possible in the sphere of knowledge of fact, then it must be
possible in the sphere of valuation. In short, judgment
in either field, in definition of a certain object or commodity
or moral act as, for the agent, an objective fact possessing
certain characters, involves the tacit assumption of social
verifiability as a matter of course ; but it does not rest upon
this assumption, nor is this assumption the essence of its
meaning. To say that my judgment is socially verifiable,
that my concrete object of perception or of valuation would
be seen as I see it by any person in precisely my place, is
merely a tautological way of formally announcing that I
have made the judgment and have now a definite object
which to me has a certain definite functional meaning.

Thus, instead of drawing a distinction between the
realms of fact and value, as between what is or can be com-
mon to all intelligent beings and what must be unique for
each individual one, we must hold that the two realms are
coextensive. The socially current object answers to a cer-
tain general type of conscious purpose or interest active in
the individual and so to a general habit of valuation, and
the concrete object to a special determination of this type of
purpose with reference to others in the recognized working
system of life. The agent's final attitude, on the conclusion
of the judgment-process, may be expressed in either sort of

324 Studies in Logical Theory

judgment — in a judgment of the value of commodity or moral
purpose, or in a judgment of concrete fact setting forth the
"external" conditions which warrant the purpose to the
"energetic" self. Throughout the judgment-process there
is a correlation between the movement whereby the socially
current object develops into the adapted means and that
whereby the socially current type of conduct develops into
the defined and valued purpose.'

At this point, however, a second general objection pre-
sents itself. However individual the content of my knowl-
edge of physical fact may be, and however irrelevant, from
the logical point of view, to my confidence in its objective
validity may be the possibility of sharing it with other per-
sons, nevertheless it refers to an object which is in some
sense permanent, and therein differs from my valuations. In
economic valuation I reach a definition of a certain com-
modity and am confirmed in it by all the conditions that
enter into my final survey of the situation. But my desire
for the new sort of consumption may fail, and so expose my
valuation to easy attack from any new desire that may arise ;
or my supply of the commodity in question may be suddenly
increased or diminished, and my valuation of the unit quan-
tity thereby changed. Likewise my ethical valuation may
have to be reversed (as Mr. Taylor has insisted) by reason
of a change of disposition or particular desire which makes
impossible, except in obedience to some other and inclusive
valuation, further adherence to it. And these changes take
place without any accompanying sense of their doing violence
to objective fact or, on the other hand, any judgment of their

1 The essential dependence of factual judgment upon the rise of economic and
ethical conflict is implied in the widely current doctrine of the teleological character
of knowledge. It is indeed nowadays something like a commonplace to say in one
sense or another that knowledge is relative to ends, but it is not always recognized by
those who hold this view that an end never appears as such in consciousness alone.
The end that guides in the construction of factual knowledge is an end in ethical or
economic conflict with some other likewise indeterminate end in the manner above
discussed.

Valuation as a Logical Pbooess 325

being in the nature of corrections of previous errors in valua-
tion, and so more closely in accordance with the truth.
Moreover, a new valuation, taking the place of an old, does
not supplement its predecessor as one set of judgments
about a physical object may supplement another, made from
a different point of view, but does literally take its place,
and this without necessarily condemning it as having been
erroneous.

This general objection rests upon a number of fairly
obvious misconceptions, and its strength is apparent only.
In the first place, the question of the objectivity of any type
of judgment must in the end, as we have seen, reduce itself to
a question of the judgment's import to the agent. How-
ever the agent's valuations may shift from time to time,
each several one will be sanctioned to the agent by the
changed conditions exhibited in the inventory which the
agent takes at the close of judgment which has formed it.
The conditions have changed, and the valuation of the
earlier purpose has likewise changed; but the new purpose
is sanctioned by the new conditions, and the test of the pre-
sumed validity of the new valuation can only be in the
manner already discussed' the test of actual execution of
the purpose. In the change, as the agent interprets the
situation, there is no violation of the former purpose nor a
nearer approach to truth. Each valuation is true for the
situation to which it corresponds. We are obviously not
here considering the case of error. An error in valuation
is evidenced to the agent, not by the need of a new valua-
tion answering to changed conditions, but by the failure of
a given valuation to make good its promise, although to all
appearance conditions have remained unchanged. If the
conditions have changed, then the purpose and the condi-
tions must be redetermined, if the expansion of the "ener-

iSee abore, pp. 282, 283.

326 Studies in Logical Theoet

getic" self is to continue; but the former valuation does not
thereby become untrue.

These brief remarks should suffice by way of answer, but
it will serve advantageously to illustrate our general position
if we pursue the objection somewhat farther. The physical
object is, nevertheless, permanent, it will be said, and this
surely distinguishes it from the object (now freely acknowl-
edged as such) of the value-judgment. To one man gold
may be soluble in aqua regia and to another worth so
many pence an ounce, but different and individual as are
these judgments and the standpoints they respectively imply,
the gold is one, impartially admitting at the same time of
both characterizations. On the other hand, one cannot
judge an act good and bad at once. The purpose of decep-
tion that may be good is one controlled and shaped by ideals
quite different from those which permit deception of the evil
sort — is, in truth, taken as a total act, altogether different
from the purpose of deception which one condemns, and not,
like the "parcel' of matter" in the two judgments about
gold, the subject of both valuations.

A brief consideration of the meaning of this "parcel of
matter" will easily expose the weakness of the plea. In the
last analysis the "parcel of matter" must for the agent
reduce itself, let us say, to certain controllable energies cen-
tering about certain closely contiguous points in space and
capable, in their exercise, of setting free or checking other
energies in the system of nature. Thus, put in aqua regia
the gold will dissolve, but in the atmosphere it retains its
brilliant color, and in the photographer's solution its ener-
gies have still a different mode of manifestation. And thus
it would appear that the various predicates which are applied
to "gold" imply, each one, a unique set of conditions. Gold
is soluble in aqua regia, but not if it is to retain its yellow
luster; which predicate is to be true of it depends upon the

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 327

conditions under which the energies "resident in the gold"
are to be set free, just as the moral character of an act
depends upon the social conditions obtaining at the time of
its performance — that is, upon the ideals with reference to
which it has been shaped in judgment. How can one
maintain that in a literal and concrete physical sense gold
in process of solution is the "same" as gold entering into
chemical combination? Surely the energy conditions which
constitute the "gold" in the two processes are not the
same — and can one nowadays hope to find sameness in
unchangeable atoms?'

In a word, the permanent substance or "real essence"
that admits of various mutually supplementary determina-
tions corresponding to diverse points of view is, strictly
speaking, a convenient abstraction, and not an existent fact
in time — ^and we shall maintain that the same species of
abstraction has its proper place, and in fact occurs, in the
sphere of moral judgment. The type of moral conduct that
in every actual case of its occurrence in the moral order is
determined in some unique and special way by relation to
other standards is precisely analogous to the " substance "
that is now dissolved in aqua regia and now made to pass in
the form of current coin, but cannot be treated in both ways
at once. Both are abstractions. The "gold" is a name for
the general possibility of attaining any one of a certain
set of particular ends by appropriately co-ordinating cer-
tain energies, resident elsewhere in the physical system,
with those at present stored in this particular "parcel of
matter;" the result to be attained depends not alone upon
the "parcel of matter," but also upon the particular energies
brought to bear upon it from without. Now let us take a
type of conduct which is sometimes judged good and some-
times bad. Deception, for example, is such a type — and

1 Cf. SoHIIiI.EE, Biddies of tlus Sphinx, chap. vU, §§ 10-14.

328 Studies in Logical Theoey

as a type it simply stands for the general possibility of
furtherance or detriment to the "energetic" self according
as it is determined in the concrete instance by ideals of
social well-being or by considerations of immediate personal
advantage.

For the type-form of conduct — when considered, not as
a type of mere physical performance, but as conduct in the
technical sense of a possible purpose of the self — is, in
the sense we have explained, a symbol for the general pos-
sibility of access or dissipation of spiritual energy —energy
which must be set free by the bringing to bear of other
energies upon it, and which furthers or works counter to the
enlargement and development of the self according to the
mode of its co-ordination with other energies which the self
has already turned to its purposes.' But actual conduct is
concrete always and never typical; and so likewise, we have
sought to show, actual "substance," the objective thing
referred to in the factual judgment, is always concrete and
never an essence. It is not a fixed thing admitting of a simul-
taneous variety of conflicting determinations and practical
uses, but absolutely unique and already determined to its
unique character by the whole assemblage of physical con-
ditions which affect it at the time and which it in turn
reacts upon. In the moral as in the physical sphere the
fundamental category would, on our present account, appear
to be that of energy. The particular physical object given
in judgment is a concrete realization, in the form of a par-
ticular means or instrument, of that general possibility of
attaining ends which the concept of a fixed fund of energy,
interpreted as a logical postulate or principle of inference,
expresses. The particular moral or economic act is a par-
ticular way in which the energy of the self may be increased

1 It would appear that the principle of the conservation of energy is valid only
in the physical sphere; but the logical significance of this limitation cannot be
here discussed.

Valuation as a Logical Pkocess 329

or diminished. In both spheres the reality presented in the
finished judgment is objective as being a stimulus to the
setting free of the energies for which it stands. Once
more, then, our answer to the objection we have been con-
sidering must be that the object as the permanent sub-
strate is merely an abstract symbol standing for the inde-
terminate means in general set over against the self. Cor-
responding to it we have, on the other side, the concept of
the "energetic" self — the self that is purposive in gen-
eral, expansive somehow or other.

The function of completed factual judgment in the
development of experience is, we have held, that of warrant-
ing to the agent the completed purpose which his judgment
of value expresses. This view calls for some further comment
and illustration in closing the present division. In the first
place the statement implies that the conditions which factual
judgment presents in the "final survey" as sanctioning the
purpose have not determined the purpose, since prior to the
determination of the purpose the conditions were not, and
could not be, so presented. The question, therefore, natur-
ally arises whether our meaning is that in the formation of
our purposes in valuation the recognition of existing con-
ditions plays no part. Our answer can be indicated only in
the barest outline as follows:

The agent must, of course, in an economic judgment-pro-
cess, recognize and take account of such facts as the tech-
nical adaptability of the means he is proposing to use to the
new purpose that is forming, as also of environing con-
ditions which may affect the success which he may meet
with in applying them. He must consider also his own
physical strength and qualities of mind with a view to this
same technical problem. And similarly in ethical valuation,
as we have seen, the psychology of the "empirical ego"

330 Studies in Logical Theoey

must play its part. But the conditions thus recognized are,
as we might seek to show more in detail, explainable as the
outcome of past factual judgment-processes, and on the
occasion of their original definition in the form in which
they now are known played the sanctioning part of which
we have so often spoken. They therefore correspond to the
agent's accepted practical ideals, so that the control which
his past experience exercises over his present conduct may
be stated equally well in either sort of terms — in terms of
his prevailing recognized standards, or in terms of his
present knowledge of the conditions which his new purpose
must respect. Thus, in general, the concept of a physical
order conditioning the conduct of all men and presented in a
definite body of socially current knowledge is the logical
correlate of the moral law conceived as a categorical imper-
ative prescribing certain types of conduct.

Thus the error of regarding the agent's conduct in a
present emergency as an outcome of existing determining
conditions is logically identical with the corresponding error
of the ethical theory of self-realization. The latter holds
the logical possibility of a determinate descriptive ideal
(already realized in the unchanging Absolute Self) which is
adequate to the solution of all possible ethical problems.
The former holds that all conduct must be subject to the
determining force of external conditions which, if not at
present completely known, are at least in theory knowable.
The physical universe in its original nebulous state con-
tained the "promise and potency" of all that has been in the
way of human conduct and of all that is to be. Into the
fixed mechanical system no new energy can enter and from
it none of the original fund of energy can be lost. This
mechanical theory of conduct is the essential basis of the
hedonistic theory of ethics; and it would not be difficult
to show that Green's criticism of this latter and his

Valuation as a Logical Pkooess 331

own affirmative theory of the moral ideal (as also the cur-
rent conventional criticism of hedonism in the same tenor
by the school of Green) are in a logical sense identical
with it. For the assumption that conduct is determined
by existing objective conditions is precisely the logical cor-
relate of the concept of a contentual and "realizable" ideal
moral self.'

We may now interpret, in the light of our general view
of the function of factual judgment, the concept of the
"empirical self" referred to in our discussion of the various
types of sanctioning condition which may enter into the
"final survey." The "empirical self" of psychological sci-
ence is a construction gradually put together by psycholo-
gist or introspective layman as an interpretation of the way
in which accepted concrete modes of conduct, in the deter-
mination of which standards have been operative, have
worked out in practice to the furtherance or impoverishment
of the "energetic" self. We have seen that the ambiguous
presented self which functions in the moral attitude of obe-
dience to authority or to conscience gives place in the atti-
tude of conscious valuation to apprehension of the "energetic"
self, on the one hand, and descriptive concepts of particular
types of conduct, on the other. The "empirical self" at the
same time makes its appearance as a constantly expanding
inventory of the "spiritual resources" which the "energetic"
self has at its disposal. These are the functions of the soul
which a functional psychology shows us in operation — powers
of attention, strength of memory, fertility in associative
recall, and the like — and these are the resources where-
with the "energetic" self may execute, and so exploit to its

1 That the assnmption mentioned is the essential basis of the twin theories of
associationism in psychology and hedonism in ethics is shown by Db. Waenee Fith
in his article, "The Associational Conception of Experience," Philosophical Bevieu),
Vol. IX, pp. 283 ff. Cf. Mb. Beadlbt's remarks on the logic of hedonism in his
Principles of Logic, pp. 244-9.

332 Studies in Logical Theoky

own furtherance, the purposes which, in particular emer-
gencies, new end and recognized standards may work out

in co-operation.'

In the foregoing pages we have consistently used the
expressions "ethical and economic judgment" and "judg-
ment of valuation" as synonymous. This may have seemed
to the reader something very like a begging of the question
from the outset, as taking for granted that very judgmental
character of our valuational experience which it was the
professed object of our discussion to establish. We are thus
called upon very briefly to consider, first of all, the relations
which subsist between the consciousness of value and the
process which we have described as that of valuation. This
will enable us, in the second place, to determine the logical
function which belongs to the consciousness of value in the
general economy of life. The consciousness of value is a
perfectly definite and distinctive psychical fact mediated by
a doubtless highly complex set of psychical or ultimately
physiological conditions. As such it admits of descriptive
analysis, and in a complete theory of value such descriptive
analysis should certainly find a place. It would doubtless

1 The " energetic " self is apparently Mr, Bkadley^s fourth " meaning of self,"
the self as monad — " something moving parallel with the life of a man, or, rather,
something not moving, but literally fiiaTwZinff in relation to his successive variety "
(Appearance and Reality [1st ed.] p. 86, in chap, ix, "The Meanings of the Self ")•
Mr. Bradley's difficulty appears to come from his desiring a psychological content for
what is essentially a logical conception — a confusion (if we may be permitted the
remark) which runs through the entire chapter to which we refer and is responsible
for the undeniable and hopeless incoherency of the various meanings of the self, as
Mr. Bradley therein expounds them. " If the monad stands aloof," says Mr. Bradley,
" either with no character at all or a private character apart, then it may be a fine
thing in itself, but it is a mere mockery to call it the self of a man " (p. 87). Surely
this is to misconstrue and then find fault with that very character of essential logical
apartness from any possibility of determination in point of descriptive psychological
content which constitutes the whole value of the " energetic " self as a logical con-
ception stimulative of the valuation -process and so inevitably of factual judgment.
See pp. 258, 259, above. The reader may find for himself in Mr. Bradley's enumera-
tion of meanings our concept of the empirical self. But surely the " energetic " and
empirical selves would appear on our showing to have no necessary conflict with
each other.

Valuation as a Logical Pkooess 333

throw much light upon the origin of valuation as a process,
and of valuing as an attitude, and admirably illustrate the
view of the function of the consciousness of value to which
a logical study of valuation as a process seems to lead us.
This problem in analysis belongs, however, to psychology,
and therefore lies apart from our present purpose ; nor is it
necessary to the establishment of our present view to under-
take it. It is necessary for our purpose only to suggest, for
purposes of identification, a brief description of the value-
consciousness, and to indicate its place in the process of
reflective thought.

The consciousness of value may best be described, by
way of first approximation, in the language of the Austrian
economists as a sense of the "importance" to oneself of a
commodity or defined moral purpose. It belongs to the
agent's attitude of survey or recapitulation which ensues
upon the completion of the judgment-process and is mediated
by attention to the ethical or economic object in its newly
defined character of specific conduciveness to the well-being
of the seK. The commodity, in virtue of its ascertained
physical properties, is adapted to certain modes of use or
consumption which, through valuation of the commodity,
have come to be accepted as desirable. The moral act
likewise has been approved by virtue of its having certain
definite sociological tendencies, or being conducive to the
welfare and happiness of a friend. Thus commodity or
moral act, as the case may be, has a determinate complexity
of meaning which has been judged as, in one sense, expan-
sive of the self, and the value-consciousness we may identify
as that sense of the valued object's importance which is
mediated by recognition of it as the bearer of this complexity
of concrete meaning. The meaning is, as we may say,
"condensed" or "compacted" into the object as given in
sense-perception, and because the meaning stands for ex-

334 Studies in Logical Theory

pansion of the self, the object in taking it up into itself
receives the character of importance as a valued object.

The sense of importance thus is expressive of an attitude
upon the agent's part. The concrete meanings which mate
up the content of the object's importance would inevitably,
if left to themselves, prompt overt action. The commodity
would forthwith be applied to its new use or the moral act
would be performed. The self would, as we may express it,
possess itself of the spiritual energies resident in the chosen
purpose. The attitude of survey, however, inhibits this action
of the self and the sense of importance is the resulting emo-
tional apprehension of the value of the object hereby brought
to recognition. Now, it should be carefully observed that the
particular concrete emotions appropriate to the details of
the valued purpose are not what we here intend. The pur-
pose may spring from some impulse of self-interest, hatred,
patriotism, or love, and the psychical material of its pres-
entation during the agent's survey will be the varied complex
of qualitative emotion that comes from inhibition of the
detailed activities which make up the purpose as a whole.
So also the apprehension of the physical object of economic
valuation is largely, if not altogether, emotional in its psychi-
cal constitution. Psychologically these emotions are the
purpose — they are the "stuff" of which the purpose as a
psychical fact occurring in time is made. But we must bear
in mind that it is not the purpose as a psychical fact that is
the object of the agent's valuing — any more than is the tool
with which one cuts perceived as a molecular mass or as an
aggregation of centers of ether-stress. As a cognized object of
value the purpose is, in our schematic terminology, a source of
energy for the increase of the self, and thus the conscious-
ness of value is the perfectly specific emotion arising from
restraint put upon the self in its movement of appropriation
of this energy. In contrast with the concrete emotions which

Valuation as a Logical Process 385

are the substance of the purpose as presented, the conscious-
ness of value may be called a "formal" emotion or the emotion
of a typical reflective attitude.

The valuing attitude we may then describe as that of
"resolution" on the part of the self to adhere to the finished
purpose which it now surveys, with a view to exploitation of
the purpose. The connection between the valuation -pro-
cess and the consciousness of value may be stated thus: The
valuation- process works out (and necessarily in cognitive,
objective terms) the purpose which is valued in the agent's
survey. But this development of the purpose is at the same
time determination of the "energetic" self to acceptance of
the purpose that shall be worked out. Thus the valuation-
process is the source of the consciousness of value in the
twofold way (1) of defining the object valued, and (2) of
determining the self to the attitude of resolution to adhere
to it and exploit it.' The consciousness of value is the appre-
hension of an object in its complete functional character as
a factor in experience.

The fumction of the consciousness of value must now be
very briefly considered. The phenomenon is a striking one,
and apparently, as the economists especially have insisted, of
much practical importance ia the conduct of life." And yet on
our account of the phenomenon, as it may appear, the prob-
lem of assigning to it a function must be, to say the least,
difficult. For the consciousness of value is, we have held,
emotional, and, on the conception of emotion in general which
we have taken for granted throughout our present discussion,
this mode of being conscious is merely a reflex of a state of
tension in activity. As such it merely reports in conscious-
ness a process of motor co-ordination already going on and in
the nature of the case can contribute nothing to the outcome.

1 In the first of these inseparable aspects valuation is determinative of Eight-
ness and Wrongness ; in the second it presents the object as Good or Bad. See p. 259,
above.

2 See, for example, WrESBE, Natural Value (Eng. trans.), p. 17.

336 Studies in Logical Theoet

Now if it were in a direct way as immediately felt emotion
that the consciousness of value must be functional if func-
tional at all, then the problem might well be given up; but
it would be a serious blunder to conceive the problem in
this strictly psychological way. A logical statement of the
problem would raise a different issue — not the question of
whether emotion as emotion can in any sense be functional
in experience, but whether the consciousness of value and
emotion in general may not receive reflective interpretation
and thereby, becoming objective, play a part as a factor in
subsequent valuation-processes. Indeed, the psychological
statement of the problem misses the entire point at issue
and leads directly to the wholly irrelevant general problem of
whether any mode of consciousness whatever can, as con-
sciousness, put forth energy and be a factor in controlling
conduct. The present problem is properly a logical one.
What is the agent's apprehension of the matter? In his
subsequent reflective processes of valuation does the con-
sciousness of value, which was a feature of the survey on a
past occasion, receive recognition in any way and so play a
part? This is simply a question of fact and clearly, as a
question relating to the logical content of the agent's re-
flective process, has no connection with or interest in the
problem of a possible dynamic efficacy of consciousness as
such. The question properly is logical, not psychological or
metaphysical.

Thus stated, then, the problem seems to admit of answer
— and along the line already suggested in our account of
economic valuation.' Recognition of the fact that the con-
sciousness of value was experienced in the survey of a certain
purpose on an earlier occasion confirms this purpose, holding
the means, in an economic situation, to their appointed use
and strengthening adherence to the standard in the ethical

1 See pp. 307-12 above.

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 337

case. This recognition serves as stimulus to a reproduction,
in memory, of the cognitive details of the earlier survey,
and so in the ideal case to a more or less complete and
recognizably adequate reinstatement of the earlier valuing
attitude, and so to a reinstatement of the consciousness of
value itself. The result is a strengthening of the established
valuation, a more efficacious control of the new end claiming
recognition, and an assured measure of continuity of ethical
development from the old valuation to the new. The function
thus assigned to the consciousness of value finds abundant
illustration elsewhere in the field of emotion. The stated
festivals of antiquity commemorative of regularly recurrent
phases of agricultural and pastoral life, as also the festivals
in observance of signal events in the private and political
life of the individual, would appear to find, more or less dis-
tinctly, here their explanation. These festivals must have
been prompted by a more or less conscious recognition of the
social value inherent in the important functions making up
the life of the community, and of the individual citizen as a
member of the community and as an individual. They
secured the end of a sustained and enhanced interest in
these normal functions by effecting, through a symbolic
reproduction of these, an intensified and glorified experience
of the emotional meaning normally and inherently belonging
to them.' In the same way the rites of the religious cults of
Greece, not to mention kindred phenomena so abundantly to
be found in lower civilizations as well as in our own, served
to fortify the individual in a certain consistent and salutary
course of institutional and private life.^

1 The illustration, as also the general principle which it here is used to illus-
trate, was suggested some years since by Professor Q. H, Mead in a lecture course on
the " History of Psychology," which the writer had the advantage of attending.

2 The conservative function of valuation may be further illustrated by reference
to the well-known principle of marginal utility of which we have already made men-
tion (p. 307 above), and which has played so great a part in modern economic
theory. The value of the unit quantity of a stock of any commodity is, according to

338 Studies in Logical Theory

It has been taken for granted throughout that there are
but two forms of valuation -process, the ethical and the eco-
nomic. The reason for this limitation may already be suffi-
ciently apparent, but it will further illustrate our general
conception of the valuation -process briefly to indicate it in
detail. What shall be said, for example, of the common use
of the term "value" in such expressions as the "value of
life," the "emotional value" of an object or a moral act, the
"natural value" of a type of impulsive activity? In these
uses of the word the reference is apparently to one's own
incommunicable inner experience of living, of perception of
the object, or of the impulse, which cannot be suggested to
any other person who has not himself had the experience.
My pleasure, my color-sensation in its affective aspect, my
emotion, are inner and subjective, and I distinguish them by
such expressions as the above from the visible, tangible object
to which I ascribe them as constituting its immediate or
natural value to me. This broader use of the term "value"
has not found recognition in the foregoing pages, and it
requires here a word of comment. So long as these phases
of the experience of the object are not recognized as separable
in thought from the object viewed as an external condition
or means, they would apparently be better characterized in
some other way. If, however, they are so recognized, and are
thereby taken as determinative of the agent's practical atti-
tude toward the thing, we have merely our typical situation
of ethical valuation of some implied purpose as conducive to
the self and economic valuation of the means as requisites for

this principle, measured by the least important single use in the schedule of uses to
-which the stock as a whole is to be applied. Manifestly, then, adherence to this
valuation placed upon the unit quantity is in so far conservative of the whole sched-
ule and the marginal value is a " short-hand " symbol expressive of the value of the
whole complex purpose presented in the schedule. Moreover, the increase of mar-
ginal value concurrently with diminution of the stock through consumption, loss,
or reapplication is not indicative so much of a change of purpose as of determina-
tion to adhere to so much ot the original program of consumption as may still be
possible of attainment with the depleted supply of the commodity.

Valuation as a Logical Peooess 839

execution of the purpose. Our general criterion for the pro-
priety of terming any mode of consciousneBS the value of an
object must be that it shall perform a logical function and
not simply be referred to in its aspect of psychical fact.
The feeling or emotion, or whatever the mode of conscious-
ness in question may be, must play the recognized part, in
the agent's survey of the situation, of prompting and sup-
porting a definite practical attitude with reference to the
object. ' If, in short, the experience in question enters in
any way into a conscious purpose of the agent, it may properly
be termed a value.*

JEsthetio value also has not been recognized, and for the
opposite reason. The sense of beauty would appear to be a
correlate of relatively perfect attained adjustment between
the agent and his natural environment or the conditions sug-
gested more or less impressively by the work of art. There
must, indeed, be present in the sesthetic experience an element
of unsatisfied curiosity sufficient to stimulate an interest in
the changing or diverse aspects of the beautiful object, but
this must not be sufficient to prompt reflective judgment of
the details presented. On the whole, the aesthetic experience
would appear to be essentially post-judgmental and appre-
ciative. It comes on the particular occasion, not as the
^result of a judgment-process of the valuational type, but as an
immediate appreciation. As an immediate appreciation it
has no logical function and on our principles must be denied
the name of value. Our standpoint must be that of the
experiencing individual. The aesthetic experience as a type
may well be a development out of the artistic and so find

1 Thus except on this condition we should deny the propriety of speaking of the
value of a friend or of a memento or sacred relic. The purpose of accurate definition
of the function of such objects as these in the attainment of one's ends is foreign to
the proper attitude of loving, prizing, or venerating them. We may ethically value
the act of sacrifice for a friend or of solicitous care of the memento,but the object of
our sacrifice or solicitude has simply the direct or immediate "qualitative " emotional
character appropriate to the kinds of activity to which it is the adequate stimulus.

340 Studies in Logical Theobt

its ultimate explanation in the psychology of man's
primitive technological occupations in the ordinary course of
life. It is, as we have said, of the post -judgmental type,
and so may very probably be but the cumulative outcome
of closer and closer approximations along certain lines to a
perfected adjustment with the conditions of life. It may
thus have its origin in past processes of the reflective valua-
tional type. Nevertheless, viewed in the light of its actual
present character and status in experience, the aesthetic must
be excluded from the sphere of values.

Thus the realms of fact and value are both real, but that
of value is logically prior and so the "more real." The
realm of fact is that of conditions warranting the purposes of
the self; as a separate order, complete and absolute in
itself, it is an abstraction that has forgotten the reason for
which it was made. Reality in the logical sense is that
which furthers the development of the self. The purpose
that falls short of its promise in this regard is unreal — not,
indeed, in the psychological sense that it never existed in
imagination, but in the logical sense that it is no longer
valued. Within the inclusive realm of reality the realm of
fact is that of the means which serve the concrete purposes
which the self accepts. The completed purpose, however,*
is not means, since still behind and beyond it there can be
no other concrete valued purpose which it can serve. Nor
is it an ultimate end, since in its character of accepted and
valued end the self adheres to it, and it therefore cannot
express the whole purpose of the self to whose unspecifiable
fulness and increase of activity it is but a temporary proba-
tional contributor. It is rather in the nature of a for-
mula or method of behavior to which the self ascribes reality
by recognizing and accepting it as its own.

SOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF PURPOSE
INTEODUOTOEY

Wheneveb and wherever it was discovered that the con-
tent of experience as given in immediate perception could
be reconstructed through ideas, then and there began to
emerge such questions as these: What is the significance of
this reconstructive power ? What is the relation between it
and the immediate experience ? What is the relative value
of each in experience as a whole ? What is their relation to
truth and error? If thinking leads to truth, and thought
must yet get its material from perception, how then shall
the product of thought escape infection from the material?
On the other hand, if truth is to be found in the immediate
experience, can it here be preserved from the blighting effects
of thought ? For so insistent and pervasive is this activity of
thought that it appears to penetrate into the sanctum of
perception itself. Turning to a third possibility, if it
should be found that truth and error are concerned with
both — that they are products of the combined activity of
perception and reflection — then just what does each do?
And what in their operations marks the difference between
truth and error ? Or still again, if truth and error cannot
be found in the operations of perception and reflection as
such, then they must be located in the relation of these
processes to something else. If so, what is this something
else? Out of such questions as these is logic born.

There may be those who will object to some of these
questions as "logical" problems — those who would limit

341

342 Studies in Logical Theory

logic to a description of the forms and processes of recon-
struction, relegating the question of the criterion of truth
and error to "epistemology." This objection we must here
dismiss summarily by saying that, by whatever name it is
called, a treatment of the forms and processes of thought
must deal with the criterion of truth and error, since these
different " forms " are just those which thought assumes in
attempting to reach truth under different conditions.

Certainly in the beginning the Greeks regarded their
newly discovered power of thought as anything but formal.
Indeed, it soon became so "substantial " that it was regarded
as simply a new world of fact, of existence alongside of, or
rather above, the world of perception. But Socrates hailed
ideas as deliverers from the contradictions and paradoxes
into which experience interpreted in terms of immediate
sense-perception had fallen. In the concept Socrates
found a solution for the then pressing problems of social life.
The Socratic universal is not a mere empty form which
thought imposes upon the world. It is something which
thought creates in order that a life of social interaction and
reciprocity may go on. This need not mean that the Greeks
were reflectively conscious of this, but that this was the way
the concept was actually used and developed by Socrates.

In attempting to formulate the relation between this new
world of ideas and immediate sense-experience, Plato con-
structed his scheme of substantiation and participation. The
Platonic doctrine of substantiation and participation is an
expression of the conviction that anything so valuable as
Socrates had shown ideas to be could not be merely formal
or unreal. Up to the discovery of these ideas reality lay
in the "substances" of perception. Hence in order to have
that reality to which their worth, their value in life, entitled
them, the ideas must be substantiated.

This introduction of the newly discovered ideas into the
world of substances and reality wrought, of course, a change

Some Logical Aspects of Pueposb 343

in the conception of the latter — a change which has well-
nigh dominated the entire philosophic development ever
since. Let ns recall that the aim of Socrates was to find
something that would prevent society from going to pieces
under the influence of the disintegrating conception of ex-
perience as a mere flux of given immediate content. Now,
in the concepts Socrates discovered the basis for just this
much-needed wholeness and stability. Moreover, the fact
that unity and stability were the actual social needs of the
hour led not only to the concepts which furnished them
being conceived as substantial and real, but to their being
regarded as a higher type of reality, as "more real" than the
given, immediate experiences of perception. They were
higher and more real because, just then, they answered the
pressing social need.

The ideas supplied this unity because they furnished
ends, purposes, to the given material of perception. The
given is now given for something; for something more,
too, than mere contemplation. Socrates also showed, by
the most acute analysis, that the content of these ends,
these purposes, was social through and through.

From the ethical standpoint this teleological character of
the idea is clearly recognized. But as "real," the ideas must
be stated in the metaphysical terms of substance and attri-
bute. Here the social need is abstracted from and lost to
sight. The fundamental attributes of the ideas are now a
metaphysical unity and stability. Hence unity and stability,
wholeness and completeness, are the very essence of reality,
while multiplicity and change constitute the nature of appear-
ance. Thus does Plato's reality become, as Windelband says,
"an immaterial eleaticism which seeks true being in the
ideas without troubling itself about the world of generation
and occurrence which it leaves to perception and opinion."'

Now it is the momentum of this conception of reality as

i History of Philosophy (Turi's translation), p. 117.

344 Studies in Logical Theoet

a stable and complete system of absolute ideas, the develop-
ment of which we have just roughly sketched, that is so
important historically. Why this conception of reality,
which apparently grew out of a particular historical situa-
tion, should have dominated philosophic theory for over two
thousand years appears at first somewhat puzzling. Those
who still hold and defend it will of course say that this sur-
vival is evidence of its validity. But, after all, our human
world may be yet very young. It may be that "a thousand
years are but as yesterday." At any rate philosophy has
never been in a hurry to reconstruct conceptions which
served their day and generation with such distinction as did
the Platonic conception of reality. And this is true to the
evolutionary instinct that experience has only its own prod-
ucts as material for further construction. On the other
hand, the principle of evolution with equal force demands
that only as material, not as final forms of experience, shall
these products continue. It may be that philosophy has
not yet taken the conception of evolution quite seriously.
At all events it is certain that long after it has been found
that, instead of being eternal and complete, the concept
undergoes change, that it has simply the stability and whole-
ness demanded by a particular and concrete situation; after
it has been discovered, in other words, that the stability and
wholeness, instead of attaching to the content of an idea, are
simply the functions of any content used as a purpose —
after all this has been accepted in psychology, the concep-
tion of truth and reality which arose under an entirely
different conception of the nature of thought still survives.
This change in the conception of the character of the
ideas, with no corresponding change in the conception of
reality, marks the divorce of thought and reality and the
rise of the epistemological problem. Let us recall that
in Plato the relation between the higher and ultimate

Some Logical Aspects of Puepose 345

reality, as constituted by the complete and " Eternal Ideas,"
and the lower reality of perception, is that of arche-
type and ectype. Perceptions attempt to imitate and copy
the ideas. Now, when the ideas are found to be changing,
and when further the interpenetration of perception and con-
ception is discovered, reality as fixed and complete must be
located elsewhere. And just as in the old system it was the
business of perception to imitate the "Eternal Ideas," so here
it is still assumed that thought is to imitate the reality wher-
ever now it is to be located. And as regards the matter of
location, the old conception is not abandoned. The elder
Plato is mighty yet. Reality must still be a completed
system of fixed and eternal "things in themselves," "rela-
tions," or "noumena" of some sort which our ideas, now
constituted by both perception and conceptional processes,
are still to "imitate," "copy," "reflect," "represent," or at
least "symbolize" in some fashion.

From this point on, then, thought has two functions: one,
to help experience meet and reorganize into itself the results
of its own past activity; the other, to reflect or represent in
some sense the absolute system of reality. For a very long
time the latter has continued to constitute the logical prob-
lem, the former being relegated to the realm of psychology.

But this discovery of the reconstructive function of the
idea and its assignment to the jurisdiction of psychology did
not leave logic where it was before, nor did it lighten its
task. Logic could not shut its eyes to this "psychological"
character of the idea.' Indeed, logic had to take the idea
as psychology described it, then do the best it could with it
for its purpose.

The embarrassment of logic by this reconstructive char-

1 Cf. Pbofessob J. E. Angell's article, "Eelations of Structural and Functional
Psychology to Philosophy," Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago^
Vol. Ill, pp. 10-12; also Philosophical Review, Vol. XII, No. 3. Cf. also Mb. Schil-
leb's essay on "Axioms as Postulates" in Personal Idealism.

346 Studies in Logical Theory

acter of the idea even Aristotle discovered to some extent in
the relation of the Platonic perceptions to the eternal ideas.
He found great difficulty in getting a flowing stream of con-
sciousness to imitate or even symbolize an eternally fixed
and completed reality. And since we have discovered, in
addition, that the idea is so palpably a reconstructive activ-
ity, the difficulties have not diminished.

In such a situation it could only be a question of time
until solutions of the problem should be sought by attempt-
ing to bring together these two functions of the idea. Per-
haps after all the representation of objects in an absolute
system is involved in the reconstruction of our experience.
Or perhaps what appears as reconstructions of our experi-
ence — as desiring, struggling, deliberating, choosing, will-
ing, as sorrows and joys, failures and triumphs — are but
the machinery by which the absolute system is repre-
sented. At any rate, these two functions surely cannot be
regarded as belonging to the idea as color and form belong
to a stone. We should never be satisfied with such a brute
dualism as this.

Without any further historical sketch of attempts at this
synthesis, I desire to pass at once to a consideration of
what I am sure everyone will agree must stand as one of
the most brilliant and in every way notable efforts in this
direction — Mr. Royce's Aberdeen lectures on "The World
and the Individual." It is the purpose here to examine
that part of these lectures, and it is the heart of the whole
matter, in which the key to the solution of the problem
of the relation between ideas and reality is sought precisely
in the purposive character of the idea. This will be found
especially in the "Introduction" and in the chapter on
"Internal and External Meaning of Ideas." '

1 From this point on this paper is an expansion of some paragraphs, pp. 11-13, in
an article on " Existence, Meaning, and Reality," printed from Vol. Ill of the First
Series of the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago.

Some Logical Aspects of Puepose 347

i. the purposive ohabactee op ideas

With his unerring sense for fundamentals, Mr. Eoyce
begins by telling us that the first thing called for by the
problem of the relation of ideas to reality is a discussion of
the nature of ideas. Here Mr. Eoyce says he shall "be
guided by certain psychological analyses of the mere con-
tents of our consciousness, which have become prominent in
recent discussion." '

Your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere imagery
of the thing, but always involve a conscioxisness of how you pro-
pose to act toward the thing of which you have ideas Com-
plex scientific ideas viewed as to their conscious significance are, as
Professor Stout has well said, plans of action, ways of constructing

the object of your scientific consciousness By the word idea,

then, as we shall use it, when, after having criticised opposing
theory, we come to state in these lectiu'es our own thesis, I shall
mean in the end any state of consciousness, whether simple or
complex, which when present is then and there viewed as at least
a partial expression, or embodiment of a single conscious purpose.
.... In brief, an idea in my present definition may, and in fact
always does, if you please, appear to be representative of a fact
existent beyond itself. But the primary character which makes it
an idea is not its representative character, is not its vicarious
assumption of the responsibility of standing for a being beyond
itself, but is its inner character as relatively fulfilling the purpose,
that is as presenting the partial fulfilment of the purpose which is
in the consciousness of the moment wherein the idea takes place.^
.... Now this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present con-
scious embodiment in the contents, and in the form of the complex
state called the idea, constitutes what I shall hereafter call the
internal meaning of the idea.' .... But ideas often seem to have
a meaning; yes, as one must add, finite ideas always undertake
or appear to have a meaning that is not exhausted by this con-
scious internal meaning presented and relatively fulfilled at the
moment when the idea is there for our finite view. The melody
sung, the artists' idea, the thought of your absent friend, a thought
on which you love to dwell, all these not merely have their obvious

JP, 22. 2Pp. 22, 23; italics mine. 3 P. 25.

348 Studies in Logical Theoey

internal meaning as meeting a conscious purpose by their very
presencej but also they at least appear to have that other sort of
meaning, that reference beyond themselves to objects, that cogni-
tive relation to outer facts, that attempted correspondence with
outer facts, which many accounts of our ideas regard as their pri-
mary inexplicable and ultimate character. I call this second, and
for me still problematic, and derived aspect of the nature of ideas,
their apparently external meaning.'

From all this it is quite evident that Mr. Royce accepts
and welcomes the results of the work of modern psychology
on the nature of the idea. The difficulty will come in
making the connection between these accepted results and
the Platonic conception of ultimate reality as stated in the
following :

To be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal
meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas. A system, more-
over, which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or
purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary.^

It may be well to note here in passing that, notwith-
standing the avowed subordination here of the representative
to the reconstructive character of the ideas, the former
becomes very important in the chapter on the relation of
internal to external meaning, where the problem of truth
and error is considered.

In this account of the two meanings of the idea, which I
have tried to state as nearly as possible in the author's own
words, there appear some conceptions of idea, of purpose,
and of their relation to each other, that play an important
part in the further treatment and in determining the final
outcome. In the description of the internal meaning there
appear to be two quite different conceptions of the relation
of idea to purpose. One regards the idea as itself consti-
tuting the purpose or plan of action ; the other describes the
idea as "the partial fulfilment" of the purpose. (1) "Complex

> P. 26. 2 p. 36 ; italics mine.

Some Logical Aspects of Pukpose 349

scientific ideas, viewed as to their conscious significance, are,
as Professor Stout has well said, plans of action." (2) "You
sing to yourself a melody ; you are then and there conscious
that the melody, as you hear yourself singing it, partially
fulfils and embodies a purpose.'" When we come to the
problem of the relation between the internal and external
meaning, we shall find that the idea as internal meaning
comes into a third relation to purpose, viz., that of having
the further purpose to agree or correspond to the external
meaning. "Is the correspondence reached between idea and
object the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended ?

If it is, the idea is true Thus it is not mere

agreement, but intended agreement, that constitutes truth.""
Thus the idea is (1) the purpose, (2) the partial fulfilment
of the purpose, and (3) has a further purpose — to correspond
to an object in the " absolute system of ideas."

The fir^t statement of the internal meaning as constitut-
ing the plan or purpose is, I take it, the conception of the
internal meaning as an ideal construction which gives a work-
ing form, a definition to the " indefinite sort of restlessness " and
blind feeling of dissatisfaction out of which the need of and
demand for thought arises.' This accords with the scientific
conception of the idea as a working hypothesis. If this
interpretation of idea were steadily followed throughout, it is
difficult to see how it could fail to lead to a conception of
reality quite different from that described as "a certain
absolute system of ideas."

The second definition of internal meaning is the one in
which it is stated as the "partial expression," "embodiment,"
and "fulfilment" of a single conscious purpose, and in which
subsequently and consequently the idea is identified with
"any conscious act," for example, singing. The first part of
the statement appears to say that the idea of a melody is in

iPp. 22, 23; itaUosmine. 2 P. 307. 3 P. 327.

350 Studies in Logical Theoky

"partial fulfilment" of the idea regarded as the purpose to
sing the melody. But, as the first statement of internal
meaning implies, how can one have a purpose to sing the
melody except in and through the idea ? It is precisely the
construction of an idea that transforms the vague "indefinite
restlessness" and dissatisfaction into a purpose. The idea is
the defining, the sharpening of the blind activity of mere
sensation, mere want, into a plan of action.

However, Mr. Royce meets this difficulty at once by the
statement that the term "idea" here not only covers the
activity involved in forming the idea, e. g., the idea of sing-
ing, but includes the action of singing, which fulfils this
purpose. "In the same sense any conscious act at the
moment when you perform it not merely expresses, but is,
in my present sense, an idea."'

But this sort of an adjustment between the idea as the
purpose and as the fulfilment of the purpose raises a new
question. What here becomes of the distinction between
immediate and mediating experience? Surely there is a
pretty discernible difference between experience as a pur-
posive idea and the experience which fulfils this purpose.
To call them both "ideas" is at least confusing, and indeed
it appears that it is just this confusion that obscures the
fundamental difficulty in dealing, later on, with the problem
of truth and error. To be sure, the very formation of the
idea as the purpose, the "plan of action," is the beginning
of the relief from the "indefinite restlessness." On the
other hand, it defines and sharpens the dissatisfaction.
When this vague unrest takes the form of a purpose to
attain food or shelter, or to sing in tune, it is of course the
first step toward solution. But this very definition of the
dissatisfaction intensifies it. The idea as purpose, then,
instead of being the fulfilment, appears to be the plan, the

IP. 23: italics mine.

Some Logical Aspects of Poepose 351

method of fulfilment. The fulfilling experience is the
further experience to which the idea points and leads.

To follow a little farther this relation between the pur-
posive and fulfilling aspects of experience, it is of course
apparent that the idea as the purpose, the "plan of action,"
must as a function go over into the fulfilling experience.
My purpose to sing the melody must remain, in so far as the
action is a conscious one, until the melody is sung. I say
"as a function," for the specific content of this purpose is
continuously changing. The purpose is certainly not the
same in content after half the melody has been sung as it is
at the beginning. This means that the purpose is being
progressively fulfilled; and as part of the purpose is ful-
filled each moment, so a part of the original content of the
idea drops out; and when the fulfilling process of this par-
ticular purpose is complete, or is suspended — for, in Mr.
Royce's view, it never is complete in human experience —
that purpose then gives way to some other, perhaps one
growing out of it, but still one regarded as another. A
purpose realized, fulfilled, cannot persist as a purpose. We
may desire to repeat the experience in memory; i. e.,
instead of singing aloud, simply, as Mr. Koyce says, "silently
recall and listen to its imagined presence." But here we
must remember that the memory experience, as such, is not
an idea in the logical sense at all. It is an immediate experi-
ence that is fulfilling the idea of the song which constitutes
the purpose to recall it, just as truly as the singing aloud
fulfils the idea of singing aloud. Shouting, whistling, or
"listening in memory to the silent notes" may all be equally
immediate, fulfilling experiences. Doubtless the idea as
purpose involves memory, as Mr. Royce says.' But it is a
memory used as a purpose, and it is just this use of the
memory material as a purpose that makes it a logical idea.

»(y. p. 34; also p. 22.

352 Studies in Logical Theoet

In its content the purposive idea is just as immediate and as
mechanical as any other part of experience. "Psychology
explains the presence and the partial present efficacy of
this purpose by the laws of motor processes, of habit, or of
what is often called association." " Here " idea," however,
simply means, as Mr. Royce takes it in his second state-
ment, conscious content of any sort. But this is not the
meaning of "idea" in the logical sense. The logical
idea is a conscious content used as an organizer, as "a
plan of action," to get other contents. If, for example,
in the course of writing a paper one wishes to recall an
abstract distinction, as the distinction dawns in conscious-
ness, it is not an idea in the logical sense. It is just
as truly an immediate fulfilling experience as is a good
golf stroke. So in the mathematician's most abstruse pro-
cesses, which Mr. Royce so admirably portrays, the
results for which he watches "as empirically as the astrono-
mer alone with his star" are not ideas in the logical sense;
they are immediate, fulfilling experiences.^ The distinction
between the idea as the mediating experience — that is, the
logical idea — and the immediate fulfilling experience is
therefore not one of content, but of use.

There is a sense, however, in which the idea as a purpose
can be taken as the partial fulfilment of another purpose ; in
the sense that any purpose is the outgrowth of activity involv-
ing previous purposes. This becomes evident , when we
inquire into the "indefinite restlessness" and dissatisfaction
out of which the idea as purpose springs. Dissatisfaction
presupposes some activity already going on in attempted ful-

1 p. 35.

2 This warns us that in the phrase, " a plan of action," the term " action " must
be more inclusive than it is in much current discussion. It must not be limited to
gymnastic performance. It must apply to any sort of activity planned for, and
which, when it arrives, fulfils the plan. This, I take it, is the Import of the para-
graph at the top of p. 7 of Pbofbssob Jaiibb's Philosophical Conceptions and Prctcti-
cat Results.

Some Logical Aspects of Purpose 353

filment of some previous purpose. If one is dissatisfied with
his singing, or with not.singing, it is because one has already
purposed to participate in the performance of a company of
people which now he finds singing a certain melody, or one
has rashly contracted to entertain a strenuous infant who
is vociferously demanding his favorite ditty. This is
only saying that any given dissatisfaction and the purpose
to which it gives rise grow out of activity involving previous
purposing. But this does not do away with the distinction
between the idea as a purpose and the immediate fulfilling
experience.

If the discussion appears at this point to be growing
somewhat captious, let us pass to a consideration of the
relation between internal and external meanings, where
the problem of truth and error appears, and where the vital
import of these distinctions becomes more obvious.

II. PURPOSE AND THE JUDGMENT

Mr. Royce begins with the traditional definition of truth,
which he then proceeds to reinterpret:

Truth is very frequently defined in terms of external meaning

as that about which we judge In the second place, truth has

been defined as the correspondence between our ideas and their
objects,^ .... When we undertake to express the objective
validity of any truth, we use judgment. These judgments, if sub-
jectively regarded, that is, if viewed merely as processes of our own
present thinking, whose objects are external to themselves, involve
in all their more complex forms, combinations of ideas, devices
whereby we weave already present ideas into more manifold
structure, thereby enriching om: internal meaning; but the act of
judgment has always its other, its objective aspect. The ideas

when we judge are also to possess external meaning It is

true, as Mr. Bradley has well said, that the intended subject of
every judgment is reality itself. The ideas that we combine when
we judge about external meanings are to have value for us as truth

IP.270.

354 Studies in Logical Theory

only in so far as they not only possess internal meaning, but also
imitate, by their structure, what is at once other than themselves,
and, in significance, something above themselves. That, at least,
is the natural view of our consciousness, just in so far as, in
judging, we conceive our thought as essentially other than its
external object, and as destined merely to correspond thereto.
Now we have by this time come to feel how hard it is to define the
Reality to which our ideas are thus to conform, and about which
our judgments are said to be made, so long as we thus sunder
external and internal meanings.'

The universal judgment. — The problem is, then, to
discover just the nature and ground of this relation between
the internal and external meaning, between the idea and its
object. This relation is established in the act of judgment.
Taking first the universal judgment, we find here that the
internal meaning has at best only a negative relation to the
external meaning.

To say that all A is B is in fact merely to assert that the real
world contains no objects that are A, but that fail to be of the class
B. To say that no A is B is to assert that the real world contains
no objects that are at once A and B.^

The universal judgments then "tell us indirectly w'hat is
in the realm of external meaning; but only by first telling
us what is not."'

However, these universal judgments have after all a
positive value in the realm of internal meaning; that is, as
mere thought.

This negative character of the universal judgments holds true
of them, as we have just said, just in so far as you sunder the
external and internal meaning, and just in so far as you view the
real as the beyond, and as the merely beyond. If you txim your
attention once more to the realm of ideas, viewed as internal mean-
ing, you see, indeed, that they are constantly becoming enriched in
their inner life by all this process. To know by inner demonstra-
tion that 2+2 = 4 and that this is necessarily so, is not yet to

I Pp. 270, 271. 2 p. 276. 3 P. 277.

Some Logical Aspects op Puepose 355

know that the external world, taken merely as the Beyond, contains
any true or finally valid variety of objects at all, any two or four

objects that can be counted On the other hand, so far as

your internal meaning goes, to have experienced within that which
' makes you call this judgment necessary, is indeed to have observed
a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to you very
positive.'

This passage deserves especial attention. In the light of
Kant, and in view of Mr. Royce's general definition of the
judgment as the reference of internal to external meanings,
one is puzzled to find that for the mathematician the positive
value of the judgment "two and two are four" is confined
to the realm of internal meaning. To be sure, Mr. Koyce
says that this limitation of the positive value of the uni-
versal judgment to the world of internal meaning occurs
only when the external and internal meaning are sundered.
But the point is : Does the mathematician or anyone else
ever so sunder as to regard the judgment " two and two are
four" as of positive value only as internal meaning?
Indeed, in another connection Mr. Royce himself shows
most clearly that mathematical results are as objective and
as empirical as the astronomer's star.'' Nor would it appear
competent for anyone to say here: "Of course, they are not
internal meanings after we come to see, through the kind
offices of the epistemologist, that the internal meanings are
valid of the external world." We are insisting that they
are never taken by the mathematician and scientists at
first as merely internal meaning whose external meaning
is then to be established. Surely the mathematical judg-
ment, or any other, does not require an epistemological
midwife to effect the passage from internal to external
meaning. The external meaning is there all the while
in the form of the diagrams and motor tensions and
images with which the mathematician works. The difficulty

1 Pp. 280, 281. 2Seep.256.

356 Studies in Logical Theoby

here again seems to be that the distinction above discussed
between the idea in the logical sense, as purpose, and the
immediate fulfilling experience is lost sight of. The rela-
tion between two and four is not first discovered as a merely
internal meaning. It is discovered in the process of ful-
filling some purpose involving the working out of this
relation. So the sum of the angles of a triangle is not
discovered as a mere internal meaning whose external
meaning is then to be found. It is found in working with
the triangle. It is discovered in the triangle. And, once
more, it matters not if the triangle here is a mere memory
image. In relation to the purpose, to the logical idea, it is
as truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk marks.
The streams of motor, etc., images that flow spontaneously
under the stimulus of the purpose are just as immediate
fulfilling experiences as the manipulation of sticks or chalk
lines.

The difficulty in keeping the universal judgment, as a
judgment, in terms of merely internal meaning may be seen
from the following:

As to these two types of judgments, the universal and the par-
ticular, they both, as we have seen, make use of experience. The
imiversal judgments arise in the realm where experience and idea
have already fused into one whole; and this is precisely the realm
of internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the con-
sequences of one's construction. But the construction is at once

an experience of fact and an idea Upon the basis of such

ideal constructions one makes universal judgments. These in a
fashion still to us, at this stage, mysterious, xindertake to be valid
of that other world — the world of external meaning.'

One is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by
the fusion "of experience and idea." We must infer that it
means the fusion of some aspect of experience which can be
set over against idea, and this has always. meant the external

I p. 289 ; italics mine.

Some Logical Aspects of Purpose 357

meaning, and this interpretation seems further warranted,
by the statement immediately following which describes the
fusion as one "olfact and idea." The situation then seems
to be this: An internal and an external meaning, a fact and
an idea, "fuse into one whole" and thus constitute that
which is yet "precisely the realm of internal meanings,"
which aims to be valid of still another world of external
meanings. And this waives the question of how experience
fused into one whole can be an internal meaning, since as
such it must be in opposition and reference to an external
meaning; or conversely, how experience can be at once fact
and idea and still be "fused into one whole."

Nor does the difficulty disappear when we turn to
the aspects of universality and necessity. What is the
significance and basis of universality and necessity as con-
fined merely to the realm of internal meaning ?

So far as your internal meaning goes, to have experienced
within that which makes you call this judgment necessary is,
indeed, to have observed a character about your own ideas which
rightly seems to you very positive.'

But what is it that we "experience within" which makes
us call this judgment necessary ? In the discussion of the
relation of the universal judgment to the disjunctive judg-
ment, through which the former is shown to get even its
negative force, there is an interesting statement:

One who inquires into a matter upon which he believes himself
able to decide in universal terms, e.g., in mathematics, has present
to his mind, at the outset, questions such as admit of alternative
answers. "A," he declares, "in case it exists at all, is either B or
C." Further research shows imiversally, perhaps, that No A is B.

The last sentence is the statement referred to. What is
meant by "further research shows universally, perhaps, that
No A is B" ? What kind of " research," internal or external,

1 p. 281 : italics mine.

358 Studies in Logical Theoey

can show this ? In short, there appears to be as much
difficulty with universality and necessity in the realm of
internal meaning as in the reference of internal to external
meaning. '

Instead, however, of discussing this point, Mr. Koyce
pursues the problem of the relation of the external and
internal meaning, and finds that regarded as sundered there
is no basis so far for even the negative universality and
necessity in the reference of the internal meaning to the
external.

For at this point arises the ancient question, How can you know
at all that your judgment is universally valid, even in this ideal
and negative way, about that external realm of validity, in so
far as it is external, and is merely your Other, — the Beyond ? Must
you not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your
negations ? This judgment is indeed positive. But how do you
prove it ? The only answer has to be in terms which already sug-
gest how vain is the very sundering in question. If you can pre-
determine, even if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the
object, the object then cannot be merely foreign to you. It must
be somewhat predetermined by your Meaning.^

But in the universal judgment this determination, as referred
to the external meaning, is only negative.

The particular judgment. — It is then through the par-
ticular judgment that the universal judgment is to get any
positive value in its reference to the external meaning.

As has been repeatedly pointed out in the discussions on recent
Logic, the particular judgments — whose form is Some A is B, or
Some A is not B — are the typical judgments that positively assert
Being in the object viewed as external. This fact constitutes their
essential contrast with the universal judgments. They imdertake
to cross the chasm that is said to sunder internal and external
meanings ; and the means by which they do so is always what is
called " external experience."

1 It is worth noting in passing that here the universal appears to be located in
finite experience, while the ground of the particular is in the absolute.

2 P. 282.

Some Logical Aspects op Pubposb 359

It is now high time to ask why the internal meaning
seeks this external meaning. Why does it seek an object?
Why does it want to cross the chasm? In other words,
what is the significance of the demand for the particular
judgment? In the introduction we have been told, as a
matter of description, that the internal meanings do seek
the external meaning, but why do they? We have also
been told that universal judgments "develop and enrich
the realm of internal meaning." Why, then, should there
be a demand for the external meaning, for a further object?
The answer is:

We have oxa internal meanings. We develop them in inner
experience. There they get presented as something of imiversal
value, but always in fragments. They, therefore, so far dissatisfy.
We conceive of the Other wherein these meanings shall get some
sort of final fulfilment.*

It is, then, the incomplete and fragmentary character of
the internal meaning that demands the particular judgment.
The particular judgment is to further complete and deter-
mine the incomplete and indeterminate internal meaning.
And yet no sooner is this particular judgment made than
we are told that "it is a form at once positive, and very
unsatisfactorily indeterminate." Again :^

The judgments of experience, the particiilar -judgments, express
a positive but still imperfect determination of internal meaning
through external experience. The limit or goal of this process
would be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its
own final determination.'

Apparently, then, the particular judgment to which the
internal meaning appeals for completion and determination
only succeeds in increasing the fragmentary and indetermi-
nate character.

This brings us to another "previous question." Just

1 p. 284 ; italics mine. 2 P. 283. 3 p. 332.

360 Studies in Logical Theoey

what are we to understand by this "fragmentary" and
"indeterminate" character of the internal meaning? In
what sense, with reference to what, is it incomplete and
fragmentary ? Later we shall be told that it is with refer-
ence to "its own final and completely individual expressioii."
This is to be reached in the individual judgment. And if
we ask what is meant by this final, complete, and individual
expression — which, by the way, no human being can
experience — we read, wondering all the while how it can be
known, that it is simply " the expression that seeks no other,"
that "is satisfied," that "is conclusive of the search for per-
fection."' Waiving for the present questions concerning
the basis of this satisfaction and perfection, all this leaves
unanswered our query concerning the other end of the
matter, viz., the meaning and criterion of the fragmentary
and indeterminate character of these internal meanings.

If we here return to the first definition of internal mean-
ing of the idea as a purpose in the sense of "a plan of
action," such as " singing in tune," or getting the properties
of a geometrical figure, it does not seem difficult to find a
basis and meaning for this fragmentary and indeterminate
character. First we may note in a general way that it is of
the very essence of a plan or purpose to lead on to a fulfill-
ing experience such as singing in tune, or reaching a mathe-
matical equation. But here this fulfilling experience to
which the plan points is not a mere working out of detail
inside the plan itself, although, indeed, this does take place.
If this were all the fulfilling experience meant, it is difficult
to see how we should escape subjective idealism.^ We start
with a relatively indeterminate idea and end with a more
determinate idea, though, indeed, there is yet no criterion
for this increased determination. To be sure, the idea as a

IP. 339.

2 This ghost of subjectivism haunts the entire part of the essay in which the
final fuliilment of finite ideas is found in '* a certain absolute system of ideas."

Some Logical Aspects of Pukpose 361

plan of action, as has already been stated, does undergo
change and does become, if you please, more definite and
complete as a plan; but this does not constitute its fulfil-
ment. Its fulfilment surely is to be found in the immediaite
experiences of singing, etc., to which the idea points and
leads.

The fragmentary and incomplete character of the internal
meaning as a plan of action does not, then, after all, so much
describe the plan itself as it does the general condition of ex-
perience out of which the idea arises. Experience takes on the
form of a plan, of an idea, precisely because it has fallen apart,
has become "fragmentary." It is just the business of the
internal meaning, as Mr. Royce so well shows, to form a
plan, an ideal, an hypothetical synthesis that shall stimulate
an activity, which shall satisfactorily heal the breach.
"Fragmentary" is a quality, then, that belongs, not to the
idea in itself considered, but to the general condition of
experience, of which the idea as a plan is an expression.

If, now, the fragmentary character of the internal mean-
ing is determined simply with relation to the fulfilling
experiences, such 'as singing in tune, adjustments of geo-
metrical figures, etc., to which it points and leads, it seems
as if the completion of the internal meaning must be defined
in the same terms. And this would appear to open a pretty
straight path to the redefinition of truth and error.

III. THE CEITEEION OP TEUTH AND BEEOB

At the outset, truth was defined as the "correspondence"
or "agreement" of an idea with its object. But we have
seen that correspondence or agreement with an object
means the completion and determination of the idea itself,
and since the idea is here a specific "plan of action," it
would seem that the "true" idea would be the one that can
complete itself by stimulating a satisfying activity. The

362 Studies in Logical Theory

false idea would be one that cannot complete itself in a sat-
isfying activity, such as singing in tune, constructing a
mathematical equation, etc., and just this solution is very
clearly expounded by our author. In the case of mathe-
matical inquiry,

In just so far as we pause satisfied we observe that there "is
no other" mathematical fact to be sought in the direction of the
particular inquiry in hand. Satisfaction of purpose by means of
presented fact and such determinate satisfaction as sends us to no
other experience for further light and fulfillment, precisely this
outcome is itself the Other that is sought when we begin om:
inquiry.'

So "when other facts of experience are sought," if I watch
for stars or for a chemical precipitate, or for a turn in the
stock market, or in the sickness of a friend, my ideas are
true when they are satisfied with " the presented facts. " Again,

It follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any
finite idea is that form which the idea itself would assume when-
ever it became individuated, or in other words, became a completely
determined idea, an idea or will fulfilled by a wholly adequate
empirical content, for which no other content need be substituted
or from the point of view of the satisfied idea, dbuld be substituted.^

In such passages as these it seems clear that the test of
the truth of an idea is its power to bring us to the point
where we "pause satisfied," where "no other content need
be substituted," etc. Nor in such passages does there seem
to be any doubt of reaching satisfaction in particular cases.
Here, it appears, we may sing in tune, we may get the
desired precipitate, and possibly even interpret the stock
market correctly. Of course, the discord, the hunger, the
loss, will come again; but so will new ideas, new truths:
"Man thinks in order to get control of his world and thereby
of himself."' Then the control actually gained must meas-
ure the value, the truth of his thought. Do you wish to

1 p. 330 ; italics mine. 2 p. 337. 3 p. 286.

Some Logical Aspects op Puepose 363

sing in tune, "then your musical ideas are false if they lead
you to strike what are then called false notes." '

It should also be noticed that here this desired deter-
mination does not consist in a further determination of the
mere idea as such. It is found in "the presented fact," in
the immediate activity of singing, of getting precipitates,
etc. As has already been pointed out, it is only by using
the term "idea" for both the purpose and the fulfilling act
of singing that this "pause of satisfaction" can be ascribed
to the further determination of the idea. As such, as also
before remarked, the sort of determination that the idea
here gets means its termination, its disappearance in the
immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which it leads.
The "indefinite restlessness" of hunger and cold would
scarcely be satisfied by getting more determinate and
specific ideas only of food and shelter. The satisfaction
comes when the ideas are "realized," when the "plans" are
swallowed up in fulfilment.

But in all this nothing has been said about "the certain
absolute system of ideas," nor does there appear to be here
any demand for it. To be sure, in the passages just con-
sidered, experience has been found to become "fragmentary,"
but it has also been found capable of healing, of wholing
itself, not of course into any "final whole," but into the unity
of "satisfaction" as regards "the particular inquiry in
hand." There is of course failure as well, but this also is
not final. It means simply that we must look farther for
the "pause of satisfaction," that we must construct another
idea, another "plan of action."

But, after having shown that the idea as a plan of action
may lead to satisfaction in the particular case, and that its
success or failure so to do is one measure of its truth or
falsity, we are now suddenly aroused to the fact that after

"P. 307.

364 Studies in Logical Theory

all thought does not lead us to the completed "absolute
system of ideas," to a final stage of eternal unbroken satis-
faction.

But never in our hvunan process of experience do we reach that
determination. It is for us the object of love and of hope, of desire
and of will, of faith and of work, but never of present finding.^

If at this point one asks: Whence this absolute system
of ideas? Why have we to reckon with it at all? there
appears to be little that is satisfying. Indeed, it seems
difficult to get rid of the impression that this "certain
absolute system of ideas" is on our hands as a philosophical
heirloom from the time of Plato, so hallowed by time and
so established by centuries of acceptance that we have
ceased to ask for its credentials. To ground it in the
"essentially fragmentary character of human experience"
appears to be a petitio, for experience does not appear
"essentially fragmentary" in this sense until after the
absolute system has been posited.

And this brings to notice that at this point both the
fragmentary and unitary characters of experience take on
new meaning. So far this fragmentary character has been
defined with reference to "the particular inquiry in hand."
Now, since the distinction between absolute and human
experience has emerged, the fragmentary character becomes
an absolute quality of the latter in contrast with the former.
So, mutatis mutandis, of unity. Up to this point unity,
wholeness, has been possible within human experience in the
case of particular problems, such as singing in tune, etc. But
with the appearance of the absolute system of ideas, whole-
ness is now the exclusive quality of the latter, as incomplete-
ness is of human experience, though of course the working
unity, the unity resulting in "pauses of satisfaction," must
still remain in the latter.

IP.297.

Some Logical Aspects op Purpose 365

The problem now is to somehow work the absolute system
of ideas into connection with the conception of the idea as a
purpose, as a concrete plan of action. Here is where the
third conception of the relation between idea and purpose,
described at the beginning, comes into play — the cohception
in which the idea, instead of being the purpose, or the ful-
filment of a purpose, has the purpose to correspond with, or
represent "its own final and completely individual expres-
sion," contained in the absolute system. From the previous
standpoint the idea's "own final and completely individual
expression" has been found in the fulfilling experiences of
singing in tune, getting mathematical equations, chemical
precipitates, etc. Here this complete individual experience
can never be found in finite, human experience, but must be
sought in the absolute system — and this can be only "the
object of love and hope, of desire and will, never of present
finding."

Notwithstanding the many previous protestations that the
purposive function of the idea is its "primary" and "most
essential" character, we are here forced to fall back upon
correspondence — representation as the primary, the essential,
and indeed, it appears at times, as the sole function. For in
the attempt to bring these two functions together the purpos-
ive function is swallowed up in the representative. The idea
still is, or has a purpose, a "plan of action," but this pur-
pose, this plan, is now nothing but to represent and corre-
spond with its own final and completed form in the absolute
system. By this simple coup is the purposive function of
the idea reduced at once to the representative. Nor is it
pertinent to urge at this point that every purpose involves
representation, that the plan must be some sort of an image
or scheme which symbolizes and stimulates the thing to
be done. This no one would question, but now the sole
"thing to be done" apparently is to perfect this representa-

366 Studies in Logical Theory

tion of the complete and individual form in the absolute
system.'

Once more, an array of passages could be marshaled from
almost every page refuting any such interpretation as this,
but they would be passages expounding the part played by
the idea in such concrete experiences as singing, measuring,
etc., not in representing an absolute system of ideas. Even
as regards the latter, one might urge that, by insisting on
the active character of the idea, we could after all regard
this absolute system as a life of will after the fashion of our
own, were it not at once described as "the complete embodi-
ment," "the final fulfilment," of finite ideas. A life con-
sisting of mere fulfilment seems a baffling paradox. And
its timeless character only adds to the difficulty. More-
over, if we regard the system as constituted by such con-
crete activities as measuring and singing, etc., while we
have saved will, we shall now have to fall back upon our first
conception of truth as found in the idea which unifies the
fragmentary condition of experience as related to specific
problems, not fragmentary as related to an absolute system.

This brings us to the final and crucial point of the dis-
cussion, the part which purpose plays in the determination
of truth and error from the standpoint of "the absolute
system of ideas." When is this purpose of the idea to cor-
respond with its absolute, final, and completed form fulfilled,

1 This reduction of the purposive to the representative function carries with it
an interesting implication concerning the whole character and relationship of
thought and will. From beginning to end, on almost every page, Mr. Koyce insists
upon the idea as an expression of will. At the outset we read : " When we try to
define the idea in itself, as a conscious fact, our best means is to lay stress upon the
sort of will or active meaning which any idea involves for the mind that forms the
idea" (p. 22) . Again : " The idea is a will seeking its own determination. It is
nothing else " (p. 332)— and so on throughout the lectures. And we have already seen
how consistently this is worked out in the analysis of concrete acts, such as singing,
etc. But now, as related to the absolute system, the will, as embodied in the idea, is
to find its final determination in approximating the certain absolute system of ideas.
This would seem to make will but little more than the mere form of representation
itself. The idea is a will, but in its relation to truth its will is " to correspond even
in its vagueness to its own final and completely individual expression."

Some Logical Aspects of Puepose 367

or partially fulfilled? And here at the very outset is a
difficulty. We have read repeatedly that the idea is itself
"the partial fulfilment of a purpose." It is now to seek an
object which shall increase this degree of fulfilment, but
still this fulfilment shall be incomplete. And when we
come to consider error, it too will be found to consist in a
partial fulfilment. So it appears that there are three stages
of "partial fulfilment" to be discriminated, one belonging
to the idea itself, another to finite truth, and still another
to error.

Returning to the problem, from this point on we find the
two standpoints, that of the specific situation and that of the
absolute system, so closely interwoven and entangled that
they are followed with great difficulty. We have already
seen that the idea seeks correspondence with its object,
because it is "fragmentary," "incomplete," "indetermined."
And there we found that this indeterminate and frag-
mentary character belonged to the idea as a purpose, a
plan of seeking relief from some sort of "restlessness"
and "dissatisfaction," such as singing out of tune, etc.
Here it is the incompleteness of an imperfect representation
of its object in the absolute system that is the motif, and
how it is to effect an improvement in its imperfect condition
is now the problem. Here again the appeal is to purpose.
Whatever may constitute the absolute system, one thing is
assured: nothing in it can be an object except as the finite
idea "intends it," purposes it, to be its object. Again must
we ask: On what basis is this object in the absolute system
selected at all? In general the answer is: On the basis of a
need of "further determination;" but when we further ana-
lyze this, we find it means on the basis of a specific want or
need, such as food, shelter, measuring, singing, etc. The
basis of the selection, then, is entirely on the side of the con-
crete, finite situation.

368 Studies in Logical Theory

Here, too, we might ask: Whence the confidence that
there will be foimd something in the absolute system
that will fulfil the purpose generated on the side of the
finite ? Must we not here fall back on something like a pre-
established harmony ? To this our author would say: "Yea,
Yerily. The fact that the absolute system responds to the
finite needs does precisely show that the finite and the abso-
lute cannot be sundered." But when we try to state how the
purpose generated on the side of the finite can be met by
the absolute system, the account again seems to run so much
in terms of the finite experience that to call it a system of
"final," "completed," and "fulfilled" ideas does not seem
accurate. We must note here, too, the shifting in the sense
of "purpose." The idea selects its object on the basis of the
material needed to relieve the unrest and dissatisfaction of
singing out of tune, etc. But now it is to be satisfied by
increasing the extent of its representation of its object in the
absolute system.

And now, finally, what shall mark the attainment of this
purpose of the idea to correspond and represent "its own
completed form"? When is the correspondence and repre-
sentation true? Simply at the point where "we pause satis-
fied," where "no other content need be substituted, or from
the point of view of the satisfied idea could be substituted."
That is all; there is no other answer. There are other
statements, but they all come to the same thing. For
instance :

It is true — this instant's idea — if, in its own measure, and
on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own
final and completely individual expression.'

But the moment we ask what this "final and individual
expression" is, and what is meant by "in its own measure,"

IP. 339.

Some Logical Aspects of Pubpose 369

and "on its own plan," we are thrown back at once upon the
preceding statement. The next sentence following the pas-
sage just quoted does indeed define this "individual expres-
sion." "Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment
of purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily
begins, as it were, to express." But how can we know that
the expression is "fragmentary" unless we have some experi-
ence of wholeness?

And here perhaps is the place to say, what has been im-
plied all along, that this absolutely "fragmentary" character
of human experience is an abstraction of the relatively dis-
integrated condition into which experience temporarily falls,
which abstraction is then reinstated as a fixed quality, over-
looking the fact that experience becomes fragmentary only
that it may again become whole. The absolute system, the
final fulfilment, is in the same case. It too is but the hypo-
statized abstraction of the function of becoming whole, of
wholing and fulfilling, which manifests itself in the " pauses
of satisfaction."

"But," Mr. Royce would say, "the wholeness of the par-
ticular instance is after all not a true and perfect wholeness,
because we can always think of the fulfilling experience as
possibly different, as having a possibly different embodi-
ment." But this implies also a different purpose. More-
over, it abstracts the purpose from the specific conditions
under which the purpose develops. Thus in singing in tune
one doubtless could easily imagine himself singing another
tune, on another occasion, in another key, in a clear tenor
instead of a cracked bass, etc. But if on this occasion, in
this song, and with this cracked bass voice one, accepting
all these conditions, does, with malice aforethought, purpose
to strike the tune, and happily succeeds, why, for that pur-
pose formed under the known and accepted conditions, is
not the accomplishment final and absolute? Nor is the

370 Studies in Logical Theory

case any different, so far as I can see, in mathematical
experience. To quote again:

You think of numbers, and accordingly count one, two, three.
Your idea of these numbers is abstract, a mere generality. Why?
Because there could be other cases of counting, and other num-
bers counted than the present counting process shows you, and why
so? Because your purpose in cotintLag is not wholly fulfilled by
the numbers now counted.'

I confess I cannot see here in what respect the purpose
is not fulfilled. Doubtless there could be " other cases of
counting," and "other numbers," but these may not be
included in my present purpose, which is simply to count
here and now. In this passage the purpose is not very fully
defined. One's counting is usually for something, if for
nothing more than merely to illustrate the process. In this
latter case one's purpose would be completely fulfilled by just
the numbers used when he should " pause satisfied " with the
illustration. Or, if I wish to show the properties of num-
bers, then the discovery that there can always be more of
them fulfils my purpose, since this endless progression is one
of the properties. Or yet again, if one should suddenly
become enamored of the process of counting, and forthwith
should purpose to devote the rest of his days to it, it would
still be fortunate that there were always other numbers to be
counted. In other words, the idea as a purpose is formed
with reference to, and out of, specific conditions. In the last
analysis the problem always is : What is to be done here
and now with the actual material at hand, under the present
conditions? As the purpose is determined by these specific
conditions, so is the fulfilment. To say that the fulfilment
might be different is virtually to say that the purpose might
have been different, or indeed that the imiverse might have
been different.

IP.338.

Some Logical Aspects of Purpose 371

This necessity of falling back upon the character of the
idea as a purpose in the sense of the specific " plan of action"
comes into still bolder relief in the consideration of error
from the standpoint of "the absolute system of ideas." As
already mentioned, the initial and persistent problem here is
to distinguish at all between truth and error in our experi-
ence from this standpoint. All our efforts at representing
the absolute system must fall short. What can we mean,
then, by calliag some of our ideas true and others false?
The definition of error is as follows :

An error is an error about a specific object, only in case the
purpose, imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when
the error is made, is better defined, is in fact, better fulfilled by an
object whose determinate character in some wise, although never
absolutely, opposes the fragmentary efforts first made to define
them.'

But in relation to the absolute system the later part of this
statement holds of all our ideas. There always is the abso-
lute object which would "better define" and "better fulfil"
our purposes. Hence it is only in reference to the "spe-
cific" instances of singing, measuring, etc., that a basis
for the distinction can be found. Here our plan is not true
so long as its mission of relieving the specific unrest and
dissatisfaction, the specific discord or hunger, is unfulfilled.
The only criterion, then, which we have been able to find
for the fulfilment of the purpose, for the truth of the idea as
representing an object in the absolute system, is the sense
of wholeness, the " pause of satisfaction," which we experi-
ence in realizing such specific purposes as "singing in tune."
And if it be said again: "Precisely so; this only shows how
intimate is the relation between our experience and the ab-
solute system of ideas;" then must it also be said once more,
either that the absolute system can be nothing more than an

1 p. 335.

372 Studies in Logical Theoey

abstraction of the element of wholeness or wholing in our
experience, or that thus far the relation appears to rest upon
sheer assumption.

Again, it may be insisted, as suggested at the outset of
this discussion, that the idea can well have two purposes:
one to help constitute and solve the specific problems of
daily life ; the other to represent the absolute system. Very
well, we must then make out a case for the latter. If the
purposes are to be different, the purpose to represent the
Absolute should have a criterion of its own. This we have
not been able to find. On the contrary, whenever pushed
to the point of stating a criterion for the representation of
the absolute system, we have had to appeal, in every case, to
the fulfilment of a specific finite purpose. And even if this
purpose to represent the absolute system had some apparent
standard of its own, we should not be content to leave the
matter so. We should scarcely be satisfied to observe as a
mere matter of fact that the idea has a reconstructive func-
tion, and also a representative function. Such a brute
dualism would be intolerable.

IV. SUMMAEY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the end, the outcome of the endeavor to establish a
connection between the relation of the idea to human expe-
rience and its relation to the absolute system does not
appear satisfying. The idea is left either with two inde-
pendent purposes — one to reconstruct finite experience, the
other to represent and symbolize the absolute system — or
one of these purposes is merged in the other. When the
attempt is made from the standpoint of the absolute system,
the reconstructive purpose is swallowed up in the representa-
tive. When, on the other hand, the need for a basis of
distinction between truth and error "here on this bank and
shoal of time" is felt, the representative disappears in the

Some Logical Aspects of Purpose 373

reconstructive function. Nowhere are we able to discover a
true unification. To be sure, we bave been told again and
again that the representation of the absolute object, if only
we could accomplish it, would be "the final fulfilment,"
"completion," and "realization" of the human, finite pur-
pose. But besides a confessed impotency at the very start,
this involves, as we have seen, either a sudden transforma-
tion of the specific purpose of singing in tune, etc., into that
of representing the absolute system, or a sheer assumption
that the representation of the absolute object does somehow
help in the realization of the specific finite purpose. No-
where is there any account of how this help would be given.

And this suggests that if the analysis of the idea as pur-
pose, given at the outset of Mr. Royce's lecture, had been
developed further, if the conditions and origin of purpose
had been examined, it is difficult to see how this discrepancy
could have escaped disclosure. Mr. Royce starts his account
by simply accepting from psychology a general description
of the purposive character of the idea. Even in the more
detailed passages on purpose we have nothing but descrip-
tions of purpose after it is formed. Nothing is said of the
origin of this purposiveness. The purposive character of
experience is of course very manifest, but what is the signifi-
cance of this purposing in experience as a whole ? What is
the source and the material of the purposes ?

It is this uncritical acceptance of the purposive quality
of the idea that obscures the irrelevancy of its relation to
the absolute system. If the idea must merely be or have a
purpose, then it may as well be that of representing the
absolute system as any other. Of course, there are trouble-
some questions as to how our finite ideas ever got such a
purpose; but, after all, if it is simply a matter of having
any sort of a purpose, representing the absolute system may
answer as well as anything. But when now we come to deal

374 Studies in Logical Theory

with the problem of fulfilment, with the question of truth
and error, we have to reckon with this neglect of the source
of this purposiveness.

It is this unanalyzed ground of the purpose that makes
the matter of fulfilment so ambiguous. Such an analysis, we
believe, would have shown that the conditions out of which
the idea as a purpose arises determine also the sort of fulfil-
ment possible. There are, indeed, one or two very general,
but very significant, statements in this direction, if they
were only followed up. For instance:

In doing what we often call " making up our minds " we pass
from a vague to a definite state of will and of resolution. In such
cases we begin with perhaps a very indefinite sort of restlessness
which arouses the question: "What is it that I want, what do I
desire, what is my real purpose? "

In other words, what does this restlessness mean? What
is the matter? What is to be done?

Purpose is born, then, out of restlessness and dissatisfac-
tion. But whence comes this restlessness and dissatisfaction ?
Surely we cannot at this point charge it to a discrepancy
between our finite idea and the absolute object, since it is
just this restlessness that is giving birth to the purposive
idea. One thing, at any rate, appears pretty certain: this
"indefinite restlessness" presupposes some sort of activity
already going on. The restlessness is not generated in a
vacuum. But why should this activity get into a condition to
be described as "indefinite restlessness" and dissatisfaction ?

Repugnant as it will be to many to have psycho-physical,
to say nothing of biological, doctrines introduced into a
logical discussion, I confess that, at this point facing the
issue squarely, I see no other way. And it appears to me that
just at this point it is the fear of phenomenalistic giants that
has kept logic wandering so many years in the wilderness.

What, then, in this action already going on is responsible

Some Logical Aspects op Pubposb 375

for this restlessness ? First let us note that " indefinite rest-
lessness" and "dissatisfaction" are terms descriptive of what
Mr. James calls "the first thing in the way of consciousness."
This assumes consciousness as a factor in activity. So that
our question now becomes: What is the significance of this
factor of restless, dissatisfied consciousness in activity ? Now,
there appears no way of getting at the part which conscious-
ness plays different from that of discovering the function of
anything else. And this way is simply that of observing, as
best we may, the conditions under which consciousness
operates, and what it does. Here the biologist and psycholo-
gist with one voice inform us that this indefinite restlessness
which marks the point of the operation of consciousness
arises where, in a co-ordinated system of activities, there
develop out of the continuation of the activity itself new
conditions calling for a readjustment and reconstruction of
the activity, if it is to go on. Consciousness then appears
to be the function which makes possible the reorganization
of the results of a process back into the process itself, thus
constituting and preserving the continuity of activity. So
interpreted, consciousness appears to be an essential element
in the conception of a self-sustaining activity. This
"indefinite restlessness," in which consciousness begins,
marks, then, the operation of the function of reconstruction
without which activity would utterly break down.

Precisely because, then, the idea "as a plan" is projected
and constructed in response to this restlessness must its ful-
filment be relevant to it. It is when the idea as a purpose,
a plan, bom out of this matrix of restlessness, begins to
aspire to the absolute system, and attempts to ignore or
repudiate its lowly antecedents, that the difficulties concerning
fulfilment begin. They are the difficulties that beset every
ambition which aspires to things foreign to its inherited
powers and equipment.

376 Studies in Logical Theoey

A detailed account at this point of the construction and
fulfilment of the idea as "a plan of action" would contain a
consecutive reinterpretation of Mr. Eoyce's principal rubrics.
Such an account the limits of this paper forbid. We shall
have to be content with pointing out in a general way a few
instances by way of illustration.

In the first place, it is in this matrix of indefinite restless-
ness out of which the idea is born that the "fragmentary
character of experience," of which Mr. Royce is so keenly
conscious, appears. But, once more, this fragmentary char-
acter is discernible only by contrast with the wholeness on
both sides of the fragments; the wholeness that precedes
the restlessness, and the new "pause of satisfaction" toward
which it points. Nor must we forget that the habit matrix,
out of the disintegration of which the restlessness is immed-
iately born, does not exist as some metaphysical ultimate out
of which thought as such has evolved. Back of it is some
previous purpose in whose service habit was enlisted. On
the other hand, this disintegration means that the old pur-
pose, the old plan, must be reconstructed ; that it, along with
the disintegrated habit, becomes the material for a new plan,
a new wholing of experience.

In the next place, the construction of this new plan of
action does involve "re-presentation." The first step in the
transition from the condition of "indefinite restlessness"
toward a " plan" is the diagnosis, the definition of the restless-
ness. This involves the re-presentation in consciousness of
the activities, out of which the restlessness hag arisen. This
re-presentation is also the beginning of the reconstruction.
The diagnosis of the singing activity as being "out of tune"
is the negative side of beginning to sing in tune. It is now
a commonplace of psychology that all representation is
reconstruction. And this is where Mr. Royce's emphasis of
the symbolic, the algebraic, as against the copy type of rep-

Some Logical Aspects of Pukposb 377

resentation, has its application. All we want here is some
sort of an image — visual, auditory, motor, it matters not —
that shall serve to focus attention upon the singing activities
until they are reconstructed sufficiently to bring us to the
"pause of satisfaction.'" But nowhere in all this is there any
reference to the idea's object in the absolute system. Nor
does there appear to be any call or place for such reference.
The representation here is a part of the very process of
forming the plan of further reconstruction out of the
materials of the specific situation. Representation is not the
plan's own end and aim. This is to stimulate a new set of
activities that shall lead out of the present state of unrest
and dissatisfaction.

It is also true, as already mentioned, that in the process
of fulfilling the plan, of realizing the idea, further determina-
tion and specification is produced in the plan itself. The
idea as a plan is certainly not formed all at once. Nor does
it reach and maintain a fixed content. No purpose is ever
realized in its original content. But this does not mean
that its realization is, therefore, "partial," "incomplete," or
"fragmentary." It is a part of its business to change. The
purpose is not there for its own sake. The purpose is there
as a means to the reorganization and reconstruction of expe-
rience. It exists, as Mr. Royce says, as an instrument, "as a
tool" for "introducing control into experience." And as,
in the process of use, a tool always undergoes modification,
so here, as an instrument for reconstructing habit, the plan,
too, undergoes reconstruction. Indeed, as regards its con-
tent, it is itself, as Mr. Royce says, as much a habit, as
much "the product of association," as any part of experience.
The purposing function, the purposing activity, remains ; its
content is constantly shifting.

Here, too, is where "the submission of the idea to the

1 Cf. Me. GtOEb's paper, above.

378 Studies in Logical Theory

object" takes place. Only, here, it is not a submission to an
object already constituted as it is in Mr. Koyce's conception
of the absolute system. The idea as an hypothetical plan of
action, as a trial construction, must be tested by the activities it
is attempting to reconstruct. That is to say, at this point the
question is: Does the plan apply to the activities actually
involved in the unrest ? Has it diagnosed the case properly,
and is it therefore one in and through which these activities
can operate and come to unity again? The "submission"
here is the submission of the purpose, the end, to the
material out of which it is formed, and with which it must
work. But again this material to which the idea submits
itself is anything but finally fixed and "complete" in form.
On the contrary, as we have seen, it is just the fragmentary
and incomplete condition of this material that calls for the
idea. Yet the idea as a plan must be true to its mission,
and to this material, and in this sense must submit itself to
whatever modifications and reconstruction the material "dic-
tates" as necessary in order that it may function in and
through the plan.'

On the other hand — and this is the point to which Mr.
Royce gives most emphasis — it is equally apparent that
"the idea must determine its object." On this all philosophy,
from Plato down, which approaches reality "from the side of
ideas " is at stake. And this does not appear impossible if,
again, the object is not already and eternally fixed and com-
plete. If the object is one constructed out of the very
mass of habit material which the idea is reconstructing, and if
"determination" means not copying, but construction, then,
indeed, must the idea "determine its object." Just for that

1 Of. Baldwin's Development and Evolution, pp. 250, 251, on the necessity of the
submission of the "new experience" to the test of its ability to utilize habit.
Interpreted broadly, habit might here mean the whole mechanical side, including
organism and environment, and so include Mr. Baldwin's second or " estra-
organic " test.

Some Logical Aspects of Pubpose 379

does it have its being. That is its sole mission. Here the
determination of the object by the idea is not a mere
abstract postulate ; it is not based upon a general considera-
tion of the disastrous consequences to our logical and ethical
assumptions, if it were not so determined. Here not only
the general necessity for it, but the modus operandi of this
determination, is apparent. But, at the risk of tedious
iteration, must it again be said that for the determination of
the completed and perfected object in the absolute system
not only is there nowhere any modus to be found, but, even
if there were, it is difficult to see what it would have to do
with the kind of determination demanded by such a specific
sort of unrest as "singing out of tune," etc. The process of
submission is thus a reciprocal one. Neither in the object
nor in the idea is there a fixed scheme or order to which the
other must submit and conform. And this is simply the
logical commonplace that submission cannot be a one-sided
affair, that determination must be reciprocal.

This brings us to what might as well have been our intro-
ductory as our concluding observation. It has just been
said that the determination of the object by the idea is a
vital matter in any philosophy which approaches reality
"from the side of ideas." Such a way of approach must
assert "the primacy of the world of ideas over the world as
a fact."' Mr. Koyce thus further states the case:

I am one of those who hold that when you ask what is an idea, and
how can ideas stand in any true relation to reality, you attack the
world knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its
meshes. This way is of course very ancient. It is the way of

Plato It is in a different sense the way of Kant. If you

view philosophy ia this fashion, you subordinate the study of the
world as fact to a reflection upon the world as idea. Begin by
accepting upon faith and tradition the mere brute reality of the
world as fact, and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mystery.

1 P. 19.

380 Studies in Logical Theoby

.... The world of fact surprises you with all sorts of strange con-
trasts. . . .It baffles you with caprices like a charming and yet
hopelessly wayward child, or like a bad fairy. The world of fact
daily announces itself to you as a defiant mystery.'

Here we have concisely stated at the outset of the lectures
the position which we have seen to be fraught with so many
difficulties: the position, namely, which accepts to start with
the opposition of the world as idea and the world as fact, as
something given, instead of something to be accounted for ;
and which assumes that this opposition stands in the way of
reaching reality, whereas it possibly may be of the very
essence of reality. To be sure, the above statement of this
opposition between the world as fact and as idea is but the
expository starting-point. And it is true that the rest of the
argument is occupied in the attempt to close this breach.
But, as we have seen, except where the idea is expounded as
a specific purpose, arising out of a specific experience of
unrest, such as singing out of tune, etc. — except in this case,
the breach is taken as found and the attempt to heal it is
made by working forward from the opposition as given instead
of back to its source. This opposition, of course, has its
forward goal, but the difficulty is to find it without an explo-
ration of its source. It is back in that matrix out of which
the opposition has arisen that the line of direction to the
goal is to be found.

Moreover, in starting from this opposition of fact and idea
as given, the only method of quelling it seems to be either
that of reducing one side to terms of the other, or of appeal-
ing to some new, and therefore external unifying, agency.
But if the factors in the opposition are found, not one in
submission to the other, nor having the "primacy" over the
other, but as co-ordinate and mutually determining func-
tions, developed from a common matrix and co-operating

iPp. 17, 18.

Some Logical Aspects of Purpose 381

in the work of reconstructing experience, some of the diffi-
culties involved in the alternative methods just mentioned
appear to drop out'

The point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and
ask just what is meant by "the defiantly mysterious,"
"baffling," and "capricious" character of the world as fact —
as "brute reality." First, if by the world as "fact," as
"brute reality," we mean experience so brute that it is not
yet "lighted up with ideaSj" it is difficult to see how it could
be mysterious or capricious, since mystery and caprice appear
only when experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes
and an inquiry for connections and meanings has begun.
That is to say, there can be neither mystery nor caprice except
in relation to some sort of order. And order is always a
matter of ideas. But it is sufficient to submit Mr. Koyce's
own statement on this point:

We all of us from moment to moment have experience. This
experience comes to us in part as brute fact; light and shade, sound

andsilence,painandgrief and joy These given facts flow by;

and were they all, our world would be too much of a blind prob-
lem for us even to be puzzled by its meaningless presence.''

If next we take the world of fact as in contrast and co-
ordinate with the world of ideas, mystery and caprice here,
certainly, are not all on the side of the fact. Here, again, must
they be functions of the relation between fact and idea. We
have seen that without thought there is neither mystery nor
caprice. The idea then cannot take part in the production
of mystery and caprice, and forthwith deny its parenthood.
Of course, mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of
this co-ordinate opposition of fact and idea. They are but
the first fruits — the relatively unorganized embryonic mass
which through the further activities of the parent functions
shall develop into the symmetry of truth and law.

1 See, above, Peofessob Dewei's Study III, pp. 49ff. 2p. 55.

382 Studies in Logical Theoey

There appears then no ultimate "primacy" of either idea
or fact over the other. Nor does either appear as a better
way of approach to reality than the other. It is only when
we say: "Lo! here in the idea," or "Lo! there in the fact
is reality," that we find it "imperfect," "incomplete," and
"fragmentary," and must straightway "look for another."
But surely not in "a certain absolute system of ideas,"
which is "the object of love and hope, of desire and will, of
faith and work, but never of present finding," shall we seek
it. Rather precisely in the loving and hoping, desiring and
willing, believing and working, shall we find that reality in
which and for which both the "World as fact" and the
"World as idea" have their being.

INDEX

AbsoIjUte : as constituting reality, 348 ;
as related to truth and error, 363 S. ;
as a hypostatized abstraction, 369.

Absolute self, 330.

AccESSOBY : thought as, 58 S.

Activity: as social, 74; thought as, 78:
interrupted, and judgment, 154; and
hypothesis, X70; as sensori-motor, 193,
200; (see Function, Keconstruction).

iBsTHETic EXFEBIENCB : appreciative
rather than reflective, 255 ; not a form
of valuation, 339, 340.

Altebnatives : in judgment, 155 ; (see
Disjunction).

Analogy. 171, 172, 175; in relation to
habit, 176.

An AXAQOBAS : in relation to the One and
the Many, 219; his xoSs, 220, 221.

Anaxijiandeb : and the infinite, 209; his
process of segregation, 214, 215.

Anaximenes: his apx^ air, 209; his scheme
of rarefaction and condensation, 209,
213, 215, 224.

Angell, J. B., 14 note, 345 note.

Animisu, 49 note.

Antecedents of thought (see Stimu-
lus).

Applied logic : Lotze's definition, 6.

Appbeciation : distinguished from re-
flection, 255, 339; not to be identified
with valuation, 320-24, 338.

'Apxo : meaning of search for, 211 ff.

Association of ideas : refers to mean-
ings, 33, 34; connection with thought,
80; doctrine of: analogous to subjec-
tivism in ethics, 261; presupposes a
mechanical metaphysics, 330, 331 note.

Atomists : treatment of the One and the
Many, 221.

Austrian economists, 307, 333.

Authority and custom: logic of atti-
tude of obedience to, 286; social con-
ditions compatible with dominance of,
286 ; failure of, as moral control, 286.

Bacon: extreme empirical position, 156
ff. ; view of induction, 157, 158.

" Bad " : practical significance of, as mor-
al predicate, 259; relation to "wrong,"
335.

Baldwin, J. M., 257 note, 378 note.

Becoming : as relative, 206.

"BegeCndung" and " BestAtigung " :
Wundt's distinction of, 179 ; criticised,
181, 182.

Biology : view of sensation, 58 ; use of,
in logic, 374, 375.

BosANQUET, B., 59 note, 147, 189, 190, 191,
300; (see Study V).

Bradley, F. H., 47 note, 54 note, 90 fl.,
147, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 299 note 2, 331
note, 332 notu, 353.

Bbentano, 250 note.

Butler, J., 277.

Certain, the : relation to tension, 50, 51 ;
as datum, 57.

Coefficients of beality, peeception,
AND recognition : defined, 263-7 ; pres-
ent in economic and ethical experience,
267-9.

Coexistence, coincidence, and coher-
ence, 28, 29, 33-6, 58, 59, 68.

Conceptions : Lotze's view of, 59 ; Ba-
con's attitude toward, 157; relation to
tact, 168 ; function in Greek philosophy,
342; (see Idea, Image, Hypothesis).

Conceptual logic: as related to idea
and image, 188-92.

Conscience : evolution of, 286, 287 ; am-
biguous and transitional character of,
287; metaphysical implications of, as
moral standard, 288 ; not autonomous,
288.

Conscientiousness: dangers of, conse-
quent upon ideal of self-realization,
316; Green's defense of, referred to,
316 note.

Conservation : of energy and mass, 206;
(see Energy).

Content of knowledge: and^ logical
object, originates in tension, 49;
thought's own, 65; and datum, 69; as
truth, 79 S. ; as static and dynamic, 73,
93 ff., llOfiE.; (see Study IV;Objectivity,
Validity).

Continuity, 10, 13, 55.

Control : idea and, 75, 129.

CONVEBSION op PROPOSITIONS, 171; in
relation to habit, 176.

Copernicus: his theory, 178; compared
with Galileo's supposition, 179-81.

Copula, 118 ff. ; scheme of mediation
between subject and predicate, 208,
214 ff.

Correspondence: of datum and idea,
51; of thought-content and thought-
activity, 70; as criterion of truth, 82 ff.,
353 ff.

Darwin, Charles, 146, 150, 179.

Datum of thought, 7, 8, 24 ; as fact, 26,
50, 52; Lotze's theory of, stated, .55;
criticised, 56 ff. ; relation to induction,
61 ; and content, 60, 70 ; (see Study UI ;
Content, Fact, Stimulus).

383

384

Studies in Logical Theory

Deduction, 211, 212.

DEriNiTioN : invented by Socrates, 203.

Deuocsitus : attempts at definition, 203.

Demonstbativb judgment, 134.

Determination: as criterion of truth,
362^ ff. ; impossibility of complete, in
finite experience, 364.

Dewey, John, 58 note, 86 note, 266 note 2,
316 note, 381 note.

Dialectic : Zeno as originator of, 203.

Diogenes of Afoldonia, 222 S.

Disjunction : in judgment, 115, 138.

Dynamic : ideas as, and as static, 73, 76 ;
reality as, 126.

Eabth : as an element, 213.

Economic judgment: involyes same
type of process as physical, 235; a pro-
cess ot valuation, 236 ; type of situation
evoking, 241-6, 293-5, 302, 303; distin-
euisbed from ethical, 243 note, 246 note,
271, 302, 303; relation to physical, 246
note 3 : subject of, the means of action,
259, 304; analysis of 'process of, 304r-12;
distinguished from "pull and haul,"
237, 238; psycholo^cal account of, 310,
311 ; a reconstructive process, 311, 312.

" Egoism, Neo-Hegelian," 316.

Ehsenfels, C. yon, 318 note.

Eidola : Bacon's view of, 157.

EiiEATIcs : their logical position, 216 S.

Elements : as four, 213 ; as infinite, 213 fl.

Emebson, E. W., 204, 246 note.

Emfedocles: attempts at definition,
203; treatment of the One and the
Many, 218 fl.

Empieicism, U, 29, 47, 48, 61 fl. ; and ra-
tionalism, 80; criticised, 156; Jevons,
169 ; treatment of imagery, 186-8.

Ends : controlling factors in acquisition
of knowledge, 229; may themselves be
objects of attention and judgment, 233:
judgment of, inseparable from factual
judgment, 234 ; conflict of, related, the
occasion tor ethical judgment, 238-41;
indirect conflict of unrelated, the occa-
sion for economic judgment, 241-3 ; the
subject-matter of ethical judgment,
258, 259; definition of, the goal of all
judgment, 264, 272; not always explicit
m judgment-process, 269, 270; nature
of relation between, in ethical judg-
ment, 273, 274, 291, 292; types of factual
condition implied in acceptance of, 275,
276; warranted by factual judgment,
276 ; nature of, unrelatedness of, in eco-
nomic judgment, 293-5, 302, 303; (see
Purpose).

Energy: principle of conservation of,
206, 299, 300; not valid in sphere of val-
uation, 328.

" Eneegy-Equivalbnce " : principle of,
in economic judgment, 308, 309 ; mean-
ing of, 309 note.

Epistemology, 5-7, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 47, 73,
341 ; origin of problem of, 344, 345.

Ebdmann, Benno: concerning induc-
tion, 173.

Ebbob : criterion of, 371.

Ethical judgment : involves same type
of process as physical, 235; a process
of valuation, 236, 332 ; type of situation
evoking, 237-41, 291-4; distinguished
from mechanical "pull and haul"
between ends, 237, 238; distinguished
from economic judgment, 243 note, 246
note, 271, 302, 303; subject of, an end of
action, 258 ; analysis of process of, 295-
302; a reconstructive process, 295, 299.

Existence : uersia meaning, 216, 217.

Expeeience : duality of, 16 ; logic of, 19-
21; how organized, 42; relation of
thought to organization of, 43-^; as
disorganized, 75 ; (see Absolute, Func-
tions).

ExPEEIMENT : as form of deduction, 212.

Fact : as equivalent to datum, 26, 50 fl. ;
criteria for determining, 106 fl. ; as
reality, 110; in relation to both idea
and reality, 380 S. ; and theory, conflict
between, 150, 151 : mutual dependence
of, 168; Whewell's view of, 163; (see
Datum, Idea, Beality, Truth).

Factual judgment : inadequate to com-
plete mediation of conduct, 230-34;
controlled by ends, 269; incidental to
judgments of valuation, 272, 295 ; types
of, implied in acceptance of an end,
275, 276; presents warrant for accep-
tance of ends, 277,

PiTE, W., 331 note.

Fbagmentaby, 72 ; as quality of internal
meaning, 360, 361; as an attribute of
finite experience, 364,376; (see Stimu-
lus, Tension).

Functions: of experience, 16; logic of,
18, 23; distinguished from status, 16;
of thought, 23, 24, 78, 85; total, as
stimulus to thought, 36-8, 80 ; different,
and logical distinctions, 42; diflerent,
confused byLotze,56; sensations as, 58.

Genetic: method, significance of, 14, 15,
187 ; distinctions, importance of, 24, 53,
62, 71, 85; effect of ignoring, 53, 62, 71;
(see Psychology).

"Good": practical significance of, as
moral predicate, 259; relation to
"right," 335.

GoEE, W. C, 377 note.
GOEGIAS, 225.

(tBEEK view OP thought AND BEALITY,

342 ff.

Gbeen, T. H., 274 note, 288 note 3, 315
note, 316 note, 330, 331.

Habit: relation of judgment to, inter-
ruption and resumption of, 154; and
hypothesis, 170 ; and analogy, 176 ; and
simple enumeration, 176; and conver-
sion, 176; and logical meaning, 198;
logical function of, 375, 376.

Hebaclitus : his position, 215 B.

Hippo, 209.

Index

385

EoBBES, Thomas, SOI.

Homogeneity ; of the world-ground, 207 ;
of the world, 209, 210.

Htjtcheson, F., 301.

Hypothesis, nature of, VII, 143-83; un-
equal stress commonly laid on its
origin, structure, and function, 143-5;
relation of data and hypothesis strictly
correlative, 145, 152, 168; as predicate,
146, 183 ; negative and positive sides of,
146, 155; came to be recognized with
rise of experimentalism, 159; and test,
174, 175, 177 ff.; origin of, 170, 171 ff.;
supposition and, 178 ; interdependence
of formation and test of, 182.

Idea: continuous with fact, 9, 10, 12;
distinction from fact, 13, 110; Lotze's
confusion regarding, 31, 32, 41, 65;
association of, 33; contrast with datum,
52-4; functional conception of, 70, 112
fl. ; objective validity of, 72-5 ; as entire
content of judgment, 119; existential
aspect of, 97, 99 ff., 113; in relation to
reference, 97 ff., 103, 129; representa-
tional theory of, 100 ff., 113 ff , 141, 347
ff., 372 ff. ; universality of, 97 ff., 113 ff. ;
as not referred to reality, 97 ff. ; as
forms of control, 129; function in judg-
ment, 153, 154; distinguished from
image, 183-93; distinction criticised,
199-202 ; problems accompanying dis-
covery of, 341; in Greek thought, 342;
instrumental and representative func-
tions of, 346 ff., 372 ff. ; purposive char-
acter of, 347 ff, ; external and internal
meaning of, 347 ff. [ Royce's absolute
system of, 348; triple relation to
purpose in Royce's account, 349 ff. ;
logical versus memorial, 351 ; in rela-
tion to fact and reality^ 379 ff. ; (see
Hypothesis, Image, Predicate).

Ideas : Platonic, 247.

Image: as merely fanciful, 53; in rela-
tion to meaning, 54 ; place or, in judg-
ment, 154; distinction from idea, 189-
93; distinction criticised, 199-202; as
direct and indirect stimulus, 195-7.

Imagekt: empirical criteria of, 186;
function of, 187; as representative,
186-8, 194; psychological function of,
193-7; logical function of, 198, 199.

Immediate: as related to mediation,
342, 350 ff.

Impbession : Lotze^s definition of, 27, 28,
29, 32; objective determination of, 3U,
31; objective quality of, 31, 68; as
psychic, 53; as transformed by thought
into meanings or ideas, 67 ff. ; (see
Idea, Meaning, Sensation).

Indeteeminate: as quality of finite
experience, 364.

Induction: Bacon's view of, 157; by
enumeration and allied processes, 171 ;
and habit, 176; versiis deduction, 211,
212.

Inference: Lotze's view of, 60; in rela-
tion to judgment, 117.

InstbumentaL : as character of thought,
78-82, 128, 140, 346 ff., 372 ff. ; (see Pur-
pose).

Intebaction : physical, 218 ff.

Interest : direction of, 205.

Invention : form of deduction, 212.

James, William, 81 note, 352 note, 375.

Jevons, W. Stanley, 169, 173.

Jones, Henry, 43 note, 59 note, 66,

Judgment : Lotze's definition of, 59 and
note; relation of, to ideas, 60; struc-
ture of, 75 note ; Bosanquet's theory of,
86 ff.; as a function, 107 ff.; dead and
live, 108; definition of, 86, 111; relation
to inference, 116 ff.: limits of single,
123 ff. ; negative, 114 ff. : of perception,
88 B.^96; parts of, 118 ff., 207, 208; time
relations of, 120 ff. ; as individual, 136;
as instrumental, 128, 140; as categori-
cal and hypothetical, 136; as imper-
sonal, 131; as intuitive, 139; various
definitions of, 147 fl. ; analysis of, 149
ff. ; disjunctive, 155; psychology of,
153; purpose of, 154; and interrupted
activity, 154; unique system of, 224-
30; general analysis of, 230-32; pur-
posive character of, 353 ft.; universal,
354; particular, 358; individual, 359,
360; mathematical, 354 S., 370; (see
Economic, Ethical, Factual judgments,
Copula, Predicate, Reflection, Subject).

Kant, I., 43, 46, 60 note, 163, 263, 301.

Keplee, 146, 181.

Knowledge: in relation to reality, 102
ff. ; meaning and, 128, "copy" and
"instrumental" theories of, 129, 140,
141 ; (see Judgment, Truth).

KClpe,0., 250 note.

Logic: origin of, 4; types of, 5-22; as
generic and specific, 18, 23 ; relations to
psychology, 14, 15, 63, 64, 184, 185, 192 ff. ;
effect of modern psychology upon, 345 ;
relation to genetic method, 15-18:
problems illustrated, 19, 20; social
significance of, 20; eristic the source
of formal, 203; pre-Socratic, 203; and
epistemology, 341, 342; (see Episte-
mology. Psychology).

Lotze: criticised. Studies II, III, IV;
applied logic, 6 ; thought as accessory,
56; view of judgment, 147; similarity
between him and Whewell, 165 note;
quoted, 6, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 66 note,
62, 63, 64, 66, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 77, 83, 84.

Many: the, and the One, 210 ff., 218 ff.

Marginal utility: principle of, 307,
337 note.

Maetineau, J., 262.

Mathematics: certain forms of proof
in, 172 ff. ; judgments of, 354 ff., 370.

McGiLVAEY, E. B., 257 note.

Mead, G. H., 38 note, 337 note.

Meaning : and logical idea, 30, 31, 32, 33,
41, 97; as content of thought, 66 fl. ;
three types of , 68 ; as property of inde-
pendent idea, 73-5 ; and association of
ideas, 33, 80; and reference, 97; world
of, 98, 103, 112; and knowledge, 89, 128,
190; equivalent to res]ponse, 198 : versus
existence, 216-18; inner and outer,
347 ff. ; (see Content, Idea, Reference).

386

Studies in Logical Theoey

Means: as external and constitutive,
78; reapplication of, the problem of
economic valuation, 242, 243, 246, 259,
260, 303, 304; objective in so far as not
known adequately for one's purpose,
256; definition of, incidental to all
judgment, 272; factual determination
of, sometimes determinative of ends
also, 270.

Mediation : in relation to the immedi-
ate, 350 S.

MeiiIssus : his dialectic, 214.

Metaphysics, 8, 9, 13, 18, 85 ; and logic
of experience, 13; as natural history,
13-18; worth, 19-22; logical and, 72, 74;
(see Epistemology, Logic).

Mill, J. Stcaet, 147, 160 fE., 162, 166.

Mixture: logical meaning of idea of,
219, 220, 222.

Monism, 224.

MooBE, A. W., 76 note, 346 note.

Motion : conservation of, 206,

Negation, 97, 114 ff.

Neo-Hegelian, 43, 316.

Newton, I., 146, 159, 179; his notes for
philosophizing, 159 note.

NofLif versus ^vau, 226.

NOBUATIVE and GENETIC, 16; (scc End,
Purpose, Validity, Value) .

Obedience : a factor in genesis of moral-
ity, 257 (see also Authority and Cus-
tom).

Object: how defined, 38, 39, 74, 76; soci-
aUy_ current, 230; real, individual
in significance, 230; nature of the ethi-
cal, 240, 328; of the economic, 259, 260,
328; (see Substance).

Objectiviti: Lotze's view of, 68 (see
Study IV) ; types of, 68 ; Lotze's distinc-
tion of logical and ontological, 72, 73;
distinction denied, 341, 342; scope or
conception of, 235; commonly denied
to other t^an factual judgments, 247,
248; not a property of sense-elements
as such, 248, 249 ; a category of " apper-
ception," 250; a mark of the proble-
matic as such, 250, 251, 255; not ascer-
tainable by any specific method, 252;
"obtrusiveness" as evidence of, 253;
"reliability" as evidence of, 263; con-
ditions of experience of, 253-6; condi-
tions of, present in the ethical and
economic situations, 257-60; a real
characteristic of ethical and economic
judgment, 261-3; not dependent on
social currency, 318-20; nor on possi-
bility of social currency, 320-24; nor
on permanence, 324-9; (see Beality,
Validity).

One : the, and the Many, 210 fl., 218 ff.

Paemenides: his logical position, 216
ff. ; influence on Platonic-Aristotelian
logic, 217.

Participation : significance of, in Plato,
342 ff.

Pabticitlaritv : of an idea, 99, 113; of a
judgment, 358.

Perception: judgments of, 88 ff., 96.

Peefbct, the, 126.

Physical judgment (see Factual judg-
ment) .

^vcrei versus voiLff^ 226.

*«<r«, 207, 224.

Plato, 53 note; on ideas and reality,
342 ff., 378, 379.

Pldbalism, 81 note.

Positing: thought as, 68.

Predicate : how constituted, 75 note : in
relation to reality, 101, 103 ; as hypothe-
sis, 147, 153, 155,156, 183, 186; develops
out of imaged end, 232; interaction
with subject, 232 ; in ethical judgment,
258, 291-6; in economic, 259, 260, 309-11 ;

isee Copula, Judgment, Hypothesis,
dea. Image).

Predication, 118 ff.

Pre-established haemont! inBoyce's
philosophy, 368.

Presuppositions, 204, 206.

Problematic (see Tension).

Proof: inductive, 172, 173; of h;;pothe-
sis, 174, 175; relation of, to origin of
hypothesis, 179-82; Wundt's view of,
177, 178.

Proposition : and judgment, 118.

Peotaooeas, 226.

Prudence : ethical status of, as a virtue,
246.

Pythagoreans, the : their logical posi-
tion, 216 ; use of experiment, 216.

Psychic AL : distinguished from physical,
25 ; Lotze's view of impression as bare-
ly, 27, 28, 30 ; view criticised, 31-4, 41, 42 :
two meanings of, 38 note; psychical
mechanism, 31 ; idea as, 53; problem of
logical and, 54 and note, 64; activity of
thought also made, by Lotze, 77 and
note; subjective result, 84; (see Im-
pression).

Psychology: and logic, 14r-16, 26, 63, 64,
153,154,184, 185, 192 ff., 345, 348; prin-
ciple of, functional, 229, 230; genesis of,
280, 281 ; logical value of functional, 293.

Psychologists' fallacy, 37.

Purpose ; logical importance of, 4, 9, 10,
13, 15, 20, 35, 58, 76, 80, 154 ; logical aspects
of, Study XI ; in an idea, 347 £f. ; in
judgment, 353 ff. ; in criterion of truth
and error, 361 ff. ; origin of, as idea, 373
ff. ; as method, 377; (see End, Becon-
struction).

QuALES : of sensation, 55, 56, 60 note.

Qualities : primary and secondary, 221.

Question : and judgment, 97, 114 ff.

Bationalism: criticised, 156 ff., 188 £.,
298 ff.

Eationality : of world, 206.

Beality : as constructed by thought^ 94
ff.,104; as developing, 126; as including
fact and idea, 108, 110, 125, 382; as inde-
pendent of thought, 85, 87 ff., 104; as

Index

387

subject of snbject, 88 £E. ; popular cri-
terion of, 105 ft. ; possibility of knowl-
edge of. 91 ff ., 102 ff., 125 ; for the individ-
ual, 94 ff., 103, 112, 224 ff. ; as relative to
judging, 149 ; as given in sensation, 160 ;
perception" and "recognition' co-
efficients of, 263-7, 277 ; these present in
ethical and economical experience,
267-9; apprehension of , emotional, 263;
scope of complete conception of, 235,
340; degrees of, 340; Platonic concep-
tion of, 343 ff . ; Eoyoe's conception of,
348; as related to fact and idea, 379 ff. ;
(see Fact, Truth, Validity).
Eeason, suppicibnt : principle of, 206.

Eeconsteuction : the function of think-
ing, 38, 40, 46, 75, 76, 85; effect of deny-
ing this, 47, 71, 72; data and, 49 ff.; in
judgment, 154; 291, 295, 299, 311, 312, 346,
347; (see Habit, Stimulus, Tension).

Befebence: as social, 74; problem of
reference of ideas, 82 ff. ; as meaning,
97 ff.: functional conception of, 113;
paradox of, 99; idea as, 129.

Eeflection : as derived, 1-12 ; naive, 3,
9; subject-matter of, 7, 8j logic and,
3, 18, 23; versus constitutive thought,
43-8; distinguished, 255; general nature
of, 269; end not always explicit in, 270;
outcome of, statable in terms of end or
means, 272; (see Judgment, Thought).

EEELECTrvB judgment, 134.

Eepkesentation : as one of the two func-
tions of an idea, 345, 347 ff., 372 ; signifi-
cance of, in ideal reconstruction, 376.

Eesponse : failure of, and origin of judg-
ment, 154.

EESTX.ES9NESS : as source of reflection
and purpose, 374 ff. ; (see Tension).

Ehetoeic : origin of, 203, 204.

"Eight" (see "Good").

EOTCB, JosiAH : referred to, 76 note, 147 ;
theory of ideas discussed, 346-82;
quoted, 347, 348, 349, 350. 352, 353, 354, 355,
356, 357, 358, 359, 362, 364, 366 note, 368,
370, 371, 374, 379, 380, 381.

Satisfaction : pause of, as marking at-
tainment of truth, 362 ff .

ScHILLEB, F. C. S., 327 note, 345 note.

Science: relation to naive experience,
10, 11; its historic stages, 11, 12; dis-
tinction of logical procedure from
epistemology, 13 ; same history as phi-
losophy, 21, 22.

Self, empikical : genesis and content
of concept of, 290, 292, 331, 332 note 1.

Self, "eneegetic": implied in experi-
ence of "warrant," 277, 278; stimulus
to development of concept of empirical
self, 279-81; essential principle in all
valuation, 281-5; evolution of moral
attitude of reference to, 285-9; logical
function ofj in valuation, 296; impor-
tant place in economic valuation, 308,
309; not capable of being described in
terms of purpose or ideal, 313-16 ; Brad-
ley's misinterpretation of, 332 note.

Sblf-kealization (see also Green.T.
H.) : theory of, as moral ideal futile,
298; logioaUy congruous with determin-
ism and hedonism, 330, 331.

Sensations: logical import of, 57; as
functions of experience, 58 ; as point of
contact with reality, 90; place in judg-
ment, 154; and ideas, 164 ff.; (seelm-
pressions. Psychical).

Senboei-motok activity, 193, 200.

Shaftesbcbt, 301.

Sigwaet, C. : view of judgment, 147.

Seefticism, 50 note, 85.

"Social ciieeency": implies an iden-
tity of aspect of an object to different
persons, 229 ; object having, an abstrac-
tion like social individual, 229; not a
test of objectivity, 318-29.

SocBATBS : function of concept, 342.

Sophists, the, 225.

Spencbb, E., 248, 250 note 1, 315 note,

Standaed (see also Predicate) : identi-
fied with predicate in ethical judgment,
238-40 ; function of, in ethical judgment,
274,299,300; morpholoCT and mode of
reconstruction of, 296, 297 ; an ultimate
ethical, impossible, 299; objectivity of,
300,301.

Stimtlds : of thought, 7, 8, 17, 24, 37-40,
47,81: Lotze's view of, 27, 29, 30: view
criticised, 30-36; confusion of datum
with, 61; defined, 75; and judgment,
153-4; as condition of thinking, 193 ff. ;
as direct and indirect, 195-7 ; ol ethical
judgment, 238-41, 291; of economic,
judgment, 241-6, 302; (see Content,
Datum).

Stout, G. F. : referred to, 349.

Steatton, G. M., 318 note.

Steuctuee, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 75; (see
Function).

Subject : of judgment, how constituted,
75 note ; as constructed by thought, 94
ff., 103; as a part of judgment, 118 ff.;
as reality, 88 ff . ; as inside and outside
of judgment, 93, 96 ; functional theory
of. 111, 125 ; as that requiring explana-
tion, 208, 211 ff . ; as modified by deduc-
tion, 212 ; given by analysis of situation,
2,32; interacts with predicate in judg-
ment, 232; of ethical judgment, 258,
296-8; of economic judgment, 259, 260,
304, 309-11 ; (see Copula, Datum, Judg-
ment, Predicate).

Subjective: distinguished from objec-
tive, 25; Lotze's view of impressions
as purely, 27, 28; view criticised. 31;
definition of , 39 ; developed only within
reflection, 52, 53; (see Psychical).

Subjectivism : in Lotze, 83, 84 ; in Eoyce,
360.

Subject-matter of thought: distin-
guished as stimulus, datum, and
content, 7, 8, 24;^ confusion of these
(genetic) distinctions, 17, 18; as ante-
cedent. Study II; as datum. Study III;
as content. Study IV.

388

Studies in Logical Theoey

Substance : ethical theories based on
logic involved in rationalistic concep-
tion of, 298, 299; meaning of concept
of, 326, 327; type-form of conduct
analogous to concept of a particular
kind of, 327, 328.

Substantiation: sisniflcance of
Plato's, of ideas, 342 a.

Supposition and hypothesis, 178-81.

Sweet, Hbnei : quoted, 153 note.

Synthetic (see Reconstruction).

Taylob, a. E., 299 note 2, 315 note, 316,
324.

Teleology (see End, Purpose).

Temptation : ethical, 238, 301 ; economic,
305.

Tension : as stimulus to thought, 37, 38,
49, 50, 53, 70, 85 ; in relation to constitu-
tion of sensory datum, 53, 58, 59, 70;
constitution of meaning as distinct
from fact, 75, 85, 154, 237-46, 250, 251, 255,
291-5, 374 ff. ; (see Purpose, Recon-
struction).

Thales : his ipOT, water, 209 ; in relation
to deduction, 212, 214.

Thought : forms of, 58 ff. ; as modes of
organizing data, 63; three kinds ac-
cording to liOtze, 68, 69; as positing
and distinguishing, 69; validity of its
function, 76-82; or its products, 82-5;
instrumental character, 78-82; as dis-
criminating sensory qualities, 200-202;
(see Judgment, Reflection).

Time : as involved in judgment, 120 ff.

Teanscendbntalism, 29, 43-8.

Tbendelenbubg, a, : view of judgment,
147.

Teuth: criterion of, 84; Bosanquet's con-
ception of, 105; popular criterion of,
105ff. ; and purpose. Study XI; repre-
sentational versus teleological view of,
341 ft'. ; criterion of, 361 ff. ; (see Objec-
tivity, Validity).

Uebeeweg : view of judgment, 147,

Unifoemity : of nature, 206.

Unity : of the world, 207,

Univeesal : first and second according
to Lotze, 56, 59, 69; ideas as, 97 ff., 113;
judgment as, 136; Mr. Eoyce's treat-
ment of, 354 S. ; necessity and, 357.

Validity: of thought, 7, 8; relation to
genesis, 14, 15 ; test, 17, 18 ; defines con-
tent of thought, 24 ; problem of. Study
IV; Lotze's dilemma regarding, 11-85:
of bare object of thought, 72-6: of
activity of thought, 76-82; of product
of thought, 82-5; (see Objectivity,
Reality, Truth).

Value: Lotze's distinction of, from
existence. 28, 29; view criticised, 31, 41,
45; organized, of experience, 42-8; de-
termined in and by a logical process,
233; nature of consciousness of, 273,
333-5; function of consciousness of,
335-7 ; properly mediate and functional
in character, 338-40.

Valuation (see also Ethical judgment,
Economic judgment) : includes only
ethical and economic types of judg-
ment, 227, 236, 338-40; general account
of process of, 272, 295 ; reconstructive
of self as well as of reality, 312.

Venn, John: origin of hypothesis, 169.

"Waeeant": consciousness of, accom-
panies purely factual as well as valua-
tional judgment processes, 276, 277 ; the
constitutive feature of survey of fac-
tual conditions, 278, 279.

Welton, J. : origin of hypothesis, 171.

Whewell, William, 163; view of sensa-
tions and ideas, 164, 165 ; of induction,
165; a certain agreement between him
and Mill, 166.

WiESEE, F. TON, 335 note 2.

Will: as related to thought, 366 note;
(see Activity, End, Purpose).

WuNDT, W. : viewof judgment, 147; view
of mathematical induction, 173; for-
mation and proof of hypothesis, 177 ff. ;
distinction between supposition and
hypothesis, 178 ff.

"WEONG"(see"Bad").

Xenophanes : his logical position, 216.

Zeno: his dialectic, 211.

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